split the system password checking routines out of smbd/password.c and

into passdb/pass_check.c. This means SWAT no longer needs to link to
smbd/password.c
(This used to be commit 90d93889d722670cbb517017531264630af759bf)

1 files changed, 950 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/source3/auth/pass_check.c b/source3/auth/pass_check.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b5aa832f48
--- /dev/null
+++ b/source3/auth/pass_check.c
@@ -0,0 +1,950 @@
+/* 
+   Unix SMB/Netbios implementation.
+   Version 1.9.
+   Password checking
+   Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 1992-1998
+   
+   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+   the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+   (at your option) any later version.
+   
+   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+   GNU General Public License for more details.
+   
+   You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+   along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+   Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
+*/
+
+/* this module is for checking a username/password against a system
+   password database. The SMB encrypted password support is elsewhere */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+extern int DEBUGLEVEL;
+
+/* these are kept here to keep the string_combinations function simple */
+static char this_user[100]="";
+static char this_salt[100]="";
+static char this_crypted[100]="";
+
+
+/****************************************************************************
+update the enhanced security database. Only relevant for OSF1 at the moment.
+****************************************************************************/
+static void update_protected_database(char *user, BOOL result)
+{
+#ifdef OSF1_ENH_SEC
+	struct pr_passwd *mypasswd;
+	time_t starttime;
+
+	mypasswd = getprpwnam (user);
+	starttime = time (NULL);
+
+	if (result)  {
+		mypasswd->ufld.fd_slogin = starttime;
+		mypasswd->ufld.fd_nlogins = 0;
+      
+		putprpwnam(user,mypasswd);
+      	} else {
+		mypasswd->ufld.fd_ulogin = starttime;
+		mypasswd->ufld.fd_nlogins = mypasswd->ufld.fd_nlogins + 1;
+		if (mypasswd->ufld.fd_max_tries != 0 && 
+		    mypasswd->ufld.fd_nlogins > mypasswd->ufld.fd_max_tries) {
+			mypasswd->uflg.fg_lock = 0;
+			DEBUG(3,("Account %s is disabled\n", user));
+		}
+		putprpwnam(user ,mypasswd);
+	}
+#endif
+}
+
+
+#ifdef HAVE_PAM
+/*******************************************************************
+check on PAM authentication
+********************************************************************/
+
+/* We first need some helper functions */
+#include <security/pam_appl.h>
+/* Static variables used to communicate between the conversation function
+ * and the server_login function
+ */
+static char *PAM_username;
+static char *PAM_password;
+
+/* PAM conversation function
+ * Here we assume (for now, at least) that echo on means login name, and
+ * echo off means password.
+ */
+static int PAM_conv (int num_msg,
+                     const struct pam_message **msg,
+                     struct pam_response **resp,
+                     void *appdata_ptr) {
+  int replies = 0;
+  struct pam_response *reply = NULL;
+
+  #define COPY_STRING(s) (s) ? strdup(s) : NULL
+
+  reply = malloc(sizeof(struct pam_response) * num_msg);
+  if (!reply) return PAM_CONV_ERR;
+
+  for (replies = 0; replies < num_msg; replies++) {
+    switch (msg[replies]->msg_style) {
+      case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON:
+        reply[replies].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
+        reply[replies].resp = COPY_STRING(PAM_username);
+          /* PAM frees resp */
+        break;
+      case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF:
+        reply[replies].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
+        reply[replies].resp = COPY_STRING(PAM_password);
+          /* PAM frees resp */
+        break;
+      case PAM_TEXT_INFO:
+	/* fall through */
+      case PAM_ERROR_MSG:
+        /* ignore it... */
+        reply[replies].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
+        reply[replies].resp = NULL;
+        break;
+      default:
+        /* Must be an error of some sort... */
+        free (reply);
+        return PAM_CONV_ERR;
+    }
+  }
+  if (reply) *resp = reply;
+  return PAM_SUCCESS;
+}
+static struct pam_conv PAM_conversation = {
+    &PAM_conv,
+    NULL
+};
+
+
+static BOOL pam_auth(char *this_user,char *password)
+{
+  pam_handle_t *pamh;
+  int pam_error;
+
+  /* Now use PAM to do authentication.  For now, we won't worry about
+   * session logging, only authentication.  Bail out if there are any
+   * errors.  Since this is a limited protocol, and an even more limited
+   * function within a server speaking this protocol, we can't be as
+   * verbose as would otherwise make sense.
