diff options
author | Jelmer Vernooij <jelmer@samba.org> | 2008-11-01 00:34:39 +0100 |
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committer | Jelmer Vernooij <jelmer@samba.org> | 2008-11-01 00:34:39 +0100 |
commit | 72a1e3acfa5789134a28fb0609bc88b25c0e0b15 (patch) | |
tree | e7a7e8aaddbae9a97543d5b13bc16ce2e154c134 | |
parent | 59206674521065e041a6020f9ba793fac47b1d7d (diff) | |
parent | ff274e57eacb9ac4c81adfcfea4f7b4b668a7d94 (diff) | |
download | samba-72a1e3acfa5789134a28fb0609bc88b25c0e0b15.tar.gz samba-72a1e3acfa5789134a28fb0609bc88b25c0e0b15.tar.bz2 samba-72a1e3acfa5789134a28fb0609bc88b25c0e0b15.zip |
Merge branch 'master' of ssh://git.samba.org/data/git/samba
-rw-r--r-- | docs-xml/smbdotconf/tuning/syncalways.xml | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | librpc/idl/security.idl | 14 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | source3/include/proto.h | 5 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | source3/include/rpc_secdes.h | 171 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | source3/lib/sharesec.c | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | source3/lib/util_seaccess.c | 341 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | source3/librpc/gen_ndr/samr.h | 25 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | source3/librpc/idl/samr.idl | 124 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | source3/modules/vfs_acl_xattr.c | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | source3/printing/nt_printing.c | 10 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | source3/registry/reg_dispatcher.c | 3 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | source3/rpc_server/srv_eventlog_nt.c | 11 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | source3/rpc_server/srv_lsa_nt.c | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | source3/rpc_server/srv_samr_nt.c | 100 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | source3/rpc_server/srv_svcctl_nt.c | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | source3/smbd/file_access.c | 7 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | source3/smbd/sesssetup.c | 3 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | source3/utils/net_rpc.c | 22 |
18 files changed, 373 insertions, 487 deletions
diff --git a/docs-xml/smbdotconf/tuning/syncalways.xml b/docs-xml/smbdotconf/tuning/syncalways.xml index 5d8eb2d568..9a095d596b 100644 --- a/docs-xml/smbdotconf/tuning/syncalways.xml +++ b/docs-xml/smbdotconf/tuning/syncalways.xml @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ </command> call to ensure the data is written to disk. Note that the <parameter moreinfo="none">strict sync</parameter> parameter must be set to <constant>yes</constant> in order for this parameter to have - any affect.</para> + any effect.</para> </description> <related>strict sync</related> diff --git a/librpc/idl/security.idl b/librpc/idl/security.idl index 6704e300a5..a313a2ccee 100644 --- a/librpc/idl/security.idl +++ b/librpc/idl/security.idl @@ -136,6 +136,20 @@ interface security const int SEC_RIGHTS_DIR_EXECUTE = SEC_RIGHTS_FILE_EXECUTE; const int SEC_RIGHTS_DIR_ALL = SEC_RIGHTS_FILE_ALL; + /* combinations of standard masks. */ + const int STANDARD_RIGHTS_ALL_ACCESS = SEC_STD_ALL; /* 0x001f0000 */ + const int STANDARD_RIGHTS_MODIFY_ACCESS = SEC_STD_READ_CONTROLS; /* 0x00020000 */ + const int STANDARD_RIGHTS_EXECUTE_ACCESS = SEC_STD_READ_CONTROLS; /* 0x00020000 */ + const int STANDARD_RIGHTS_READ_ACCESS = SEC_STD_READ_CONTROLS; /* 0x00020000 */ + const int STANDARD_RIGHTS_WRITE_ACCESS = + (SEC_STD_WRITE_OWNER | + SEC_STD_WRITE_DAC | + SEC_STD_DELETE); /* 0x000d0000 */ + const int STANDARD_RIGHTS_REQUIRED_ACCESS = + (SEC_STD_DELETE | + SEC_STD_READ_CONTROL | + SEC_STD_WRITE_DAC | + SEC_STD_WRITE_OWNER); /* 0x000f0000 */ /***************************************************************/ /* WELL KNOWN SIDS */ diff --git a/source3/include/proto.h b/source3/include/proto.h index 65dda2ac3d..c6609be5d6 100644 --- a/source3/include/proto.h +++ b/source3/include/proto.h @@ -1417,9 +1417,8 @@ WERROR registry_push_value(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, void se_map_generic(uint32 *access_mask, const struct generic_mapping *mapping); void security_acl_map_generic(struct security_acl *sa, const struct generic_mapping *mapping); void se_map_standard(uint32 *access_mask, struct standard_mapping *mapping); -bool se_access_check(const SEC_DESC *sd, const NT_USER_TOKEN *token, - uint32 acc_desired, uint32 *acc_granted, - NTSTATUS *status); +NTSTATUS se_access_check(const SEC_DESC *sd, const NT_USER_TOKEN *token, + uint32 acc_desired, uint32 *acc_granted); NTSTATUS samr_make_sam_obj_sd(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, SEC_DESC **psd, size_t *sd_size); /* The following definitions come from lib/util_sec.c */ diff --git a/source3/include/rpc_secdes.h b/source3/include/rpc_secdes.h index fb73498b0d..15adebe29d 100644 --- a/source3/include/rpc_secdes.h +++ b/source3/include/rpc_secdes.h @@ -214,177 +214,6 @@ struct standard_mapping { SA_RIGHT_FILE_WRITE_DATA | \ SA_RIGHT_FILE_READ_DATA) -/* SAM server specific access rights */ - -#define SA_RIGHT_SAM_CONNECT_SERVER 0x00000001 -#define SA_RIGHT_SAM_SHUTDOWN_SERVER 0x00000002 -#define SA_RIGHT_SAM_INITIALISE_SERVER 0x00000004 -#define SA_RIGHT_SAM_CREATE_DOMAIN 0x00000008 -#define SA_RIGHT_SAM_ENUM_DOMAINS 0x00000010 -#define SA_RIGHT_SAM_OPEN_DOMAIN 0x00000020 - -#define SA_RIGHT_SAM_ALL_ACCESS 0x0000003F - -#define GENERIC_RIGHTS_SAM_ALL_ACCESS \ - (STANDARD_RIGHTS_REQUIRED_ACCESS| \ - SA_RIGHT_SAM_ALL_ACCESS) - -#define GENERIC_RIGHTS_SAM_READ \ - (STANDARD_RIGHTS_READ_ACCESS | \ - SA_RIGHT_SAM_ENUM_DOMAINS) - -#define GENERIC_RIGHTS_SAM_WRITE \ - (STANDARD_RIGHTS_WRITE_ACCESS | \ - SA_RIGHT_SAM_CREATE_DOMAIN | \ - SA_RIGHT_SAM_INITIALISE_SERVER | \ - SA_RIGHT_SAM_SHUTDOWN_SERVER) - -#define GENERIC_RIGHTS_SAM_EXECUTE \ - (STANDARD_RIGHTS_EXECUTE_ACCESS | \ - SA_RIGHT_SAM_OPEN_DOMAIN | \ - SA_RIGHT_SAM_CONNECT_SERVER) - - -/* Domain Object specific access rights */ - -#define SA_RIGHT_DOMAIN_LOOKUP_INFO_1 0x00000001 -#define SA_RIGHT_DOMAIN_SET_INFO_1 0x00000002 -#define SA_RIGHT_DOMAIN_LOOKUP_INFO_2 0x00000004 -#define SA_RIGHT_DOMAIN_SET_INFO_2 0x00000008 -#define SA_RIGHT_DOMAIN_CREATE_USER 0x00000010 -#define SA_RIGHT_DOMAIN_CREATE_GROUP 0x00000020 -#define SA_RIGHT_DOMAIN_CREATE_ALIAS 0x00000040 -#define SA_RIGHT_DOMAIN_LOOKUP_ALIAS_BY_MEM 0x00000080 -#define SA_RIGHT_DOMAIN_ENUM_ACCOUNTS 0x00000100 -#define SA_RIGHT_DOMAIN_OPEN_ACCOUNT 0x00000200 -#define SA_RIGHT_DOMAIN_SET_INFO_3 0x00000400 - -#define SA_RIGHT_DOMAIN_ALL_ACCESS 0x000007FF - -#define GENERIC_RIGHTS_DOMAIN_ALL_ACCESS \ - (STANDARD_RIGHTS_REQUIRED_ACCESS| \ - SA_RIGHT_DOMAIN_ALL_ACCESS) - -#define GENERIC_RIGHTS_DOMAIN_READ \ - (STANDARD_RIGHTS_READ_ACCESS | \ - SA_RIGHT_DOMAIN_LOOKUP_ALIAS_BY_MEM | \ - SA_RIGHT_DOMAIN_LOOKUP_INFO_2) - -#define GENERIC_RIGHTS_DOMAIN_WRITE \ - (STANDARD_RIGHTS_WRITE_ACCESS | \ - SA_RIGHT_DOMAIN_SET_INFO_3 | \ - SA_RIGHT_DOMAIN_CREATE_ALIAS | \ - SA_RIGHT_DOMAIN_CREATE_GROUP | \ - SA_RIGHT_DOMAIN_CREATE_USER | \ - SA_RIGHT_DOMAIN_SET_INFO_2 | \ - SA_RIGHT_DOMAIN_SET_INFO_1) - -#define GENERIC_RIGHTS_DOMAIN_EXECUTE \ - (STANDARD_RIGHTS_EXECUTE_ACCESS | \ - SA_RIGHT_DOMAIN_OPEN_ACCOUNT | \ - SA_RIGHT_DOMAIN_ENUM_ACCOUNTS | \ - SA_RIGHT_DOMAIN_LOOKUP_INFO_1) - - -/* User Object specific access rights */ - -#define SA_RIGHT_USER_GET_NAME_ETC 0x00000001 -#define SA_RIGHT_USER_GET_LOCALE 0x00000002 -#define SA_RIGHT_USER_SET_LOC_COM 0x00000004 -#define SA_RIGHT_USER_GET_LOGONINFO 0x00000008 -#define SA_RIGHT_USER_ACCT_FLAGS_EXPIRY 0x00000010 -#define SA_RIGHT_USER_SET_ATTRIBUTES 0x00000020 -#define SA_RIGHT_USER_CHANGE_PASSWORD 0x00000040 -#define SA_RIGHT_USER_SET_PASSWORD 0x00000080 -#define SA_RIGHT_USER_GET_GROUPS 0x00000100 -#define SA_RIGHT_USER_READ_GROUP_MEM 0x00000200 -#define SA_RIGHT_USER_CHANGE_GROUP_MEM 0x00000400 - -#define SA_RIGHT_USER_ALL_ACCESS 0x000007FF - -#define GENERIC_RIGHTS_USER_ALL_ACCESS \ - (STANDARD_RIGHTS_REQUIRED_ACCESS| \ - SA_RIGHT_USER_ALL_ACCESS) /* 0x000f07ff */ - -#define GENERIC_RIGHTS_USER_READ \ - (STANDARD_RIGHTS_READ_ACCESS | \ - SA_RIGHT_USER_READ_GROUP_MEM | \ - SA_RIGHT_USER_GET_GROUPS | \ - SA_RIGHT_USER_ACCT_FLAGS_EXPIRY | \ - SA_RIGHT_USER_GET_LOGONINFO | \ - SA_RIGHT_USER_GET_LOCALE) /* 0x0002031a */ - -#define GENERIC_RIGHTS_USER_WRITE \ - (STANDARD_RIGHTS_WRITE_ACCESS | \ - SA_RIGHT_USER_CHANGE_PASSWORD | \ - SA_RIGHT_USER_SET_LOC_COM | \ - SA_RIGHT_USER_SET_ATTRIBUTES | \ - SA_RIGHT_USER_SET_PASSWORD | \ - SA_RIGHT_USER_CHANGE_GROUP_MEM) /* 0x000204e4 */ - -#define GENERIC_RIGHTS_USER_EXECUTE \ - (STANDARD_RIGHTS_EXECUTE_ACCESS | \ - SA_RIGHT_USER_CHANGE_PASSWORD | \ - SA_RIGHT_USER_GET_NAME_ETC ) /* 0x00020041 */ - - -/* Group Object specific access rights */ - -#define SA_RIGHT_GROUP_LOOKUP_INFO 0x00000001 -#define SA_RIGHT_GROUP_SET_INFO 0x00000002 -#define SA_RIGHT_GROUP_ADD_MEMBER 0x00000004 -#define SA_RIGHT_GROUP_REMOVE_MEMBER 0x00000008 -#define SA_RIGHT_GROUP_GET_MEMBERS 0x00000010 - -#define SA_RIGHT_GROUP_ALL_ACCESS 0x0000001F - -#define GENERIC_RIGHTS_GROUP_ALL_ACCESS \ - (STANDARD_RIGHTS_REQUIRED_ACCESS| \ - SA_RIGHT_GROUP_ALL_ACCESS) /* 0x000f001f */ - -#define GENERIC_RIGHTS_GROUP_READ \ - (STANDARD_RIGHTS_READ_ACCESS | \ - SA_RIGHT_GROUP_GET_MEMBERS) /* 0x00020010 */ - -#define GENERIC_RIGHTS_GROUP_WRITE \ - (STANDARD_RIGHTS_WRITE_ACCESS | \ - SA_RIGHT_GROUP_REMOVE_MEMBER | \ - SA_RIGHT_GROUP_ADD_MEMBER | \ - SA_RIGHT_GROUP_SET_INFO ) /* 0x0002000e */ - -#define GENERIC_RIGHTS_GROUP_EXECUTE \ - (STANDARD_RIGHTS_EXECUTE_ACCESS | \ - SA_RIGHT_GROUP_LOOKUP_INFO) /* 0x00020001 */ - - -/* Alias Object specific access rights */ - -#define SA_RIGHT_ALIAS_ADD_MEMBER 0x00000001 -#define SA_RIGHT_ALIAS_REMOVE_MEMBER 0x00000002 -#define SA_RIGHT_ALIAS_GET_MEMBERS 0x00000004 -#define SA_RIGHT_ALIAS_LOOKUP_INFO 0x00000008 -#define SA_RIGHT_ALIAS_SET_INFO 0x00000010 - -#define SA_RIGHT_ALIAS_ALL_ACCESS 0x0000001F - -#define GENERIC_RIGHTS_ALIAS_ALL_ACCESS \ - (STANDARD_RIGHTS_REQUIRED_ACCESS| \ - SA_RIGHT_ALIAS_ALL_ACCESS) /* 0x000f001f */ - -#define GENERIC_RIGHTS_ALIAS_READ \ - (STANDARD_RIGHTS_READ_ACCESS | \ - SA_RIGHT_ALIAS_GET_MEMBERS ) /* 0x00020004 */ - -#define GENERIC_RIGHTS_ALIAS_WRITE \ - (STANDARD_RIGHTS_WRITE_ACCESS | \ - SA_RIGHT_ALIAS_REMOVE_MEMBER | \ - SA_RIGHT_ALIAS_ADD_MEMBER | \ - SA_RIGHT_ALIAS_SET_INFO ) /* 0x00020013 */ - -#define GENERIC_RIGHTS_ALIAS_EXECUTE \ - (STANDARD_RIGHTS_EXECUTE_ACCESS | \ - SA_RIGHT_ALIAS_LOOKUP_INFO ) /* 0x00020008 */ - /* * Access Bits for registry ACLS */ diff --git a/source3/lib/sharesec.c b/source3/lib/sharesec.c index 298655e181..b90346ff7e 100644 --- a/source3/lib/sharesec.c +++ b/source3/lib/sharesec.c @@ -287,11 +287,11 @@ bool share_access_check(const NT_USER_TOKEN *token, const char *sharename, return True; } - ret = se_access_check(psd, token, desired_access, &granted, &status); + status = se_access_check(psd, token, desired_access, &granted); TALLOC_FREE(psd); - return ret; + return NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status); } /*************************************************************************** diff --git a/source3/lib/util_seaccess.c b/source3/lib/util_seaccess.c index 7e461556b3..17d4b78202 100644 --- a/source3/lib/util_seaccess.c +++ b/source3/lib/util_seaccess.c @@ -1,8 +1,10 @@ /* Unix SMB/CIFS implementation. - Copyright (C) Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton 1996-2000. - Copyright (C) Tim Potter 2000. - Copyright (C) Re-written by Jeremy Allison 2000. + + Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 2004 + Copyright (C) Gerald Carter 2005 + Copyright (C) Volker Lendecke 2007 + Copyright (C) Jeremy Allison 2008 This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by @@ -22,125 +24,6 @@ extern NT_USER_TOKEN anonymous_token; -/********************************************************************************* - Check an ACE against a SID. We return the remaining needed permission - bits not yet granted. Zero means permission allowed (no more needed bits). -**********************************************************************************/ - -static uint32 check_ace(SEC_ACE *ace, const NT_USER_TOKEN *token, uint32 acc_desired, - NTSTATUS *status) -{ - uint32_t mask = ace->access_mask; - - /* - * Inherit only is ignored. - */ - - if (ace->flags & SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERIT_ONLY) { - return acc_desired; - } - - /* - * If this ACE has no SID in common with the token, - * ignore it as it cannot be used to make an access - * determination. - */ - - if (!token_sid_in_ace( token, ace)) - return acc_desired; - - switch (ace->type) { - case SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED: - /* - * This is explicitly allowed. - * Remove the bits from the remaining - * access required. Return the remaining - * bits needed. - */ - acc_desired &= ~mask; - break; - case SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_DENIED: - /* - * This is explicitly denied. - * If any bits match terminate here, - * we are denied. - */ - if (acc_desired & mask) { - *status = NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; - return 0xFFFFFFFF; - } - break; - case SEC_ACE_TYPE_SYSTEM_ALARM: - case SEC_ACE_TYPE_SYSTEM_AUDIT: - *status = NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED; - return 0xFFFFFFFF; - default: - *status = NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER; - return 0xFFFFFFFF; - } - - return acc_desired; -} - -/********************************************************************************* - Maximum access was requested. Calculate the max possible. Fail if it doesn't - include other bits requested. -**********************************************************************************/ - -static bool get_max_access( SEC_ACL *the_acl, const NT_USER_TOKEN *token, uint32 *granted, - uint32 desired, - NTSTATUS *status) -{ - uint32 