r3377: Merge in first part of modified patch from Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>

for bug #1717.The rest of the code needed to call this patch has not yet been
checked in (that's my next task). This has not yet been tested - I'll do this
once the rest of the patch is integrated.
Jeremy.
(This used to be commit 7565019286cf44f43c8066c005b1cd5c1556435f)

6 files changed, 592 insertions, 19 deletions

diff --git a/source3/include/secrets.h b/source3/include/secrets.h
index cb4fbd043a..4b8d5db66b 100644
--- a/source3/include/secrets.h
+++ b/source3/include/secrets.h
@@ -32,6 +32,9 @@
 /* this one is for storing trusted domain account password */
 #define SECRETS_DOMTRUST_ACCT_PASS "SECRETS/$DOMTRUST.ACC"
 
+/* Store the principal name used for Kerberos DES key salt under this key name. */
+#define SECRETS_SALTING_PRINCIPAL "SECRETS/SALTING_PRINCIPAL"
+
 /* The domain sid and our sid are stored here even though they aren't
    really secret. */
 #define SECRETS_DOMAIN_SID    "SECRETS/SID"
diff --git a/source3/libads/kerberos.c b/source3/libads/kerberos.c
index 327a76826e..9eb4d9da46 100644
--- a/source3/libads/kerberos.c
+++ b/source3/libads/kerberos.c
@@ -3,8 +3,9 @@
    kerberos utility library
    Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 2001
    Copyright (C) Remus Koos 2001
-   
-   
+   Copyright (C) Nalin Dahyabhai 2004.
+   Copyright (C) Jeremy Allison 2004.
+
    This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
    it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
    the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
@@ -24,6 +25,8 @@
 
 #ifdef HAVE_KRB5
 
+#define LIBADS_CCACHE_NAME "MEMORY:libads"
+
 /*
   we use a prompter to avoid a crash bug in the kerberos libs when 
   dealing with empty passwords
@@ -38,7 +41,7 @@ kerb_prompter(krb5_context ctx, void *data,
 {
 	if (num_prompts == 0) return 0;
 
-	memset(prompts[0].reply->data, 0, prompts[0].reply->length);
+	memset(prompts[0].reply->data, '\0', prompts[0].reply->length);
 	if (prompts[0].reply->length > 0) {
 		if (data) {
 			strncpy(prompts[0].reply->data, data, prompts[0].reply->length-1);
@@ -51,10 +54,15 @@ kerb_prompter(krb5_context ctx, void *data,
 }
 
 /*
-  simulate a kinit, putting the tgt in the default cache location
+  simulate a kinit, putting the tgt in the given cache location. If cache_name == NULL
+  place in default cache location.
   remus@snapserver.com
 */
-int kerberos_kinit_password(const char *principal, const char *password, int time_offset, time_t *expire_time)
+int kerberos_kinit_password(const char *principal,
+				const char *password,
+				int time_offset,
+				time_t *expire_time,
+				const char *cache_name)
 {
 	krb5_context ctx = NULL;
 	krb5_error_code code = 0;
@@ -69,7 +77,8 @@ int kerberos_kinit_password(const char *principal, const char *password, int tim
 		krb5_set_real_time(ctx, time(NULL) + time_offset, 0);
 	}
 	
-	if ((code = krb5_cc_default(ctx, &cc))) {
+	if ((code = krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, cache_name ?
+			cache_name : krb5_cc_default_name(ctx), &cc))) {
 		krb5_free_context(ctx);
 		return code;
 	}
@@ -129,7 +138,8 @@ int ads_kinit_password(ADS_STRUCT *ads)
 		return KRB5_LIBOS_CANTREADPWD;
 	}
 	
-	ret = kerberos_kinit_password(s, ads->auth.password, ads->auth.time_offset, &ads->auth.expire);
+	ret = kerberos_kinit_password(s, ads->auth.password, ads->auth.time_offset,
+			&ads->auth.expire, NULL);
 
 	if (ret) {
 		DEBUG(0,("kerberos_kinit_password %s failed: %s\n", 
@@ -174,4 +184,535 @@ int ads_kdestroy(const char *cc_name)
 	return code;
 }
 