+   * Query: should we be using PAM_SILENT to shut PAM up?
+   */
+  #define PAM_BAIL if (pam_error != PAM_SUCCESS) { \
+     pam_end(pamh, 0); return False; \
+   }
+  PAM_password = password;
+  PAM_username = this_user;
+  pam_error = pam_start("samba", this_user, &PAM_conversation, &pamh);
+  PAM_BAIL;
+/* Setting PAM_SILENT stops generation of error messages to syslog
+ * to enable debugging on Red Hat Linux set:
+ * /etc/pam.d/samba:
+ *	auth required /lib/security/pam_pwdb.so nullok shadow audit
+ * _OR_ change PAM_SILENT to 0 to force detailed reporting (logging)
+ */
+  pam_error = pam_authenticate(pamh, PAM_SILENT);
+  PAM_BAIL;
+  /* It is not clear to me that account management is the right thing
+   * to do, but it is not clear that it isn't, either.  This can be
+   * removed if no account management should be done.  Alternately,
+   * put a pam_allow.so entry in /etc/pam.conf for account handling. */
+  pam_error = pam_acct_mgmt(pamh, PAM_SILENT);
+  PAM_BAIL;
+  pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS);
+  /* If this point is reached, the user has been authenticated. */
+  return(True);
+}
+#endif
+
+
+#ifdef WITH_AFS
+/*******************************************************************
+check on AFS authentication
+********************************************************************/
+static BOOL afs_auth(char *this_user,char *password)
+{
+	long password_expires = 0;
+	char *reason;
+    
+	/* For versions of AFS prior to 3.3, this routine has few arguments, */
+	/* but since I can't find the old documentation... :-)               */
+	setpag();
+	if (ka_UserAuthenticateGeneral(KA_USERAUTH_VERSION+KA_USERAUTH_DOSETPAG,
+				       this_user,
+				       (char *) 0, /* instance */
+				       (char *) 0, /* cell */
+				       password,
+				       0,          /* lifetime, default */
+				       &password_expires, /*days 'til it expires */
+				       0,          /* spare 2 */
+				       &reason) == 0) {
+		return(True);
+	}
+	return(False);
+}
+#endif
+
+
+#ifdef WITH_DFS
+
+/*****************************************************************
+ This new version of the DFS_AUTH code was donated by Karsten Muuss
+ <muuss@or.uni-bonn.de>. It fixes the following problems with the
+ old code :
+
+  - Server credentials may expire
+  - Client credential cache files have wrong owner
+  - purge_context() function is called with invalid argument
+
+ This new code was modified to ensure that on exit the uid/gid is
+ still root, and the original directory is restored. JRA.
+******************************************************************/
+
+sec_login_handle_t my_dce_sec_context;
+int dcelogin_atmost_once = 0;
+
+/*******************************************************************
+check on a DCE/DFS authentication
+********************************************************************/
+static BOOL dfs_auth(char *this_user,char *password)
+{
+	error_status_t err;
+	int err2;
+	int prterr;
+	signed32 expire_time, current_time;
+	boolean32 password_reset;
+	struct passwd *pw;
+	sec_passwd_rec_t passwd_rec;
+	sec_login_auth_src_t auth_src = sec_login_auth_src_network;
+	unsigned char dce_errstr[dce_c_error_string_len];
+
+	if (dcelogin_atmost_once) return(False);
+
+#ifdef HAVE_CRYPT
+	/*
+	 * We only go for a DCE login context if the given password
+	 * matches that stored in the local password file.. 
+	 * Assumes local passwd file is kept in sync w/ DCE RGY!