acc_denied = 0; - uint32 acc_granted = 0; - size_t i; - - for ( i = 0 ; i < the_acl->num_aces; i++) { - SEC_ACE *ace = &the_acl->aces[i]; - uint32 mask = ace->access_mask; - - if (!token_sid_in_ace( token, ace)) - continue; - - switch (ace->type) { - case SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED: - acc_granted |= (mask & ~acc_denied); - break; - case SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_DENIED: - acc_denied |= (mask & ~acc_granted); - break; - case SEC_ACE_TYPE_SYSTEM_ALARM: - case SEC_ACE_TYPE_SYSTEM_AUDIT: - *status = NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED; - *granted = 0; - return False; - default: - *status = NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER; - *granted = 0; - return False; - } - } - - /* - * If we were granted no access, or we desired bits that we - * didn't get, then deny. - */ - - if ((acc_granted == 0) || ((acc_granted & desired) != desired)) { - *status = NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; - *granted = 0; - return False; - } - - /* - * Return the access we did get. - */ - - *granted = acc_granted; - *status = NT_STATUS_OK; - return True; -} - /* Map generic access rights to object specific rights. This technique is used to give meaning to assigning read, write, execute and all access to objects. Each type of object has its own mapping of generic to object @@ -203,13 +86,13 @@ void se_map_standard(uint32 *access_mask, struct standard_mapping *mapping) { uint32 old_mask = *access_mask; - if (*access_mask & READ_CONTROL_ACCESS) { - *access_mask &= ~READ_CONTROL_ACCESS; + if (*access_mask & SEC_STD_READ_CONTROL) { + *access_mask &= ~SEC_STD_READ_CONTROL; *access_mask |= mapping->std_read; } - if (*access_mask & (DELETE_ACCESS|WRITE_DAC_ACCESS|WRITE_OWNER_ACCESS|SYNCHRONIZE_ACCESS)) { - *access_mask &= ~(DELETE_ACCESS|WRITE_DAC_ACCESS|WRITE_OWNER_ACCESS|SYNCHRONIZE_ACCESS); + if (*access_mask & (SEC_STD_DELETE|SEC_STD_WRITE_DAC|SEC_STD_WRITE_OWNER|SEC_STD_SYNCHRONIZE)) { + *access_mask &= ~(SEC_STD_DELETE|SEC_STD_WRITE_DAC|SEC_STD_WRITE_OWNER|SEC_STD_SYNCHRONIZE); *access_mask |= mapping->std_all; } @@ -219,122 +102,140 @@ void se_map_standard(uint32 *access_mask, struct standard_mapping *mapping) } } -/***************************************************************************** - Check access rights of a user against a security descriptor. Look at - each ACE in the security descriptor until an access denied ACE denies - any of the desired rights to the user or any of the users groups, or one - or more ACEs explicitly grant all requested access rights. See - "Access-Checking" document in MSDN. -*****************************************************************************/ - -bool se_access_check(const SEC_DESC *sd, const NT_USER_TOKEN *token, - uint32 acc_desired, uint32 *acc_granted, - NTSTATUS *status) +/* + perform a SEC_FLAG_MAXIMUM_ALLOWED access check +*/ +static uint32_t access_check_max_allowed(const struct security_descriptor *sd, + const NT_USER_TOKEN *token) { - size_t i; - SEC_ACL *the_acl; - uint32 tmp_acc_desired = acc_desired; - - if (!status || !acc_granted) - return False; + uint32_t denied = 0, granted = 0; + unsigned i; + + if (is_sid_in_token(token, sd->owner_sid)) { + granted |= SEC_STD_WRITE_DAC | SEC_STD_READ_CONTROL | SEC_STD_DELETE; + } else if (user_has_privileges(token, &se_restore)) { + granted |= SEC_STD_DELETE; + } - if (!token) - token = &anonymous_token; + if (sd->dacl == NULL) { + return granted & ~denied; + } + + for (i = 0;i<sd->dacl->num_aces; i++) { + struct security_ace *ace = &sd->dacl->aces[i]; - *status = NT_STATUS_OK; - *acc_granted = 0; + if (ace->flags & SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERIT_ONLY) { + continue; + } - DEBUG(10,("se_access_check: requested access 0x%08x, for NT token " - "with %u entries and first sid %s.\n", - (unsigned int)acc_desired, (unsigned int)token->num_sids, - sid_string_dbg(&token->user_sids[0]))); + if (!is_sid_in_token(token, &ace->trustee)) { + continue; + } - /* - * No security descriptor or security descriptor with no DACL - * present allows all access. - */ + switch (ace->type) { + case SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED: + granted |= ace->access_mask; + break; + case SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_DENIED: + case SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_DENIED_OBJECT: + denied |= ace->access_mask; + break; + default: /* Other ACE types not handled/supported */ + break; + } + } - /* ACL must have something in it */ + return granted & ~denied; +} - if (!sd || (sd && (!(sd->type & SEC_DESC_DACL_PRESENT) || sd->dacl == NULL))) { - *status = NT_STATUS_OK; - *acc_granted = acc_desired; - DEBUG(5, ("se_access_check: no sd or blank DACL, access allowed\n")); - return True; +/* + the main entry point for access checking. +*/ +NTSTATUS se_access_check(const struct security_descriptor *sd, + const NT_USER_TOKEN *token, + uint32_t access_desired, + uint32_t *access_granted) +{ + int i; + uint32_t bits_remaining; + + *access_granted = access_desired; + bits_remaining = access_desired; + + /* handle the maximum allowed flag */ + if (access_desired & SEC_FLAG_MAXIMUM_ALLOWED) { + access_desired |= access_check_max_allowed(sd, token); + access_desired &= ~SEC_FLAG_MAXIMUM_ALLOWED; + *access_granted = access_desired; + bits_remaining = access_desired & ~SEC_STD_DELETE; } - /* The user sid is the first in the token */ - if (DEBUGLVL(3)) { - DEBUG(3, ("se_access_check: user sid is %s\n", - sid_string_dbg( - &token->user_sids[PRIMARY_USER_SID_INDEX]))); - - for (i = 1; i < token->num_sids; i++) { - DEBUGADD(3, ("se_access_check: also %s\n", - sid_string_dbg(&token->user_sids[i]))); +#if 0 + /* We need to support SeSecurityPrivilege for this. */ + + if (access_desired & SEC_FLAG_SYSTEM_SECURITY) { + if (user_has_privileges(token, &sec_security)) { + bits_remaining &= ~SEC_FLAG_SYSTEM_SECURITY; + } else { + return NT_STATUS_PRIVILEGE_NOT_HELD; } } +#endif - /* Is the token the owner of the SID ? */ - - if (sd->owner_sid) { - for (i = 0; i < token->num_sids; i++) { - if (sid_equal(&token->user_sids[i], sd->owner_sid)) { - /* - * The owner always has SEC_RIGHTS_WRITE_DAC & READ_CONTROL. - */ - if (tmp_acc_desired & WRITE_DAC_ACCESS) - tmp_acc_desired &= ~WRITE_DAC_ACCESS; - if (tmp_acc_desired & READ_CONTROL_ACCESS) - tmp_acc_desired &= ~READ_CONTROL_ACCESS; - } - } + /* a NULL dacl allows access */ + if ((sd->type & SEC_DESC_DACL_PRESENT) && sd->dacl == NULL) { + *access_granted = access_desired; + return NT_STATUS_OK; } - the_acl = sd->dacl; + /* the owner always gets SEC_STD_WRITE_DAC, SEC_STD_READ_CONTROL and SEC_STD_DELETE */ + if ((bits_remaining & (SEC_STD_WRITE_DAC|SEC_STD_READ_CONTROL|SEC_STD_DELETE)) && + is_sid_in_token(token, sd->owner_sid)) { + bits_remaining &= ~(SEC_STD_WRITE_DAC|SEC_STD_READ_CONTROL|SEC_STD_DELETE); + } + if ((bits_remaining & SEC_STD_DELETE) && + user_has_privileges(token, &se_restore)) { + bits_remaining &= ~SEC_STD_DELETE; + } - if (tmp_acc_desired & MAXIMUM_ALLOWED_ACCESS) { - tmp_acc_desired &= ~MAXIMUM_ALLOWED_ACCESS; - return get_max_access( the_acl, token, acc_granted, tmp_acc_desired, - status); + if (sd->dacl == NULL) { + goto done; } - for ( i = 0 ; i < the_acl->num_aces && tmp_acc_desired != 0; i++) { - SEC_ACE *ace = &the_acl->aces[i]; - - DEBUGADD(10,("se_access_check: ACE %u: type %d, flags = " - "0x%02x, SID = %s mask = %x, current desired " - "= %x\n", (unsigned int)i, ace->type, ace->flags, - sid_string_dbg(&ace->trustee), - (unsigned int) ace->access_mask, - (unsigned int)tmp_acc_desired )); - - tmp_acc_desired = check_ace( ace, token, tmp_acc_desired, status); - if (NT_STATUS_V(*status)) { - *acc_granted = 0; - DEBUG(5,("se_access_check: ACE %u denied with status %s.