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authorJelmer Vernooij <jelmer@samba.org>2002-08-29 16:18:59 +0000
committerJelmer Vernooij <jelmer@samba.org>2002-08-29 16:18:59 +0000
commitf338cf5a83d4ebde456bb2d2cf02e85eeb2e1454 (patch)
tree83704e2b204f688d9db23d1ae19ce4e6eaca5d57 /docs/textdocs
parent38cc0a1b81f4447699064bfa3f4d8ca42f5cb205 (diff)
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Remove more obsolete documents
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Diffstat (limited to 'docs/textdocs')
-rw-r--r--docs/textdocs/Passwords.txt46
-rw-r--r--docs/textdocs/Tracing.txt93
-rw-r--r--docs/textdocs/UNIX-SMB.txt231
-rw-r--r--docs/textdocs/cifsntdomain.txt1498
4 files changed, 0 insertions, 1868 deletions
diff --git a/docs/textdocs/Passwords.txt b/docs/textdocs/Passwords.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 25d4c816f0..0000000000
--- a/docs/textdocs/Passwords.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
-Contributor: Unknown
-Date: Updated April 19th 1999.
-Status: Current
-
-Subject: NOTE ABOUT PASSWORDS
-=============================================================================
-
-Unix systems use a wide variety of methods for checking the validity
-of a password. This is primarily controlled with the Makefile defines
-mentioned in the Makefile.
-
-Also note that some clients (notably WfWg) uppercase the password
-before sending it. The server tries the password as it receives it and
-also after lowercasing it.
-
-The Samba server can also be configured to try different
-upper/lowercase combinations. This is controlled by the [global]
-parameter "password level". A level of N means to try all combinations
-up to N uppercase characters in the password. A high value can chew a
-fair bit of CPU time and can lower the security of your system. Do not
-use this options unless you really need it - the time taken for
-password checking can become so high that clients time out.
-
-If you do use the "password level" option then you might like to use
--DUFC_CRYPT in your Makefile. On some machine this makes password
-checking _much_ faster. This is also useful if you use the @group
-syntax in the user= option.
-
-If your site uses AFS (the Andrew File System), you can use the AFS section
-in the Makefile. This will first attempt to authenticate a username and
-password to AFS. If that succeeds, then the associated AFS rights will be
-granted. Otherwise, the password checking routine falls back to whatever
-Unix password checking method you are using. Note that the AFS code is
-only written and tested for AFS 3.3 and later.
-
-
-SECURITY = SERVER or DOMAIN
-===========================
-
-Samba can use a remote server to do its username/password
-validation. This allows you to have one central machine (for example a
-NT box) control the passwords for the Unix box.
-
-See the section on "security =" in smb.conf(5) for details.
-
-
diff --git a/docs/textdocs/Tracing.txt b/docs/textdocs/Tracing.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 6cc1d69258..0000000000
--- a/docs/textdocs/Tracing.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,93 +0,0 @@
-Contributor: Andrew Tridgell <samba@samba.org>
-Date: Old
-Status: Questionable
-
-Subject: How to trace samba system calls for debugging purposes
-=============================================================================
-
-This file describes how to do a system call trace on Samba to work out
-what its doing wrong. This is not for the faint of heart, but if you
-are reading this then you are probably desperate.
-
-Actually its not as bad as the the above makes it sound, just don't
-expect the output to be very pretty :-)
-
-Ok, down to business. One of the big advantages of unix systems is
-that they nearly all come with a system trace utility that allows you
-to monitor all system calls that a program is making. This is
-extremely using for debugging and also helps when trying to work out
-why something is slower than you expect. You can use system tracing
-without any special compilation options.
-
-The system trace utility is called different things on different
-systems. On Linux systems its called strace. Under SunOS 4 its called
-trace. Under SVR4 style systems (including solaris) its called
-truss. Under many BSD systems its called ktrace.
-
-The first thing you should do is read the man page for your native
-system call tracer. In the discussion below I'll assume its called
-strace as strace is the only portable system tracer (its available for
-free for many unix types) and its also got some of the nicest
-features.
-
-Next, try using strace on some simple commands. For example, "strace
-ls" or "strace echo hello".
-
-You'll notice that it produces a LOT of output. It is showing you the
-arguments to every system call that the program makes and the
-result. Very little happens in a program without a system call so you
-get lots of output. You'll also find that it produces a lot of
-"preamble" stuff showing the loading of shared libraries etc. Ignore
-this (unless its going wrong!)
-
-For example, the only line that really matters in the "strace echo
-hello" output is:
-
-write(1, "hello\n", 6) = 6
-
-all the rest is just setting up to run the program.
-
-Ok, now you're famialiar with strace. To use it on Samba you need to
-strace the running smbd daemon. The way I tend ot use it is to first
-login from my Windows PC to the Samba server, then use smbstatus to
-find which process ID that client is attached to, then as root I do
-"strace -p PID" to attach to that process. I normally redirect the
-stderr output from this command to a file for later perusal. For
-example, if I'm using a csh style shell:
-
- strace -f -p 3872 >& strace.out
-
-or with a sh style shell:
-
- strace -f -p 3872 > strace.out 2>&1
-
-Note the "-f" option. This is only available on some systems, and
-allows you to trace not just the current process, but any children it
-forks. This is great for finding printing problems caused by the
-"print command" being wrong.
-
-Once you are attached you then can do whatever it is on the client
-that is causing problems and you will capture all the system calls
-that smbd makes.
-
-So how do you interpret the results? Generally I search through the
-output for strings that I know will appear when the problem
-happens. For example, if I am having touble with permissions on a file
-I would search for that files name in the strace output and look at
-the surrounding lines. Another trick is to match up file descriptor
-numbers and "follow" what happens to an open file until it is closed.
-
-Beyond this you will have to use your initiative. To give you an idea
-of wehat you are looking for here is a piece of strace output that
-shows that /dev/null is not world writeable, which causes printing to
-fail with Samba:
-
-[pid 28268] open("/dev/null", O_RDWR) = -1 EACCES (Permission denied)
-[pid 28268] open("/dev/null", O_WRONLY) = -1 EACCES (Permission denied)
-
-the process is trying to first open /dev/null read-write then
-read-only. Both fail. This means /dev/null has incorrect permissions.
-
-Have fun!
-
-(please send updates/fixes to this file to samba@samba.org)
diff --git a/docs/textdocs/UNIX-SMB.txt b/docs/textdocs/UNIX-SMB.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index c3d7643cbc..0000000000
--- a/docs/textdocs/UNIX-SMB.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,231 +0,0 @@
-Contributor: Andrew Tridgell <samba@samba.org>
-Date: April 1995
-
-Subject: Discussion of NetBIOS in a Unix World
-============================================================================
-
-This is a short document that describes some of the issues that
-confront a SMB implementation on unix, and how Samba copes with
-them. They may help people who are looking at unix<->PC
-interoperability.
-
-It was written to help out a person who was writing a paper on unix to
-PC connectivity.
-
-
-Usernames
-=========
-
-The SMB protocol has only a loose username concept. Early SMB
-protocols (such as CORE and COREPLUS) have no username concept at
-all. Even in later protocols clients often attempt operations
-(particularly printer operations) without first validating a username
-on the server.
-
-Unix security is based around username/password pairs. A unix box
-should not allow clients to do any substantive operation without some
-sort of validation.
-
-The problem mostly manifests itself when the unix server is in "share
-level" security mode. This is the default mode as the alternative
-"user level" security mode usually forces a client to connect to the
-server as the same user for each connected share, which is
-inconvenient in many sites.
-
-In "share level" security the client normally gives a username in the
-"session setup" protocol, but does not supply an accompanying
-password. The client then connects to resources using the "tree
-connect" protocol, and supplies a password. The problem is that the
-user on the PC types the username and the password in different
-contexts, unaware that they need to go together to give access to the
-server. The username is normally the one the user typed in when they
-"logged onto" the PC (this assumes Windows for Workgroups). The
-password is the one they chose when connecting to the disk or printer.