+/************************************************************************
+ Routine to fetch the salting principal for a service.  Active
+ Directory may use a non-obvious principal name to generate the salt
+ when it determines the key to use for encrypting tickets for a service,
+ and hopefully we detected that when we joined the domain.
+ ************************************************************************/
+
+static char *kerberos_secrets_fetch_salting_principal(const char *service, int enctype)
+{
+	char *key = NULL;
+	char *ret = NULL;
+
+	asprintf(&key, "%s/%s/enctype=%d", SECRETS_SALTING_PRINCIPAL, service, enctype);
+	if (!key) {
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	ret = (char *)secrets_fetch(key, NULL);
+	SAFE_FREE(key);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/************************************************************************
+ Routine to get the salting principal for this service.  Active
+ Directory may use a non-obvious principal name to generate the salt
+ when it determines the key to use for encrypting tickets for a service,
+ and hopefully we detected that when we joined the domain.
+ Caller must free if return is not null.
+ ************************************************************************/
+
+krb5_principal kerberos_fetch_salt_princ_for_host_princ(krb5_context context,
+							krb5_principal host_princ,
+							int enctype)
+{
+	char *unparsed_name = NULL, *salt_princ_s = NULL;
+	krb5_principal ret_princ = NULL;
+
+	if (krb5_unparse_name(context, host_princ, &unparsed_name) != 0) {
+		return (krb5_principal)NULL;
+	}
+
+	if ((salt_princ_s = kerberos_secrets_fetch_salting_principal(unparsed_name, enctype)) == NULL) {
+		krb5_free_unparsed_name(context, unparsed_name);
+		return (krb5_principal)NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (krb5_parse_name(context, salt_princ_s, &ret_princ) != 0) {
+		krb5_free_unparsed_name(context, unparsed_name);
+		SAFE_FREE(salt_princ_s);
+		return (krb5_principal)NULL;
+	}
+	krb5_free_unparsed_name(context, unparsed_name);
+	SAFE_FREE(salt_princ_s);
+	return ret_princ;
+}
+
+/************************************************************************
+ Routine to set the salting principal for this service.  Active
+ Directory may use a non-obvious principal name to generate the salt
+ when it determines the key to use for encrypting tickets for a service,
+ and hopefully we detected that when we joined the domain.
+ Setting principal to NULL deletes this entry.
+ ************************************************************************/
+
+BOOL kerberos_secrets_store_salting_principal(const char *service,
+					      int enctype,
+					      const char *principal)
+{
+	char *key = NULL;
+	BOOL ret = False;
+	krb5_context context = NULL;
+	krb5_principal princ = NULL;
+	char *princ_s = NULL;
+	char *unparsed_name = NULL;
+
+	krb5_init_context(&context);
+	if (!context) {
+		return False;
+	}
+	if (strchr_m(service, '@')) {
+		asprintf(&princ_s, "%s", service);
+	} else {
+		asprintf(&princ_s, "%s@%s", service, lp_realm());
+	}
+
+	if (krb5_parse_name(context, princ_s, &princ) != 0) {
+		goto out;
+		
+	}
+	if (krb5_unparse_name(context, princ, &unparsed_name) != 0) {
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	asprintf(&key, "%s/%s/enctype=%d", SECRETS_SALTING_PRINCIPAL, unparsed_name, enctype);
+	if (!key)  {
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if ((principal != NULL) && (strlen(principal) > 0)) {
+		ret = secrets_store(key, principal, strlen(principal) + 1);
+	} else {
+		ret = secrets_delete(key);
+	}
+
+ out:
+
+	SAFE_FREE(key);
+	SAFE_FREE(princ_s);
+
+	if (unparsed_name) {
+		krb5_free_unparsed_name(context, unparsed_name);
+	}
+	if (context) {
+		krb5_free_context(context);
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/************************************************************************
+ Routine to get initial credentials as a service ticket for the local machine.
+ Returns a buffer initialized with krb5_mk_req_extended.
+ ************************************************************************/
+
+static krb5_error_code get_service_ticket(krb5_context ctx,
+					krb5_ccache ccache,
+					const char *service_principal,
+					int enctype,
+					krb5_data *p_outbuf)
+{
+	krb5_creds creds, *new_creds = NULL;
+	char *service_s = NULL;
+	char *machine_account = NULL, *password = NULL;
+	krb5_data in_data;
+	krb5_auth_context auth_context = NULL;
+	krb5_error_code err = 0;
+
+	asprintf(&machine_account, "%s$@%s", global_myname(), lp_realm());
