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authorAndrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>2002-04-14 09:44:16 +0000
committerAndrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>2002-04-14 09:44:16 +0000
commit07e6ff5fcfe337bb65a7c3a4493a92a7761cf2ed (patch)
tree0623e2c8e4b760f294c31de6f01aec1ec1a71902
parent06f15779303dc540ee7801fe843023970454166b (diff)
downloadsamba-07e6ff5fcfe337bb65a7c3a4493a92a7761cf2ed.tar.gz
samba-07e6ff5fcfe337bb65a7c3a4493a92a7761cf2ed.tar.bz2
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Partly based on the work by mimir (Rafal Szczesniak
<mimir@diament.ists.pwr.wroc.pl>) this patch allows samba to correctly enumerate its trusted domains - by exaimining the keys in the secrets.tdb file. This patch has been tested with both NT4 and rpcclient/wbinfo, and adds some extra functionality to talloc and rpc_parse to allow it to deal with already unicode strings. Finally, this cleans up some const warnings that were in net_rpc.c by pushing another dash of const into the rpc client code. Andrew Bartlett (This used to be commit 0bdd94cb992b40942aaf2e5e0efd2868b4686296)
-rw-r--r--source3/auth/auth_domain.c2
-rw-r--r--source3/include/includes.h1
-rw-r--r--source3/include/rpc_lsa.h4
-rw-r--r--source3/include/secrets.h22
-rw-r--r--source3/lib/talloc.c9
-rw-r--r--source3/lib/util_unistr.c41
-rw-r--r--source3/libsmb/cli_samr.c2
-rw-r--r--source3/passdb/secrets.c136
-rw-r--r--source3/rpc_parse/parse_lsa.c76
-rw-r--r--source3/rpc_parse/parse_misc.c45
-rw-r--r--source3/rpc_parse/parse_samr.c2
-rw-r--r--source3/rpc_server/srv_lsa.c2
-rw-r--r--source3/rpc_server/srv_lsa_nt.c20
-rw-r--r--source3/tdb/tdbutil.c72
-rw-r--r--source3/utils/net_rpc.c40
15 files changed, 406 insertions, 68 deletions
diff --git a/source3/auth/auth_domain.c b/source3/auth/auth_domain.c
index af353ef812..a77bbeade3 100644
--- a/source3/auth/auth_domain.c
+++ b/source3/auth/auth_domain.c
@@ -527,7 +527,7 @@ static NTSTATUS check_trustdomain_security(const struct auth_context *auth_conte
}
/*
- * Get the machine account password for the trusted domain
+ * Get the trusted account password for the trusted domain
* No need to become_root() as secrets_init() is done at startup.
*/
diff --git a/source3/include/includes.h b/source3/include/includes.h
index 5da1c1d997..1dfebcea78 100644
--- a/source3/include/includes.h
+++ b/source3/include/includes.h
@@ -696,6 +696,7 @@ extern int errno;
#include "dlinklist.h"
#include "../tdb/tdb.h"
#include "../tdb/spinlock.h"
+#include "../tdb/tdbutil.h"
#include "talloc.h"
#include "ads.h"
#include "interfaces.h"
diff --git a/source3/include/rpc_lsa.h b/source3/include/rpc_lsa.h
index ccdce6f263..ceb0e17d5c 100644
--- a/source3/include/rpc_lsa.h
+++ b/source3/include/rpc_lsa.h
@@ -278,8 +278,8 @@ typedef struct lsa_r_query_info
typedef struct lsa_enum_trust_dom_info
{
POLICY_HND pol; /* policy handle */
- uint32 enum_context; /* enumeration context handle */
- uint32 preferred_len; /* preferred maximum length */
+ uint32 enum_context; /* enumeration context handle */
+ uint32 preferred_len; /* preferred maximum length */
} LSA_Q_ENUM_TRUST_DOM;
diff --git a/source3/include/secrets.h b/source3/include/secrets.h
index 69ab4f6c8d..3d7e2aa97e 100644
--- a/source3/include/secrets.h
+++ b/source3/include/secrets.h
@@ -48,12 +48,26 @@ struct machine_acct_pass {
time_t mod_time;
};
-/* structure for storing trusted domain password */
+/*
+ * storage structure for trusted domain
+ */
struct trusted_dom_pass {
- int pass_len;
- fstring pass;
+ size_t uni_name_len;
+ smb_ucs2_t uni_name[32]; /* unicode domain name */