-
-The user often chooses a totally different username for their login as
-for the drive connection. Often they also want to access different
-drives as different usernames. The unix server needs some way of
-divining the correct username to combine with each password.
-
-Samba tries to avoid this problem using several methods. These succeed
-in the vast majority of cases. The methods include username maps, the
-service%user syntax, the saving of session setup usernames for later
-validation and the derivation of the username from the service name
-(either directly or via the user= option).
-
-File Ownership
-==============
-
-The commonly used SMB protocols have no way of saying "you can't do
-that because you don't own the file". They have, in fact, no concept
-of file ownership at all.
-
-This brings up all sorts of interesting problems. For example, when
-you copy a file to a unix drive, and the file is world writeable but
-owned by another user the file will transfer correctly but will
-receive the wrong date. This is because the utime() call under unix
-only succeeds for the owner of the file, or root, even if the file is
-world writeable. For security reasons Samba does all file operations
-as the validated user, not root, so the utime() fails. This can stuff
-up shared development diectories as programs like "make" will not get
-file time comparisons right.
-
-There are several possible solutions to this problem, including
-username mapping, and forcing a specific username for particular
-shares.
-
-Passwords
-=========
-
-Many SMB clients uppercase passwords before sending them. I have no
-idea why they do this. Interestingly WfWg uppercases the password only
-if the server is running a protocol greater than COREPLUS, so
-obviously it isn't just the data entry routines that are to blame.
-
-Unix passwords are case sensitive. So if users use mixed case
-passwords they are in trouble.
-
-Samba can try to cope with this by either using the "password level"
-option which causes Samba to try the offered password with up to the
-specified number of case changes, or by using the "password server"
-option which allows Samba to do its validation via another machine
-(typically a WinNT server).
-
-Samba supports the password encryption method used by SMB
-clients. Note that the use of password encryption in Microsoft
-networking leads to password hashes that are "plain text equivalent".
-This means that it is *VERY* important to ensure that the Samba
-smbpasswd file containing these password hashes is only readable
-by the root user. See the documentation ENCRYPTION.txt for more
-details.
-
-
-Locking
-=======
-
-The locking calls available under a DOS/Windows environment are much
-richer than those available in unix. This means a unix server (like
-Samba) choosing to use the standard fcntl() based unix locking calls
-to implement SMB locking has to improvise a bit.
-
-One major problem is that dos locks can be in a 32 bit (unsigned)
-range. Unix locking calls are 32 bits, but are signed, giving only a 31
-bit range. Unfortunately OLE2 clients use the top bit to select a
-locking range used for OLE semaphores.
-
-To work around this problem Samba compresses the 32 bit range into 31
-bits by appropriate bit shifting. This seems to work but is not
-ideal. In a future version a separate SMB lockd may be added to cope
-with the problem.
-
-It also doesn't help that many unix lockd daemons are very buggy and
-crash at the slightest provocation. They normally go mostly unused in
-a unix environment because few unix programs use byte range
-locking. The stress of huge numbers of lock requests from dos/windows
-clients can kill the daemon on some systems.
-
-The second major problem is the "opportunistic locking" requested by
-some clients. If a client requests opportunistic locking then it is
-asking the server to notify it if anyone else tries to do something on
-the same file, at which time the client will say if it is willing to
-give up its lock. Unix has no simple way of implementing
-opportunistic locking, and currently Samba has no support for it.
-
-Deny Modes
-==========
-
-When a SMB client opens a file it asks for a particular "deny mode" to
-be placed on the file. These modes (DENY_NONE, DENY_READ, DENY_WRITE,
-DENY_ALL, DENY_FCB and DENY_DOS) specify what actions should be
-allowed by anyone else who tries to use the file at the same time. If
-DENY_READ is placed on the file, for example, then any attempt to open
-the file for reading should fail.
-
-Unix has no equivalent notion. To implement this Samba uses either lock
-files based on the files inode and placed in a separate lock
-directory or a shared memory implementation. The lock file method
-is clumsy and consumes processing and file resources,
-the shared memory implementation is vastly prefered and is turned on
-by default for those systems that support it.
-
-Trapdoor UIDs
-=============
-
-A SMB session can run with several uids on the one socket. This
-happens when a user connects to two shares with different
-usernames. To cope with this the unix server needs to switch uids
-within the one process. On some unixes (such as SCO) this is not
-possible. This means that on those unixes the client is restricted to
-a single uid.
-
-Note that you can also get the "trapdoor uid" message for other
-reasons. Please see the FAQ for details.
-
-Port numbers
-============
-
-There is a convention that clients on sockets use high "unprivilaged"
-port numbers (>1000) and connect to servers on low "privilaged" port
-numbers. This is enforced in Unix as non-root users can't open a
-socket for listening on port numbers less than 1000.
-
-Most PC based SMB clients (such as WfWg and WinNT) don't follow this
-convention completely. The main culprit is the netbios nameserving on
-udp port 137. Name query requests come from a source port of 137. This
-is a problem when you combine it with the common firewalling technique
-of not allowing incoming packets on low port numbers. This means that
-these clients can't query a netbios nameserver on the other side of a
-low port based firewall.
-
-The problem is more severe with netbios node status queries. I've
-found that WfWg, Win95 and WinNT3.5 all respond to netbios node status
-queries on port 137 no matter what the source port was in the
-request. This works between machines that are both using port 137, but
-it means it's not possible for a unix user to do a node status request
-to any of these OSes unless they are running as root. The answer comes
-back, but it goes to port 137 which the unix user can't listen
-on. Interestingly WinNT3.1 got this right - it sends node status
-responses back to the source port in the request.
-
-
-Protocol Complexity
-===================
-
-There are many "protocol levels" in the SMB protocol. It seems that
-each time new functionality was added to a Microsoft operating system,
-they added the equivalent functions in a new protocol level of the SMB
-protocol to "externalise" the new capabilities.
-
-This means the protocol is very "rich", offering many ways of doing
-each file operation. This means SMB servers need to be complex and
-large. It also means it is very difficult to make them bug free. It is
-not just Samba that suffers from this problem, other servers such as
-WinNT don't support every variation of every call and it has almost
-certainly been a headache for MS developers to support the myriad of
-SMB calls that are available.
-
-There are about 65 "top level" operations in the SMB protocol (things
-like SMBread and SMBwrite). Some of these include hundreds of
-sub-functions (SMBtrans has at least 120 sub-functions, like
-DosPrintQAdd and NetSessionEnum). All of them take several options
-that can change the way they work. Many take dozens of possible
-"information levels" that change the structures that need to be
-returned. Samba supports all but 2 of the "top level" functions. It
-supports only 8 (so far) of the SMBtrans sub-functions. Even NT
-doesn't support them all.
-
-Samba currently supports up to the "NT LM 0.12" protocol, which is the
-one preferred by Win95 and WinNT3.5. Luckily this protocol level has a
-"capabilities" field which specifies which super-duper new-fangled
-options the server suports. This helps to make the implementation of
-this protocol level much easier.
-
-There is also a problem with the SMB specications. SMB is a X/Open
-spec, but the X/Open book is far from ideal, and fails to cover many
-important issues, leaving much to the imagination. Microsoft recently
-renamed the SMB protocol CIFS (Common Internet File System) and have
-published new specifications. These are far superior to the old
-X/Open documents but there are still undocumented calls and features.
-This specification is actively being worked on by a CIFS developers
-mailing list hosted by Microsft.
-
diff --git a/docs/textdocs/cifsntdomain.txt b/docs/textdocs/cifsntdomain.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 643b8957c9..0000000000
--- a/docs/textdocs/cifsntdomain.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,1498 +0,0 @@
-NT Domain Authentication
-------------------------
-
-Authors: - Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton (lkcl@switchboard.net)
--------- - Paul Ashton (paul@argo.demon.co.uk)
- - Duncan Stansfield (duncans@sco.com)
-
- Copyright (C) 1997 Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton
- Copyright (C) 1997 Paul Ashton
- Copyright (C) 1997 Duncan Stansfield
-
-Version: 0.024 (01Nov97)
---------
-
-Distribution: Unlimited and encouraged, for the purposes of implementation
-------------- and comments. Feedback welcomed by the authors.