+	 */
+
+	if (strcmp((char *)crypt(password,this_salt),this_crypted)) {
+		return(False);
+	}
+#endif
+
+	sec_login_get_current_context(&my_dce_sec_context, &err);
+	if (err != error_status_ok ) {  
+		dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+		DEBUG(0,("DCE can't get current context. %s\n", dce_errstr));
+
+		return(False);
+	}
+
+	sec_login_certify_identity(my_dce_sec_context, &err);
+	if (err != error_status_ok) {  
+		dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+		DEBUG(0,("DCE can't get current context. %s\n", dce_errstr));
+		
+		return(False);
+	}
+
+	sec_login_get_expiration(my_dce_sec_context, &expire_time, &err);
+	if (err != error_status_ok) {
+		dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+		DEBUG(0,("DCE can't get expiration. %s\n", dce_errstr));
+		
+		return(False);
+	}
+  
+	time(&current_time);
+
+	if (expire_time < (current_time + 60)) {
+		struct passwd    *pw;
+		sec_passwd_rec_t *key;
+  
+		sec_login_get_pwent(my_dce_sec_context, 
+				    (sec_login_passwd_t*)&pw, &err);
+		if (err != error_status_ok ) {
+			dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+			DEBUG(0,("DCE can't get pwent. %s\n", dce_errstr));
+			
+			return(False);
+		}
+		
+		sec_login_refresh_identity(my_dce_sec_context, &err);
+		if (err != error_status_ok) { 
+			dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+			DEBUG(0,("DCE can't refresh identity. %s\n", 
+				 dce_errstr));
+			
+			return(False);
+		}
+  
+		sec_key_mgmt_get_key(rpc_c_authn_dce_secret, NULL,
+				     (unsigned char *)pw->pw_name,
+				     sec_c_key_version_none,
+				     (void**)&key, &err);
+		if (err != error_status_ok) {
+			dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+			DEBUG(0,("DCE can't get key for %s. %s\n", 
+				 pw->pw_name, dce_errstr));
+
+			return(False);
+		}
+  
+		sec_login_valid_and_cert_ident(my_dce_sec_context, key,
+					       &password_reset, &auth_src, 
+					       &err);
+		if (err != error_status_ok ) {
+			dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+			DEBUG(0,("DCE can't validate and certify identity for %s. %s\n", 
+				 pw->pw_name, dce_errstr));
+		}
+  
+		sec_key_mgmt_free_key(key, &err);
+		if (err != error_status_ok ) {
+			dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+			DEBUG(0,("DCE can't free key.\n", dce_errstr));
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (sec_login_setup_identity((unsigned char *)this_user,
+				     sec_login_no_flags,
+				     &my_dce_sec_context,
+				     &err) == 0) {
+		dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+		DEBUG(0,("DCE Setup Identity for %s failed: %s\n",
+			 this_user,dce_errstr));
+		return(False);
+	}
+
+	sec_login_get_pwent(my_dce_sec_context, 
+			    (sec_login_passwd_t*)&pw, &err);
+	if (err != error_status_ok) {
+		dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+		DEBUG(0,("DCE can't get pwent. %s\n", dce_errstr));
+		
+		return(False);
+	}
+
+	sec_login_purge_context(&my_dce_sec_context, &err);
+	if (err != error_status_ok) {
+		dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+		DEBUG(0,("DCE can't purge context. %s\n", dce_errstr));
+
+		return(False);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * NB. I'd like to change these to call something like become_user()
+	 * instead but currently we don't have a connection
+	 * context to become the correct user. This is already
+	 * fairly platform specific code however, so I think
+	 * this should be ok. I have added code to go
+	 * back to being root on error though. JRA.
+	 */
+	
+	if (setregid(-1, pw->pw_gid) != 0) {
+		DEBUG(0,("Can't set egid to %d (%s)\n", 
+			 pw->pw_gid, strerror(errno)));
+		return False;
+	}
+
+	if (setreuid(-1, pw->pw_uid) != 0) {
+		setgid(0);
+		DEBUG(0,("Can't set euid to %d (%s)\n", 
+			 pw->pw_uid, strerror(errno)));
+		return False;
+	}
+ 
+	if (sec_login_setup_identity((unsigned char *)this_user,
+				     sec_login_no_flags,
+				     &my_dce_sec_context,
