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authorAndrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>2009-03-16 13:26:38 +1100
committerAndrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>2009-04-14 14:19:39 +1000
commit927a8b330435b4c959ad851e32b83d97a6e3001b (patch)
treed8132fa21f60ae83ed7e19d6b07a8345071ed271 /libcli/auth
parent786447dea021f97a44582009bf33e28d972dacb4 (diff)
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Move libcli/auth to the top level
Diffstat (limited to 'libcli/auth')
-rw-r--r--libcli/auth/config.mk13
-rw-r--r--libcli/auth/credentials.c375
-rw-r--r--libcli/auth/credentials.h46
-rw-r--r--libcli/auth/libcli_auth.h24
-rw-r--r--libcli/auth/ntlm_check.c603
-rw-r--r--libcli/auth/session.c218
-rw-r--r--libcli/auth/smbdes.c381
-rw-r--r--libcli/auth/smbencrypt.c595
8 files changed, 2255 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/libcli/auth/config.mk b/libcli/auth/config.mk
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c09d1631c0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/libcli/auth/config.mk
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+[SUBSYSTEM::LIBCLI_AUTH]
+PUBLIC_DEPENDENCIES = \
+ MSRPC_PARSE \
+ LIBSAMBA-HOSTCONFIG
+
+LIBCLI_AUTH_OBJ_FILES = $(addprefix $(libclicommonsrcdir)/auth/, \
+ credentials.o \
+ session.o \
+ smbencrypt.o \
+ smbdes.o)
+
+PUBLIC_HEADERS += ../libcli/auth/credentials.h
+$(eval $(call proto_header_template,$(libclicommonsrcdir)/auth/proto.h,$(LIBCLI_AUTH_OBJ_FILES:.o=.c)))
diff --git a/libcli/auth/credentials.c b/libcli/auth/credentials.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3c77b0836d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/libcli/auth/credentials.c
@@ -0,0 +1,375 @@
+/*
+ Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
+
+ code to manipulate domain credentials
+
+ Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 1997-2003
+ Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2004
+
+ This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+ (at your option) any later version.
+
+ This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+ You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+*/
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include "system/time.h"
+#include "auth/auth.h"
+#include "../lib/crypto/crypto.h"
+#include "libcli/auth/libcli_auth.h"
+
+/*
+ initialise the credentials state for old-style 64 bit session keys
+
+ this call is made after the netr_ServerReqChallenge call
+*/
+static void creds_init_64bit(struct creds_CredentialState *creds,
+ const struct netr_Credential *client_challenge,
+ const struct netr_Credential *server_challenge,
+ const struct samr_Password *machine_password)
+{
+ uint32_t sum[2];
+ uint8_t sum2[8];
+
+ sum[0] = IVAL(client_challenge->data, 0) + IVAL(server_challenge->data, 0);
+ sum[1] = IVAL(client_challenge->data, 4) + IVAL(server_challenge->data, 4);
+
+ SIVAL(sum2,0,sum[0]);
+ SIVAL(sum2,4,sum[1]);
+
+ ZERO_STRUCT(creds->session_key);
+
+ des_crypt128(creds->session_key, sum2, machine_password->hash);
+
+ des_crypt112(creds->client.data, client_challenge->data, creds->session_key, 1);
+ des_crypt112(creds->server.data, server_challenge->data, creds->session_key, 1);
+
+ creds->seed = creds->client;
+}
+
+/*
+ initialise the credentials state for ADS-style 128 bit session keys
+
+ this call is made after the netr_ServerReqChallenge call
+*/
+static void creds_init_128bit(struct creds_CredentialState *creds,
+ const struct netr_Credential *client_challenge,
+ const struct netr_Credential *server_challenge,
+ const struct samr_Password *machine_password)
+{
+ unsigned char zero[4], tmp[16];
+ HMACMD5Context ctx;
+ struct MD5Context md5;
+
+ ZERO_STRUCT(creds->session_key);
+
+ memset(zero, 0, sizeof(zero));
+
+ hmac_md5_init_rfc2104(machine_password->hash, sizeof(machine_password->hash), &ctx);
+ MD5Init(&md5);
+ MD5Update(&md5, zero, sizeof(zero));
+ MD5Update(&md5, client_challenge->data, 8);
+ MD5Update(&md5, server_challenge->data, 8);
+ MD5Final(tmp, &md5);
+ hmac_md5_update(tmp, sizeof(tmp), &ctx);
+ hmac_md5_final(creds->session_key, &ctx);
+
+ creds->client = *client_challenge;
+ creds->server = *server_challenge;
+
+ des_crypt112(creds->client.data, client_challenge->data, creds->session_key, 1);
+ des_crypt112(creds->server.data, server_challenge->data, creds->session_key, 1);
+
+ creds->seed = creds->client;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ step the credentials to the next element in the chain, updating the
+ current client and server credentials and the seed
+*/
+static void creds_step(struct creds_CredentialState *creds)
+{
+ struct netr_Credential time_cred;
+
+ DEBUG(5,("\tseed %08x:%08x\n",
+ IVAL(creds->seed.data, 0), IVAL(creds->seed.data, 4)));
+
+ SIVAL(time_cred.data, 0, IVAL(creds->seed.data, 0) + creds->sequence);
+ SIVAL(time_cred.data, 4, IVAL(creds->seed.data, 4));
+
+ DEBUG(5,("\tseed+time %08x:%08x\n", IVAL(time_cred.data, 0), IVAL(time_cred.data, 4)));
+
+ des_crypt112(creds->client.data, time_cred.data, creds->session_key, 1);
+
+ DEBUG(5,("\tCLIENT %08x:%08x\n",
+ IVAL(creds->client.data, 0), IVAL(creds->client.data, 4)));
+
+ SIVAL(time_cred.data, 0, IVAL(creds->seed.data, 0) + creds->sequence + 1);
+ SIVAL(time_cred.data, 4, IVAL(creds->seed.data, 4));
+
+ DEBUG(5,("\tseed+time+1 %08x:%08x\n",
+ IVAL(time_cred.data, 0), IVAL(time_cred.data, 4)));
+
+ des_crypt112(creds->server.data, time_cred.data, creds->session_key, 1);
+
+ DEBUG(5,("\tSERVER %08x:%08x\n",
+ IVAL(creds->server.data, 0), IVAL(creds->server.data, 4)));
+
+ creds->seed = time_cred;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ DES encrypt a 8 byte LMSessionKey buffer using the Netlogon session key
+*/
+void creds_des_encrypt_LMKey(struct creds_CredentialState *creds, struct netr_LMSessionKey *key)
+{
+ struct netr_LMSessionKey tmp;
+ des_crypt56(tmp.key, key->key, creds->session_key, 1);
+ *key = tmp;
+}
+
+/*
+ DES decrypt a 8 byte LMSessionKey buffer using the Netlogon session key
+*/
+void creds_des_decrypt_LMKey(struct creds_CredentialState *creds, struct netr_LMSessionKey *key)
+{
+ struct netr_LMSessionKey tmp;
+ des_crypt56(tmp.key, key->key, creds->session_key, 0);
+ *key = tmp;
+}
+
+/*
+ DES encrypt a 16 byte password buffer using the session key
+*/
+void creds_des_encrypt(struct creds_CredentialState *creds, struct samr_Password *pass)
+{
+ struct samr_Password tmp;
+ des_crypt112_16(tmp.hash, pass->hash, creds->session_key, 1);
+ *pass = tmp;
+}
+
+/*
+ DES decrypt a 16 byte password buffer using the session key
+*/
+void creds_des_decrypt(struct creds_CredentialState *creds, struct samr_Password *pass)
+{
+ struct samr_Password tmp;
+ des_crypt112_16(tmp.hash, pass->hash, creds->session_key, 0);
+ *pass = tmp;
+}
+
+/*
+ ARCFOUR encrypt/decrypt a password buffer using the session key
+*/
+void creds_arcfour_crypt(struct creds_CredentialState *creds, uint8_t *data, size_t len)
+{
+ DATA_BLOB session_key = data_blob(creds->session_key, 16);
+
+ arcfour_crypt_blob(data, len, &session_key);
+
+ data_blob_free(&session_key);
+}
+
+/*****************************************************************
+The above functions are common to the client and server interface
+next comes the client specific functions
+******************************************************************/
+
+/*
+ initialise the credentials chain and return the first client
+ credentials
+*/
+void creds_client_init(struct creds_CredentialState *creds,
+ const struct netr_Credential *client_challenge,
+ const struct netr_Credential *server_challenge,
+ const struct samr_Password *machine_password,
+ struct netr_Credential *initial_credential,
+ uint32_t negotiate_flags)
+{
+ creds->sequence = time(NULL);
+ creds->negotiate_flags = negotiate_flags;
+
+ dump_data_pw("Client chall", client_challenge->data, sizeof(client_challenge->data));
+ dump_data_pw("Server chall", server_challenge->data, sizeof(server_challenge->data));
+ dump_data_pw("Machine Pass", machine_password->hash, sizeof(machine_password->hash));
+
+ if (negotiate_flags & NETLOGON_NEG_128BIT) {
+ creds_init_128bit(creds, client_challenge, server_challenge, machine_password);
+ } else {
+ creds_init_64bit(creds, client_challenge, server_challenge, machine_password);
+ }
+
+ dump_data_pw("Session key", creds->session_key, 16);
+ dump_data_pw("Credential ", creds->client.data, 8);
+
+ *initial_credential = creds->client;
+}
+
+/*
+ step the credentials to the next element in the chain, updating the
+ current client and server credentials and the seed
+
+ produce the next authenticator in the sequence ready to send to
+ the server
+*/
+void creds_client_authenticator(struct creds_CredentialState *creds,
+ struct netr_Authenticator *next)
+{
+ creds->sequence += 2;
+ creds_step(creds);
+
+ next->cred = creds->client;
+ next->timestamp = creds->sequence;
+}
+
+/*
+ check that a credentials reply from a server is correct
+*/
+bool creds_client_check(struct creds_CredentialState *creds,
+ const struct netr_Credential *received_credentials)
+{
+ if (!received_credentials ||
+ memcmp(received_credentials->data, creds->server.data, 8) != 0) {
+ DEBUG(2,("credentials check failed\n"));
+ return false;
+ }
+ return true;
+}
+
+
+/*****************************************************************
+The above functions are common to the client and server interface
+next comes the server specific functions
+******************************************************************/
+
+/*
+ initialise the credentials chain and return the first server
+ credentials
+*/
+void creds_server_init(struct creds_CredentialState *creds,
+ const struct netr_Credential *client_challenge,
+ const struct netr_Credential *server_challenge,
+ const struct samr_Password *machine_password,