+	if (machine_account == NULL) {
+		goto out;
+	}
+	password = secrets_fetch_machine_password(lp_workgroup(), NULL, NULL);
+	if (password == NULL) {
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((err = kerberos_kinit_password(machine_account, password, 0, NULL, LIBADS_CCACHE_NAME)) != 0) {
+		DEBUG(0,("get_service_ticket: kerberos_kinit_password %s@%s failed: %s\n", 
+			machine_account,
+			lp_realm(),
+			error_message(err)));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* Ok - the above call has gotten a TGT. Now we need to get a service
+	   ticket to ourselves. */
+
+	/* Set up the enctype and client and server principal fields for krb5_get_credentials. */
+	memset(&creds, '\0', sizeof(creds));
+	kerberos_set_creds_enctype(&creds, enctype);
+
+	if ((err = krb5_cc_get_principal(ctx, ccache, &creds.client))) {
+		DEBUG(3, ("get_service_ticket: krb5_cc_get_principal failed: %s\n", 
+			error_message(err)));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (strchr_m(service_principal, '@')) {
+		asprintf(&service_s, "%s", service_principal);
+	} else {
+		asprintf(&service_s, "%s@%s", service_principal, lp_realm());
+	}
+
+	if ((err = krb5_parse_name(ctx, service_s, &creds.server))) {
+		DEBUG(0,("get_service_ticket: krb5_parse_name %s failed: %s\n", 
+			service_s, error_message(err)));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if ((err = krb5_get_credentials(ctx, 0, ccache, &creds, &new_creds))) {
+		DEBUG(5,("get_service_ticket: krb5_get_credentials for %s failed: %s\n", 
+			service_s, error_message(err)));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	memset(&in_data, '\0', sizeof(in_data));
+	if ((err = krb5_mk_req_extended(ctx, &auth_context, 0, &in_data,
+			new_creds, p_outbuf)) != 0) {
+		DEBUG(0,("get_service_ticket: krb5_mk_req_extended failed: %s\n", 
+			error_message(err)));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+ out:
+
+	if (auth_context) {
+		krb5_auth_con_free(ctx, auth_context);
+	}
+	if (new_creds) {
+		krb5_free_creds(ctx, new_creds);
+	}
+	if (creds.server) {
+		krb5_free_principal(ctx, creds.server);
+	}
+	if (creds.client) {
+		krb5_free_principal(ctx, creds.client);
+	}
+
+	SAFE_FREE(service_s);
+	SAFE_FREE(password);
+	SAFE_FREE(machine_account);
+	return err;
+}
+
+/************************************************************************
+ Check if the machine password can be used in conjunction with the salting_principal
+ to generate a key which will successfully decrypt the AP_REQ already
+ gotten as a message to the local machine.
+ ************************************************************************/
+
+static BOOL verify_service_password(krb5_context ctx,
+				    int enctype,
+				    const char *salting_principal,
+				    krb5_data *in_data)
+{
+	BOOL ret = False;
+	krb5_principal salting_kprinc = NULL;
+	krb5_ticket *ticket = NULL;
+	krb5_keyblock key;
+	krb5_data passdata;
+	char *salting_s = NULL;
+	char *machine_account = NULL, *password = NULL;
+	krb5_auth_context auth_context = NULL;
+	krb5_error_code err;
+
+	memset(&passdata, '\0', sizeof(passdata));
+	memset(&key, '\0', sizeof(key));
+
+	asprintf(&machine_account, "%s$@%s", global_myname(), lp_realm());
+	if (machine_account == NULL) {
+		goto out;
+	}
+	password = secrets_fetch_machine_password(lp_workgroup(), NULL, NULL);
+	if (password == NULL) {
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (strchr_m(salting_principal, '@')) {
+		asprintf(&salting_s, "%s", salting_principal);
+	} else {
+		asprintf(&salting_s, "%s@%s", salting_principal, lp_realm());
+	}
+
+	if ((err = krb5_parse_name(ctx, salting_s, &salting_kprinc))) {
+		DEBUG(0,("verify_service_password: krb5_parse_name %s failed: %s\n", 
+			salting_s, error_message(err)));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	passdata.length = strlen(password);
+	passdata.data = (char*)password;
+	if ((err = create_kerberos_key_from_string_direct(ctx, salting_kprinc, &passdata, &key, enctype))) {
+		DEBUG(0,("verify_service_password: create_kerberos_key_from_string %d failed: %s\n",
+			enctype, error_message(err)));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if ((err = krb5_auth_con_init(ctx, &auth_context)) != 0) {
+		DEBUG(0,("verify_service_password: krb5_auth_con_init failed %s\n", error_message(err)));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if ((err = krb5_auth_con_setuseruserkey(ctx, auth_context, &key)) != 0) {
+		DEBUG(0,("verify_service_password: krb5_auth_con_setuseruserkey failed %s\n", error_message(err)));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (!(err = krb5_rd_req(ctx, &auth_context, in_data, NULL, NULL, NULL, &ticket))) {