+				     &err) == 0) {
+		dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+		/* Go back to root, JRA. */
+		setuid(0);
+		setgid(0);
+		DEBUG(0,("DCE Setup Identity for %s failed: %s\n",
+			 this_user,dce_errstr));
+		return(False);
+	}
+
+	sec_login_get_pwent(my_dce_sec_context, 
+			    (sec_login_passwd_t*)&pw, &err);
+	if (err != error_status_ok ) {
+		dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+		/* Go back to root, JRA. */
+		setuid(0);
+		setgid(0);
+		DEBUG(0,("DCE can't get pwent. %s\n", dce_errstr));
+		
+		return(False);
+	}
+
+	passwd_rec.version_number = sec_passwd_c_version_none;
+	passwd_rec.pepper = NULL;
+	passwd_rec.key.key_type = sec_passwd_plain;
+	passwd_rec.key.tagged_union.plain  = (idl_char *)password;
+	
+	sec_login_validate_identity(my_dce_sec_context,
+				    &passwd_rec, &password_reset,
+				    &auth_src, &err);
+	if (err != error_status_ok ) { 
+		dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+		/* Go back to root, JRA. */
+		setuid(0);
+		setgid(0);
+		DEBUG(0,("DCE Identity Validation failed for principal %s: %s\n",
+			 this_user,dce_errstr));
+		
+		return(False);
+	}
+
+	sec_login_certify_identity(my_dce_sec_context, &err);
+	if (err != error_status_ok) { 
+		dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+		/* Go back to root, JRA. */
+		setuid(0);
+		setgid(0);
+		DEBUG(0,("DCE certify identity failed: %s\n", dce_errstr));
+		
+		return(False);
+	}
+
+	if (auth_src != sec_login_auth_src_network) { 
+		DEBUG(0,("DCE context has no network credentials.\n"));
+	}
+
+	sec_login_set_context(my_dce_sec_context, &err);
+	if (err != error_status_ok) {  
+		dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+		DEBUG(0,("DCE login failed for principal %s, cant set context: %s\n",
+			 this_user,dce_errstr));
+		
+		sec_login_purge_context(&my_dce_sec_context, &err);
+		/* Go back to root, JRA. */
+		setuid(0);
+		setgid(0);
+		return(False);
+	}
+	
+	sec_login_get_pwent(my_dce_sec_context, 
+			    (sec_login_passwd_t*)&pw, &err);
+	if (err != error_status_ok) {
+		dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+		DEBUG(0,("DCE can't get pwent. %s\n", dce_errstr));
+
+		/* Go back to root, JRA. */
+		setuid(0);
+		setgid(0);
+		return(False);
+	}
+	
+	DEBUG(0,("DCE login succeeded for principal %s on pid %d\n",
+		 this_user, getpid()));
+	
+	DEBUG(3,("DCE principal: %s\n"
+		 "          uid: %d\n"
+		 "          gid: %d\n",
+		 pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_gid));
+	DEBUG(3,("         info: %s\n"
+		 "          dir: %s\n"
+		 "        shell: %s\n",
+		 pw->pw_gecos, pw->pw_dir, pw->pw_shell));
+	
+	sec_login_get_expiration(my_dce_sec_context, &expire_time, &err);
+	if (err != error_status_ok) {
+		dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+		/* Go back to root, JRA. */
+		setuid(0);
+		setgid(0);
+		DEBUG(0,("DCE can't get expiration. %s\n", dce_errstr));
+		
+		return(False);
+	}
+	
+	setuid(0);
+	setgid(0);
+	
+	DEBUG(0,("DCE context expires: %s",asctime(localtime(&expire_time))));
+	
+	dcelogin_atmost_once = 1;
+	return (True);
+}
+
+void dfs_unlogin(void)
+{
+	error_status_t err;
+	int err2;
+	unsigned char dce_errstr[dce_c_error_string_len];
+	
+	sec_login_purge_context(&my_dce_sec_context, &err);
+	if (err != error_status_ok) {  
+		dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+		DEBUG(0,("DCE purge login context failed for server instance %d: %s\n",
+			 getpid(), dce_errstr));
+	}
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef KRB5_AUTH
+/*******************************************************************
+check on Kerberos authentication
+********************************************************************/
+static BOOL krb5_auth(char *this_user,char *password)
+{
+	krb5_data tgtname = {
+		0,
+		KRB5_TGS_NAME_SIZE,
+	 	KRB5_TGS_NAME
+ 	};
+	krb5_context kcontext;
+	krb5_principal kprinc;
+	krb5_principal server;
+	krb5_creds kcreds;
+	int options = 0;
+	krb5_address **addrs = (krb5_address **)0;