+ size_t pass_len;
+ fstring pass; /* trust relationship's password */
time_t mod_time;
- DOM_SID domain_sid; /* remote domain's sid */
+ DOM_SID domain_sid; /* remote domain's sid */
};
+/*
+ * trusted domain entry/entries returned by secrets_get_trusted_domains
+ * (used in _lsa_enum_trust_dom call)
+ */
+typedef struct trustdom {
+ smb_ucs2_t *name;
+ DOM_SID sid;
+} TRUSTDOM;
+
+
#endif /* _SECRETS_H */
diff --git a/source3/lib/talloc.c b/source3/lib/talloc.c
index 6ac784a929..b50e451b95 100644
--- a/source3/lib/talloc.c
+++ b/source3/lib/talloc.c
@@ -287,6 +287,15 @@ char *talloc_strdup(TALLOC_CTX *t, const char *p)
return NULL;
}
+/** strdup_w with a talloc */
+smb_ucs2_t *talloc_strdup_w(TALLOC_CTX *t, const smb_ucs2_t *p)
+{
+ if (p)
+ return talloc_memdup(t, p, (strlen_w(p) + 1) * sizeof(smb_ucs2_t));
+ else
+ return NULL;
+}
+
/**
* Perform string formatting, and return a pointer to newly allocated
* memory holding the result, inside a memory pool.
diff --git a/source3/lib/util_unistr.c b/source3/lib/util_unistr.c
index a1cff26169..ba02819bdc 100644
--- a/source3/lib/util_unistr.c
+++ b/source3/lib/util_unistr.c
@@ -775,3 +775,44 @@ int unistrcpy(uint16 *dst, uint16 *src)
return num_wchars;
}
+
+/**
+ * Samba ucs2 type to UNISTR2 conversion
+ *
+ * @param ctx Talloc context to create the dst strcture (if null) and the
+ * contents of the unicode string.
+ * @param dst UNISTR2 destination. If equals null, then it's allocated.
+ * @param src smb_ucs2_t source.
+ * @param max_len maximum number of unicode characters to copy. If equals
+ * null, then null-termination of src is taken
+ *
+ * @return copied UNISTR2 destination
+ **/
+UNISTR2* ucs2_to_unistr2(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, UNISTR2* dst, smb_ucs2_t* src)
+{
+ size_t len;
+
+ if (!src) return NULL;
+ len = strlen_w(src);
+
+ /* allocate UNISTR2 destination if not given */
+ if (!dst) {
+ dst = (UNISTR2*) talloc(ctx, sizeof(UNISTR2));
+ if (!dst) return NULL;
+ }
+ if (!dst->buffer) {
+ dst->buffer = (uint16*) talloc(ctx, sizeof(uint16) * (len + 1));
+ if (!dst->buffer) return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* set UNISTR2 parameters */
+ dst->uni_max_len = len + 1;
+ dst->undoc = 0;
+ dst->uni_str_len = len;
+
+ /* copy the actual unicode string */
+ strncpy_w(dst->buffer, src, dst->uni_max_len);
+
+ return dst;
+};
+
diff --git a/source3/libsmb/cli_samr.c b/source3/libsmb/cli_samr.c
index 85a7375f99..f3560ede5d 100644
--- a/source3/libsmb/cli_samr.c
+++ b/source3/libsmb/cli_samr.c
@@ -971,7 +971,7 @@ NTSTATUS cli_samr_lookup_rids(struct cli_state *cli, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
NTSTATUS cli_samr_lookup_names(struct cli_state *cli, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
POLICY_HND *domain_pol, uint32 flags,
- uint32 num_names, char **names,
+ uint32 num_names, const char **names,
uint32 *num_rids, uint32 **rids,
uint32 **rid_types)
{
diff --git a/source3/passdb/secrets.c b/source3/passdb/secrets.c
index b3507a1392..073317824b 100644
--- a/source3/passdb/secrets.c
+++ b/source3/passdb/secrets.c
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
/*
Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 1992-2001
+ Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett 2002
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -124,9 +125,13 @@ BOOL secrets_fetch_domain_sid(char *domain, DOM_SID *sid)
}
-/************************************************************************
-form a key for fetching the machine trust account password