-
-Liability: Absolutely none accepted implicitly or explicitly, direct
----------- or consequentially, for use, abuse, misuse, lack of use,
- misunderstandings, mistakes, omissions, mis-information for
- anything in or not in, related to or not related to, or
- pertaining to this document, or anything else that a lawyer
- can think of or not think of.
-
-Warning: Please bear in mind that an incorrect implementation of this
--------- protocol can cause NT workstation to fail irrevocably, for
- which the authors accept no liability (see above). Please
- contact your vendor if you have any problems.
-
-Sources: - Packet Traces from Netmonitor (Service Pack 1 and above)
--------- - Paul Ashton and Luke Leighton's other "NT Domain" doc.
- - CIFS documentation - cifs6.txt
- - CIFS documentation - cifsrap2.txt
-
-Original: http://mailhost.cb1.com/~lkcl/cifsntdomain.txt.
---------- (Controlled copy maintained by lkcl@switchboard.net)
-
-Credits: - Paul Ashton: loads of work with Net Monitor;
--------- understanding the NT authentication system;
- reference implementation of the NT domain support on which
- this document is originally based.
- - Duncan Stansfield: low-level analysis of MSRPC Pipes.
- - Linus Nordberg: producing c-code from Paul's crypto spec.
- - Windows Sourcer development team
-
-
-Contents:
----------
-
- 1) Introduction
-
- 2) Structures and notes
-
- 2.1) Notes
- 2.3) Enumerations
- 2.3) Structures
-
- 3) Transact Named Pipe Header/Tail
-
- 3.1) MSRPC Pipes
- 3.2) Header
- 3.3) Tail
-
- 4) NTLSA Transact Named Pipe
-
- 4.1) LSA Open Policy
- 4.2) LSA Query Info Policy
- 4.3) LSA Enumerate Trusted Domains
- 4.4) LSA Open Secret
- 4.5) LSA Close
- 4.6) LSA Lookup SIDS
- 4.7) LSA Lookup Names
-
- 5) NETLOGON rpc Transact Named Pipe
-
- 5.1) LSA Request Challenge
- 5.2) LSA Authenticate 2
- 5.3) LSA Server Password Set
- 5.4) LSA SAM Logon
- 5.5) LSA SAM Logoff
-
- 6) \\MAILSLOT\NET\NTLOGON
-
- 6.1) Query for PDC
- 6.2) SAM Logon
-
- 7) SRVSVC Transact Named Pipe
-
- 7.1) Net Share Enum
- 7.2) Net Server Get Info
-
-
-Appendix:
----------
-
- A1) Cryptographic side of NT Domain Authentication
-
- A1.1) Definitions
- A1.2) Protocol
- A1.3) Comments
-
- A2) SIDs and RIDs
-
- A2.1) Well-known SIDs
-
- A2.1.1) Universal well-known SIDs
- A2.1.2) NT well-known SIDs
-
- A2.2) Well-known RIDS
-
- A2.2.1) Well-known RID users
- A2.2.2) Well-known RID groups
- A2.2.3) Well-known RID aliases
-
-
-
-1) Introduction
----------------
-
-
-This document contains information to provide an NT workstation with login
-services, without the need for an NT server.
-
-It should be possible to select a domain instead of a workgroup (in the NT
-workstation's TCP/IP settings) and after the obligatory reboot, type in a
-username, password, select a domain and successfully log in. I would
-appreciate any feedback on your experiences with this process, and any
-comments, corrections and additions to this document.
-
-
-The packets described here can be easily derived from (and are probably
-better understood using) Netmon.exe. You will need to use the version
-of Netmon that matches your system, in order to correctly decode the
-NETLOGON, lsarpc and srvsvc Transact pipes. This document is derived from
-NT Service Pack 1 and its corresponding version of Netmon. It is intended
-that an annotated packet trace be produced, which will likely be more
-instructive than this document.
-
-Also needed, to fully implement NT Domain Login Services, is the
-document describing the cryptographic part of the NT authentication.
-This document is available from comp.protocols.smb; from the ntsecurity.net
-digest and from the samba digest, amongst other sources.
-
-A copy is available from:
-
-http://ntbugtraq.rc.on.ca/SCRIPTS/WA.EXE?A2=ind9708&L=ntbugtraq&O=A&P=2935
-http://mailhost.cb1.com/~lkcl/crypt.html
-
-
-A c-code implementation, provided by Linus Nordberg <linus@incolumitas.se>
-of this protocol is available from:
-
-http://samba.org/cgi-bin/mfs/01/digest/1997/97aug/0391.html
-http://mailhost.cb1.com/~lkcl/crypt.txt
-
-
-Also used to provide debugging information is the Check Build version of
-NT workstation, and enabling full debugging in NETLOGON. This is
-achieved by setting the following REG_SZ registry key to 0x1ffffff:
-
-HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Netlogon\Parameters
-
-- Incorrect direct editing of the registry can cause your machine to fail.
- Then again, so can incorrect implementation of this protocol.
- See "Liability:" above.
-
-
-Bear in mind that each packet over-the-wire will have its origin in an
-API call. Therefore, there are likely to be structures, enumerations
-and defines that are usefully documented elsewhere.
-
-
-This document is by no means complete or authoritative. Missing sections
-include, but are not limited to:
-
-- the meaning (and use by NT) of SIDs and RIDs.
-
-- mappings of RIDs to usernames (and vice-versa).
-
-- what a User ID is and what a Group ID is.
-
-- the exact meaning/definition of various magic constants or enumerations.
-
-- the reply error code and use of that error code when a workstation
- becomes a member of a domain (to be described later). Failure to
- return this error code will make the workstation report that it is
- already a member of the domain.
-
-- the cryptographic side of the NetrServerPasswordSet command, which would
- allow the workstation to change its password. This password is used to
- generate the long-term session key. [It is possible to reject this
- command, and keep the default workstation password].
-
-
-2) Notes and Structures
------------------------
-
-
-2.1) Notes
-----------
-
-- In the SMB Transact pipes, some "Structures", described here, appear to be
- 4-byte aligned with the SMB header, at their start. Exactly which
- "Structures" need aligning is not precisely known or documented.
-
-- In the UDP NTLOGON Mailslots, some "Structures", described here, appear to be
- 2-byte aligned with the start of the mailslot, at their start.
-
-- Domain SID is of the format S-revision-version-auth1-auth2...authN.
- e.g S-1-5-123-456-789-123-456. the 5 could be a sub-revision.
-
-- any undocumented buffer pointers must be non-zero if the string buffer it
- refers to contains characters. exactly what value they should be is unknown.
- 0x0000 0002 seems to do the trick to indicate that the buffer exists. a
- NULL buffer pointer indicates that the string buffer is of zero length.
- If the buffer pointer is NULL, then it is suspected that the structure it
- refers to is NOT put into (or taken out of) the SMB data stream. This is
- empirically derived from, for example, the LSA SAM Logon response packet,
- where if the buffer pointer is NULL, the user information is not inserted
- into the data stream. Exactly what happens with an array of buffer pointers
- is not known, although an educated guess can be made.
-
-- an array of structures (a container) appears to have a count and a pointer.
- if the count is zero, the pointer is also zero. no further data is put
- into or taken out of the SMB data stream. if the count is non-zero, then
- the pointer is also non-zero. immediately following the pointer is the
- count again, followed by an array of container sub-structures. the count
- appears a third time after the last sub-structure.
-
-
-2.2) Enumerations
------------------
-
-- MSRPC Header type. command number in the msrpc packet header
-
- MSRPC_Request: 0x00
- MSRPC_Response: 0x02
- MSRPC_Bind: 0x0B
- MSRPC_BindAck: 0x0C
-
-- MSRPC Packet info. the meaning of these flags is undocumented
-
- FirstFrag: 0x01
- LastFrag: 0x02
- NotaFrag: 0x04
- RecRespond: 0x08
- NoMultiplex: 0x10
- NotForIdemp: 0x20
- NotforBcast: 0x40
- NoUuid: 0x80
-
-
-2.3) Structures
----------------
-
-- sizeof VOID* is 32 bits.