+ struct netr_Credential *initial_credential,
+ uint32_t negotiate_flags)
+{
+ if (negotiate_flags & NETLOGON_NEG_128BIT) {
+ creds_init_128bit(creds, client_challenge, server_challenge,
+ machine_password);
+ } else {
+ creds_init_64bit(creds, client_challenge, server_challenge,
+ machine_password);
+ }
+
+ *initial_credential = creds->server;
+ creds->negotiate_flags = negotiate_flags;
+}
+
+/*
+ check that a credentials reply from a server is correct
+*/
+bool creds_server_check(const struct creds_CredentialState *creds,
+ const struct netr_Credential *received_credentials)
+{
+ if (memcmp(received_credentials->data, creds->client.data, 8) != 0) {
+ DEBUG(2,("credentials check failed\n"));
+ dump_data_pw("client creds", creds->client.data, 8);
+ dump_data_pw("calc creds", received_credentials->data, 8);
+ return false;
+ }
+ return true;
+}
+
+NTSTATUS creds_server_step_check(struct creds_CredentialState *creds,
+ struct netr_Authenticator *received_authenticator,
+ struct netr_Authenticator *return_authenticator)
+{
+ if (!received_authenticator || !return_authenticator) {
+ return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ }
+
+ if (!creds) {
+ return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
+ }
+
+ /* TODO: this may allow the a replay attack on a non-signed
+ connection. Should we check that this is increasing? */
+ creds->sequence = received_authenticator->timestamp;
+ creds_step(creds);
+ if (creds_server_check(creds, &received_authenticator->cred)) {
+ return_authenticator->cred = creds->server;
+ return_authenticator->timestamp = creds->sequence;
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+ } else {
+ ZERO_STRUCTP(return_authenticator);
+ return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
+ }
+}
+
+void creds_decrypt_samlogon(struct creds_CredentialState *creds,
+ uint16_t validation_level,
+ union netr_Validation *validation)
+{
+ static const char zeros[16];
+
+ struct netr_SamBaseInfo *base = NULL;
+ switch (validation_level) {
+ case 2:
+ if (validation->sam2) {
+ base = &validation->sam2->base;
+ }
+ break;
+ case 3:
+ if (validation->sam3) {
+ base = &validation->sam3->base;
+ }
+ break;
+ case 6:
+ if (validation->sam6) {
+ base = &validation->sam6->base;
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* If we can't find it, we can't very well decrypt it */
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (!base) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* find and decyrpt the session keys, return in parameters above */
+ if (validation_level == 6) {
+ /* they aren't encrypted! */
+ } else if (creds->negotiate_flags & NETLOGON_NEG_ARCFOUR) {
+ if (memcmp(base->key.key, zeros,
+ sizeof(base->key.key)) != 0) {
+ creds_arcfour_crypt(creds,
+ base->key.key,
+ sizeof(base->key.key));
+ }
+
+ if (memcmp(base->LMSessKey.key, zeros,
+ sizeof(base->LMSessKey.key)) != 0) {
+ creds_arcfour_crypt(creds,
+ base->LMSessKey.key,
+ sizeof(base->LMSessKey.key));
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (memcmp(base->LMSessKey.key, zeros,
+ sizeof(base->LMSessKey.key)) != 0) {
+ creds_des_decrypt_LMKey(creds,
+ &base->LMSessKey);
+ }
+ }
+}
diff --git a/libcli/auth/credentials.h b/libcli/auth/credentials.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4e11cb090f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/libcli/auth/credentials.h
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+/*
+ Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
+
+ code to manipulate domain credentials
+
+ Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 2004
+
+ This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+ (at your option) any later version.
+
+ This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+ You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+*/
+
+#include "librpc/gen_ndr/netlogon.h"
+
+struct creds_CredentialState {
+ uint32_t negotiate_flags;
+ uint8_t session_key[16];
+ uint32_t sequence;
+ struct netr_Credential seed;
+ struct netr_Credential client;
+ struct netr_Credential server;
+ uint16_t secure_channel_type;
+ const char *domain;
+ const char *computer_name;
+ const char *account_name;
+ struct dom_sid *sid;
+};
+
+/* for the timebeing, use the same neg flags as Samba3. */
+/* The 7 here seems to be required to get Win2k not to downgrade us
+ to NT4. Actually, anything other than 1ff would seem to do... */
+#define NETLOGON_NEG_AUTH2_FLAGS 0x000701ff
+
+/* these are the flags that ADS clients use */
+#define NETLOGON_NEG_AUTH2_ADS_FLAGS (0x200fbffb | NETLOGON_NEG_ARCFOUR | NETLOGON_NEG_128BIT | NETLOGON_NEG_SCHANNEL)
+
+
diff --git a/libcli/auth/libcli_auth.h b/libcli/auth/libcli_auth.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ec1c1e7d98
--- /dev/null
+++ b/libcli/auth/libcli_auth.h
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+/*
+ samba -- Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
+
+ This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+ (at your option) any later version.
+
+ This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+ You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+*/
+#ifndef __LIBCLI_AUTH_H__
+#define __LIBCLI_AUTH_H__
+
+#include "librpc/gen_ndr/netlogon.h"
+#include "libcli/auth/credentials.h"
+#include "libcli/auth/proto.h"
+
+#endif /* __LIBCLI_AUTH_H__ */
diff --git a/libcli/auth/ntlm_check.c b/libcli/auth/ntlm_check.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0805b1b043
--- /dev/null
+++ b/libcli/auth/ntlm_check.c
@@ -0,0 +1,603 @@
+/*
+ Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
+ Password and authentication handling
+ Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2001-2004
+ Copyright (C) Gerald Carter 2003
+ Copyright (C) Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton 1996-2000
+
+ This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+ (at your option) any later version.
+
+ This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+ You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+*/
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include "../lib/crypto/crypto.h"
+#include "librpc/gen_ndr/netlogon.h"
+#include "libcli/auth/libcli_auth.h"
+#include "auth/ntlm/ntlm_check.h"
+
+/****************************************************************************
+ Core of smb password checking routine.
+****************************************************************************/
+
+static bool smb_pwd_check_ntlmv1(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ const DATA_BLOB *nt_response,
+ const uint8_t *part_passwd,
+ const DATA_BLOB *sec_blob,
+ DATA_BLOB *user_sess_key)
+{
+ /* Finish the encryption of part_passwd. */
+ uint8_t p24[24];
+
+ if (part_passwd == NULL) {
+ DEBUG(10,("No password set - DISALLOWING access\n"));
+ /* No password set - always false ! */
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (sec_blob->length != 8) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("smb_pwd_check_ntlmv1: incorrect challenge size (%lu)\n",
+ (unsigned long)sec_blob->length));
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (nt_response->length != 24) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("smb_pwd_check_ntlmv1: incorrect password length (%lu)\n",
+ (unsigned long)nt_response->length));
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ SMBOWFencrypt(part_passwd, sec_blob->data, p24);
+
+#if DEBUG_PASSWORD
+ DEBUG(100,("Part password (P16) was |\n"));
+ dump_data(100, part_passwd, 16);
+ DEBUGADD(100,("Password from client was |\n"));
+ dump_data(100, nt_response->data, nt_response->length);
+ DEBUGADD(100,("Given challenge was |\n"));
+ dump_data(100, sec_blob->data, sec_blob->length);
+ DEBUGADD(100,("Value from encryption was |\n"));
+ dump_data(100, p24, 24);
+#endif
+ if (memcmp(p24, nt_response->data, 24) == 0) {
+ if (user_sess_key != NULL) {
+ *user_sess_key = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, NULL, 16);
+ SMBsesskeygen_ntv1(part_passwd, user_sess_key->data);
+ }
+ return true;
+ }
+ return false;
+}
+
+/****************************************************************************
+ Core of smb password checking routine. (NTLMv2, LMv2)
+ Note: The same code works with both NTLMv2 and LMv2.
+****************************************************************************/
+
+static bool smb_pwd_check_ntlmv2(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ const DATA_BLOB *ntv2_response,
+ const uint8_t *part_passwd,
+ const DATA_BLOB *sec_blob,
+ const char *user, const char *domain,
+ bool upper_case_domain, /* should the domain be transformed into upper case? */
+ DATA_BLOB *user_sess_key)
+{
+ /* Finish the encryption of part_passwd. */
+ uint8_t kr[16];
+ uint8_t value_from_encryption[16];
+ DATA_BLOB client_key_data;
+
+ if (part_passwd == NULL) {
+ DEBUG(10,("No password set - DISALLOWING access\n"));
+ /* No password set - always false */
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (sec_blob->length != 8) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("smb_pwd_check_ntlmv2: incorrect challenge size (%lu)\n",
+ (unsigned long)sec_blob->length));
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (ntv2_response->length < 24) {
+ /* We MUST have more than 16 bytes, or the stuff below will go
+ crazy. No known implementation sends less than the 24 bytes
+ for LMv2, let alone NTLMv2. */
+ DEBUG(0, ("smb_pwd_check_ntlmv2: incorrect password length (%lu)\n",
+ (unsigned long)ntv2_response->length));
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ client_key_data = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, ntv2_response->data+16, ntv2_response->length-16);
+ /*
+ todo: should we be checking this for anything? We can't for LMv2,
+ but for NTLMv2 it is meant to contain the current time etc.