-************************************************************************/
+/**
+ * Form a key for fetching the machine trust account password
+ *
+ * @param domain domain name
+ *
+ * @return stored password's key
+ **/
char *trust_keystr(char *domain)
{
static fstring keystr;
@@ -141,7 +146,7 @@ char *trust_keystr(char *domain)
/**
* Form a key for fetching a trusted domain password
*
- * @param domain domain name
+ * @param domain trusted domain name
*
* @return stored password's key
**/
@@ -194,21 +199,23 @@ BOOL secrets_fetch_trust_account_password(char *domain, uint8 ret_pwd[16],
Routine to get account password to trusted domain
************************************************************************/
BOOL secrets_fetch_trusted_domain_password(char *domain, char** pwd,
- DOM_SID *sid, time_t *pass_last_set_time)
+ DOM_SID *sid, time_t *pass_last_set_time)
{
struct trusted_dom_pass *pass;
size_t size;
+ /* fetching trusted domain password structure */
if (!(pass = secrets_fetch(trustdom_keystr(domain), &size))) {
DEBUG(5, ("secrets_fetch failed!\n"));
return False;
}
-
+
if (size != sizeof(*pass)) {
DEBUG(0, ("secrets were of incorrect size!\n"));
return False;
}
-
+
+ /* the trust's password */
if (pwd) {
*pwd = strdup(pass->pass);
if (!*pwd) {
@@ -216,9 +223,12 @@ BOOL secrets_fetch_trusted_domain_password(char *domain, char** pwd,
}
}
+ /* last change time */
if (pass_last_set_time) *pass_last_set_time = pass->mod_time;
+ /* domain sid */
memcpy(&sid, &(pass->domain_sid), sizeof(sid));
+
SAFE_FREE(pass);
return True;
@@ -247,19 +257,30 @@ BOOL secrets_store_trust_account_password(char *domain, uint8 new_pwd[16])
* @return true if succeeded
**/
-BOOL secrets_store_trusted_domain_password(char* domain, char* pwd,
+BOOL secrets_store_trusted_domain_password(char* domain, smb_ucs2_t *uni_dom_name,
+ size_t uni_name_len, char* pwd,
DOM_SID sid)
{
struct trusted_dom_pass pass;
ZERO_STRUCT(pass);
+ /* unicode domain name and its length */
+ if (!uni_dom_name)
+ return False;
+
+ strncpy_w(pass.uni_name, uni_dom_name, sizeof(pass.uni_name) - 1);
+ pass.uni_name_len = uni_name_len;
+
+ /* last change time */
pass.mod_time = time(NULL);
+ /* password of the trust */
pass.pass_len = strlen(pwd);
fstrcpy(pass.pass, pwd);
+ /* domain sid */
memcpy(&(pass.domain_sid), &sid, sizeof(sid));
-
+
return secrets_store(trustdom_keystr(domain), (void *)&pass, sizeof(pass));
}
@@ -357,3 +378,100 @@ BOOL secrets_store_ldap_pw(char* dn, char* pw)
return secrets_store(key, pw, strlen(pw));
}
+
+/**
+ * The linked list is allocated on the supplied talloc context, caller gets to destory
+ * when done.
+ *
+ * @param start_idx starting index, eg. we can start fetching
+ * at third or sixth trusted domain entry
+ * @param num_domains number of domain entries to fetch at one call
+ *
+ * @return list of trusted domains structs (unicode name, sid and password)
+ **/
+
+NTSTATUS secrets_get_trusted_domains(TALLOC_CTX* ctx, int start_idx, int max_num_domains, int *num_domains, TRUSTDOM ***domains)
+{
+ TDB_LIST_NODE *keys, *k;
+ TRUSTDOM *dom = NULL;
+ char *pattern;
+ uint32 idx = 0;
+ size_t size;
+ struct trusted_dom_pass *pass;
+
+ secrets_init();
+
+ *num_domains = 0;
+
+ /* generate searching pattern */
+ if (!(pattern = talloc_asprintf(ctx, "%s/*", SECRETS_DOMTRUST_ACCT_PASS))) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("secrets_get_trusted_domains: talloc_asprintf() failed!\n"));
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+ DEBUG(5, ("secrets_get_trusted_domains: looking for %d domains, starting at index %d\n",
+ max_num_domains, start_idx));
+