-
-- sizeof char is 8 bits.
-
-- UTIME is 32 bits, indicating time in seconds since 01jan1970. documented
- in cifs6.txt (section 3.5 page, page 30).
-
-- NTTIME is 64 bits. documented in cifs6.txt (section 3.5 page, page 30).
-
-- DOM_SID (domain SID structure) :
-
- UINT32 num of sub-authorities in domain SID
- UINT8 SID revision number
- UINT8 num of sub-authorities in domain SID
- UINT8[6] 6 bytes for domain SID - Identifier Authority.
- UINT16[n_subauths] domain SID sub-authorities
-
- Note: the domain SID is documented elsewhere.
-
-- STR (string) :
-
- char[] null-terminated string of ascii characters.
-
-- UNIHDR (unicode string header) :
-
- UINT16 length of unicode string
- UINT16 max length of unicode string
- UINT32 4 - undocumented.
-
-- UNIHDR2 (unicode string header plus buffer pointer) :
-
- UNIHDR unicode string header
- VOID* undocumented buffer pointer
-
-- UNISTR (unicode string) :
-
- UINT16[] null-terminated string of unicode characters.
-
-- NAME (length-indicated unicode string) :
-
- UINT32 length of unicode string
- UINT16[] null-terminated string of unicode characters.
-
-- UNISTR2 (aligned unicode string) :
-
- UINT8[] padding to get unicode string 4-byte aligned
- with the start of the SMB header.
- UINT32 max length of unicode string
- UINT32 0 - undocumented
- UINT32 length of unicode string
- UINT16[] string of uncode characters.
-
-- OBJ_ATTR (object attributes) :
-
- UINT32 0x18 - length (in bytes) including the length field.
- VOID* 0 - root directory (pointer)
- VOID* 0 - object name (pointer)
- UINT32 0 - attributes (undocumented)
- VOID* 0 - security descriptior (pointer)
- UINT32 0 - security quality of service
-
-- POL_HND (LSA policy handle) :
-
- char[20] policy handle
-
-- DOM_SID2 (domain SID structure, SIDS stored in unicode) :
-
- UINT32 5 - SID type
- UINT32 0 - undocumented
- UNIHDR2 domain SID unicode string header
- UNISTR domain SID unicode string
-
- Note: there is a conflict between the unicode string header and the
- unicode string itself as to which to use to indicate string
- length. this will need to be resolved.
-
- Note: the SID type indicates, for example, an alias; a well-known group etc.
- this is documented somewhere.
-
-- DOM_RID (domain RID structure) :
-
- UINT32 5 - well-known SID. 1 - user SID (see ShowACLs)
- UINT32 5 - undocumented
- UINT32 domain RID
- UINT32 0 - domain index out of above reference domains
-
-
-- LOG_INFO (server, account, client structure) :
-
- Note: logon server name starts with two '\' characters and is upper case.
-
- Note: account name is the logon client name from the LSA Request Challenge,
- with a $ on the end of it, in upper case.
-
- VOID* undocumented buffer pointer
- UNISTR2 logon server unicode string
- UNISTR2 account name unicode string
- UINT16 sec_chan - security channel type
- UNISTR2 logon client machine unicode string
-
-- CLNT_SRV (server, client names structure) :
-
- Note: logon server name starts with two '\' characters and is upper case.
-
- VOID* undocumented buffer pointer
- UNISTR2 logon server unicode string
- VOID* undocumented buffer pointer
- UNISTR2 logon client machine unicode string
-
-- CREDS (credentials + time stamp)
-
- char[8] credentials
- UTIME time stamp
-
-- CLNT_INFO2 (server, client structure, client credentials) :
-
- Note: whenever this structure appears in a request, you must take a copy
- of the client-calculated credentials received, because they will be
- used in subsequent credential checks. the presumed intention is to
- maintain an authenticated request/response trail.
-
- CLNT_SRV client and server names
- UINT8[] ???? padding, for 4-byte alignment with SMB header.
- VOID* pointer to client credentials.
- CREDS client-calculated credentials + client time
-
-- CLNT_INFO (server, account, client structure, client credentials) :
-
- Note: whenever this structure appears in a request, you must take a copy
- of the client-calculated credentials received, because they will be
- used in subsequent credential checks. the presumed intention is to
- maintain an authenticated request/response trail.
-
- LOG_INFO logon account info
- CREDS client-calculated credentials + client time
-
-- ID_INFO_1 (id info structure, auth level 1) :
-
- VOID* ptr_id_info_1
- UNIHDR domain name unicode header
- UINT32 param control
- UINT64 logon ID
- UNIHDR user name unicode header
- UNIHDR workgroup name unicode header
- char[16] arc4 LM OWF Password
- char[16] arc4 NT OWF Password
- UNISTR2 domain name unicode string
- UNISTR2 user name unicode string
- UNISTR2 workstation name unicode string
-
-- SAM_INFO (sam logon/logoff id info structure) :
-
- Note: presumably, the return credentials is supposedly for the server to
- verify that the credential chain hasn't been compromised.
-
- CLNT_INFO2 client identification/authentication info
- VOID* pointer to return credentials.
- CRED return credentials - ignored.
- UINT16 logon level
- UINT16 switch value
-
- switch (switch_value)
- case 1:
- {
- ID_INFO_1 id_info_1;
- }
-
-- GID (group id info) :
-
- UINT32 group id
- UINT32 user attributes (only used by NT 3.1 and 3.51)
-
-- DOM_REF (domain reference info) :
-
- VOID* undocumented buffer pointer.
- UINT32 num referenced domains?
- VOID* undocumented domain name buffer pointer.
- UINT32 32 - max number of entries
- UINT32 4 - num referenced domains?
-
- UNIHDR2 domain name unicode string header
- UNIHDR2[num_ref_doms-1] referenced domain unicode string headers
-
- UNISTR domain name unicode string
- DOM_SID[num_ref_doms] referenced domain SIDs
-
-- DOM_INFO (domain info, levels 3 and 5 are the same)) :
-
- UINT8[] ??? padding to get 4-byte alignment with start of SMB header
- UINT16 domain name string length * 2
- UINT16 domain name string length * 2
- VOID* undocumented domain name string buffer pointer
- VOID* undocumented domain SID string buffer pointer
- UNISTR2 domain name (unicode string)
- DOM_SID domain SID
-
-- USER_INFO (user logon info) :
-
- Note: it would be nice to know what the 16 byte user session key is for.
-
- NTTIME logon time
- NTTIME logoff time
- NTTIME kickoff time
- NTTIME password last set time
- NTTIME password can change time
- NTTIME password must change time
-
- UNIHDR username unicode string header
- UNIHDR user's full name unicode string header
- UNIHDR logon script unicode string header
- UNIHDR profile path unicode string header
- UNIHDR home directory unicode string header
- UNIHDR home directory drive unicode string header
-
- UINT16 logon count
- UINT16 bad password count
-
- UINT32 User ID
- UINT32 Group ID
- UINT32 num groups
- VOID* undocumented buffer pointer to groups.
-
- UINT32 user flags
- char[16] user session key
-
- UNIHDR logon server unicode string header
- UNIHDR logon domain unicode string header
- VOID* undocumented logon domain id pointer
- char[40] 40 undocumented padding bytes. future expansion?
-
- UINT32 0 - num_other_sids?
- VOID* NULL - undocumented pointer to other domain SIDs.
-
- UNISTR2 username unicode string
- UNISTR2 user's full name unicode string
- UNISTR2 logon script unicode string
- UNISTR2 profile path unicode string
- UNISTR2 home directory unicode string
- UNISTR2 home directory drive unicode string
-
- UINT32 num groups
- GID[num_groups] group info
-
- UNISTR2 logon server unicode string
- UNISTR2 logon domain unicode string
-
- DOM_SID domain SID
- DOM_SID[num_sids] other domain SIDs?