+ */
+
+ if (!ntv2_owf_gen(part_passwd, user, domain, upper_case_domain, kr)) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ SMBOWFencrypt_ntv2(kr, sec_blob, &client_key_data, value_from_encryption);
+
+#if DEBUG_PASSWORD
+ DEBUG(100,("Part password (P16) was |\n"));
+ dump_data(100, part_passwd, 16);
+ DEBUGADD(100,("Password from client was |\n"));
+ dump_data(100, ntv2_response->data, ntv2_response->length);
+ DEBUGADD(100,("Variable data from client was |\n"));
+ dump_data(100, client_key_data.data, client_key_data.length);
+ DEBUGADD(100,("Given challenge was |\n"));
+ dump_data(100, sec_blob->data, sec_blob->length);
+ DEBUGADD(100,("Value from encryption was |\n"));
+ dump_data(100, value_from_encryption, 16);
+#endif
+ data_blob_clear_free(&client_key_data);
+ if (memcmp(value_from_encryption, ntv2_response->data, 16) == 0) {
+ if (user_sess_key != NULL) {
+ *user_sess_key = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, NULL, 16);
+ SMBsesskeygen_ntv2(kr, value_from_encryption, user_sess_key->data);
+ }
+ return true;
+ }
+ return false;
+}
+
+/****************************************************************************
+ Core of smb password checking routine. (NTLMv2, LMv2)
+ Note: The same code works with both NTLMv2 and LMv2.
+****************************************************************************/
+
+static bool smb_sess_key_ntlmv2(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ const DATA_BLOB *ntv2_response,
+ const uint8_t *part_passwd,
+ const DATA_BLOB *sec_blob,
+ const char *user, const char *domain,
+ bool upper_case_domain, /* should the domain be transformed into upper case? */
+ DATA_BLOB *user_sess_key)
+{
+ /* Finish the encryption of part_passwd. */
+ uint8_t kr[16];
+ uint8_t value_from_encryption[16];
+ DATA_BLOB client_key_data;
+
+ if (part_passwd == NULL) {
+ DEBUG(10,("No password set - DISALLOWING access\n"));
+ /* No password set - always false */
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (sec_blob->length != 8) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("smb_sess_key_ntlmv2: incorrect challenge size (%lu)\n",
+ (unsigned long)sec_blob->length));
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (ntv2_response->length < 24) {
+ /* We MUST have more than 16 bytes, or the stuff below will go
+ crazy. No known implementation sends less than the 24 bytes
+ for LMv2, let alone NTLMv2. */
+ DEBUG(0, ("smb_sess_key_ntlmv2: incorrect password length (%lu)\n",
+ (unsigned long)ntv2_response->length));
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ client_key_data = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, ntv2_response->data+16, ntv2_response->length-16);
+
+ if (!ntv2_owf_gen(part_passwd, user, domain, upper_case_domain, kr)) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ SMBOWFencrypt_ntv2(kr, sec_blob, &client_key_data, value_from_encryption);
+ *user_sess_key = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, NULL, 16);
+ SMBsesskeygen_ntv2(kr, value_from_encryption, user_sess_key->data);
+ return true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Compare password hashes against those from the SAM
+ *
+ * @param mem_ctx talloc context
+ * @param client_lanman LANMAN password hash, as supplied by the client
+ * @param client_nt NT (MD4) password hash, as supplied by the client
+ * @param username internal Samba username, for log messages
+ * @param client_username username the client used
+ * @param client_domain domain name the client used (may be mapped)
+ * @param stored_lanman LANMAN password hash, as stored on the SAM
+ * @param stored_nt NT (MD4) password hash, as stored on the SAM
+ * @param user_sess_key User session key
+ * @param lm_sess_key LM session key (first 8 bytes of the LM hash)
+ */
+
+NTSTATUS hash_password_check(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ bool lanman_auth,
+ const struct samr_Password *client_lanman,
+ const struct samr_Password *client_nt,
+ const char *username,
+ const struct samr_Password *stored_lanman,
+ const struct samr_Password *stored_nt)
+{
+ if (stored_nt == NULL) {
+ DEBUG(3,("ntlm_password_check: NO NT password stored for user %s.\n",
+ username));
+ }
+
+ if (client_nt && stored_nt) {
+ if (memcmp(client_nt->hash, stored_nt->hash, sizeof(stored_nt->hash)) == 0) {
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+ } else {
+ DEBUG(3,("ntlm_password_check: Interactive logon: NT password check failed for user %s\n",
+ username));
+ return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
+ }
+
+ } else if (client_lanman && stored_lanman) {
+ if (!lanman_auth) {
+ DEBUG(3,("ntlm_password_check: Interactive logon: only LANMAN password supplied for user %s, and LM passwords are disabled!\n",
+ username));
+ return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
+ }
+ if (strchr_m(username, '@')) {
+ return NT_STATUS_NOT_FOUND;
+ }
+
+ if (memcmp(client_lanman->hash, stored_lanman->hash, sizeof(stored_lanman->hash)) == 0) {
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+ } else {
+ DEBUG(3,("ntlm_password_check: Interactive logon: LANMAN password check failed for user %s\n",
+ username));
+ return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
+ }
+ }
+ if (strchr_m(username, '@')) {
+ return NT_STATUS_NOT_FOUND;
+ }
+ return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Check a challenge-response password against the value of the NT or
+ * LM password hash.
+ *
+ * @param mem_ctx talloc context
+ * @param challenge 8-byte challenge. If all zero, forces plaintext comparison
+ * @param nt_response 'unicode' NT response to the challenge, or unicode password
+ * @param lm_response ASCII or LANMAN response to the challenge, or password in DOS code page
+ * @param username internal Samba username, for log messages
+ * @param client_username username the client used
+ * @param client_domain domain name the client used (may be mapped)
+ * @param stored_lanman LANMAN ASCII password from our passdb or similar
+ * @param stored_nt MD4 unicode password from our passdb or similar
+ * @param user_sess_key User session key
+ * @param lm_sess_key LM session key (first 8 bytes of the LM hash)
+ */
+
+NTSTATUS ntlm_password_check(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ bool lanman_auth,
+ bool ntlm_auth,
+ uint32_t logon_parameters,
+ const DATA_BLOB *challenge,
+ const DATA_BLOB *lm_response,
+ const DATA_BLOB *nt_response,
+ const char *username,
+ const char *client_username,
+ const char *client_domain,
+ const struct samr_Password *stored_lanman,
+ const struct samr_Password *stored_nt,
+ DATA_BLOB *user_sess_key,
+ DATA_BLOB *lm_sess_key)
+{
+ const static uint8_t zeros[8];
+ DATA_BLOB tmp_sess_key;
+
+ if (stored_nt == NULL) {
+ DEBUG(3,("ntlm_password_check: NO NT password stored for user %s.\n",
+ username));
+ }
+
+ *lm_sess_key = data_blob(NULL, 0);
+ *user_sess_key = data_blob(NULL, 0);
+
+ /* Check for cleartext netlogon. Used by Exchange 5.5. */
+ if ((logon_parameters & MSV1_0_CLEARTEXT_PASSWORD_ALLOWED)
+ && challenge->length == sizeof(zeros)
+ && (memcmp(challenge->data, zeros, challenge->length) == 0 )) {
+ struct samr_Password client_nt;
+ struct samr_Password client_lm;
+ char *unix_pw = NULL;
+ bool lm_ok;
+
+ DEBUG(4,("ntlm_password_check: checking plaintext passwords for user %s\n",
+ username));
+ mdfour(client_nt.hash, nt_response->data, nt_response->length);
+
+ if (lm_response->length &&
+ (convert_string_talloc(mem_ctx, CH_DOS, CH_UNIX,
+ lm_response->data, lm_response->length,
+ (void **)&unix_pw, NULL, false))) {
+ if (E_deshash(unix_pw, client_lm.hash)) {
+ lm_ok = true;
+ } else {
+ lm_ok = false;
+ }
+ } else {
+ lm_ok = false;
+ }
+ return hash_password_check(mem_ctx,
+ lanman_auth,
+ lm_ok ? &client_lm : NULL,
+ nt_response->length ? &client_nt : NULL,
+ username,
+ stored_lanman, stored_nt);
+ }
+
+ if (nt_response->length != 0 && nt_response->length < 24) {
+ DEBUG(2,("ntlm_password_check: invalid NT password length (%lu) for user %s\n",
+ (unsigned long)nt_response->length, username));
+ }
+
+ if (nt_response->length > 24 && stored_nt) {
+ /* We have the NT MD4 hash challenge available - see if we can
+ use it
+ */
+ DEBUG(4,("ntlm_password_check: Checking NTLMv2 password with domain [%s]\n", client_domain));
+ if (smb_pwd_check_ntlmv2(mem_ctx,
+ nt_response,
+ stored_nt->hash, challenge,
+ client_username,
+ client_domain,
+ false,
+ user_sess_key)) {
+ *lm_sess_key = *user_sess_key;
+ if (user_sess_key->length) {
+ lm_sess_key->length = 8;
+ }
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+ }
+
+ DEBUG(4,("ntlm_password_check: Checking NTLMv2 password with uppercased version of domain [%s]\n", client_domain));
+ if (smb_pwd_check_ntlmv2(mem_ctx,
+ nt_response,
+ stored_nt->hash, challenge,
+ client_username,
+ client_domain,
+ true,
+ user_sess_key)) {
+ *lm_sess_key = *user_sess_key;
+ if (user_sess_key->length) {
+ lm_sess_key->length = 8;
+ }
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+ }
+
+ DEBUG(4,("ntlm_password_check: Checking NTLMv2 password without a domain\n"));
+ if (smb_pwd_check_ntlmv2(mem_ctx,
+ nt_response,
+ stored_nt->hash, challenge,
+ client_username,
+ "",
+ false,
+ user_sess_key)) {
+ *lm_sess_key = *user_sess_key;
+ if (user_sess_key->length) {
+ lm_sess_key->length = 8;
+ }
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+ } else {
+ DEBUG(3,("ntlm_password_check: NTLMv2 password check failed\n"));
+ }
+ } else if (nt_response->length == 24 && stored_nt) {
+ if (ntlm_auth) {
+ /* We have the NT MD4 hash challenge available - see if we can
+ use it (ie. does it exist in the smbpasswd file).