+ *domains = talloc_zero(ctx, sizeof(**domains)*max_num_domains);
+
+ /* fetching trusted domains' data and collecting them in a list */
+ keys = tdb_search_keys(tdb, pattern);
+
+ /* searching for keys in sectrets db -- way to go ... */
+ for (k = keys; k; k = k->next) {
+ char *secrets_key;
+
+ /* important: ensure null-termination of the key string */
+ secrets_key = strndup(k->node_key.dptr, k->node_key.dsize);
+ if (!secrets_key) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("strndup failed!\n"));
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+ pass = secrets_fetch(secrets_key, &size);
+
+ if (size != sizeof(*pass)) {
+ DEBUG(2, ("Secrets record %s is invalid!\n", secrets_key));
+ SAFE_FREE(pass);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ SAFE_FREE(secrets_key);
+
+ if (idx >= start_idx && idx < start_idx + max_num_domains) {
+ dom = talloc_zero(ctx, sizeof(*dom));
+ if (!dom) {
+ /* free returned tdb record */
+ SAFE_FREE(pass);
+
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+ /* copy domain sid */
+ SMB_ASSERT(sizeof(dom->sid) == sizeof(pass->domain_sid));
+ memcpy(&(dom->sid), &(pass->domain_sid), sizeof(dom->sid));
+
+ /* copy unicode domain name */
+ dom->name = talloc_strdup_w(ctx, pass->uni_name);
+
+ (*domains)[*num_domains] = dom;
+
+ (*num_domains)++;
+
+ }
+
+ idx++;
+
+ /* free returned tdb record */
+ SAFE_FREE(pass);
+ }
+
+ DEBUG(5, ("secrets_get_trusted_domains: got %d of %d domains\n",
+ *num_domains, max_num_domains));
+
+ /* free the results of searching the keys */
+ tdb_search_list_free(keys);
+
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
diff --git a/source3/rpc_parse/parse_lsa.c b/source3/rpc_parse/parse_lsa.c
index 91b54b9c83..415737ebfb 100644
--- a/source3/rpc_parse/parse_lsa.c
+++ b/source3/rpc_parse/parse_lsa.c
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
* Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 1992-1997,
* Copyright (C) Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton 1996-1997,
* Copyright (C) Paul Ashton 1997.
+ * Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett 2002.
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -523,40 +524,63 @@ BOOL lsa_io_q_enum_trust_dom(char *desc, LSA_Q_ENUM_TRUST_DOM *q_e,
Inits an LSA_R_ENUM_TRUST_DOM structure.
********************************************************************/
-void init_r_enum_trust_dom(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, LSA_R_ENUM_TRUST_DOM *r_e, uint32 enum_context,
- char *domain_name, DOM_SID *domain_sid,
- NTSTATUS status)
+void init_r_enum_trust_dom(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, LSA_R_ENUM_TRUST_DOM *r_e, uint32 enum_context,
+ uint32 requested_num_domains, uint32 num_domains, TRUSTDOM **td)
{
+ int i;
+
DEBUG(5, ("init_r_enum_trust_dom\n"));
r_e->enum_context = enum_context;
-
- if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
- int len_domain_name = strlen(domain_name) + 1;
-
- r_e->num_domains = 1;
- r_e->ptr_enum_domains = 1;
- r_e->num_domains2 = 1;
-
- if (!(r_e->hdr_domain_name = (UNIHDR2 *)talloc(ctx,sizeof(UNIHDR2))))
- return;
+ r_e->num_domains = 0;
+ r_e->ptr_enum_domains = 0;
+ r_e->num_domains2 = 0;
+
+ if (num_domains == 0) {
+ r_e->status = NT_STATUS_NO_MORE_ENTRIES;
- if (!(r_e->uni_domain_name = (UNISTR2 *)talloc(ctx,sizeof(UNISTR2))))
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * allocating empty arrays of unicode headers, strings
+ * and sids of enumerated trusted domains
+ */
+ if (!(r_e->hdr_domain_name = (UNIHDR2 *)talloc(ctx,sizeof(UNIHDR2) * num_domains))) {