\n", (unsigned int)i, nt_errstr(*status))); - return False; + /* check each ace in turn. */ + for (i=0; bits_remaining && i < sd->dacl->num_aces; i++) { + struct security_ace *ace = &sd->dacl->aces[i]; + + if (ace->flags & SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERIT_ONLY) { + continue; } - } - /* - * If there are no more desired permissions left then - * access was allowed. - */ + if (!is_sid_in_token(token, &ace->trustee)) { + continue; + } - if (tmp_acc_desired == 0) { - *acc_granted = acc_desired; - *status = NT_STATUS_OK; - DEBUG(5,("se_access_check: access (%x) granted.\n", (unsigned int)acc_desired )); - return True; + switch (ace->type) { + case SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED: + bits_remaining &= ~ace->access_mask; + break; + case SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_DENIED: + case SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_DENIED_OBJECT: + if (bits_remaining & ace->access_mask) { + return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; + } + break; + default: /* Other ACE types not handled/supported */ + break; + } } - - *acc_granted = 0; - *status = NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; - DEBUG(5,("se_access_check: access (%x) denied.\n", (unsigned int)acc_desired )); - return False; -} +done: + if (bits_remaining != 0) { + return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; + } + + return NT_STATUS_OK; +} /******************************************************************* samr_make_sam_obj_sd diff --git a/source3/librpc/gen_ndr/samr.h b/source3/librpc/gen_ndr/samr.h index 62f6bf8de6..e5d009e0d9 100644 --- a/source3/librpc/gen_ndr/samr.h +++ b/source3/librpc/gen_ndr/samr.h @@ -8,6 +8,31 @@ #ifndef _HEADER_samr #define _HEADER_samr +#define SAMR_ACCESS_ALL_ACCESS ( 0x0000003F ) +#define GENERIC_RIGHTS_SAM_ALL_ACCESS ( (STANDARD_RIGHTS_REQUIRED_ACCESS|SAMR_ACCESS_ALL_ACCESS) ) +#define GENERIC_RIGHTS_SAM_READ ( (STANDARD_RIGHTS_READ_ACCESS|SAMR_ACCESS_ENUM_DOMAINS) ) +#define GENERIC_RIGHTS_SAM_WRITE ( (STANDARD_RIGHTS_WRITE_ACCESS|SAMR_ACCESS_CREATE_DOMAIN|SAMR_ACCESS_INITIALIZE_SERVER|SAMR_ACCESS_SHUTDOWN_SERVER) ) +#define GENERIC_RIGHTS_SAM_EXECUTE ( (STANDARD_RIGHTS_EXECUTE_ACCESS|SAMR_ACCESS_OPEN_DOMAIN|SAMR_ACCESS_CONNECT_TO_SERVER) ) +#define SAMR_USER_ACCESS_ALL_ACCESS ( 0x000007FF ) +#define GENERIC_RIGHTS_USER_ALL_ACCESS ( (STANDARD_RIGHTS_REQUIRED_ACCESS|SAMR_USER_ACCESS_ALL_ACCESS) ) +#define GENERIC_RIGHTS_USER_READ ( (STANDARD_RIGHTS_READ_ACCESS|SAMR_USER_ACCESS_GET_GROUP_MEMBERSHIP|SAMR_USER_ACCESS_GET_GROUPS|SAMR_USER_ACCESS_GET_ATTRIBUTES|SAMR_USER_ACCESS_GET_LOGONINFO|SAMR_USER_ACCESS_GET_LOCALE) ) +#define GENERIC_RIGHTS_USER_WRITE ( (STANDARD_RIGHTS_WRITE_ACCESS|SAMR_USER_ACCESS_CHANGE_PASSWORD|SAMR_USER_ACCESS_SET_LOC_COM|SAMR_USER_ACCESS_SET_ATTRIBUTES|SAMR_USER_ACCESS_SET_PASSWORD|SAMR_USER_ACCESS_CHANGE_GROUP_MEMBERSHIP) ) +#define GENERIC_RIGHTS_USER_EXECUTE ( (STANDARD_RIGHTS_EXECUTE_ACCESS|SAMR_USER_ACCESS_CHANGE_PASSWORD|SAMR_USER_ACCESS_GET_NAME_ETC) ) +#define SAMR_DOMAIN_ACCESS_ALL_ACCESS ( 0x000007FF ) +#define GENERIC_RIGHTS_DOMAIN_ALL_ACCESS ( (STANDARD_RIGHTS_REQUIRED_ACCESS|SAMR_DOMAIN_ACCESS_ALL_ACCESS) ) +#define GENERIC_RIGHTS_DOMAIN_READ ( (STANDARD_RIGHTS_READ_ACCESS|SAMR_DOMAIN_ACCESS_LOOKUP_ALIAS|SAMR_DOMAIN_ACCESS_LOOKUP_INFO_2) ) +#define GENERIC_RIGHTS_DOMAIN_WRITE ( (STANDARD_RIGHTS_WRITE_ACCESS|SAMR_DOMAIN_ACCESS_SET_INFO_3|SAMR_DOMAIN_ACCESS_CREATE_ALIAS|SAMR_DOMAIN_ACCESS_CREATE_GROUP|SAMR_DOMAIN_ACCESS_CREATE_USER|SAMR_DOMAIN_ACCESS_SET_INFO_2|SAMR_DOMAIN_ACCESS_SET_INFO_1) ) +#define GENERIC_RIGHTS_DOMAIN_EXECUTE ( (STANDARD_RIGHTS_EXECUTE_ACCESS|SAMR_DOMAIN_ACCESS_OPEN_ACCOUNT|SAMR_DOMAIN_ACCESS_ENUM_ACCOUNTS|SAMR_DOMAIN_ACCESS_LOOKUP_INFO_1) ) +#define SAMR_GROUP_ACCESS_ALL_ACCESS ( 0x0000001F ) +#define GENERIC_RIGHTS_GROUP_ALL_ACCESS ( (STANDARD_RIGHTS_REQUIRED_ACCESS|SAMR_GROUP_ACCESS_ALL_ACCESS) ) +#define GENERIC_RIGHTS_GROUP_READ ( (STANDARD_RIGHTS_READ_ACCESS|SAMR_GROUP_ACCESS_GET_MEMBERS) ) +#define GENERIC_RIGHTS_GROUP_WRITE ( (STANDARD_RIGHTS_WRITE_ACCESS|SAMR_GROUP_ACCESS_REMOVE_MEMBER|SAMR_GROUP_ACCESS_ADD_MEMBER|SAMR_GROUP_ACCESS_SET_INFO) ) +#define GENERIC_RIGHTS_GROUP_EXECUTE ( (STANDARD_RIGHTS_EXECUTE_ACCESS|SAMR_GROUP_ACCESS_LOOKUP_INFO) ) +#define SAMR_ALIAS_ACCESS_ALL_ACCESS ( 0x0000001F ) +#define GENERIC_RIGHTS_ALIAS_ALL_ACCESS ( (STANDARD_RIGHTS_REQUIRED_ACCESS|SAMR_ALIAS_ACCESS_ALL_ACCESS) ) +#define GENERIC_RIGHTS_ALIAS_READ ( (STANDARD_RIGHTS_READ_ACCESS|SAMR_ALIAS_ACCESS_GET_MEMBERS) ) +#define GENERIC_RIGHTS_ALIAS_WRITE ( (STANDARD_RIGHTS_WRITE_ACCESS|SAMR_ALIAS_ACCESS_REMOVE_MEMBER|SAMR_ALIAS_ACCESS_ADD_MEMBER|SAMR_ALIAS_ACCESS_SET_INFO) ) +#define GENERIC_RIGHTS_ALIAS_EXECUTE ( (STANDARD_RIGHTS_EXECUTE_ACCESS|SAMR_ALIAS_ACCESS_LOOKUP_INFO) ) #define MAX_SAM_ENTRIES_W2K ( 0x400 ) #define MAX_SAM_ENTRIES_W95 ( 50 ) #define SAMR_ENUM_USERS_MULTIPLIER ( 54 ) diff --git a/source3/librpc/idl/samr.idl b/source3/librpc/idl/samr.idl index cd5fe07845..9f72657620 100644 --- a/source3/librpc/idl/samr.idl +++ b/source3/librpc/idl/samr.idl @@ -40,6 +40,8 @@ import "misc.idl", "lsa.idl", "security.idl"; ACB_NO_AUTH_DATA_REQD = 0x00080000 /* 1 = No authorization data required */ } samr_AcctFlags; + /* SAM server specific access rights */ + typedef [bitmap32bit] bitmap { SAMR_ACCESS_CONNECT_TO_SERVER = 0x00000001, SAMR_ACCESS_SHUTDOWN_SERVER = 0x00000002, @@ -49,6 +51,29 @@ import "misc.idl", "lsa.idl", "security.idl"; SAMR_ACCESS_OPEN_DOMAIN = 0x00000020 } samr_ConnectAccessMask; + const int SAMR_ACCESS_ALL_ACCESS = 0x0000003F; + + const int GENERIC_RIGHTS_SAM_ALL_ACCESS = + (STANDARD_RIGHTS_REQUIRED_ACCESS | + SAMR_ACCESS_ALL_ACCESS); + + const int GENERIC_RIGHTS_SAM_READ = + (STANDARD_RIGHTS_READ_ACCESS | + SAMR_ACCESS_ENUM_DOMAINS); + + const int GENERIC_RIGHTS_SAM_WRITE = + (STANDARD_RIGHTS_WRITE_ACCESS | + SAMR_ACCESS_CREATE_DOMAIN | + SAMR_ACCESS_INITIALIZE_SERVER | + SAMR_ACCESS_SHUTDOWN_SERVER); + + const int GENERIC_RIGHTS_SAM_EXECUTE = + (STANDARD_RIGHTS_EXECUTE_ACCESS | + SAMR_ACCESS_OPEN_DOMAIN | + SAMR_ACCESS_CONNECT_TO_SERVER); + + /* User Object specific access rights */ + typedef [bitmap32bit] bitmap { SAMR_USER_ACCESS_GET_NAME_ETC = 0x00000001, SAMR_USER_ACCESS_GET_LOCALE = 0x00000002, @@ -63,6 +88,35 @@ import "misc.idl", "lsa.idl", "security.idl"; SAMR_USER_ACCESS_CHANGE_GROUP_MEMBERSHIP = 0x00000400 } samr_UserAccessMask; + const int SAMR_USER_ACCESS_ALL_ACCESS = 0x000007FF; + + const int GENERIC_RIGHTS_USER_ALL_ACCESS = + (STANDARD_RIGHTS_REQUIRED_ACCESS | + SAMR_USER_ACCESS_ALL_ACCESS); /* 0x000f07ff */ + + const int GENERIC_RIGHTS_USER_READ = + (STANDARD_RIGHTS_READ_ACCESS | + SAMR_USER_ACCESS_GET_GROUP_MEMBERSHIP | + SAMR_USER_ACCESS_GET_GROUPS | + SAMR_USER_ACCESS_GET_ATTRIBUTES | + SAMR_USER_ACCESS_GET_LOGONINFO | + SAMR_USER_ACCESS_GET_LOCALE); /* 0x0002031a */ + + const int GENERIC_RIGHTS_USER_WRITE = + (STANDARD_RIGHTS_WRITE_ACCESS | + SAMR_USER_ACCESS_CHANGE_PASSWORD | + SAMR_USER_ACCESS_SET_LOC_COM | + SAMR_USER_ACCESS_SET_ATTRIBUTES | + SAMR_USER_ACCESS_SET_PASSWORD | + SAMR_USER_ACCESS_CHANGE_GROUP_MEMBERSHIP); /* 0x000204e4 */ + + const int GENERIC_RIGHTS_USER_EXECUTE = + (STANDARD_RIGHTS_EXECUTE_ACCESS | + SAMR_USER_ACCESS_CHANGE_PASSWORD | + SAMR_USER_ACCESS_GET_NAME_ETC); /* 0x00020041 */ + + /* Domain Object specific access rights */ + typedef [bitmap32bit] bitmap { SAMR_DOMAIN_ACCESS_LOOKUP_INFO_1 = 0x00000001, SAMR_DOMAIN_ACCESS_SET_INFO_1 = 0x00000002, @@ -77,6 +131,34 @@ import "misc.idl", "lsa.idl", "security.idl"; SAMR_DOMAIN_ACCESS_SET_INFO_3 = 0x00000400 } samr_DomainAccessMask; + const int SAMR_DOMAIN_ACCESS_ALL_ACCESS = 0x000007FF; + + const int GENERIC_RIGHTS_DOMAIN_ALL_ACCESS = + (STANDARD_RIGHTS_REQUIRED_ACCESS | + SAMR_DOMAIN_ACCESS_ALL_ACCESS); + + const int GENERIC_RIGHTS_DOMAIN_READ = + (STANDARD_RIGHTS_READ_ACCESS | + SAMR_DOMAIN_ACCESS_LOOKUP_ALIAS | + SAMR_DOMAIN_ACCESS_LOOKUP_INFO_2); + + const int GENERIC_RIGHTS_DOMAIN_WRITE = + (STANDARD_RIGHTS_WRITE_ACCESS | + SAMR_DOMAIN_ACCESS_SET_INFO_3 | + SAMR_DOMAIN_ACCESS_CREATE_ALIAS | + SAMR_DOMAIN_ACCESS_CREATE_GROUP | + SAMR_DOMAIN_ACCESS_CREATE_USER | + SAMR_DOMAIN_ACCESS_SET_INFO_2 | + SAMR_DOMAIN_ACCESS_SET_INFO_1); + + const int GENERIC_RIGHTS_DOMAIN_EXECUTE = + (STANDARD_RIGHTS_EXECUTE_ACCESS | + SAMR_DOMAIN_ACCESS_OPEN_ACCOUNT | + SAMR_DOMAIN_ACCESS_ENUM_ACCOUNTS | + SAMR_DOMAIN_ACCESS_LOOKUP_INFO_1); + + /* Group Object specific access rights */ + typedef [bitmap32bit] bitmap { SAMR_GROUP_ACCESS_LOOKUP_INFO = 0x00000001, SAMR_GROUP_ACCESS_SET_INFO = 0x00000002, @@ -85,6 +167,28 @@ import "misc.idl", "lsa.idl", "security.idl"; SAMR_GROUP_ACCESS_GET_MEMBERS = 0x00000010 } samr_GroupAccessMask; + const int SAMR_GROUP_ACCESS_ALL_ACCESS = 0x0000001F; + + const int GENERIC_RIGHTS_GROUP_ALL_ACCESS = + (STANDARD_RIGHTS_REQUIRED_ACCESS | + SAMR_GROUP_ACCESS_ALL_ACCESS); /* 0x000f001f */ + + const int GENERIC_RIGHTS_GROUP_READ = + (STANDARD_RIGHTS_READ_ACCESS | + SAMR_GROUP_ACCESS_GET_MEMBERS); /* 0x00020010 */ + + const int GENERIC_RIGHTS_GROUP_WRITE = + (STANDARD_RIGHTS_WRITE_ACCESS | + SAMR_GROUP_ACCESS_REMOVE_MEMBER | + SAMR_GROUP_ACCESS_ADD_MEMBER | + SAMR_GROUP_ACCESS_SET_INFO); /* 0x0002000e */ + + const int GENERIC_RIGHTS_GROUP_EXECUTE = + (STANDARD_RIGHTS_EXECUTE_ACCESS | + SAMR_GROUP_ACCESS_LOOKUP_INFO); /* 0x00020001 */ + + /* Alias Object specific access rights */ + typedef [bitmap32bit] bitmap { SAMR_ALIAS_ACCESS_ADD_MEMBER = 0x00000001, SAMR_ALIAS_ACCESS_REMOVE_MEMBER = 0x00000002, @@ -93,6 +197,26 @@ import "misc.idl", "lsa.idl", "security.idl"; SAMR_ALIAS_ACCESS_SET_INFO = 0x00000010 } samr_AliasAccessMask; + const int SAMR_ALIAS_ACCESS_ALL_ACCESS = 0x0000001F; + + const int GENERIC_RIGHTS_ALIAS_ALL_ACCESS = + (STANDARD_RIGHTS_REQUIRED_ACCESS | + SAMR_ALIAS_ACCESS_ALL_ACCESS); /* 0x000f001f */ + + const int GENERIC_RIGHTS_ALIAS_READ = + (STANDARD_RIGHTS_READ_ACCESS | + SAMR_ALIAS_ACCESS_GET_MEMBERS); /* 0x00020004 */ + + const int GENERIC_RIGHTS_ALIAS_WRITE = + (STANDARD_RIGHTS_WRITE_ACCESS | + SAMR_ALIAS_ACCESS_REMOVE_MEMBER | + SAMR_ALIAS_ACCESS_ADD_MEMBER | + SAMR_ALIAS_ACCESS_SET_INFO); /* 0x00020013 */ + + const int GENERIC_RIGHTS_ALIAS_EXECUTE = + (STANDARD_RIGHTS_EXECUTE_ACCESS | + SAMR_ALIAS_ACCESS_LOOKUP_INFO); /* 0x00020008 */ + /******************/ /* Function: 0x00 */ NTSTATUS samr_Connect ( diff --git a/source3/modules/vfs_acl_xattr.c b/source3/modules/vfs_acl_xattr.c index 6932d522d4..ca34e97155 100644 --- a/source3/modules/vfs_acl_xattr.c +++ b/source3/modules/vfs_acl_xattr.c @@ -376,11 +376,11 @@ static int open_acl_xattr(vfs_handle_struct *handle, &pdesc); if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { /* See if we can access it. */ - if (!se_access_check(pdesc, + status = se_access_check(pdesc, handle->conn->server_info->ptok, fsp->access_mask, - &access_granted, - &status)) { + &access_granted); + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { errno = map_errno_from_nt_status(status); return -1; } diff --git a/source3/printing/nt_printing.c b/source3/printing/nt_printing.c index 5ec0e1e9f3..9c1323eaa2 100644 --- a/source3/printing/nt_printing.c +++ b/source3/printing/nt_printing.c @@ -5825,10 +5825,10 @@ bool print_access_check(struct auth_serversupplied_info *server_info, int snum, } /* Check access */ - result = se_access_check(secdesc->sd, server_info->ptok, access_type, - &access_granted, &status); + status = se_access_check(secdesc->sd, server_info->ptok, access_type, + &access_granted); - DEBUG(4, ("access check was %s\n", result ? "SUCCESS" : "FAILURE")); + DEBUG(4, ("access check was %s\n", NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status) ? "SUCCESS" : "FAILURE")); /* see if we need to try the printer admin list */ @@ -5842,11 +5842,11 @@ bool print_access_check(struct auth_serversupplied_info *server_info, int snum, talloc_destroy(mem_ctx); - if (!result) { + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { errno = EACCES; } - return result; + return NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status); } /**************************************************************************** diff --git a/source3/registry/reg_dispatcher.c b/source3/registry/reg_dispatcher.c index d06410a1b3..7d950c3c4e 100644 --- a/source3/registry/reg_dispatcher.c +++ b/source3/registry/reg_dispatcher.c @@ -170,7 +170,8 @@ bool regkey_access_check( REGISTRY_KEY *key, uint32 requested, uint32 *granted, se_map_generic( &requested, ®_generic_map ); - if (!se_access_check(sec_desc, token, requested, granted, &status)) { + status =se_access_check(sec_desc, token, requested, granted); + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { TALLOC_FREE(mem_ctx); return false; } diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/srv_eventlog_nt.c b/source3/rpc_server/srv_eventlog_nt.c index 0e2bcf4126..e56a2e9095 100644 --- a/source3/rpc_server/srv_eventlog_nt.c +++ b/source3/rpc_server/srv_eventlog_nt.c @@ -71,8 +71,7 @@ static bool elog_check_access( EVENTLOG_INFO *info, NT_USER_TOKEN *token ) { char *tdbname = elog_tdbname(talloc_tos(), info->logname ); SEC_DESC *sec_desc; - bool ret; - NTSTATUS ntstatus; + NTSTATUS status; if ( !tdbname ) return False; @@ -97,15 +96,15 @@ static bool elog_check_access( EVENTLOG_INFO *info, NT_USER_TOKEN *token ) /* run the check, try for the max allowed */ - ret = se_access_check( sec_desc, token, MAXIMUM_ALLOWED_ACCESS, - &info->access_granted, &ntstatus ); + status = se_access_check( sec_desc, token, MAXIMUM_ALLOWED_ACCESS, + &info->access_granted); if ( sec_desc ) TALLOC_FREE( sec_desc ); - if ( !ret ) { + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { DEBUG(8,("elog_check_access: se_access_check() return %s\n", - nt_errstr( ntstatus))); + nt_errstr(status))); return False; } diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/srv_lsa_nt.c b/source3/rpc_server/srv_lsa_nt.c index 3addf91494..f4e891ca8c 100644 --- a/source3/rpc_server/srv_lsa_nt.c +++ b/source3/rpc_server/srv_lsa_nt.c @@ -381,7 +381,8 @@ NTSTATUS _lsa_OpenPolicy2(pipes_struct *p, /* get the generic lsa policy SD until we store it */ lsa_get_generic_sd(p->mem_ctx, &psd, &sd_size); - if(!se_access_check(psd, p->pipe_user.nt_user_token, des_access, &acc_granted, &status)) { + status = se_access_check(psd, p->pipe_user.nt_user_token, des_access, &acc_granted); + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { if (p->pipe_user.ut.uid != sec_initial_uid()) { return status; } @@ -431,7 +432,8 @@ NTSTATUS _lsa_OpenPolicy(pipes_struct *p, /* get the generic lsa policy SD until we store it */ lsa_get_generic_sd(p->mem_ctx, &psd, &sd_size); - if(!se_access_check(psd, p->pipe_user.nt_user_token, des_access, &acc_granted, &status)) { + status = se_access_check(psd, p->pipe_user.nt_user_token, des_access, &acc_granted); + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { if (p->pipe_user.ut.uid != sec_initial_uid()) { return status; } diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/srv_samr_nt.c b/source3/rpc_server/srv_samr_nt.c index 386e081d4a..c573173900 100644 --- a/source3/rpc_server/srv_samr_nt.c +++ b/source3/rpc_server/srv_samr_nt.c @@ -38,10 +38,10 @@ #define SAMR_USR_RIGHTS_WRITE_PW \ ( READ_CONTROL_ACCESS | \ - SA_RIGHT_USER_CHANGE_PASSWORD | \ - SA_RIGHT_USER_SET_LOC_COM ) + SAMR_USER_ACCESS_CHANGE_PASSWORD | \ + SAMR_USER_ACCESS_SET_LOC_COM) #define SAMR_USR_RIGHTS_CANT_WRITE_PW \ - ( READ_CONTROL_ACCESS | SA_RIGHT_USER_SET_LOC_COM ) + ( READ_CONTROL_ACCESS | SAMR_USER_ACCESS_SET_LOC_COM ) #define DISP_INFO_CACHE_TIMEOUT 10 @@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ static const struct generic_mapping usr_generic_mapping = { static const struct generic_mapping usr_nopwchange_generic_mapping = { GENERIC_RIGHTS_USER_READ, GENERIC_RIGHTS_USER_WRITE, - GENERIC_RIGHTS_USER_EXECUTE & ~SA_RIGHT_USER_CHANGE_PASSWORD, + GENERIC_RIGHTS_USER_EXECUTE & ~SAMR_USER_ACCESS_CHANGE_PASSWORD, GENERIC_RIGHTS_USER_ALL_ACCESS}; static const struct generic_mapping grp_generic_mapping = { GENERIC_RIGHTS_GROUP_READ, @@ -186,8 +186,10 @@ static NTSTATUS access_check_samr_object( SEC_DESC *psd, NT_USER_TOKEN *token, /* check the security descriptor first */ - if ( se_access_check(psd, token, des_access, acc_granted, &status) ) + status = se_access_check(psd, token, des_access, acc_granted); + if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { goto done; + } /* give root a free pass */ @@ -620,7 +622,7 @@ NTSTATUS _samr_OpenDomain(pipes_struct *p, return NT_STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE; status = access_check_samr_function(info->acc_granted, - SA_RIGHT_SAM_OPEN_DOMAIN, + SAMR_ACCESS_OPEN_DOMAIN, "_samr_OpenDomain" ); if ( !NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status) ) @@ -789,7 +791,7 @@ NTSTATUS _samr_SetSecurity(pipes_struct *p, if (sid_equal(&pol_sid, &dacl->aces[i].trustee)) { ret = pdb_set_pass_can_change(sampass, (dacl->aces[i].access_mask & - SA_RIGHT_USER_CHANGE_PASSWORD) ? + SAMR_USER_ACCESS_CHANGE_PASSWORD) ? True: False); break; } @@ -801,7 +803,7 @@ NTSTATUS _samr_SetSecurity(pipes_struct *p, } status = access_check_samr_function(acc_granted, - SA_RIGHT_USER_SET_ATTRIBUTES, + SAMR_USER_ACCESS_SET_ATTRIBUTES, "_samr_SetSecurity"); if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { become_root(); @@ -988,7 +990,7 @@ NTSTATUS _samr_EnumDomainUsers(pipes_struct *p, return NT_STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE; status = access_check_samr_function(info->acc_granted, - SA_RIGHT_DOMAIN_ENUM_ACCOUNTS, + SAMR_DOMAIN_ACCESS_ENUM_ACCOUNTS, "_samr_EnumDomainUsers"); if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { return status; @@ -1127,7 +1129,7 @@ NTSTATUS _samr_EnumDomainGroups(pipes_struct *p, return NT_STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE; status = access_check_samr_function(info->acc_granted, - SA_RIGHT_DOMAIN_ENUM_ACCOUNTS, + SAMR_DOMAIN_ACCESS_ENUM_ACCOUNTS, "_samr_EnumDomainGroups"); if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { return status; @@ -1207,7 +1209,7 @@ NTSTATUS _samr_EnumDomainAliases(pipes_struct *p, sid_string_dbg(&info->sid))); status = access_check_samr_function(info->acc_granted, - SA_RIGHT_DOMAIN_ENUM_ACCOUNTS, + SAMR_DOMAIN_ACCESS_ENUM_ACCOUNTS, "_samr_EnumDomainAliases"); if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { return status; @@ -1480,7 +1482,7 @@ NTSTATUS _samr_QueryDisplayInfo(pipes_struct *p, return NT_STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE; status = access_check_samr_function(info->acc_granted, - SA_RIGHT_DOMAIN_ENUM_ACCOUNTS, + SAMR_DOMAIN_ACCESS_ENUM_ACCOUNTS, "_samr_QueryDisplayInfo"); if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { return status; @@ -1735,7 +1737,7 @@ NTSTATUS _samr_QueryAliasInfo(pipes_struct *p, return NT_STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE; status = access_check_samr_function(acc_granted, - SA_RIGHT_ALIAS_LOOKUP_INFO, + SAMR_ALIAS_ACCESS_LOOKUP_INFO, "_samr_QueryAliasInfo"); if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { return status; @@ -2060,8 +2062,8 @@ NTSTATUS _samr_LookupRids(pipes_struct *p, return NT_STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE; status = access_check_samr_function(acc_granted, - SA_RIGHT_DOMAIN_ENUM_ACCOUNTS, - "_samr__LookupRids"); + SAMR_DOMAIN_ACCESS_ENUM_ACCOUNTS, + "_samr_LookupRids"); if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { return status; } @@ -2144,7 +2146,7 @@ NTSTATUS _samr_OpenUser(pipes_struct *p, return NT_STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE; nt_status = access_check_samr_function(acc_granted, - SA_RIGHT_DOMAIN_OPEN_ACCOUNT, + SAMR_DOMAIN_ACCESS_OPEN_ACCOUNT, "_samr_OpenUser" ); if ( !NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status) ) @@ -2639,7 +2641,7 @@ NTSTATUS _samr_QueryUserInfo(pipes_struct *p, return NT_STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE; status = access_check_samr_function(info->acc_granted, - SA_RIGHT_DOMAIN_OPEN_ACCOUNT, + SAMR_DOMAIN_ACCESS_OPEN_ACCOUNT, "_samr_QueryUserInfo"); if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { return status; @@ -2762,7 +2764,7 @@ NTSTATUS _samr_GetGroupsForUser(pipes_struct *p, return