-
-- SH_INFO_1_PTR (pointers to level 1 share info strings):
-
-Note: see cifsrap2.txt section5, page 10.
-
- 0 for shi1_type indicates a Disk.
- 1 for shi1_type indicates a Print Queue.
- 2 for shi1_type indicates a Device.
- 3 for shi1_type indicates an IPC pipe.
- 0x8000 0000 (top bit set in shi1_type) indicates a hidden share.
-
- VOID* shi1_netname - pointer to net name
- UINT32 shi1_type - type of share. 0 - undocumented.
- VOID* shi1_remark - pointer to comment.
-
-- SH_INFO_1_STR (level 1 share info strings) :
-
- UNISTR2 shi1_netname - unicode string of net name
- UNISTR2 shi1_remark - unicode string of comment.
-
-- SHARE_INFO_1_CTR :
-
- share container with 0 entries:
-
- UINT32 0 - EntriesRead
- UINT32 0 - Buffer
-
- share container with > 0 entries:
-
- UINT32 EntriesRead
- UINT32 non-zero - Buffer
- UINT32 EntriesRead
-
- SH_INFO_1_PTR[EntriesRead] share entry pointers
- SH_INFO_1_STR[EntriesRead] share entry strings
-
- UINT8[] padding to get unicode string 4-byte
- aligned with start of the SMB header.
- UINT32 EntriesRead
- UINT32 0 - padding
-
-- SERVER_INFO_101 :
-
-Note: see cifs6.txt section 6.4 - the fields described therein will be
- of assistance here. for example, the type listed below is the
- same as fServerType, which is described in 6.4.1.
-
- SV_TYPE_WORKSTATION 0x00000001 All workstations
- SV_TYPE_SERVER 0x00000002 All servers
- SV_TYPE_SQLSERVER 0x00000004 Any server running with SQL
- server
- SV_TYPE_DOMAIN_CTRL 0x00000008 Primary domain controller
- SV_TYPE_DOMAIN_BAKCTRL 0x00000010 Backup domain controller
- SV_TYPE_TIME_SOURCE 0x00000020 Server running the timesource
- service
- SV_TYPE_AFP 0x00000040 Apple File Protocol servers
- SV_TYPE_NOVELL 0x00000080 Novell servers
- SV_TYPE_DOMAIN_MEMBER 0x00000100 Domain Member
- SV_TYPE_PRINTQ_SERVER 0x00000200 Server sharing print queue
- SV_TYPE_DIALIN_SERVER 0x00000400 Server running dialin service.
- SV_TYPE_XENIX_SERVER 0x00000800 Xenix server
- SV_TYPE_NT 0x00001000 NT server
- SV_TYPE_WFW 0x00002000 Server running Windows for
-
- SV_TYPE_SERVER_NT 0x00008000 Windows NT non DC server
- SV_TYPE_POTENTIAL_BROWSER 0x00010000 Server that can run the browser
- service
- SV_TYPE_BACKUP_BROWSER 0x00020000 Backup browser server
- SV_TYPE_MASTER_BROWSER 0x00040000 Master browser server
- SV_TYPE_DOMAIN_MASTER 0x00080000 Domain Master Browser server
- SV_TYPE_LOCAL_LIST_ONLY 0x40000000 Enumerate only entries marked
- "local"
- SV_TYPE_DOMAIN_ENUM 0x80000000 Enumerate Domains. The pszServer
- and pszDomain parameters must be
- NULL.
-
- UINT32 500 - platform_id
- VOID* pointer to name
- UINT32 5 - major version
- UINT32 4 - minor version
- UINT32 type (SV_TYPE_... bit field)
- VOID* pointer to comment
-
- UNISTR2 sv101_name - unicode string of server name
- UNISTR2 sv_101_comment - unicode string of server comment.
-
- UINT8[] padding to get unicode string 4-byte
- aligned with start of the SMB header.
-
-
-
-3) MSRPC over Transact Named Pipe
----------------------------------
-
-For details on the SMB Transact Named Pipe, see cifs6.txt
-
-
-3.1) MSRPC Pipes
-----------------
-
-The MSRPC is conducted over an SMB Transact Pipe with a name of "\PIPE\".
-You must first obtain a 16 bit file handle, by sending a SMBopenX with the
-pipe name "\PIPE\srvsvc" for example. You can then perform an SMB Trans,
-and must carry out an SMBclose on the file handle once you are finished.
-
-Trans Requests must be sent with two setup UINT16s, no UINT16 params (none
-known about), and UINT8 data parameters sufficient to contain the MSRPC
-header, and MSRPC data. The first UINT16 setup parameter must be either
-0x0026 to indicate an RPC, or 0x0001 to indicate Set Named Pipe Handle
-state. The second UINT16 parameter must be the file handle for the pipe,
-obtained above.
-
-The Data section for an API Command of 0x0026 (RPC pipe) in the Trans
-Request is the RPC Header, followed by the RPC Data. The Data section for
-an API Command of 0x0001 (Set Named Pipe Handle state) is two bytes. The
-only value seen for these two bytes is 0x00 0x43.
-
-
-MSRPC Responses are sent as response data inside standard SMB Trans
-responses, with the MSRPC Header, MSRPC Data and MSRPC tail.
-
-
-It is suspected that the Trans Requests will need to be at least 2-byte
-aligned (probably 4-byte). This is standard practice for SMBs. It is also
-independent of the observed 4-byte alignments with the start of the MSRPC
-header, including the 4-byte alignment between the MSRPC header and the
-MSRPC data.
-
-
-First, an SMBtconX connection is made to the IPC$ share. The connection
-must be made using encrypted passwords, not clear-text. Then, an SMBopenX
-is made on the pipe. Then, a Set Named Pipe Handle State must be sent,
-after which the pipe is ready to accept API commands. Lastly, and SMBclose
-is sent.
-
-
-To be resolved:
-
- lkcl/01nov97 there appear to be two additional bytes after the null-
- terminated \PIPE\ name for the RPC pipe. Values seen so far are
- listed below:
-
- initial SMBopenX request: RPC API command 0x26 params:
-
- "\\PIPE\\lsarpc" 0x65 0x63; 0x72 0x70; 0x44 0x65;
- "\\PIPE\\srvsvc" 0x73 0x76; 0x4E 0x00; 0x5C 0x43;
-
-
-3.2) Header
------------
-
-[section to be rewritten, following receipt of work by Duncan Stansfield]
-
-
-Interesting note: if you set packed data representation to 0x0100 0000
-then all 4-byte and 2-byte word ordering is turned around!
-
-The start of each of the NTLSA and NETLOGON named pipes begins with:
-
-00 UINT8 5 - RPC major version
-01 UINT8 0 - RPC minor version
-02 UINT8 2 - RPC response packet
-03 UINT8 3 - (FirstFrag bit-wise or with LastFrag)
-04 UINT32 0x1000 0000 - packed data representation
-08 UINT16 fragment length - data size (bytes) inc header and tail.
-0A UINT16 0 - authentication length
-0C UINT32 call identifier. matches 12th UINT32 of incoming RPC data.
-10 UINT32 allocation hint - data size (bytes) minus header and tail.
-14 UINT16 0 - presentation context identifier
-16 UINT8 0 - cancel count
-17 UINT8 in replies: 0 - reserved; in requests: opnum - see #defines.
-18 ...... start of data (goes on for allocation_hint bytes)
-
-
-RPC_Packet for request, response, bind and bind acknowledgement.