+ */
+ DEBUG(4,("ntlm_password_check: Checking NT MD4 password\n"));
+ if (smb_pwd_check_ntlmv1(mem_ctx,
+ nt_response,
+ stored_nt->hash, challenge,
+ user_sess_key)) {
+ /* The LM session key for this response is not very secure,
+ so use it only if we otherwise allow LM authentication */
+
+ if (lanman_auth && stored_lanman) {
+ *lm_sess_key = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, stored_lanman->hash, 8);
+ }
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+ } else {
+ DEBUG(3,("ntlm_password_check: NT MD4 password check failed for user %s\n",
+ username));
+ return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
+ }
+ } else {
+ DEBUG(2,("ntlm_password_check: NTLMv1 passwords NOT PERMITTED for user %s\n",
+ username));
+ /* no return, becouse we might pick up LMv2 in the LM field */
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (lm_response->length == 0) {
+ DEBUG(3,("ntlm_password_check: NEITHER LanMan nor NT password supplied for user %s\n",
+ username));
+ return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
+ }
+
+ if (lm_response->length < 24) {
+ DEBUG(2,("ntlm_password_check: invalid LanMan password length (%lu) for user %s\n",
+ (unsigned long)nt_response->length, username));
+ return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
+ }
+
+ if (!lanman_auth) {
+ DEBUG(3,("ntlm_password_check: Lanman passwords NOT PERMITTED for user %s\n",
+ username));
+ } else if (!stored_lanman) {
+ DEBUG(3,("ntlm_password_check: NO LanMan password set for user %s (and no NT password supplied)\n",
+ username));
+ } else if (strchr_m(username, '@')) {
+ DEBUG(3,("ntlm_password_check: NO LanMan password allowed for username@realm logins (user: %s)\n",
+ username));
+ } else {
+ DEBUG(4,("ntlm_password_check: Checking LM password\n"));
+ if (smb_pwd_check_ntlmv1(mem_ctx,
+ lm_response,
+ stored_lanman->hash, challenge,
+ NULL)) {
+ /* The session key for this response is still very odd.
+ It not very secure, so use it only if we otherwise
+ allow LM authentication */
+
+ if (lanman_auth && stored_lanman) {
+ uint8_t first_8_lm_hash[16];
+ memcpy(first_8_lm_hash, stored_lanman->hash, 8);
+ memset(first_8_lm_hash + 8, '\0', 8);
+ *user_sess_key = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, first_8_lm_hash, 16);
+ *lm_sess_key = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, stored_lanman->hash, 8);
+ }
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!stored_nt) {
+ DEBUG(4,("ntlm_password_check: LM password check failed for user, no NT password %s\n",username));
+ return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
+ }
+
+ /* This is for 'LMv2' authentication. almost NTLMv2 but limited to 24 bytes.
+ - related to Win9X, legacy NAS pass-though authentication
+ */
+ DEBUG(4,("ntlm_password_check: Checking LMv2 password with domain %s\n", client_domain));
+ if (smb_pwd_check_ntlmv2(mem_ctx,
+ lm_response,
+ stored_nt->hash, challenge,
+ client_username,
+ client_domain,
+ false,
+ &tmp_sess_key)) {
+ if (nt_response->length > 24) {
+ /* If NTLMv2 authentication has preceeded us
+ * (even if it failed), then use the session
+ * key from that. See the RPC-SAMLOGON
+ * torture test */
+ smb_sess_key_ntlmv2(mem_ctx,
+ nt_response,
+ stored_nt->hash, challenge,
+ client_username,
+ client_domain,
+ false,
+ user_sess_key);
+ } else {
+ /* Otherwise, use the LMv2 session key */
+ *user_sess_key = tmp_sess_key;
+ }
+ *lm_sess_key = *user_sess_key;
+ if (user_sess_key->length) {
+ lm_sess_key->length = 8;
+ }
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+ }
+
+ DEBUG(4,("ntlm_password_check: Checking LMv2 password with upper-cased version of domain %s\n", client_domain));
+ if (smb_pwd_check_ntlmv2(mem_ctx,
+ lm_response,
+ stored_nt->hash, challenge,
+ client_username,
+ client_domain,
+ true,
+ &tmp_sess_key)) {
+ if (nt_response->length > 24) {
+ /* If NTLMv2 authentication has preceeded us
+ * (even if it failed), then use the session
+ * key from that. See the RPC-SAMLOGON
+ * torture test */
+ smb_sess_key_ntlmv2(mem_ctx,
+ nt_response,
+ stored_nt->hash, challenge,
+ client_username,
+ client_domain,
+ true,
+ user_sess_key);
+ } else {
+ /* Otherwise, use the LMv2 session key */
+ *user_sess_key = tmp_sess_key;
+ }
+ *lm_sess_key = *user_sess_key;
+ if (user_sess_key->length) {
+ lm_sess_key->length = 8;
+ }
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+ }
+
+ DEBUG(4,("ntlm_password_check: Checking LMv2 password without a domain\n"));
+ if (smb_pwd_check_ntlmv2(mem_ctx,
+ lm_response,
+ stored_nt->hash, challenge,
+ client_username,
+ "",
+ false,
+ &tmp_sess_key)) {
+ if (nt_response->length > 24) {
+ /* If NTLMv2 authentication has preceeded us
+ * (even if it failed), then use the session
+ * key from that. See the RPC-SAMLOGON
+ * torture test */
+ smb_sess_key_ntlmv2(mem_ctx,
+ nt_response,
+ stored_nt->hash, challenge,
+ client_username,
+ "",
+ false,
+ user_sess_key);
+ } else {
+ /* Otherwise, use the LMv2 session key */
+ *user_sess_key = tmp_sess_key;
+ }
+ *lm_sess_key = *user_sess_key;
+ if (user_sess_key->length) {
+ lm_sess_key->length = 8;
+ }
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+ }
+
+ /* Apparently NT accepts NT responses in the LM field
+ - I think this is related to Win9X pass-though authentication
+ */
+ DEBUG(4,("ntlm_password_check: Checking NT MD4 password in LM field\n"));
+ if (ntlm_auth) {
+ if (smb_pwd_check_ntlmv1(mem_ctx,
+ lm_response,
+ stored_nt->hash, challenge,
+ NULL)) {
+ /* The session key for this response is still very odd.
+ It not very secure, so use it only if we otherwise
+ allow LM authentication */
+
+ if (lanman_auth && stored_lanman) {
+ uint8_t first_8_lm_hash[16];
+ memcpy(first_8_lm_hash, stored_lanman->hash, 8);
+ memset(first_8_lm_hash + 8, '\0', 8);
+ *user_sess_key = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, first_8_lm_hash, 16);
+ *lm_sess_key = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, stored_lanman->hash, 8);
+ }
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+ }
+ DEBUG(3,("ntlm_password_check: LM password, NT MD4 password in LM field and LMv2 failed for user %s\n",username));
+ } else {
+ DEBUG(3,("ntlm_password_check: LM password and LMv2 failed for user %s, and NT MD4 password in LM field not permitted\n",username));
+ }
+
+ /* Try and match error codes */
+ if (strchr_m(username, '@')) {
+ return NT_STATUS_NOT_FOUND;
+ }
+ return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
+}
+
diff --git a/libcli/auth/session.c b/libcli/auth/session.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..10c728662d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/libcli/auth/session.c
@@ -0,0 +1,218 @@
+/*
+ Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
+
+ code to encrypt/decrypt data using the user session key
+
+ Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 2004
+
+ This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+ (at your option) any later version.