+		DEBUG(10,("verify_service_password: decrypted message with enctype %u salt %s!\n",
+				(unsigned int)enctype, salting_s));
+		ret = True;
+	}
+
+ out:
+
+	memset(&passdata, 0, sizeof(passdata));
+	krb5_free_keyblock_contents(ctx, &key);
+	if (ticket != NULL) {
+		krb5_free_ticket(ctx, ticket);
+	}
+	if (salting_kprinc) {
+		krb5_free_principal(ctx, salting_kprinc);
+	}
+	SAFE_FREE(salting_s);
+	SAFE_FREE(password);
+	SAFE_FREE(machine_account);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/************************************************************************
+ *
+ * From the current draft of kerberos-clarifications:
+ *
+ *     It is not possible to reliably generate a user's key given a pass
+ *     phrase without contacting the KDC, since it will not be known
+ *     whether alternate salt or parameter values are required.
+ *
+ * And because our server has a password, we have this exact problem.  We
+ * make multiple guesses as to which principal name provides the salt which
+ * the KDC is using.
+ *
+ ************************************************************************/
+
+static void kerberos_derive_salting_principal_for_enctype(const char *service_principal,
+							  krb5_context ctx,
+							  krb5_ccache ccache,
+							  krb5_enctype enctype,
+							  krb5_enctype *enctypes)
+{
+	char *salting_principals[3] = {NULL, NULL, NULL}, *second_principal = NULL;
+	krb5_error_code err = 0;
+	krb5_data outbuf;
+	int i, j;
+
+	memset(&outbuf, '\0', sizeof(outbuf));
+
+	/* Check that the service_principal is useful. */
+	if ((service_principal == NULL) || (strlen(service_principal) == 0)) {
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/* Generate our first guess -- the principal as-given. */
+	asprintf(&salting_principals[0], "%s", service_principal);
+	if ((salting_principals[0] == NULL) || (strlen(salting_principals[0]) == 0)) {
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/* Generate our second guess -- the computer's principal, as Win2k3. */
+	asprintf(&second_principal, "host/%s.%s", global_myname(), lp_realm());
+	if (second_principal != NULL) {
+		strlower_m(second_principal);
+		asprintf(&salting_principals[1], "%s@%s", second_principal, lp_realm());
+		SAFE_FREE(second_principal);
+	}
+	if ((salting_principals[1] == NULL) || (strlen(salting_principals[1]) == 0)) {
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* Generate our third guess -- the computer's principal, as Win2k. */
+	asprintf(&second_principal, "HOST/%s", global_myname());
+	if (second_principal != NULL) {
+		strlower_m(second_principal + 5);
+		asprintf(&salting_principals[2], "%s@%s",
+			second_principal, lp_realm());
+		SAFE_FREE(second_principal);
+	}
+	if ((salting_principals[2] == NULL) || (strlen(salting_principals[2]) == 0)) {
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* Get a service ticket for ourselves into our memory ccache. */
+	/* This will commonly fail if there is no principal by that name (and we're trying
+	   many names). So don't print a debug 0 error. */
+
+	if ((err = get_service_ticket(ctx, ccache, service_principal, enctype, &outbuf)) != 0) {
+		DEBUG(3, ("verify_service_password: get_service_ticket failed: %s\n", 
+			error_message(err)));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* At this point we have a message to ourselves, salted only the KDC knows how. We
+	   have to work out what that salting is. */
+
+	/* Try and find the correct salting principal. */
+	for (i = 0; i < sizeof(salting_principals) / sizeof(salting_principals[i]); i++) {
+		if (verify_service_password(ctx, enctype, salting_principals[i], &outbuf)) {
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* If we failed to get a match, return. */
+	if (i >= sizeof(salting_principals) / sizeof(salting_principals[i])) {
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* If we succeeded, store the principal for use for all enctypes which
+	 * share the same cipher and string-to-key function.  Doing this here
+	 * allows servers which just pass a keytab to krb5_rd_req() to work
+	 * correctly. */
+	for (j = 0; enctypes[j] != 0; j++) {
+		if (enctype != enctypes[j]) {
+			/* If this enctype isn't compatible with the one which
+			 * we used, skip it. */
+
+			if (!kerberos_compatible_enctypes(ctx, enctypes[j], enctype))
+				continue;
+		}
+		/* If the principal which gives us the proper salt is the one
+		 * which we would normally guess, don't bother noting anything
+		 * in the secrets tdb. */