+ r_e->status = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
return;
+ }
+
+ if (!(r_e->uni_domain_name = (UNISTR2 *)talloc(ctx,sizeof(UNISTR2) * num_domains))) {
+ r_e->status = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+ return;
+ }
- if (!(r_e->domain_sid = (DOM_SID2 *)talloc(ctx,sizeof(DOM_SID2))))
+ if (!(r_e->domain_sid = (DOM_SID2 *)talloc(ctx,sizeof(DOM_SID2) * num_domains))) {
+ r_e->status = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
return;
+ }
+
+ r_e->num_domains = num_domains;
+ r_e->num_domains2 = num_domains;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num_domains; i++) {
+
+ /* don't know what actually is this for */
+ r_e->ptr_enum_domains = 1;
+
+ init_uni_hdr2(&r_e->hdr_domain_name[i], strlen_w((td[i])->name));
+ init_dom_sid2(&r_e->domain_sid[i], &(td[i])->sid);
+
+ init_unistr2_w(ctx, &r_e->uni_domain_name[i], (td[i])->name);
+
+ };
+
+ if (num_domains < requested_num_domains) {
+ r_e->status = NT_STATUS_NO_MORE_ENTRIES;
+ } else {
+ r_e->status = NT_STATUS_OK;
+ }
+ }
- init_uni_hdr2(&r_e->hdr_domain_name[0], len_domain_name);
- init_unistr2 (&r_e->uni_domain_name[0], domain_name,
- len_domain_name);
- init_dom_sid2(&r_e->domain_sid[0], domain_sid);
- } else {
- r_e->num_domains = 0;
- r_e->ptr_enum_domains = 0;
- }
-
- r_e->status = status;
}
/*******************************************************************
@@ -603,7 +627,7 @@ BOOL lsa_io_r_enum_trust_dom(char *desc, LSA_R_ENUM_TRUST_DOM *r_e,
for (i = 0; i < num_domains; i++) {
if(!smb_io_unistr2 ("", &r_e->uni_domain_name[i],
- r_e->hdr_domain_name[i].buffer,
+ r_e->hdr_domain_name[i].buffer,
ps, depth))
return False;
if(!smb_io_dom_sid2("", &r_e->domain_sid[i], ps,
diff --git a/source3/rpc_parse/parse_misc.c b/source3/rpc_parse/parse_misc.c
index 73f285e320..f326681c64 100644
--- a/source3/rpc_parse/parse_misc.c
+++ b/source3/rpc_parse/parse_misc.c
@@ -916,6 +916,51 @@ void init_unistr2(UNISTR2 *str, const char *buf, size_t len)
rpcstr_push((char *)str->buffer, buf, len, STR_TERMINATE);
}
+/**
+ * Inits a UNISTR2 structure.
+ * @param ctx talloc context to allocate string on
+ * @param str pointer to string to create
+ * @param buf UCS2 null-terminated buffer to init from
+*/
+
+void init_unistr2_w(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, UNISTR2 *str, const smb_ucs2_t *buf)
+{
+ uint32 len = strlen_w(buf);
+ uint32 max_len = len;
+ uint32 alloc_len;
+
+ ZERO_STRUCTP(str);
+
+ /* set up string lengths. */
+ str->uni_max_len = len;
+ str->undoc = 0;
+ str->uni_str_len = len;
+
+ if (max_len < MAX_UNISTRLEN)
+ max_len = MAX_UNISTRLEN;
+
+ alloc_len = (max_len + 1) * sizeof(uint16);
+
+ str->buffer = (uint16 *)talloc_zero(ctx, alloc_len);
+ if ((str->buffer == NULL) && (alloc_len > 0))
+ {
+ smb_panic("init_unistr2_w: malloc fail\n");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * don't move this test above ! The UNISTR2 must be initialized !!!
+ * jfm, 7/7/2001.
+ */
+ if (buf==NULL)
+ return;
+
+ /* Yes, this is a strncpy( foo, bar, strlen(bar)) - but as
+ long as the buffer above is talloc()ed correctly then this
+ is the correct thing to do */
+ strncpy_w(str->buffer, buf, len + 1);
+}
+
/*******************************************************************
Inits a UNISTR2 structure from a UNISTR
********************************************************************/
diff --git a/source3/rpc_parse/parse_samr.c b/source3/rpc_parse/parse_samr.c
index 4edc0678af..b8a558665f 100644
--- a/source3/rpc_parse/parse_samr.c
+++ b/source3/rpc_parse/parse_samr.c
@@ -4535,7 +4535,7 @@ inits a SAMR_Q_LOOKUP_NAMES structure.