+
+ This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+ You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+*/
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include "libcli/auth/libcli_auth.h"
+
+/*
+ encrypt or decrypt a blob of data using the user session key
+ as used in lsa_SetSecret
+
+ before calling, the out blob must be initialised to be the same size
+ as the in blob
+*/
+void sess_crypt_blob(DATA_BLOB *out, const DATA_BLOB *in, const DATA_BLOB *session_key,
+ bool forward)
+{
+ int i, k;
+
+ for (i=0,k=0;
+ i<in->length;
+ i += 8, k += 7) {
+ uint8_t bin[8], bout[8], key[7];
+
+ memset(bin, 0, 8);
+ memcpy(bin, &in->data[i], MIN(8, in->length-i));
+
+ if (k + 7 > session_key->length) {
+ k = (session_key->length - k);
+ }
+ memcpy(key, &session_key->data[k], 7);
+
+ des_crypt56(bout, bin, key, forward?1:0);
+
+ memcpy(&out->data[i], bout, MIN(8, in->length-i));
+ }
+}
+
+
+/*
+ a convenient wrapper around sess_crypt_blob() for strings, using the LSA convention
+
+ note that we round the length to a multiple of 8. This seems to be needed for
+ compatibility with windows
+
+ caller should free using data_blob_free()
+*/
+DATA_BLOB sess_encrypt_string(const char *str, const DATA_BLOB *session_key)
+{
+ DATA_BLOB ret, src;
+ int slen = strlen(str);
+ int dlen = (slen+7) & ~7;
+
+ src = data_blob(NULL, 8+dlen);
+ if (!src.data) {
+ return data_blob(NULL, 0);
+ }
+
+ ret = data_blob(NULL, 8+dlen);
+ if (!ret.data) {
+ data_blob_free(&src);
+ return data_blob(NULL, 0);
+ }
+
+ SIVAL(src.data, 0, slen);
+ SIVAL(src.data, 4, 1);
+ memset(src.data+8, 0, dlen);
+ memcpy(src.data+8, str, slen);
+
+ sess_crypt_blob(&ret, &src, session_key, true);
+
+ data_blob_free(&src);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ a convenient wrapper around sess_crypt_blob() for strings, using the LSA convention
+
+ caller should free the returned string
+*/
+char *sess_decrypt_string(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ DATA_BLOB *blob, const DATA_BLOB *session_key)
+{
+ DATA_BLOB out;
+ int slen;
+ char *ret;
+
+ if (blob->length < 8) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ out = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, NULL, blob->length);
+ if (!out.data) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ sess_crypt_blob(&out, blob, session_key, false);
+
+ if (IVAL(out.data, 4) != 1) {
+ DEBUG(0,("Unexpected revision number %d in session crypted string\n",
+ IVAL(out.data, 4)));
+ data_blob_free(&out);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ slen = IVAL(out.data, 0);
+ if (slen > blob->length - 8) {
+ DEBUG(0,("Invalid crypt length %d\n", slen));
+ data_blob_free(&out);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ ret = talloc_strndup(mem_ctx, (const char *)(out.data+8), slen);
+
+ data_blob_free(&out);
+
+ DEBUG(0,("decrypted string '%s' of length %d\n", ret, slen));
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ a convenient wrapper around sess_crypt_blob() for DATA_BLOBs, using the LSA convention
+
+ note that we round the length to a multiple of 8. This seems to be needed for
+ compatibility with windows
+
+ caller should free using data_blob_free()
+*/
+DATA_BLOB sess_encrypt_blob(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, DATA_BLOB *blob_in, const DATA_BLOB *session_key)
+{
+ DATA_BLOB ret, src;
+ int dlen = (blob_in->length+7) & ~7;
+
+ src = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, NULL, 8+dlen);
+ if (!src.data) {
+ return data_blob(NULL, 0);
+ }
+
+ ret = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, NULL, 8+dlen);
+ if (!ret.data) {
+ data_blob_free(&src);
+ return data_blob(NULL, 0);
+ }
+
+ SIVAL(src.data, 0, blob_in->length);
+ SIVAL(src.data, 4, 1);
+ memset(src.data+8, 0, dlen);
+ memcpy(src.data+8, blob_in->data, blob_in->length);
+
+ sess_crypt_blob(&ret, &src, session_key, true);
+
+ data_blob_free(&src);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ Decrypt a DATA_BLOB using the LSA convention
+*/
+NTSTATUS sess_decrypt_blob(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, const DATA_BLOB *blob, const DATA_BLOB *session_key,
+ DATA_BLOB *ret)
+{
+ DATA_BLOB out;
+ int slen;
+
+ if (blob->length < 8) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("Unexpected length %d in session crypted secret (BLOB)\n",
+ (int)blob->length));
+ return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ }
+
+ out = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, NULL, blob->length);
+ if (!out.data) {
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+ sess_crypt_blob(&out, blob, session_key, false);
+
+ if (IVAL(out.data, 4) != 1) {
+ DEBUG(2,("Unexpected revision number %d in session crypted secret (BLOB)\n",
+ IVAL(out.data, 4)));
+ return NT_STATUS_UNKNOWN_REVISION;
+ }
+
+ slen = IVAL(out.data, 0);
+ if (slen > blob->length - 8) {
+ DEBUG(0,("Invalid crypt length %d in session crypted secret (BLOB)\n", slen));
+ return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
+ }
+
+ *ret = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, out.data+8, slen);
+ if (slen && !ret->data) {
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+ data_blob_free(&out);
+
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
diff --git a/libcli/auth/smbdes.c b/libcli/auth/smbdes.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..32e65e779d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/libcli/auth/smbdes.c
@@ -0,0 +1,381 @@
+/*
+ Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
+
+ a partial implementation of DES designed for use in the
+ SMB authentication protocol
+
+ Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 1998
+
+ This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+ (at your option) any later version.
+
+ This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+ You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+*/
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include "libcli/auth/libcli_auth.h"
+
+/* NOTES:
+
+ This code makes no attempt to be fast! In fact, it is a very
+ slow implementation
+
+ This code is NOT a complete DES implementation. It implements only
+ the minimum necessary for SMB authentication, as used by all SMB
+ products (including every copy of Microsoft Windows95 ever sold)
+
+ In particular, it can only do a unchained forward DES pass. This
+ means it is not possible to use this code for encryption/decryption
+ of data, instead it is only useful as a "hash" algorithm.
+
+ There is no entry point into this code that allows normal DES operation.
+
+ I believe this means that this code does not come under ITAR
+ regulations but this is NOT a legal opinion. If you are concerned
+ about the applicability of ITAR regulations to this code then you
+ should confirm it for yourself (and maybe let me know if you come
+ up with a different answer to the one above)
+*/
+
+
+static const uint8_t perm1[56] = {57, 49, 41, 33, 25, 17, 9,
+ 1, 58, 50, 42, 34, 26, 18,
+ 10, 2, 59, 51, 43, 35, 27,
+ 19, 11, 3, 60, 52, 44, 36,
+ 63, 55, 47, 39, 31, 23, 15,
+ 7, 62, 54, 46, 38, 30, 22,
+ 14, 6, 61, 53, 45, 37, 29,
+ 21, 13, 5, 28, 20, 12, 4};
+
+static const uint8_t perm2[48] = {14, 17, 11, 24, 1, 5,
+ 3, 28, 15, 6, 21, 10,
+ 23, 19, 12, 4, 26, 8,
+ 16, 7, 27, 20, 13, 2,
+ 41, 52, 31, 37, 47, 55,
+ 30, 40, 51, 45, 33, 48,
+ 44, 49, 39, 56, 34, 53,
+ 46, 42, 50, 36, 29, 32};
+
+static const uint8_t perm3[64] = {58, 50, 42, 34, 26, 18, 10, 2,
+ 60, 52, 44, 36, 28, 20, 12, 4,
+ 62, 54, 46, 38, 30, 22, 14, 6,
+ 64, 56, 48, 40, 32, 24, 16, 8,
+ 57, 49, 41, 33, 25, 17, 9, 1,
+ 59, 51, 43, 35, 27, 19, 11, 3,
+ 61, 53, 45, 37, 29, 21, 13, 5,
+ 63, 55, 47, 39, 31, 23, 15, 7};
+
+static const uint8_t perm4[48] = { 32, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,
+ 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9,
+ 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13,
+ 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17,
+ 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21,
+ 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25,
+ 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29,