+		if (strcmp(service_principal, salting_principals[i]) != 0) {
+			kerberos_secrets_store_salting_principal(service_principal,
+								enctypes[j],
+								salting_principals[i]);
+		}
+	}
+
+ out :
+
+	kerberos_free_data_contents(ctx, &outbuf);
+	SAFE_FREE(salting_principals[0]);
+	SAFE_FREE(salting_principals[1]);
+	SAFE_FREE(salting_principals[2]);
+	SAFE_FREE(second_principal);
+}
+
+/************************************************************************
+ Go through all the possible enctypes for this principal.
+ ************************************************************************/
+
+void kerberos_derive_salting_principal(krb5_context context,
+					krb5_ccache ccache,
+					krb5_enctype *enctypes,
+					char *service_principal)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	/* Try for each enctype separately, because the rules are
+	 * different for different enctypes. */
+	for (i = 0; enctypes[i] != 0; i++) {
+		/* Delete secrets entry first. */
+		kerberos_secrets_store_salting_principal(service_principal, 0, NULL);
+#ifdef ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC
+		if (enctypes[i] == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) {
+			/* Of course this'll always work, so just save
+			 * ourselves the effort. */
+			continue;
+		}
+#endif
+		/* Try to figure out what's going on with this
+		 * principal. */
+		kerberos_derive_salting_principal_for_enctype(service_principal,
+								context,
+								ccache,
+								enctypes[i],
+								enctypes);
+	}
+}
+
+/************************************************************************
+ Core function to try and determine what salt is being used for any keytab
+ keys.
+ ************************************************************************/
+
+BOOL kerberos_derive_cifs_salting_principals(void)
+{
+	fstring my_fqdn;
+	char *service = NULL;
+	krb5_context context = NULL;
+	krb5_enctype *enctypes = NULL;
+	krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
+	krb5_error_code ret = 0;
+	BOOL retval = False;
+
+	initialize_krb5_error_table();
+	if ((ret = krb5_init_context(&context)) != 0) {
+		DEBUG(1,("kerberos_derive_cifs_salting_principals: krb5_init_context failed. %s\n",
+			error_message(ret)));
+		return False;
+	}
+	if ((ret = get_kerberos_allowed_etypes(context, &enctypes)) != 0) {
+		DEBUG(1,("kerberos_derive_cifs_salting_principals: get_kerberos_allowed_etypes failed. %s\n",
+			error_message(ret)));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if ((ret = krb5_cc_resolve(context, LIBADS_CCACHE_NAME, &ccache)) != 0) {
+		DEBUG(3, ("get_service_ticket: krb5_cc_resolve for %s failed: %s\n", 
+			LIBADS_CCACHE_NAME, error_message(ret)));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (asprintf(&service, "%s$", global_myname()) != -1) {
+		strlower_m(service);
+		kerberos_derive_salting_principal(context, ccache, enctypes, service);
+		SAFE_FREE(service);
+	}
+	if (asprintf(&service, "cifs/%s", global_myname()) != -1) {
+		strlower_m(service);
+		kerberos_derive_salting_principal(context, ccache, enctypes, service);
+		SAFE_FREE(service);
+	}
+	if (asprintf(&service, "host/%s", global_myname()) != -1) {
+		strlower_m(service);
+		kerberos_derive_salting_principal(context, ccache, enctypes, service);
+		SAFE_FREE(service);
+	}
+	if (asprintf(&service, "cifs/%s.%s", global_myname(), lp_realm()) != -1) {
+		strlower_m(service);
+		kerberos_derive_salting_principal(context, ccache, enctypes, service);
+		SAFE_FREE(service);
+	}
+	if (asprintf(&service, "host/%s.%s", global_myname(), lp_realm()) != -1) {
+		strlower_m(service);
+		kerberos_derive_salting_principal(context, ccache, enctypes, service);
+		SAFE_FREE(service);
+	}
+	name_to_fqdn(my_fqdn, global_myname());
+	if (asprintf(&service, "cifs/%s", my_fqdn) != -1) {
+		strlower_m(service);
+		kerberos_derive_salting_principal(context, ccache, enctypes, service);
+		SAFE_FREE(service);
+	}
+	if (asprintf(&service, "host/%s", my_fqdn) != -1) {
+		strlower_m(service);
+		kerberos_derive_salting_principal(context, ccache, enctypes, service);
+		SAFE_FREE(service);
+	}
+
+	retval = True;
+
+  out: 
+	if (enctypes) {
+		free_kerberos_etypes(context, enctypes);
+	}
+	if (ccache) {
+		krb5_cc_destroy(context, ccache);
+	}
+	if (context) {
+		krb5_free_context(context);
+	}
+	return retval;
+}
 #endif
diff --git a/source3/libads/krb5_setpw.c b/source3/libads/krb5_setpw.c
index 84595212e6..385c1f02aa 100644
--- a/source3/libads/krb5_setpw.c
+++ b/source3/libads/krb5_setpw.c
@@ -667,7 +667,7 @@ ADS_STATUS kerberos_set_password(const char *kpasswd_server,
 {
     int ret;
 