NT_STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE; result = access_check_samr_function(acc_granted, - SA_RIGHT_USER_GET_GROUPS, + SAMR_USER_ACCESS_GET_GROUPS, "_samr_GetGroupsForUser"); if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) { return result; @@ -2889,7 +2891,7 @@ NTSTATUS _samr_QueryDomainInfo(pipes_struct *p, } status = access_check_samr_function(info->acc_granted, - SA_RIGHT_SAM_OPEN_DOMAIN, + SAMR_ACCESS_OPEN_DOMAIN, "_samr_QueryDomainInfo" ); if ( !NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status) ) @@ -3145,7 +3147,7 @@ NTSTATUS _samr_CreateUser2(pipes_struct *p, return NT_STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE; nt_status = access_check_samr_function(acc_granted, - SA_RIGHT_DOMAIN_CREATE_USER, + SAMR_DOMAIN_ACCESS_CREATE_USER, "_samr_CreateUser2"); if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) { return nt_status; @@ -3282,14 +3284,14 @@ NTSTATUS _samr_Connect(pipes_struct *p, if ((info = get_samr_info_by_sid(NULL)) == NULL) return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; - /* don't give away the farm but this is probably ok. The SA_RIGHT_SAM_ENUM_DOMAINS + /* don't give away the farm but this is probably ok. The SAMR_ACCESS_ENUM_DOMAINS was observed from a win98 client trying to enumerate users (when configured user level access control on shares) --jerry */ map_max_allowed_access(p->pipe_user.nt_user_token, &des_access); se_map_generic( &des_access, &sam_generic_mapping ); - info->acc_granted = des_access & (SA_RIGHT_SAM_ENUM_DOMAINS|SA_RIGHT_SAM_OPEN_DOMAIN); + info->acc_granted = des_access & (SAMR_ACCESS_ENUM_DOMAINS|SAMR_ACCESS_OPEN_DOMAIN); /* get a (unique) handle. open a policy on it. */ if (!create_policy_hnd(p, r->out.connect_handle, free_samr_info, (void *)info)) @@ -3472,11 +3474,11 @@ NTSTATUS _samr_LookupDomain(pipes_struct *p, if (!find_policy_by_hnd(p, r->in.connect_handle, (void**)(void *)&info)) return NT_STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE; - /* win9x user manager likes to use SA_RIGHT_SAM_ENUM_DOMAINS here. + /* win9x user manager likes to use SAMR_ACCESS_ENUM_DOMAINS here. Reverted that change so we will work with RAS servers again */ status = access_check_samr_function(info->acc_granted, - SA_RIGHT_SAM_OPEN_DOMAIN, + SAMR_ACCESS_OPEN_DOMAIN, "_samr_LookupDomain"); if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { return status; @@ -3522,7 +3524,7 @@ NTSTATUS _samr_EnumDomains(pipes_struct *p, return NT_STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE; status = access_check_samr_function(info->acc_granted, - SA_RIGHT_SAM_ENUM_DOMAINS, + SAMR_ACCESS_ENUM_DOMAINS, "_samr_EnumDomains"); if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { return status; @@ -3580,7 +3582,7 @@ NTSTATUS _samr_OpenAlias(pipes_struct *p, return NT_STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE; status = access_check_samr_function(acc_granted, - SA_RIGHT_DOMAIN_OPEN_ACCOUNT, + SAMR_DOMAIN_ACCESS_OPEN_ACCOUNT, "_samr_OpenAlias"); if ( !NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status) ) @@ -4107,9 +4109,9 @@ NTSTATUS _samr_SetUserInfo(pipes_struct *p, } /* This is tricky. A WinXP domain join sets - (SA_RIGHT_USER_SET_PASSWORD|SA_RIGHT_USER_SET_ATTRIBUTES|SA_RIGHT_USER_ACCT_FLAGS_EXPIRY) + (SAMR_USER_ACCESS_SET_PASSWORD|SAMR_USER_ACCESS_SET_ATTRIBUTES|SAMR_USER_ACCESS_GET_ATTRIBUTES) The MMC lusrmgr plugin includes these perms and more in the SamrOpenUser(). But the - standard Win32 API calls just ask for SA_RIGHT_USER_SET_PASSWORD in the SamrOpenUser(). + standard Win32 API calls just ask for SAMR_USER_ACCESS_SET_PASSWORD in the SamrOpenUser(). This should be enough for levels 18, 24, 25,& 26. Info level 23 can set more so we'll use the set from the WinXP join as the basis. */ @@ -4118,12 +4120,12 @@ NTSTATUS _samr_SetUserInfo(pipes_struct *p, case 24: case 25: case 26: - acc_required = SA_RIGHT_USER_SET_PASSWORD; + acc_required = SAMR_USER_ACCESS_SET_PASSWORD; break; default: - acc_required = SA_RIGHT_USER_SET_PASSWORD | - SA_RIGHT_USER_SET_ATTRIBUTES | - SA_RIGHT_USER_ACCT_FLAGS_EXPIRY; + acc_required = SAMR_USER_ACCESS_SET_PASSWORD | + SAMR_USER_ACCESS_SET_ATTRIBUTES | + SAMR_USER_ACCESS_GET_ATTRIBUTES; break; } @@ -4340,10 +4342,10 @@ NTSTATUS _samr_GetAliasMembership(pipes_struct *p, return NT_STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE; ntstatus1 = access_check_samr_function(info->acc_granted, - SA_RIGHT_DOMAIN_LOOKUP_ALIAS_BY_MEM, + SAMR_DOMAIN_ACCESS_LOOKUP_ALIAS, "_samr_GetAliasMembership"); ntstatus2 = access_check_samr_function(info->acc_granted, - SA_RIGHT_DOMAIN_OPEN_ACCOUNT, + SAMR_DOMAIN_ACCESS_OPEN_ACCOUNT, "_samr_GetAliasMembership"); if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ntstatus1) || !NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ntstatus2)) { @@ -4410,7 +4412,7 @@ NTSTATUS _samr_GetMembersInAlias(pipes_struct *p, return NT_STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE; status = access_check_samr_function(acc_granted, - SA_RIGHT_ALIAS_GET_MEMBERS, + SAMR_ALIAS_ACCESS_GET_MEMBERS, "_samr_GetMembersInAlias"); if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { return status; @@ -4478,7 +4480,7 @@ NTSTATUS _samr_QueryGroupMember(pipes_struct *p, return NT_STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE; status = access_check_samr_function(acc_granted, - SA_RIGHT_GROUP_GET_MEMBERS, + SAMR_GROUP_ACCESS_GET_MEMBERS, "_samr_QueryGroupMember"); if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { return status; @@ -4542,7 +4544,7 @@ NTSTATUS _samr_AddAliasMember(pipes_struct *p, return NT_STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE; status = access_check_samr_function(acc_granted, - SA_RIGHT_ALIAS_ADD_MEMBER, + SAMR_ALIAS_ACCESS_ADD_MEMBER, "_samr_AddAliasMember"); if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { return status; @@ -4591,7 +4593,7 @@ NTSTATUS _samr_DeleteAliasMember(pipes_struct *p, return NT_STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE; status = access_check_samr_function(acc_granted, - SA_RIGHT_ALIAS_REMOVE_MEMBER, + SAMR_ALIAS_ACCESS_REMOVE_MEMBER, "_samr_DeleteAliasMember"); if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { return status; @@ -4642,7 +4644,7 @@ NTSTATUS _samr_AddGroupMember(pipes_struct *p, return NT_STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE; status = access_check_samr_function(acc_granted, - SA_RIGHT_GROUP_ADD_MEMBER, + SAMR_GROUP_ACCESS_ADD_MEMBER, "_samr_AddGroupMember"); if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { return status; @@ -4702,7 +4704,7 @@ NTSTATUS _samr_DeleteGroupMember(pipes_struct *p, return NT_STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE; status = access_check_samr_function(acc_granted, - SA_RIGHT_GROUP_REMOVE_MEMBER, + SAMR_GROUP_ACCESS_REMOVE_MEMBER, "_samr_DeleteGroupMember"); if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { return status; @@ -4983,7 +4985,7 @@ NTSTATUS _samr_CreateDomainGroup(pipes_struct *p, return