+ 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 1};
+
+static const uint8_t perm5[32] = { 16, 7, 20, 21,
+ 29, 12, 28, 17,
+ 1, 15, 23, 26,
+ 5, 18, 31, 10,
+ 2, 8, 24, 14,
+ 32, 27, 3, 9,
+ 19, 13, 30, 6,
+ 22, 11, 4, 25};
+
+
+static const uint8_t perm6[64] ={ 40, 8, 48, 16, 56, 24, 64, 32,
+ 39, 7, 47, 15, 55, 23, 63, 31,
+ 38, 6, 46, 14, 54, 22, 62, 30,
+ 37, 5, 45, 13, 53, 21, 61, 29,
+ 36, 4, 44, 12, 52, 20, 60, 28,
+ 35, 3, 43, 11, 51, 19, 59, 27,
+ 34, 2, 42, 10, 50, 18, 58, 26,
+ 33, 1, 41, 9, 49, 17, 57, 25};
+
+
+static const uint8_t sc[16] = {1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1};
+
+static const uint8_t sbox[8][4][16] = {
+ {{14, 4, 13, 1, 2, 15, 11, 8, 3, 10, 6, 12, 5, 9, 0, 7},
+ {0, 15, 7, 4, 14, 2, 13, 1, 10, 6, 12, 11, 9, 5, 3, 8},
+ {4, 1, 14, 8, 13, 6, 2, 11, 15, 12, 9, 7, 3, 10, 5, 0},
+ {15, 12, 8, 2, 4, 9, 1, 7, 5, 11, 3, 14, 10, 0, 6, 13}},
+
+ {{15, 1, 8, 14, 6, 11, 3, 4, 9, 7, 2, 13, 12, 0, 5, 10},
+ {3, 13, 4, 7, 15, 2, 8, 14, 12, 0, 1, 10, 6, 9, 11, 5},
+ {0, 14, 7, 11, 10, 4, 13, 1, 5, 8, 12, 6, 9, 3, 2, 15},
+ {13, 8, 10, 1, 3, 15, 4, 2, 11, 6, 7, 12, 0, 5, 14, 9}},
+
+ {{10, 0, 9, 14, 6, 3, 15, 5, 1, 13, 12, 7, 11, 4, 2, 8},
+ {13, 7, 0, 9, 3, 4, 6, 10, 2, 8, 5, 14, 12, 11, 15, 1},
+ {13, 6, 4, 9, 8, 15, 3, 0, 11, 1, 2, 12, 5, 10, 14, 7},
+ {1, 10, 13, 0, 6, 9, 8, 7, 4, 15, 14, 3, 11, 5, 2, 12}},
+
+ {{7, 13, 14, 3, 0, 6, 9, 10, 1, 2, 8, 5, 11, 12, 4, 15},
+ {13, 8, 11, 5, 6, 15, 0, 3, 4, 7, 2, 12, 1, 10, 14, 9},
+ {10, 6, 9, 0, 12, 11, 7, 13, 15, 1, 3, 14, 5, 2, 8, 4},
+ {3, 15, 0, 6, 10, 1, 13, 8, 9, 4, 5, 11, 12, 7, 2, 14}},
+
+ {{2, 12, 4, 1, 7, 10, 11, 6, 8, 5, 3, 15, 13, 0, 14, 9},
+ {14, 11, 2, 12, 4, 7, 13, 1, 5, 0, 15, 10, 3, 9, 8, 6},
+ {4, 2, 1, 11, 10, 13, 7, 8, 15, 9, 12, 5, 6, 3, 0, 14},
+ {11, 8, 12, 7, 1, 14, 2, 13, 6, 15, 0, 9, 10, 4, 5, 3}},
+
+ {{12, 1, 10, 15, 9, 2, 6, 8, 0, 13, 3, 4, 14, 7, 5, 11},
+ {10, 15, 4, 2, 7, 12, 9, 5, 6, 1, 13, 14, 0, 11, 3, 8},
+ {9, 14, 15, 5, 2, 8, 12, 3, 7, 0, 4, 10, 1, 13, 11, 6},
+ {4, 3, 2, 12, 9, 5, 15, 10, 11, 14, 1, 7, 6, 0, 8, 13}},
+
+ {{4, 11, 2, 14, 15, 0, 8, 13, 3, 12, 9, 7, 5, 10, 6, 1},
+ {13, 0, 11, 7, 4, 9, 1, 10, 14, 3, 5, 12, 2, 15, 8, 6},
+ {1, 4, 11, 13, 12, 3, 7, 14, 10, 15, 6, 8, 0, 5, 9, 2},
+ {6, 11, 13, 8, 1, 4, 10, 7, 9, 5, 0, 15, 14, 2, 3, 12}},
+
+ {{13, 2, 8, 4, 6, 15, 11, 1, 10, 9, 3, 14, 5, 0, 12, 7},
+ {1, 15, 13, 8, 10, 3, 7, 4, 12, 5, 6, 11, 0, 14, 9, 2},
+ {7, 11, 4, 1, 9, 12, 14, 2, 0, 6, 10, 13, 15, 3, 5, 8},
+ {2, 1, 14, 7, 4, 10, 8, 13, 15, 12, 9, 0, 3, 5, 6, 11}}};
+
+static void permute(char *out, const char *in, const uint8_t *p, int n)
+{
+ int i;
+ for (i=0;i<n;i++)
+ out[i] = in[p[i]-1];
+}
+
+static void lshift(char *d, int count, int n)
+{
+ char out[64];
+ int i;
+ for (i=0;i<n;i++)
+ out[i] = d[(i+count)%n];
+ for (i=0;i<n;i++)
+ d[i] = out[i];
+}
+
+static void concat(char *out, char *in1, char *in2, int l1, int l2)
+{
+ while (l1--)
+ *out++ = *in1++;
+ while (l2--)
+ *out++ = *in2++;
+}
+
+static void xor(char *out, char *in1, char *in2, int n)
+{
+ int i;
+ for (i=0;i<n;i++)
+ out[i] = in1[i] ^ in2[i];
+}
+
+static void dohash(char *out, char *in, char *key, int forw)
+{
+ int i, j, k;
+ char pk1[56];
+ char c[28];
+ char d[28];
+ char cd[56];
+ char ki[16][48];
+ char pd1[64];
+ char l[32], r[32];
+ char rl[64];
+
+ permute(pk1, key, perm1, 56);
+
+ for (i=0;i<28;i++)
+ c[i] = pk1[i];
+ for (i=0;i<28;i++)
+ d[i] = pk1[i+28];
+
+ for (i=0;i<16;i++) {
+ lshift(c, sc[i], 28);
+ lshift(d, sc[i], 28);
+
+ concat(cd, c, d, 28, 28);
+ permute(ki[i], cd, perm2, 48);
+ }
+
+ permute(pd1, in, perm3, 64);
+
+ for (j=0;j<32;j++) {
+ l[j] = pd1[j];
+ r[j] = pd1[j+32];
+ }
+
+ for (i=0;i<16;i++) {
+ char er[48];
+ char erk[48];
+ char b[8][6];
+ char cb[32];
+ char pcb[32];
+ char r2[32];
+
+ permute(er, r, perm4, 48);
+
+ xor(erk, er, ki[forw ? i : 15 - i], 48);
+
+ for (j=0;j<8;j++)
+ for (k=0;k<6;k++)
+ b[j][k] = erk[j*6 + k];
+
+ for (j=0;j<8;j++) {
+ int m, n;
+ m = (b[j][0]<<1) | b[j][5];
+
+ n = (b[j][1]<<3) | (b[j][2]<<2) | (b[j][3]<<1) | b[j][4];
+
+ for (k=0;k<4;k++)
+ b[j][k] = (sbox[j][m][n] & (1<<(3-k)))?1:0;
+ }
+
+ for (j=0;j<8;j++)
+ for (k=0;k<4;k++)
+ cb[j*4+k] = b[j][k];
+ permute(pcb, cb, perm5, 32);
+
+ xor(r2, l, pcb, 32);
+
+ for (j=0;j<32;j++)
+ l[j] = r[j];
+
+ for (j=0;j<32;j++)
+ r[j] = r2[j];
+ }
+
+ concat(rl, r, l, 32, 32);
+
+ permute(out, rl, perm6, 64);
+}
+
+static void str_to_key(const uint8_t *str,uint8_t *key)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ key[0] = str[0]>>1;
+ key[1] = ((str[0]&0x01)<<6) | (str[1]>>2);
+ key[2] = ((str[1]&0x03)<<5) | (str[2]>>3);
+ key[3] = ((str[2]&0x07)<<4) | (str[3]>>4);
+ key[4] = ((str[3]&0x0F)<<3) | (str[4]>>5);
+ key[5] = ((str[4]&0x1F)<<2) | (str[5]>>6);
+ key[6] = ((str[5]&0x3F)<<1) | (str[6]>>7);
+ key[7] = str[6]&0x7F;
+ for (i=0;i<8;i++) {
+ key[i] = (key[i]<<1);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ basic des crypt using a 56 bit (7 byte) key
+*/
+void des_crypt56(uint8_t out[8], const uint8_t in[8], const uint8_t key[7], int forw)
+{
+ int i;
+ char outb[64];
+ char inb[64];
+ char keyb[64];
+ uint8_t key2[8];
+
+ str_to_key(key, key2);
+
+ for (i=0;i<64;i++) {
+ inb[i] = (in[i/8] & (1<<(7-(i%8)))) ? 1 : 0;
+ keyb[i] = (key2[i/8] & (1<<(7-(i%8)))) ? 1 : 0;
+ outb[i] = 0;
+ }
+
+ dohash(outb, inb, keyb, forw);
+
+ for (i=0;i<8;i++) {
+ out[i] = 0;
+ }
+
+ for (i=0;i<64;i++) {
+ if (outb[i])
+ out[i/8] |= (1<<(7-(i%8)));
+ }
+}
+
+void E_P16(const uint8_t *p14,uint8_t *p16)
+{
+ const uint8_t sp8[8] = {0x4b, 0x47, 0x53, 0x21, 0x40, 0x23, 0x24, 0x25};
+ des_crypt56(p16, sp8, p14, 1);
+ des_crypt56(p16+8, sp8, p14+7, 1);
+}
+
+void E_P24(const uint8_t *p21, const uint8_t *c8, uint8_t *p24)
+{
+ des_crypt56(p24, c8, p21, 1);
+ des_crypt56(p24+8, c8, p21+7, 1);
+ des_crypt56(p24+16, c8, p21+14, 1);
+}
+
+void D_P16(const uint8_t *p14, const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out)
+{
+ des_crypt56(out, in, p14, 0);
+ des_crypt56(out+8, in+8, p14+7, 0);
+}
+
+void E_old_pw_hash( uint8_t *p14, const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out)
+{
+ des_crypt56(out, in, p14, 1);
+ des_crypt56(out+8, in+8, p14+7, 1);
+}
+
+/* des encryption with a 128 bit key */
+void des_crypt128(uint8_t out[8], const uint8_t in[8], const uint8_t key[16])
+{
+ uint8_t buf[8];
+ des_crypt56(buf, in, key, 1);
+ des_crypt56(out, buf, key+9, 1);
+}
+
+/* des encryption with a 64 bit key */
+void des_crypt64(uint8_t out[8], const uint8_t in[8], const uint8_t key[8], int forw)
+{
+ uint8_t buf[8];
+ uint8_t key2[8];
+ ZERO_STRUCT(key2);
+ des_crypt56(buf, in, key, forw);
+ key2[0] = key[7];
+ des_crypt56(out, buf, key2, forw);
+}
+
+/* des encryption with a 112 bit (14 byte) key */
+void des_crypt112(uint8_t out[8], const uint8_t in[8], const uint8_t key[14], int forw)
+{
+ uint8_t buf[8];
+ des_crypt56(buf, in, key, forw);
+ des_crypt56(out, buf, key+7, forw);
+}
+
+/* des encryption of a 16 byte lump of data with a 112 bit key */
+void des_crypt112_16(uint8_t out[16], uint8_t in[16], const uint8_t key[14], int forw)
+{
+ des_crypt56(out, in, key, forw);
+ des_crypt56(out + 8, in + 8, key+7, forw);
+}
+
+/* Decode a sam password hash into a password. The password hash is the
+ same method used to store passwords in the NT registry. The DES key
+ used is based on the RID of the user. */
+void sam_rid_crypt(uint_t rid, const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, int forw)
+{
+ uint8_t s[14];
+
+ s[0] = s[4] = s[8] = s[12] = (uint8_t)(rid & 0xFF);
+ s[1] = s[5] = s[9] = s[13] = (uint8_t)((rid >> 8) & 0xFF);
+ s[2] = s[6] = s[10] = (uint8_t)((rid >> 16) & 0xFF);
+ s[3] = s[7] = s[11] = (uint8_t)((rid >> 24) & 0xFF);
+
+ des_crypt56(out, in, s, forw);
+ des_crypt56(out+8, in+8, s+7, forw);
+}
diff --git a/libcli/auth/smbencrypt.c b/libcli/auth/smbencrypt.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c6118c6568
--- /dev/null
+++ b/libcli/auth/smbencrypt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,595 @@
+/*
+ Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
+ SMB parameters and setup
+ Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 1992-1998
+ Modified by Jeremy Allison 1995.