-    if ((ret = kerberos_kinit_password(auth_principal, auth_password, time_offset, NULL))) {
+    if ((ret = kerberos_kinit_password(auth_principal, auth_password, time_offset, NULL, NULL))) {
 	DEBUG(1,("Failed kinit for principal %s (%s)\n", auth_principal, error_message(ret)));
 	return ADS_ERROR_KRB5(ret);
     }
diff --git a/source3/libsmb/cliconnect.c b/source3/libsmb/cliconnect.c
index 4ff60c1b1c..60691287e6 100644
--- a/source3/libsmb/cliconnect.c
+++ b/source3/libsmb/cliconnect.c
@@ -757,7 +757,7 @@ ADS_STATUS cli_session_setup_spnego(struct cli_state *cli, const char *user,
 			int ret;
 			
 			use_in_memory_ccache();
-			ret = kerberos_kinit_password(user, pass, 0 /* no time correction for now */, NULL);
+			ret = kerberos_kinit_password(user, pass, 0 /* no time correction for now */, NULL, NULL);
 			
 			if (ret){
 				SAFE_FREE(principal);
diff --git a/source3/libsmb/clikrb5.c b/source3/libsmb/clikrb5.c
index 5aa1668705..32a50464e0 100644
--- a/source3/libsmb/clikrb5.c
+++ b/source3/libsmb/clikrb5.c
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@
 #endif
 