-{
-
- UINT8 versionmaj # reply same as request (0x05)
- UINT8 versionmin # reply same as request (0x00)
- UINT8 type # one of the MSRPC_Type enums
- UINT8 flags # reply same as request (0x00 for Bind, 0x03 for Request)
- UINT32 representation # reply same as request (0x00000010)
- UINT16 fraglength # the length of the data section of the SMB trans packet
- UINT16 authlength
- UINT32 callid # call identifier. (e.g. 0x00149594)
-
- * stub USE TvPacket # the remainder of the packet depending on the "type"
-}
-
-
-# the interfaces are numbered. as yet I haven't seen more than one interface
-# used on the same pipe name
-# srvsvc
-# abstract (0x4B324FC8, 0x01D31670, 0x475A7812, 0x88E16EBF, 0x00000003)
-# transfer (0x8A885D04, 0x11C91CEB, 0x0008E89F, 0x6048102B, 0x00000002)
-RPC_Iface RW
-{
- UINT8 byte[16] # 16 bytes of number
- UINT32 version # the interface number
-}
-
-
-# the remainder of the packet after the header if "type" was Bind
-# in the response header, "type" should be BindAck
-RPC_ReqBind RW
-{
- UINT16 maxtsize # maximum transmission fragment size (0x1630)
- UINT16 maxrsize # max receive fragment size (0x1630)
- UINT32 assocgid # associated group id (0x0)
- UINT32 numelements # the number of elements (0x1)
- UINT16 contextid # presentation context identifier (0x0)
- UINT8 numsyntaxes # the number of syntaxes (has always been 1?)(0x1)
- UINT8[] # 4-byte alignment padding, against SMB header
-
- * abstractint USE RPC_Iface # num and vers. of interface client is using
- * transferint USE RPC_Iface # num and vers. of interface to use for replies
-}
-
-
-RPC_Address RW
-{
- UINT16 length # length of the string including null terminator
- * port USE string # the string above in single byte, null terminated form
-}
-
-
-# the response to place after the header in the reply packet
-RPC_ResBind RW
-{
- UINT16 maxtsize # same as request
- UINT16 maxrsize # same as request
- UINT32 assocgid # zero
-
- * secondaddr USE RPC_Address # the address string, as described earlier
-
- UINT8[] # 4-byte alignment padding, against SMB header
-
- UINT8 numresults # the number of results (0x01)
-
- UINT8[] # 4-byte alignment padding, against SMB header
- UINT16 result # result (0x00 = accept)
- UINT16 reason # reason (0x00 = no reason specified)
-
- * transfersyntax USE RPC_Iface # the transfer syntax from the request
-}
-
-
-# the remainder of the packet after the header for every other other
-# request
-RPC_ReqNorm RW
-{
- UINT32 allochint # the size of the stub data in bytes
- UINT16 prescontext # presentation context identifier (0x0)
- UINT16 opnum # operation number (0x15)
-
- * stub USE TvPacket # a packet dependent on the pipe name
- # (probably the interface) and the op number)
-}
-
-
-# response to a request
-RPC_ResNorm RW
-{
- UINT32 allochint # size of the stub data in bytes
- UINT16 prescontext # presentation context identifier (same as request)
- UINT8 cancelcount # cancel count? (0x0)
- UINT8 reserved # 0 - one byte padding
-
- * stub USE TvPacket # the remainder of the reply
-}
-
-
-3.3) Tail
----------
-
-The end of each of the NTLSA and NETLOGON named pipes ends with:
-
- ...... end of data
- UINT32 return code
-
-
-
-3.4 RPC Bind / Bind Ack
------------------------
-
-RPC Binds are the process of associating an RPC pipe (e.g \PIPE\lsarpc)
-with a "transfer syntax" (see RPC_Iface structure). The purpose for doing
-this is unknown.
-
-Note: The RPC_ResBind SMB Transact request is sent with two uint16 setup
- parameters. The first is 0x0026; the second is the file handle
- returned by the SMBopenX Transact response.
-
-Note: The RPC_ResBind members maxtsize, maxrsize and assocgid are the
- same in the response as the same members in the RPC_ReqBind. The
- RPC_ResBind member transfersyntax is the same in the response as
- the
-
-Note: The RPC_ResBind response member secondaddr contains the name
- of what is presumed to be the service behind the RPC pipe. The
- mapping identified so far is:
-
- initial SMBopenX request: RPC_ResBind response:
-
- "\\PIPE\\srvsvc" "\\PIPE\\ntsvcs"
- "\\PIPE\\samr" "\\PIPE\\lsass"
- "\\PIPE\\lsarpc" "\\PIPE\\lsass"
- "\\PIPE\\wkssvc" "\\PIPE\\wksvcs"
- "\\PIPE\\NETLOGON" "\\PIPE\\NETLOGON"
-
-Note: The RPC_Packet fraglength member in both the Bind Request and Bind
- Acknowledgment must contain the length of the entire RPC data,
- including the RPC_Packet header.
-
-Request:
-
- RPC_Packet
- RPC_ReqBind
-
-Response:
-
- RPC_Packet
- RPC_ResBind
-
-
-
-4) NTLSA Transact Named Pipe
-----------------------------
-
-The sequence of actions taken on this pipe are:
-
-- Establish a connection to the IPC$ share (SMBtconX). use encrypted passwords.
-- Open an RPC Pipe with the name "\\PIPE\\lsarpc". Store the file handle.
-- Using the file handle, send a Set Named Pipe Handle state to 0x4300.
-- Send an LSA Open Policy request. Store the Policy Handle.
-- Using the Policy Handle, send LSA Query Info Policy requests, etc.
-- Using the Policy Handle, send an LSA Close.
-- Close the IPC$ share.
-
-
-Defines for this pipe, identifying the query are:
-
-- LSA Open Policy: 0x2c
-- LSA Query Info Policy: 0x07
-- LSA Enumerate Trusted Domains: 0x0d
-- LSA Open Secret: 0xff
-- LSA Lookup SIDs: 0xfe
-- LSA Lookup Names: 0xfd
-- LSA Close: 0x00
-
-
-4.1) LSA Open Policy
---------------------
-
-Note: The policy handle can be anything you like.
-
-Request:
-
- VOID* buffer pointer
- UNISTR2 server name - unicode string starting with two '\'s
- OBJ_ATTR object attributes
- UINT32 1 - desired access
-
-Response:
-
- POL_HND LSA policy handle
-
- return 0 - indicates success
-
-
-4.2) LSA Query Info Policy
---------------------------
-
-Note: The info class in response must be the same as that in the request.
-
-Request:
-
- POL_HND LSA policy handle
- UINT16 info class (also a policy handle?)
-
-Response:
-
- VOID* undocumented buffer pointer
- UINT16 info class (same as info class in request).
-
- switch (info class)
- case 3:
- case 5:
- {
- DOM_INFO domain info, levels 3 and 5 (are the same).
- }
-
- return 0 - indicates success
-
-
-4.3) LSA Enumerate Trusted Domains
-----------------------------------
-
-Request:
-
- no extra data
-
-Response:
-
- UINT32 0 - enumeration context
- UINT32 0 - entries read
- UINT32 0 - trust information
-
- return 0x8000 001a - "no trusted domains" success code
-
-
-4.4) LSA Open Secret
---------------------
-
-Request:
-
- no extra data
-
-Response:
-
- UINT32 0 - undocumented
- UINT32 0 - undocumented
- UINT32 0 - undocumented
- UINT32 0 - undocumented
- UINT32 0 - undocumented
-
- return 0x0C00 0034 - "no such secret" success code
-
-
-4.5) LSA Close
---------------
-
-Request:
-
- POL_HND policy handle to be closed
-
-Response:
-
- POL_HND 0s - closed policy handle (all zeros)
-
- return 0 - indicates success
-
-
-4.6) LSA Lookup SIDS
---------------------
-
-Note: num_entries in response must be same as num_entries in request.
-
-Request:
-
- POL_HND LSA policy handle
- UINT32 num_entries
- VOID* undocumented domain SID buffer pointer
- VOID* undocumented domain name buffer pointer
- VOID*[num_entries] undocumented domain SID pointers to be looked up.
- DOM_SID[num_entries] domain SIDs to be looked up.
- char[16] completely undocumented 16 bytes.