+ Copyright (C) Jeremy Allison 1995-2000.
+ Copyright (C) Luke Kennethc Casson Leighton 1996-2000.
+ Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2002-2003
+
+ This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+ (at your option) any later version.
+
+ This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+ You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+*/
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include "system/time.h"
+#include "auth/ntlmssp/ntlmssp.h"
+#include "auth/ntlmssp/msrpc_parse.h"
+#include "../lib/crypto/crypto.h"
+#include "libcli/auth/libcli_auth.h"
+
+/*
+ This implements the X/Open SMB password encryption
+ It takes a password ('unix' string), a 8 byte "crypt key"
+ and puts 24 bytes of encrypted password into p24
+
+ Returns false if password must have been truncated to create LM hash
+*/
+bool SMBencrypt(const char *passwd, const uint8_t *c8, uint8_t p24[24])
+{
+ bool ret;
+ uint8_t p21[21];
+
+ memset(p21,'\0',21);
+ ret = E_deshash(passwd, p21);
+
+ SMBOWFencrypt(p21, c8, p24);
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
+ DEBUG(100,("SMBencrypt: lm#, challenge, response\n"));
+ dump_data(100, p21, 16);
+ dump_data(100, c8, 8);
+ dump_data(100, p24, 24);
+#endif
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Creates the MD4 Hash of the users password in NT UNICODE.
+ * @param passwd password in 'unix' charset.
+ * @param p16 return password hashed with md4, caller allocated 16 byte buffer
+ */
+
+bool E_md4hash(const char *passwd, uint8_t p16[16])
+{
+ size_t len;
+ smb_ucs2_t *wpwd;
+ bool ret;
+
+ ret = push_ucs2_talloc(NULL, &wpwd, passwd, &len);
+ if (!ret || len < 2) {
+ /* We don't want to return fixed data, as most callers
+ * don't check */
+ mdfour(p16, (const uint8_t *)passwd, strlen(passwd));
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ len -= 2;
+ mdfour(p16, (const uint8_t *)wpwd, len);
+
+ talloc_free(wpwd);
+ return true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Creates the DES forward-only Hash of the users password in DOS ASCII charset
+ * @param passwd password in 'unix' charset.
+ * @param p16 return password hashed with DES, caller allocated 16 byte buffer
+ * @return false if password was > 14 characters, and therefore may be incorrect, otherwise true
+ * @note p16 is filled in regardless
+ */
+
+bool E_deshash(const char *passwd, uint8_t p16[16])
+{
+ bool ret = true;
+ char dospwd[256];
+ ZERO_STRUCT(dospwd);
+
+ /* Password must be converted to DOS charset - null terminated, uppercase. */
+ push_string(dospwd, passwd, sizeof(dospwd), STR_ASCII|STR_UPPER|STR_TERMINATE);
+
+ /* Only the first 14 chars are considered, password need not be null terminated. */
+ E_P16((const uint8_t *)dospwd, p16);
+
+ if (strlen(dospwd) > 14) {
+ ret = false;
+ }
+
+ ZERO_STRUCT(dospwd);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* Does both the NTLMv2 owfs of a user's password */
+bool ntv2_owf_gen(const uint8_t owf[16],
+ const char *user_in, const char *domain_in,
+ bool upper_case_domain, /* Transform the domain into UPPER case */
+ uint8_t kr_buf[16])
+{
+ smb_ucs2_t *user;
+ smb_ucs2_t *domain;
+ size_t user_byte_len;
+ size_t domain_byte_len;
+ bool ret;
+
+ HMACMD5Context ctx;
+ TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_init("ntv2_owf_gen for %s\\%s", domain_in, user_in);
+
+ if (!mem_ctx) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (!user_in) {
+ user_in = "";
+ }
+
+ if (!domain_in) {
+ domain_in = "";
+ }
+
+ user_in = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, user_in);
+ if (user_in == NULL) {
+ talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (upper_case_domain) {
+ domain_in = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, domain_in);
+ if (domain_in == NULL) {
+ talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ret = push_ucs2_talloc(mem_ctx, &user, user_in, &user_byte_len );
+ if (!ret) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("push_uss2_talloc() for user returned -1 (probably talloc() failure)\n"));
+ talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ ret = push_ucs2_talloc(mem_ctx, &domain, domain_in, &domain_byte_len);
+ if (!ret) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("push_ucs2_talloc() for domain returned -1 (probably talloc() failure)\n"));
+ talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ SMB_ASSERT(user_byte_len >= 2);
+ SMB_ASSERT(domain_byte_len >= 2);
+
+ /* We don't want null termination */
+ user_byte_len = user_byte_len - 2;
+ domain_byte_len = domain_byte_len - 2;
+
+ hmac_md5_init_limK_to_64(owf, 16, &ctx);
+ hmac_md5_update((const void *)user, user_byte_len, &ctx);
+ hmac_md5_update((const void *)domain, domain_byte_len, &ctx);
+ hmac_md5_final(kr_buf, &ctx);
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
+ DEBUG(100, ("ntv2_owf_gen: user, domain, owfkey, kr\n"));
+ dump_data(100, (const void *)user, user_byte_len);
+ dump_data(100, (const void *)domain, domain_byte_len);
+ dump_data(100, owf, 16);
+ dump_data(100, kr_buf, 16);
+#endif
+
+ talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+ return true;
+}
+
+/* Does the des encryption from the NT or LM MD4 hash. */
+void SMBOWFencrypt(const uint8_t passwd[16], const uint8_t *c8, uint8_t p24[24])
+{
+ uint8_t p21[21];
+
+ ZERO_STRUCT(p21);
+
+ memcpy(p21, passwd, 16);
+ E_P24(p21, c8, p24);
+}
+
+/* Does the NT MD4 hash then des encryption. */
+
+void SMBNTencrypt(const char *passwd, uint8_t *c8, uint8_t *p24)
+{
+ uint8_t p21[21];
+
+ memset(p21,'\0',21);
+
+ E_md4hash(passwd, p21);
+ SMBOWFencrypt(p21, c8, p24);
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
+ DEBUG(100,("SMBNTencrypt: nt#, challenge, response\n"));
+ dump_data(100, p21, 16);
+ dump_data(100, c8, 8);
+ dump_data(100, p24, 24);
+#endif
+}
+
+/* Does the md5 encryption from the Key Response for NTLMv2. */
+void SMBOWFencrypt_ntv2(const uint8_t kr[16],
+ const DATA_BLOB *srv_chal,
+ const DATA_BLOB *smbcli_chal,
+ uint8_t resp_buf[16])
+{
+ HMACMD5Context ctx;
+
+ hmac_md5_init_limK_to_64(kr, 16, &ctx);
+ hmac_md5_update(srv_chal->data, srv_chal->length, &ctx);
+ hmac_md5_update(smbcli_chal->data, smbcli_chal->length, &ctx);
+ hmac_md5_final(resp_buf, &ctx);
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
+ DEBUG(100, ("SMBOWFencrypt_ntv2: srv_chal, smbcli_chal, resp_buf\n"));
+ dump_data(100, srv_chal->data, srv_chal->length);
+ dump_data(100, smbcli_chal->data, smbcli_chal->length);
+ dump_data(100, resp_buf, 16);
+#endif
+}
+
+void SMBsesskeygen_ntv2(const uint8_t kr[16],
+ const uint8_t * nt_resp, uint8_t sess_key[16])
+{
+ /* a very nice, 128 bit, variable session key */
+
+ HMACMD5Context ctx;
+
+ hmac_md5_init_limK_to_64(kr, 16, &ctx);
+ hmac_md5_update(nt_resp, 16, &ctx);
+ hmac_md5_final((uint8_t *)sess_key, &ctx);
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
+ DEBUG(100, ("SMBsesskeygen_ntv2:\n"));
+ dump_data(100, sess_key, 16);
+#endif
+}
+
+void SMBsesskeygen_ntv1(const uint8_t kr[16], uint8_t sess_key[16])
+{
+ /* yes, this session key does not change - yes, this
+ is a problem - but it is 128 bits */
+
+ mdfour((uint8_t *)sess_key, kr, 16);
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
+ DEBUG(100, ("SMBsesskeygen_ntv1:\n"));
+ dump_data(100, sess_key, 16);
+#endif
+}
+
+void SMBsesskeygen_lm_sess_key(const uint8_t lm_hash[16],
+ const uint8_t lm_resp[24], /* only uses 8 */
+ uint8_t sess_key[16])
+{
+ /* Calculate the LM session key (effective length 40 bits,
+ but changes with each session) */
+ uint8_t p24[24];
+ uint8_t partial_lm_hash[14];
+
+ memcpy(partial_lm_hash, lm_hash, 8);
+ memset(partial_lm_hash + 8, 0xbd, 6);
+
+ des_crypt56(p24, lm_resp, partial_lm_hash, 1);
+ des_crypt56(p24+8, lm_resp, partial_lm_hash + 7, 1);
+
+ memcpy(sess_key, p24, 16);
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
+ DEBUG(100, ("SMBsesskeygen_lm_sess_key: \n"));
+ dump_data(100, sess_key, 16);
+#endif
+}
+
+DATA_BLOB NTLMv2_generate_names_blob(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ const char *hostname,
+ const char *domain)
+{
+ DATA_BLOB names_blob = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, NULL, 0);
+
+ msrpc_gen(mem_ctx, &names_blob,
+ "aaa",
+ NTLMSSP_NAME_TYPE_DOMAIN, domain,
+ NTLMSSP_NAME_TYPE_SERVER, hostname,
+ 0, "");
+ return names_blob;
+}
+
+static DATA_BLOB NTLMv2_generate_client_data(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, const DATA_BLOB *names_blob)
+{
+ uint8_t client_chal[8];
+ DATA_BLOB response = data_blob(NULL, 0);
+ uint8_t long_date[8];
+ NTTIME nttime;
+
+ unix_to_nt_time(&nttime, time(NULL));
+
+ generate_random_buffer(client_chal, sizeof(client_chal));
+
+ push_nttime(long_date, 0, nttime);
+
+ /* See http://www.ubiqx.org/cifs/SMB.html#SMB.8.5 */