NTSTATUS init_samr_q_lookup_names(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, SAMR_Q_LOOKUP_NAMES * q_u,
POLICY_HND *pol, uint32 flags,
- uint32 num_names, char **name)
+ uint32 num_names, const char **name)
{
uint32 i;
diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/srv_lsa.c b/source3/rpc_server/srv_lsa.c
index fcd4be0212..3914556e88 100644
--- a/source3/rpc_server/srv_lsa.c
+++ b/source3/rpc_server/srv_lsa.c
@@ -105,8 +105,10 @@ static BOOL api_lsa_enum_trust_dom(pipes_struct *p)
if(!lsa_io_q_enum_trust_dom("", &q_u, data, 0))
return False;
+ /* get required trusted domains information */
r_u.status = _lsa_enum_trust_dom(p, &q_u, &r_u);
+ /* prepare the response */
if(!lsa_io_r_enum_trust_dom("", &r_u, rdata, 0))
return False;
diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/srv_lsa_nt.c b/source3/rpc_server/srv_lsa_nt.c
index 84ab44bc30..c564323803 100644
--- a/source3/rpc_server/srv_lsa_nt.c
+++ b/source3/rpc_server/srv_lsa_nt.c
@@ -416,14 +416,18 @@ NTSTATUS _lsa_open_policy(pipes_struct *p, LSA_Q_OPEN_POL *q_u, LSA_R_OPEN_POL *
/***************************************************************************
_lsa_enum_trust_dom - this needs fixing to do more than return NULL ! JRA.
+ ufff, done :) mimir
***************************************************************************/
NTSTATUS _lsa_enum_trust_dom(pipes_struct *p, LSA_Q_ENUM_TRUST_DOM *q_u, LSA_R_ENUM_TRUST_DOM *r_u)
{
struct lsa_info *info;
- uint32 enum_context = 0;
- char *dom_name = NULL;
- DOM_SID *dom_sid = NULL;
+ uint32 enum_context = q_u->enum_context;
+ /* it's set to 10 as a "our" preferred length */
+ uint32 max_num_domains = q_u->preferred_len < 10 ? q_u->preferred_len : 10;
+ TRUSTDOM **trust_doms;
+ uint32 num_domains;
+ NTSTATUS nt_status;
if (!find_policy_by_hnd(p, &q_u->pol, (void **)&info))
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE;
@@ -432,9 +436,13 @@ NTSTATUS _lsa_enum_trust_dom(pipes_struct *p, LSA_Q_ENUM_TRUST_DOM *q_u, LSA_R_E
if (!(info->access & POLICY_VIEW_LOCAL_INFORMATION))
return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
- /* set up the LSA QUERY INFO response */
- init_r_enum_trust_dom(p->mem_ctx, r_u, enum_context, dom_name, dom_sid,
- dom_name != NULL ? NT_STATUS_OK : NT_STATUS_NO_MORE_ENTRIES);
+ nt_status = secrets_get_trusted_domains(p->mem_ctx, enum_context, max_num_domains, &num_domains, &trust_doms);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+ return nt_status;
+ }
+
+ /* set up the lsa_enum_trust_dom response */
+ init_r_enum_trust_dom(p->mem_ctx, r_u, enum_context, max_num_domains, num_domains, trust_doms);
return r_u->status;
}
diff --git a/source3/tdb/tdbutil.c b/source3/tdb/tdbutil.c
index bc39082f63..92a5a9d37f 100644
--- a/source3/tdb/tdbutil.c
+++ b/source3/tdb/tdbutil.c
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
*/
#include "includes.h"
+#include <fnmatch.h>
/* these are little tdb utility functions that are meant to make
dealing with a tdb database a little less cumbersome in Samba */
@@ -524,3 +525,74 @@ int tdb_traverse_delete_fn(TDB_CONTEXT *the_tdb, TDB_DATA key, TDB_DATA dbuf,
{
return tdb_delete(the_tdb, key);
}
+
+
+
+/**
+ * Search across the whole tdb for keys that match the given pattern
+ * return the result as a list of keys
+ *
+ * @param tdb pointer to opened tdb file context
+ * @param pattern searching pattern used by fnmatch(3) functions
+ *
+ * @return list of keys found by looking up with given pattern
+ **/
+TDB_LIST_NODE *tdb_search_keys(TDB_CONTEXT *tdb, const char* pattern)
+{
+ TDB_DATA key, next;
+ TDB_LIST_NODE *list = NULL;
+ TDB_LIST_NODE *rec = NULL;
+ TDB_LIST_NODE *tmp = NULL;
+