-
-Response:
-
- DOM_REF domain reference response
-
- UINT32 num_entries (listed above)
- VOID* undocumented buffer pointer
-
- UINT32 num_entries (listed above)
- DOM_SID2[num_entries] domain SIDs (from Request, listed above).
-
- UINT32 num_entries (listed above)
-
- return 0 - indicates success
-
-
-4.7) LSA Lookup Names
----------------------
-
-Note: num_entries in response must be same as num_entries in request.
-
-Request:
-
- POL_HND LSA policy handle
- UINT32 num_entries
- UINT32 num_entries
- VOID* undocumented domain SID buffer pointer
- VOID* undocumented domain name buffer pointer
- NAME[num_entries] names to be looked up.
- char[] undocumented bytes - falsely translated SID structure?
-
-Response:
-
- DOM_REF domain reference response
-
- UINT32 num_entries (listed above)
- VOID* undocumented buffer pointer
-
- UINT32 num_entries (listed above)
- DOM_RID[num_entries] domain SIDs (from Request, listed above).
-
- UINT32 num_entries (listed above)
-
- return 0 - indicates success
-
-
-
-5) NETLOGON rpc Transact Named Pipe
------------------------------------
-
-The sequence of actions taken on this pipe are:
-
-- Establish a connection to the IPC$ share (SMBtconX). use encrypted passwords.
-- Open an RPC Pipe with the name "\\PIPE\\NETLOGON". Store the file handle.
-- Using the file handle, send a Set Named Pipe Handle state to 0x4300.
-- Create Client Challenge. Send LSA Request Challenge. Store Server Challenge.
-- Calculate Session Key. Send an LSA Auth 2 Challenge. Store Auth2 Challenge.
-- Calc/Verify Client Creds. Send LSA Srv PW Set. Calc/Verify Server Creds.
-- Calc/Verify Client Creds. Send LSA SAM Logon . Calc/Verify Server Creds.
-- Calc/Verify Client Creds. Send LSA SAM Logoff. Calc/Verify Server Creds.
-- Close the IPC$ share.
-
-
-Defines for this pipe, identifying the query are:
-
-- LSA Request Challenge: 0x04
-- LSA Server Password Set: 0x06
-- LSA SAM Logon: 0x02
-- LSA SAM Logoff: 0x03
-- LSA Auth 2: 0x0f
-- LSA Logon Control: 0x0e
-
-
-5.1) LSA Request Challenge
---------------------------
-
-Note: logon server name starts with two '\' characters and is upper case.
-
-Note: logon client is the machine, not the user.
-
-Note: the initial LanManager password hash, against which the challenge
- is issued, is the machine name itself (lower case). there will be
- calls issued (LSA Server Password Set) which will change this, later.
- refusing these calls allows you to always deal with the same password
- (i.e the LM# of the machine name in lower case).
-
-Request:
-
- VOID* undocumented buffer pointer
- UNISTR2 logon server unicode string
- UNISTR2 logon client unicode string
- char[8] client challenge
-
-Response:
-
- char[8] server challenge
-
- return 0 - indicates success
-
-
-
-5.2) LSA Authenticate 2
------------------------
-
-Note: in between request and response, calculate the client credentials,
- and check them against the client-calculated credentials (this
- process uses the previously received client credentials).
-
-Note: neg_flags in the response is the same as that in the request.
-
-Note: you must take a copy of the client-calculated credentials received
- here, because they will be used in subsequent authentication packets.
-
-Request:
-
- LOG_INFO client identification info
-
- char[8] client-calculated credentials
- UINT8[] padding to 4-byte align with start of SMB header.
- UINT32 neg_flags - negotiated flags (usual value is 0x0000 01ff)
-
-Response:
-
- char[8] server credentials.
- UINT32 neg_flags - same as neg_flags in request.
-
- return 0 - indicates success. failure value unknown.
-
-
-5.3) LSA Server Password Set
-----------------------------
-
-Note: the new password is suspected to be a DES encryption using the old
- password to generate the key.
-
-Note: in between request and response, calculate the client credentials,
- and check them against the client-calculated credentials (this
- process uses the previously received client credentials).
-
-Note: the server credentials are constructed from the client-calculated
- credentials and the client time + 1 second.
-
-Note: you must take a copy of the client-calculated credentials received
- here, because they will be used in subsequent authentication packets.
-
-Request:
-
- CLNT_INFO client identification/authentication info
- char[] new password - undocumented.
-
-Response:
-
- CREDS server credentials. server time stamp appears to be ignored.
-
- return 0 - indicates success; 0xC000 006a indicates failure
-
-
-5.4) LSA SAM Logon
-------------------
-
-Note: valid_user is True iff the username and password hash are valid for
- the requested domain.
-
-Request:
-
- SAM_INFO sam_id structure
-
-Response:
-
- VOID* undocumented buffer pointer
- CREDS server credentials. server time stamp appears to be ignored.
-
- if (valid_user)
- {
- UINT16 3 - switch value indicating USER_INFO structure.
- VOID* non-zero - pointer to USER_INFO structure
- USER_INFO user logon information
-
- UINT32 1 - Authoritative response; 0 - Non-Auth?
-
- return 0 - indicates success
- }
- else
- {
- UINT16 0 - switch value. value to indicate no user presumed.
- VOID* 0x0000 0000 - indicates no USER_INFO structure.
-
- UINT32 1 - Authoritative response; 0 - Non-Auth?
-
- return 0xC000 0064 - NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER.
- }
-
-
-5.5) LSA SAM Logoff
---------------------
-
-Note: presumably, the SAM_INFO structure is validated, and a (currently
- undocumented) error code returned if the Logoff is invalid.
-
-Request:
-
- SAM_INFO sam_id structure
-
-Response:
-
- VOID* undocumented buffer pointer
- CREDS server credentials. server time stamp appears to be ignored.
-
- return 0 - indicates success. undocumented failure indication.
-
-
-6) \\MAILSLOT\NET\NTLOGON
--------------------------
-
-Note: mailslots will contain a response mailslot, to which the response
- should be sent. the target NetBIOS name is REQUEST_NAME<20>, where
- REQUEST_NAME is the name of the machine that sent the request.
-
-
-6.1) Query for PDC
-------------------
-
-Note: NTversion, LMNTtoken, LM20token in response are the same as those
- given in the request.
-
-Request:
-
- UINT16 0x0007 - Query for PDC
- STR machine name
- STR response mailslot
- UINT8[] padding to 2-byte align with start of mailslot.
- UNISTR machine name
- UINT32 NTversion
- UINT16 LMNTtoken
- UINT16 LM20token
-
-Response:
-
- UINT16 0x000A - Respose to Query for PDC
- STR machine name (in uppercase)
- UINT8[] padding to 2-byte align with start of mailslot.
- UNISTR machine name
- UNISTR domain name
- UINT32 NTversion (same as received in request)
- UINT16 LMNTtoken (same as received in request)
- UINT16 LM20token (same as received in request)
-
-
-6.2) SAM Logon
---------------
-
-Note: machine name in response is preceded by two '\' characters.
-
-Note: NTversion, LMNTtoken, LM20token in response are the same as those
- given in the request.
-
-Note: user name in the response is presumably the same as that in the request.
-
-Request:
-
- UINT16 0x0012 - SAM Logon
- UINT16 request count
- UNISTR machine name
- UNISTR user name
- STR response mailslot
- UINT32 alloweable account
- UINT32 domain SID size
- char[sid_size] domain SID, of sid_size bytes.
- UINT8[] ???? padding to 4? 2? -byte align with start of mailslot.
- UINT32 NTversion
- UINT16 LMNTtoken
- UINT16 LM20token
-
-Response:
-
- UINT16 0x0013 - Response to SAM Logon
- UNISTR machine name
- UNISTR user name - workstation trust account
- UNISTR domain name
- UINT32 NTversion
- UINT16 LMNTtoken
- UINT16 LM20token
-
-
-
-7) SRVSVC Transact Named Pipe
------------------------------
-
-
-Defines for this pipe, identifying the query are:
-
-- Net Share Enum : 0x0f
-- Net Server Get Info : 0x15
-
-
-7.1) Net Share Enum
-------------------
-
-Note: share level and switch value in the response are presumably the
- same as those in the request.
