diff options
author | Gerald Carter <jerry@samba.org> | 2005-09-23 15:23:16 +0000 |
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committer | Gerald (Jerry) Carter <jerry@samba.org> | 2007-10-10 11:03:42 -0500 |
commit | 963351f59d4256743b7238e26614411aeeabc59d (patch) | |
tree | 5e76ae541879e33808a0fe652bddd2e22b13049c | |
parent | 79a822b7e62d474f33884731282491d9bf8152ae (diff) | |
download | samba-963351f59d4256743b7238e26614411aeeabc59d.tar.gz samba-963351f59d4256743b7238e26614411aeeabc59d.tar.bz2 samba-963351f59d4256743b7238e26614411aeeabc59d.zip |
r10454: * prevent privilege code from storing an empty SID
(and filter it out if one is already there)
* Fix LUID value match in privilege_set_to_se_priv()
(fix jmcd's bug report).
(This used to be commit 356334264f5cd3a2480c3288ec40e0ee63264e1b)
-rw-r--r-- | source3/lib/privileges.c | 38 |
1 files changed, 31 insertions, 7 deletions
diff --git a/source3/lib/privileges.c b/source3/lib/privileges.c index a2797f2a5d..d95c1ba4c1 100644 --- a/source3/lib/privileges.c +++ b/source3/lib/privileges.c @@ -286,6 +286,11 @@ static BOOL set_privileges( const DOM_SID *sid, SE_PRIV *mask ) if ( !tdb ) return False; + if ( !sid || (sid->num_auths == 0) ) { + DEBUG(0,("set_privileges: Refusing to store empty SID!\n")); + return False; + } + /* PRIV_<SID> (NULL terminated) as the key */ fstr_sprintf( keystr, "%s%s", PRIVPREFIX, sid_string_static(sid) ); @@ -498,6 +503,12 @@ static int priv_traverse_fn(TDB_CONTEXT *t, TDB_DATA key, TDB_DATA data, void *s fstrcpy( sid_string, &key.dptr[strlen(PRIVPREFIX)] ); + /* this is a last ditch safety check to preventing returning + and invalid SID (i've somehow run into this on development branches) */ + + if ( strcmp( "S-0-0", sid_string ) == 0 ) + return 0; + if ( !string_to_sid(&sid, sid_string) ) { DEBUG(0,("travsersal_fn_enum__acct: Could not convert SID [%s]\n", sid_string)); @@ -812,11 +823,28 @@ BOOL se_priv_to_privilege_set( PRIVILEGE_SET *set, SE_PRIV *mask ) /******************************************************************* *******************************************************************/ -BOOL privilege_set_to_se_priv( SE_PRIV *mask, PRIVILEGE_SET *privset ) +static BOOL luid_to_se_priv( LUID *luid, SE_PRIV *mask ) { int i; uint32 num_privs = count_all_privileges(); + for ( i=0; i<num_privs; i++ ) { + if ( luid->low == privs[i].luid.low ) { + se_priv_copy( mask, &privs[i].se_priv ); + return True; + } + } + + return False; +} + +/******************************************************************* +*******************************************************************/ + +BOOL privilege_set_to_se_priv( SE_PRIV *mask, PRIVILEGE_SET *privset ) +{ + int i; + ZERO_STRUCTP( mask ); for ( i=0; i<privset->count; i++ ) { @@ -828,12 +856,8 @@ BOOL privilege_set_to_se_priv( SE_PRIV *mask, PRIVILEGE_SET *privset ) if ( privset->set[i].luid.high != 0 ) return False; - /* make sure :LUID.low is in range */ - if ( privset->set[i].luid.low == 0 || privset->set[i].luid.low > num_privs ) - return False; - - r = privs[privset->set[i].luid.low - 1].se_priv; - se_priv_add( mask, &r ); + if ( luid_to_se_priv( &privset->set[i].luid, &r ) ) + se_priv_add( mask, &r ); } return True; |