+ for (key = tdb_firstkey(tdb); key.dptr; key = next) {
+ /* duplicate key string to ensure null-termination */
+ char *key_str = (char*) strndup(key.dptr, key.dsize);
+ if (!key_str) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("tdb_search_keys: strndup() failed!\n"));
+ smb_panic("strndup failed!\n");
+ }
+
+ DEBUG(18, ("checking %s for match to pattern %s\n", key_str, pattern));
+
+ next = tdb_nextkey(tdb, key);
+
+ /* do the pattern checking */
+ if (fnmatch(pattern, key_str, 0) == 0) {
+ rec = (TDB_LIST_NODE*) malloc(sizeof(*rec));
+ ZERO_STRUCTP(rec);
+
+ rec->node_key = key;
+
+ DLIST_ADD_END(list, rec, tmp);
+
+ DEBUG(18, ("checking %s matched pattern %s\n", key_str, pattern));
+ } else {
+ free(key.dptr);
+ }
+
+ /* free duplicated key string */
+ free(key_str);
+ }
+
+ return list;
+
+};
+
+
+/**
+ * Free the list returned by tdb_search_keys
+ *
+ * @param node list of results found by tdb_search_keys
+ **/
+void tdb_search_list_free(TDB_LIST_NODE* node)
+{
+ TDB_LIST_NODE *next_node;
+
+ while (node) {
+ next_node = node->next;
+ SAFE_FREE(node);
+ node = next_node;
+ };
+};
+
+
diff --git a/source3/utils/net_rpc.c b/source3/utils/net_rpc.c
index 2aca3f0485..315c2de030 100644
--- a/source3/utils/net_rpc.c
+++ b/source3/utils/net_rpc.c
@@ -451,7 +451,7 @@ static NTSTATUS rpc_user_del_internals(const DOM_SID *domain_sid,
uint32 flags = 0x000003e8; /* Unknown */
result = cli_samr_lookup_names(cli, mem_ctx, &domain_pol,
- flags, 1, (char **) &argv[0],
+ flags, 1, &argv[0],
&num_rids, &user_rids,
&name_types);
@@ -548,7 +548,7 @@ rpc_user_info_internals(const DOM_SID *domain_sid, struct cli_state *cli,
/* Get handle on user */
result = cli_samr_lookup_names(cli, mem_ctx, &domain_pol,
- flags, 1, (char **) &argv[0],
+ flags, 1, &argv[0],
&num_rids, &rids, &name_types);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) goto done;
@@ -874,7 +874,7 @@ static NTSTATUS rpc_trustdom_add_internals(const DOM_SID *domain_sid, struct cli
if (argc != 1) {
d_printf("Usage: net rpc trustdom add <domain_name>\n");
- return NT_STATUS_OK;
+ return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
/*
@@ -985,6 +985,12 @@ static int rpc_trustdom_establish(int argc, const char **argv) {
* Connect to \\server\ipc$ as 'our domain' account with password
*/
+ if (argc != 1) {
+ d_printf("Usage: net rpc trustdom add <domain_name>\n");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+
domain_name = smb_xstrdup(argv[0]);
strupper(domain_name);
@@ -1061,10 +1067,8 @@ static int rpc_trustdom_establish(int argc, const char **argv) {
return -1;
}
- if (cli->nt_pipe_fnum) {
+ if (cli->nt_pipe_fnum)
cli_nt_session_close(cli);
- talloc_destroy(mem_ctx);
- }
/*
@@ -1104,6 +1108,17 @@ static int rpc_trustdom_establish(int argc, const char **argv) {
but I still don't know if it's _really_ necessary */
/*
+ * Store the password in secrets db
+ */
+
+ if (!secrets_store_trusted_domain_password(domain_name, wks_info.uni_lan_grp.buffer,
+ wks_info.uni_lan_grp.uni_str_len, opt_password,
+ domain_sid)) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("Storing password for trusted domain failed.\n"));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
* Close the pipes and clean up
*/
@@ -1116,20 +1131,9 @@ static int rpc_trustdom_establish(int argc, const char **argv) {
if (cli->nt_pipe_fnum)
cli_nt_session_close(cli);
-
- talloc_destroy(mem_ctx);
+ talloc_destroy(mem_ctx);
- /*
- * Store the password in secrets db
- */
-
- if (!secrets_store_trusted_domain_password(domain_name, opt_password,
- domain_sid)) {
- DEBUG(0, ("Storing password for trusted domain failed.\n"));
- return -1;
- }
-
DEBUG(0, ("Success!\n"));
return 0;
}