-
-Note: cifsrap2.txt (section 5) may be of limited assistance here.
-
-Request:
-
- VOID* pointer (to server name?)
- UNISTR2 server name
-
- UINT8[] padding to get unicode string 4-byte aligned
- with the start of the SMB header.
-
- UINT32 share level
- UINT32 switch value
-
- VOID* pointer to SHARE_INFO_1_CTR
- SHARE_INFO_1_CTR share info with 0 entries
-
- UINT32 preferred maximum length (0xffff ffff)
-
-Response:
-
- UINT32 share level
- UINT32 switch value
-
- VOID* pointer to SHARE_INFO_1_CTR
- SHARE_INFO_1_CTR share info (only added if share info ptr is non-zero)
-
- return 0 - indicates success
-
-
-7.2) Net Server Get Info
-------------------
-
-Note: level is the same value as in the request.
-
-Request:
-
- UNISTR2 server name
- UINT32 switch level
-
-Response:
-
- UINT32 switch level
- VOID* pointer to SERVER_INFO_101
-
- SERVER_INFO_101 server info (only added if server info ptr is non-zero)
-
- return 0 - indicates success
-
-
-
-Appendix
---------
-
-A1) Cryptographic side of NT Domain Authentication
---------------------------------------------------
-
-
-A1.1) Definitions
------------------
-
-Add(A1,A2): Intel byte ordered addition of corresponding 4 byte words
-in arrays A1 and A2
-
-E(K,D): DES ECB encryption of 8 byte data D using 7 byte key K
-
-lmowf(): Lan man hash
-
-ntowf(): NT hash
-
-PW: md4(machine_password) == md4(lsadump $machine.acc) ==
-pwdump(machine$) (initially) == md4(lmowf(unicode(machine)))
-
-ARC4(K,Lk,D,Ld): ARC4 encryption of data D of length Ld with key K of
-length Lk
-
-v[m..n(,l)]: subset of v from bytes m to n, optionally padded with
-zeroes to length l
-
-Cred(K,D): E(K[7..7,7],E(K[0..6],D)) computes a credential
-
-Time(): 4 byte current time
-
-Cc,Cs: 8 byte client and server challenges Rc,Rs: 8 byte client and
-server credentials
-
-
-A1.2) Protocol
---------------
-
-C->S ReqChal,Cc S->C Cs
-
-C & S compute session key Ks = E(PW[9..15],E(PW[0..6],Add(Cc,Cs)))
-
-C: Rc = Cred(Ks,Cc) C->S Authenticate,Rc S: Rs = Cred(Ks,Cs),
-assert(Rc == Cred(Ks,Cc)) S->C Rs C: assert(Rs == Cred(Ks,Cs))
-
-On joining the domain the client will optionally attempt to change its
-password and the domain controller may refuse to update it depending
-on registry settings. This will also occur weekly afterwards.
-
-C: Tc = Time(), Rc' = Cred(Ks,Rc+Tc) C->S ServerPasswordSet,Rc',Tc,
-arc4(Ks[0..7,16],lmowf(randompassword()) C: Rc = Cred(Ks,Rc+Tc+1) S:
-assert(Rc' == Cred(Ks,Rc+Tc)), Ts = Time() S: Rs' = Cred(Ks,Rs+Tc+1)
-S->C Rs',Ts C: assert(Rs' == Cred(Ks,Rs+Tc+1)) S: Rs = Rs'
-
-User: U with password P wishes to login to the domain (incidental data
-such as workstation and domain omitted)
-
-C: Tc = Time(), Rc' = Cred(Ks,Rc+Tc) C->S NetLogonSamLogon,Rc',Tc,U,
-arc4(Ks[0..7,16],16,ntowf(P),16), arc4(Ks[0..7,16],16,lmowf(P),16) S:
-assert(Rc' == Cred(Ks,Rc+Tc)) assert(passwords match those in SAM) S:
-Ts = Time()
-
-S->C Cred(Ks,Cred(Ks,Rc+Tc+1)),userinfo(logon script,UID,SIDs,etc) C:
-assert(Rs == Cred(Ks,Cred(Rc+Tc+1)) C: Rc = Cred(Ks,Rc+Tc+1)
-
-
-A1.3) Comments
---------------
-
-On first joining the domain the session key could be computed by
-anyone listening in on the network as the machine password has a well
-known value. Until the machine is rebooted it will use this session
-key to encrypt NT and LM one way functions of passwords which are
-password equivalents. Any user who logs in before the machine has been
-rebooted a second time will have their password equivalent exposed. Of
-course the new machine password is exposed at this time anyway.
-
-None of the returned user info such as logon script, profile path and
-SIDs *appear* to be protected by anything other than the TCP checksum.
-
-The server time stamps appear to be ignored.
-
-The client sends a ReturnAuthenticator in the SamLogon request which I
-can't find a use for. However its time is used as the timestamp
-returned by the server.
-
-The password OWFs should NOT be sent over the network reversibly
-encrypted. They should be sent using ARC4(Ks,md4(owf)) with the server
-computing the same function using the owf values in the SAM.
-
-
-A2) SIDs and RIDs
------------------
-
-SIDs and RIDs are well documented elsewhere.
-
-A SID is an NT Security ID (see DOM_SID structure). They are of the form:
-
- S-revision-NN-SubAuth1-SubAuth2-SubAuth3...
- S-revision-0xNNNNNNNNNNNN-SubAuth1-SubAuth2-SubAuth3...
-
-currently, the SID revision is 1.
-The Sub-Authorities are known as Relative IDs (RIDs).
-
-
-A2.1) Well-known SIDs
----------------------
-
-
-A2.1.1) Universal well-known SIDs
----------------------------------
-
- Null SID S-1-0-0
- World S-1-1-0
- Local S-1-2-0
- Creator Owner ID S-1-3-0
- Creator Group ID S-1-3-1
- Creator Owner Server ID S-1-3-2
- Creator Group Server ID S-1-3-3
-
- (Non-unique IDs) S-1-4
-
-
-A2.1.2) NT well-known SIDs
---------------------------
-
- NT Authority S-1-5
- Dialup S-1-5-1
-
- Network S-1-5-2
- Batch S-1-5-3
- Interactive S-1-5-4
- Service S-1-5-6
- AnonymousLogon S-1-5-7 (aka null logon session)
- Proxy S-1-5-8
- ServerLogon S-1-5-8 (aka domain controller account)
-
- (Logon IDs) S-1-5-5-X-Y
-
- (NT non-unique IDs) S-1-5-0x15-...
-
- (Built-in domain) s-1-5-0x20
-
-
-
-A2.2) Well-known RIDS
----------------------
-
-A RID is a sub-authority value, as part of either a SID, or in the case
-of Group RIDs, part of the DOM_GID structure, in the USER_INFO_1
-structure, in the LSA SAM Logon response.
-
-
-A2.2.1) Well-known RID users
-----------------------------
-
- DOMAIN_USER_RID_ADMIN 0x0000 01F4
- DOMAIN_USER_RID_GUEST 0x0000 01F5
-
-
-
-A2.2.2) Well-known RID groups
-----------------------------
-
- DOMAIN_GROUP_RID_ADMINS 0x0000 0200
- DOMAIN_GROUP_RID_USERS 0x0000 0201
- DOMAIN_GROUP_RID_GUESTS 0x0000 0202
-
-
-
-A2.2.3) Well-known RID aliases
-------------------------------
-
- DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_ADMINS 0x0000 0220
- DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_USERS 0x0000 0221
- DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_GUESTS 0x0000 0222
- DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_POWER_USERS 0x0000 0223
-
- DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_ACCOUNT_OPS 0x0000 0224
- DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_SYSTEM_OPS 0x0000 0225
- DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_PRINT_OPS 0x0000 0226
- DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_BACKUP_OPS 0x0000 0227
-
- DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_REPLICATOR 0x0000 0228
-
-