+
+ msrpc_gen(mem_ctx, &response, "ddbbdb",
+ 0x00000101, /* Header */
+ 0, /* 'Reserved' */
+ long_date, 8, /* Timestamp */
+ client_chal, 8, /* client challenge */
+ 0, /* Unknown */
+ names_blob->data, names_blob->length); /* End of name list */
+
+ return response;
+}
+
+static DATA_BLOB NTLMv2_generate_response(TALLOC_CTX *out_mem_ctx,
+ const uint8_t ntlm_v2_hash[16],
+ const DATA_BLOB *server_chal,
+ const DATA_BLOB *names_blob)
+{
+ uint8_t ntlmv2_response[16];
+ DATA_BLOB ntlmv2_client_data;
+ DATA_BLOB final_response;
+
+ TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(out_mem_ctx, 0,
+ "NTLMv2_generate_response internal context");
+
+ if (!mem_ctx) {
+ return data_blob(NULL, 0);
+ }
+
+ /* NTLMv2 */
+ /* generate some data to pass into the response function - including
+ the hostname and domain name of the server */
+ ntlmv2_client_data = NTLMv2_generate_client_data(mem_ctx, names_blob);
+
+ /* Given that data, and the challenge from the server, generate a response */
+ SMBOWFencrypt_ntv2(ntlm_v2_hash, server_chal, &ntlmv2_client_data, ntlmv2_response);
+
+ final_response = data_blob_talloc(out_mem_ctx, NULL, sizeof(ntlmv2_response) + ntlmv2_client_data.length);
+
+ memcpy(final_response.data, ntlmv2_response, sizeof(ntlmv2_response));
+
+ memcpy(final_response.data+sizeof(ntlmv2_response),
+ ntlmv2_client_data.data, ntlmv2_client_data.length);
+
+ talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+
+ return final_response;
+}
+
+static DATA_BLOB LMv2_generate_response(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ const uint8_t ntlm_v2_hash[16],
+ const DATA_BLOB *server_chal)
+{
+ uint8_t lmv2_response[16];
+ DATA_BLOB lmv2_client_data = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, NULL, 8);
+ DATA_BLOB final_response = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, NULL,24);
+
+ /* LMv2 */
+ /* client-supplied random data */
+ generate_random_buffer(lmv2_client_data.data, lmv2_client_data.length);
+
+ /* Given that data, and the challenge from the server, generate a response */
+ SMBOWFencrypt_ntv2(ntlm_v2_hash, server_chal, &lmv2_client_data, lmv2_response);
+ memcpy(final_response.data, lmv2_response, sizeof(lmv2_response));
+
+ /* after the first 16 bytes is the random data we generated above,
+ so the server can verify us with it */
+ memcpy(final_response.data+sizeof(lmv2_response),
+ lmv2_client_data.data, lmv2_client_data.length);
+
+ data_blob_free(&lmv2_client_data);
+
+ return final_response;
+}
+
+bool SMBNTLMv2encrypt_hash(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ const char *user, const char *domain, const uint8_t nt_hash[16],
+ const DATA_BLOB *server_chal,
+ const DATA_BLOB *names_blob,
+ DATA_BLOB *lm_response, DATA_BLOB *nt_response,
+ DATA_BLOB *lm_session_key, DATA_BLOB *user_session_key)
+{
+ uint8_t ntlm_v2_hash[16];
+
+ /* We don't use the NT# directly. Instead we use it mashed up with
+ the username and domain.
+ This prevents username swapping during the auth exchange
+ */
+ if (!ntv2_owf_gen(nt_hash, user, domain, true, ntlm_v2_hash)) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (nt_response) {
+ *nt_response = NTLMv2_generate_response(mem_ctx,
+ ntlm_v2_hash, server_chal,
+ names_blob);
+ if (user_session_key) {
+ *user_session_key = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, NULL, 16);
+
+ /* The NTLMv2 calculations also provide a session key, for signing etc later */
+ /* use only the first 16 bytes of nt_response for session key */
+ SMBsesskeygen_ntv2(ntlm_v2_hash, nt_response->data, user_session_key->data);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* LMv2 */
+
+ if (lm_response) {
+ *lm_response = LMv2_generate_response(mem_ctx,
+ ntlm_v2_hash, server_chal);
+ if (lm_session_key) {
+ *lm_session_key = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, NULL, 16);
+
+ /* The NTLMv2 calculations also provide a session key, for signing etc later */
+ /* use only the first 16 bytes of lm_response for session key */
+ SMBsesskeygen_ntv2(ntlm_v2_hash, lm_response->data, lm_session_key->data);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+bool SMBNTLMv2encrypt(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ const char *user, const char *domain,
+ const char *password,
+ const DATA_BLOB *server_chal,
+ const DATA_BLOB *names_blob,
+ DATA_BLOB *lm_response, DATA_BLOB *nt_response,
+ DATA_BLOB *lm_session_key, DATA_BLOB *user_session_key)
+{
+ uint8_t nt_hash[16];
+ E_md4hash(password, nt_hash);
+
+ return SMBNTLMv2encrypt_hash(mem_ctx,
+ user, domain, nt_hash, server_chal, names_blob,
+ lm_response, nt_response, lm_session_key, user_session_key);
+}
+
+/***********************************************************
+ encode a password buffer with a unicode password. The buffer
+ is filled with random data to make it harder to attack.
+************************************************************/
+bool encode_pw_buffer(uint8_t buffer[516], const char *password, int string_flags)
+{
+ uint8_t new_pw[512];
+ size_t new_pw_len;
+
+ /* the incoming buffer can be any alignment. */
+ string_flags |= STR_NOALIGN;
+
+ new_pw_len = push_string(new_pw,
+ password,
+ sizeof(new_pw), string_flags);
+
+ memcpy(&buffer[512 - new_pw_len], new_pw, new_pw_len);
+
+ generate_random_buffer(buffer, 512 - new_pw_len);
+
+ /*
+ * The length of the new password is in the last 4 bytes of
+ * the data buffer.
+ */
+ SIVAL(buffer, 512, new_pw_len);
+ ZERO_STRUCT(new_pw);
+ return true;
+}
+
+
+/***********************************************************
+ decode a password buffer
+ *new_pw_len is the length in bytes of the possibly mulitbyte
+ returned password including termination.
+************************************************************/
+bool decode_pw_buffer(uint8_t in_buffer[516], char *new_pwrd,
+ int new_pwrd_size, int string_flags)
+{
+ int byte_len=0;
+ ssize_t converted_pw_len;
+
+ /* the incoming buffer can be any alignment. */
+ string_flags |= STR_NOALIGN;
+
+ /*
+ Warning !!! : This function is called from some rpc call.
+ The password IN the buffer may be a UNICODE string.
+ The password IN new_pwrd is an ASCII string
+ If you reuse that code somewhere else check first.
+ */
+
+ /* The length of the new password is in the last 4 bytes of the data buffer. */
+
+ byte_len = IVAL(in_buffer, 512);
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
+ dump_data(100, in_buffer, 516);
+#endif
+
+ /* Password cannot be longer than the size of the password buffer */
+ if ( (byte_len < 0) || (byte_len > 512)) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ /* decode into the return buffer. Buffer length supplied */
+ converted_pw_len = pull_string(new_pwrd, &in_buffer[512 - byte_len], new_pwrd_size,
+ byte_len, string_flags);
+
+ if (converted_pw_len == -1) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
+ DEBUG(100,("decode_pw_buffer: new_pwrd: "));
+ dump_data(100, (const uint8_t *)new_pwrd, converted_pw_len);
+ DEBUG(100,("multibyte len:%d\n", (int)converted_pw_len));
+ DEBUG(100,("original char len:%d\n", byte_len/2));
+#endif
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+/***********************************************************
+ encode a password buffer with an already unicode password. The
+ rest of the buffer is filled with random data to make it harder to attack.
+************************************************************/
+bool set_pw_in_buffer(uint8_t buffer[516], DATA_BLOB *password)
+{
+ if (password->length > 512) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(&buffer[512 - password->length], password->data, password->length);
+
+ generate_random_buffer(buffer, 512 - password->length);
+
+ /*
+ * The length of the new password is in the last 4 bytes of
+ * the data buffer.
+ */
+ SIVAL(buffer, 512, password->length);
+ return true;
+}
+
+/***********************************************************
+ decode a password buffer
+ *new_pw_size is the length in bytes of the extracted unicode password
+************************************************************/
+bool extract_pw_from_buffer(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ uint8_t in_buffer[516], DATA_BLOB *new_pass)
+{
+ int byte_len=0;
+
+ /* The length of the new password is in the last 4 bytes of the data buffer. */
+
+ byte_len = IVAL(in_buffer, 512);
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
+ dump_data(100, in_buffer, 516);
+#endif
+
+ /* Password cannot be longer than the size of the password buffer */
+ if ( (byte_len < 0) || (byte_len > 512)) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ *new_pass = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, &in_buffer[512 - byte_len], byte_len);
+
+ if (!new_pass->data) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}