NT_STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE; status = access_check_samr_function(acc_granted, - SA_RIGHT_DOMAIN_CREATE_GROUP, + SAMR_DOMAIN_ACCESS_CREATE_GROUP, "_samr_CreateDomainGroup"); if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { return status; @@ -5065,7 +5067,7 @@ NTSTATUS _samr_CreateDomAlias(pipes_struct *p, return NT_STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE; result = access_check_samr_function(acc_granted, - SA_RIGHT_DOMAIN_CREATE_ALIAS, + SAMR_DOMAIN_ACCESS_CREATE_ALIAS, "_samr_CreateDomAlias"); if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) { return result; @@ -5157,7 +5159,7 @@ NTSTATUS _samr_QueryGroupInfo(pipes_struct *p, return NT_STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE; status = access_check_samr_function(acc_granted, - SA_RIGHT_GROUP_LOOKUP_INFO, + SAMR_GROUP_ACCESS_LOOKUP_INFO, "_samr_QueryGroupInfo"); if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { return status; @@ -5263,7 +5265,7 @@ NTSTATUS _samr_SetGroupInfo(pipes_struct *p, return NT_STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE; status = access_check_samr_function(acc_granted, - SA_RIGHT_GROUP_SET_INFO, + SAMR_GROUP_ACCESS_SET_INFO, "_samr_SetGroupInfo"); if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { return status; @@ -5328,7 +5330,7 @@ NTSTATUS _samr_SetAliasInfo(pipes_struct *p, return NT_STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE; status = access_check_samr_function(acc_granted, - SA_RIGHT_ALIAS_SET_INFO, + SAMR_ALIAS_ACCESS_SET_INFO, "_samr_SetAliasInfo"); if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { return status; @@ -5472,7 +5474,7 @@ NTSTATUS _samr_OpenGroup(pipes_struct *p, return NT_STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE; status = access_check_samr_function(acc_granted, - SA_RIGHT_DOMAIN_OPEN_ACCOUNT, + SAMR_DOMAIN_ACCESS_OPEN_ACCOUNT, "_samr_OpenGroup"); if ( !NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status) ) @@ -5626,11 +5628,11 @@ NTSTATUS _samr_SetDomainInfo(pipes_struct *p, * levels here, but we're really just looking for * GENERIC_RIGHTS_DOMAIN_WRITE access. Unfortunately * this maps to different specific bits. So - * assume if we have SA_RIGHT_DOMAIN_SET_INFO_1 + * assume if we have SAMR_DOMAIN_ACCESS_SET_INFO_1 * set we are ok. */ result = access_check_samr_function(info->acc_granted, - SA_RIGHT_DOMAIN_SET_INFO_1, + SAMR_DOMAIN_ACCESS_SET_INFO_1, "_samr_SetDomainInfo"); if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) @@ -5703,7 +5705,7 @@ NTSTATUS _samr_GetDisplayEnumerationIndex(pipes_struct *p, } status = access_check_samr_function(info->acc_granted, - SA_RIGHT_DOMAIN_ENUM_ACCOUNTS, + SAMR_DOMAIN_ACCESS_ENUM_ACCOUNTS, "_samr_GetDisplayEnumerationIndex"); if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { return status; diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/srv_svcctl_nt.c b/source3/rpc_server/srv_svcctl_nt.c index a7215ac686..cb6657400f 100644 --- a/source3/rpc_server/srv_svcctl_nt.c +++ b/source3/rpc_server/srv_svcctl_nt.c @@ -123,16 +123,12 @@ static struct service_control_op* find_service_by_name( const char *name ) static NTSTATUS svcctl_access_check( SEC_DESC *sec_desc, NT_USER_TOKEN *token, uint32 access_desired, uint32 *access_granted ) { - NTSTATUS result; - if ( geteuid() == sec_initial_uid() ) { DEBUG(5,("svcctl_access_check: using root's token\n")); token = get_root_nt_token(); } - se_access_check( sec_desc, token, access_desired, access_granted, &result ); - - return result; + return se_access_check( sec_desc, token, access_desired, access_granted); } /******************************************************************** diff --git a/source3/smbd/file_access.c b/source3/smbd/file_access.c index 84c993d06b..c535bc7fd8 100644 --- a/source3/smbd/file_access.c +++ b/source3/smbd/file_access.c @@ -30,7 +30,6 @@ bool can_access_file_acl(struct connection_struct *conn, const char * fname, uint32_t access_mask) { - bool result; NTSTATUS status; uint32_t access_granted; struct security_descriptor *secdesc = NULL; @@ -45,10 +44,10 @@ bool can_access_file_acl(struct connection_struct *conn, return false; } - result = se_access_check(secdesc, conn->server_info->ptok, - access_mask, &access_granted, &status); + status = se_access_check(secdesc, conn->server_info->ptok, + access_mask, &access_granted); TALLOC_FREE(secdesc); - return result; + return NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status); } /**************************************************************************** diff --git a/source3/smbd/sesssetup.c b/source3/smbd/sesssetup.c index a482b3398a..b258386121 100644 --- a/source3/smbd/sesssetup.c +++ b/source3/smbd/sesssetup.c @@ -1447,8 +1447,7 @@ void reply_sesssetup_and_X(struct smb_request *req) remove_from_common_flags2(FLAGS2_32_BIT_ERROR_CODES); if ((passlen1 > MAX_PASS_LEN) - || (passlen1 > smb_bufrem(req->inbuf, - smb_buf(req->inbuf)))) { + || (passlen1 > smb_buflen(req->inbuf))) { reply_nterror(req, nt_status_squash( NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER)); END_PROFILE(SMBsesssetupX); diff --git a/source3/utils/net_rpc.c b/source3/utils/net_rpc.c index 531bbfe43c..d3b10019d4 100644 --- a/source3/utils/net_rpc.c +++ b/source3/utils/net_rpc.c @@ -4285,16 +4285,15 @@ static void show_userlist(struct rpc_pipe_client *pipe_hnd, uint32 acc_granted; if (share_sd != NULL) { - if (!se_access_check(share_sd, &tokens[i].token, - 1, &acc_granted, &status)) { + status = se_access_check(share_sd, &tokens[i].token, + 1, &acc_granted); + + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { DEBUG(1, ("Could not check share_sd for " "user %s\n", tokens[i].name)); continue; } - - if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) - continue; } if (root_sd == NULL) { @@ -4302,16 +4301,13 @@ static void show_userlist(struct rpc_pipe_client *pipe_hnd, continue; } - if (!se_access_check(root_sd, &tokens[i].token, - 1, &acc_granted, &status)) { + status = se_access_check(root_sd, &tokens[i].token, + 1, &acc_granted); + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { DEBUG(1, ("Could not check root_sd for user %s\n", tokens[i].name)); continue; } - - if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) - continue; - d_printf(" %s\n", tokens[i].name); } @@ -6117,7 +6113,7 @@ static int rpc_trustdom_list(struct net_context *c, int argc, const char **argv) /* SamrConnect2 */ nt_status = rpccli_samr_Connect2(pipe_hnd, mem_ctx, pipe_hnd->desthost, - SA_RIGHT_SAM_OPEN_DOMAIN, + SAMR_ACCESS_OPEN_DOMAIN, &connect_hnd); if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) { DEBUG(0, ("Couldn't open SAMR policy handle. Error was %s\n", @@ -6131,7 +6127,7 @@ static int rpc_trustdom_list(struct net_context *c, int argc, const char **argv) able to enumerate accounts*/ nt_status = rpccli_samr_OpenDomain(pipe_hnd, mem_ctx, &connect_hnd, - SA_RIGHT_DOMAIN_ENUM_ACCOUNTS, + SAMR_DOMAIN_ACCESS_ENUM_ACCOUNTS, queried_dom_sid, &domain_hnd); if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) { |