 #if defined(HAVE_KRB5_PRINCIPAL2SALT) && defined(HAVE_KRB5_USE_ENCTYPE) && defined(HAVE_KRB5_STRING_TO_KEY)
- int create_kerberos_key_from_string(krb5_context context,
+ int create_kerberos_key_from_string_direct(krb5_context context,
 					krb5_principal host_princ,
 					krb5_data *password,
 					krb5_keyblock *key,
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@
 	return ret;
 }
 #elif defined(HAVE_KRB5_GET_PW_SALT) && defined(HAVE_KRB5_STRING_TO_KEY_SALT)
- int create_kerberos_key_from_string(krb5_context context,
+ int create_kerberos_key_from_string_direct(krb5_context context,
 					krb5_principal host_princ,
 					krb5_data *password,
 					krb5_keyblock *key,
@@ -123,6 +123,27 @@
  __ERROR_XX_UNKNOWN_CREATE_KEY_FUNCTIONS
 #endif
 
+int create_kerberos_key_from_string(krb5_context context,
+					krb5_principal host_princ,
+					krb5_data *password,
+					krb5_keyblock *key,
+					krb5_enctype enctype)
+{
+	krb5_principal salt_princ = NULL;
+	int ret;
+	/*
+	 * Check if we've determined that the KDC is salting keys for this
+	 * principal/enctype in a non-obvious way.  If it is, try to match
+	 * its behavior.
+	 */
+	salt_princ = kerberos_fetch_salt_princ_for_host_princ(context, host_princ, enctype);
+	ret = create_kerberos_key_from_string_direct(context, salt_princ ? salt_princ : host_princ, password, key, enctype);
+	if (salt_princ) {
+		krb5_free_principal(context, salt_princ);
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
 #if defined(HAVE_KRB5_GET_PERMITTED_ENCTYPES)
  krb5_error_code get_kerberos_allowed_etypes(krb5_context context, 
 					    krb5_enctype **enctypes)
@@ -251,6 +272,17 @@
 }
 #endif
 
+void kerberos_free_data_contents(krb5_context context, krb5_data *pdata)
+{
+#if !defined(HAVE_KRB5_FREE_DATA_CONTENTS)
+	if (pdata->data) {
+		krb5_free_data_contents(context, pdata);
+	}
+#else
+	SAFE_FREE(pdata->data);
+#endif
+}
+
 void kerberos_set_creds_enctype(krb5_creds *pcreds, int enctype)
 {
 #if defined(HAVE_KRB5_KEYBLOCK_IN_CREDS)
@@ -262,7 +294,7 @@ void kerberos_set_creds_enctype(krb5_creds *pcreds, int enctype)
 #endif
 }
 
-krb5_boolean kerberos_compatible_enctypes(krb5_context context,
+BOOL kerberos_compatible_enctypes(krb5_context context,
 				  krb5_enctype enctype1,
 				  krb5_enctype enctype2)
 {
@@ -270,9 +302,9 @@ krb5_boolean kerberos_compatible_enctypes(krb5_context context,
 	krb5_boolean similar = 0;
 
 	krb5_c_enctype_compare(context, enctype1, enctype2, &similar);
-	return similar;
+	return similar ? True : False;
 #elif defined(HAVE_KRB5_ENCTYPES_COMPATIBLE_KEYS)
-	return krb5_enctypes_compatible_keys(context, enctype1, enctype2);
+	return krb5_enctypes_compatible_keys(context, enctype1, enctype2) ? True : False;
 #endif
 }
 
@@ -447,10 +479,7 @@ int cli_krb5_get_ticket(const char *principal, time_t time_offset,
 
 	*ticket = data_blob(packet.data, packet.length);
 
-/* Hmm, heimdal dooesn't have this - what's the correct call? */
-#ifdef HAVE_KRB5_FREE_DATA_CONTENTS
- 	krb5_free_data_contents(context, &packet); 
-#endif
+ 	kerberos_free_data_contents(context, &packet); 
 
 failed:
 
diff --git a/source3/utils/ntlm_auth.c b/source3/utils/ntlm_auth.c
index 8296ccb5fb..3d51523831 100644
--- a/source3/utils/ntlm_auth.c
+++ b/source3/utils/ntlm_auth.c
@@ -1184,7 +1184,7 @@ static BOOL manage_client_krb5_init(SPNEGO_DATA spnego)
 		pstr_sprintf(user, "%s@%s", opt_username, opt_domain);
 
 		if ((retval = kerberos_kinit_password(user, opt_password, 
-						      0, NULL))) {
+						      0, NULL, NULL))) {
 			DEBUG(10, ("Requesting TGT failed: %s\n", error_message(retval)));
 			return False;
 		}