+	krb5_preauthtype *preauth = NULL;
+	krb5_keytab keytab = NULL;
+	krb5_timestamp now;
+	krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
+	int retval;
+	char *name;
+
+	if (retval=krb5_init_context(&kcontext)) {
+		return(False);
+	}
+
+	if (retval = krb5_timeofday(kcontext, &now)) {
+		return(False);
+	}
+
+	if (retval = krb5_cc_default(kcontext, &ccache)) {
+		return(False);
+	}
+	
+	if (retval = krb5_parse_name(kcontext, this_user, &kprinc)) {
+		return(False);
+	}
+
+	memset((char *)&kcreds, 0, sizeof(kcreds));
+
+	kcreds.client = kprinc;
+	
+	if ((retval = krb5_build_principal_ext(kcontext, &server,
+		krb5_princ_realm(kcontext, kprinc)->length,
+		krb5_princ_realm(kcontext, kprinc)->data,
+		tgtname.length,
+		tgtname.data,
+		krb5_princ_realm(kcontext, kprinc)->length,
+		krb5_princ_realm(kcontext, kprinc)->data,
+		0))) {
+ 		return(False);
+	}
+
+	kcreds.server = server;
+
+	retval = krb5_get_in_tkt_with_password(kcontext,
+					       options,
+					       addrs,
+					       NULL,
+					       preauth,
+					       password,
+					       0,
+					       &kcreds,
+					       0);
+
+	if (retval) {
+		return(False);
+	}
+
+	return(True);
+}
+#endif /* KRB5_AUTH */
+
+#ifdef KRB4_AUTH
+/*******************************************************************
+check on Kerberos authentication
+********************************************************************/
+static BOOL krb4_auth(char *this_user,char *password)
+{
+	char realm[REALM_SZ];
+	char tkfile[MAXPATHLEN];
+  
+	if (krb_get_lrealm(realm, 1) != KSUCCESS) {
+		(void) safe_strcpy(realm, KRB_REALM, sizeof (realm) - 1);
+	}
+
+	(void) slprintf(tkfile, sizeof(tkfile) - 1, "/tmp/samba_tkt_%d", 
+			getpid());
+  
+	krb_set_tkt_string(tkfile);
+	if (krb_verify_user(this_user, "", realm,
+			    password, 0,
+			    "rmcd") == KSUCCESS) {
+		unlink(tkfile);
+		return 1;
+	}
+	unlink(tkfile);
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif /* KRB4_AUTH */
+
+#ifdef LINUX_BIGCRYPT
+/****************************************************************************
+an enhanced crypt for Linux to handle password longer than 8 characters
+****************************************************************************/
+static int linux_bigcrypt(char *password,char *salt1, char *crypted)
+{
+#define LINUX_PASSWORD_SEG_CHARS 8
+	char salt[3];
+	int i;
+  
+	StrnCpy(salt,salt1,2);
+	crypted +=2;
+  
+	for ( i=strlen(password); i > 0; i -= LINUX_PASSWORD_SEG_CHARS) {
+		char * p = crypt(password,salt) + 2;
+		if (strncmp(p, crypted, LINUX_PASSWORD_SEG_CHARS) != 0)
+			return(0);
+		password += LINUX_PASSWORD_SEG_CHARS;
+		crypted  += strlen(p);
+	}
+  
+	return(1);
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef OSF1_ENH_SEC
+/****************************************************************************
+an enhanced crypt for OSF1
+****************************************************************************/
+static char *osf1_bigcrypt(char *password,char *salt1)
+{
+	static char result[AUTH_MAX_PASSWD_LENGTH] = "";
+	char *p1;
+	char *p2=password;
+	char salt[3];
+	int i;
+	int parts = strlen(password) / AUTH_CLEARTEXT_SEG_CHARS;
+	if (strlen(password)%AUTH_CLEARTEXT_SEG_CHARS) {
+		parts++;
+	}
+	
+	StrnCpy(salt,salt1,2);
+	StrnCpy(result,salt1,2);
+
+	for (i=0; i<parts;i++) {
+		p1 = crypt(p2,salt);
+		strncat(result,p1+2,AUTH_MAX_PASSWD_LENGTH-strlen(p1+2)-1);
+		StrnCpy(salt,&result[2+i*AUTH_CIPHERTEXT_SEG_CHARS],2);
+		p2 += AUTH_CLEARTEXT_SEG_CHARS;
+	}
+
+	return(result);
+}
+#endif
+
+
+/****************************************************************************
+apply a function to upper/lower case combinations
+of a string and return true if one of them returns true.
+try all combinations with N uppercase letters.
+offset is the first char to try and change (start with 0)
+it assumes the string starts lowercased
+****************************************************************************/
+static BOOL string_combinations2(char *s,int offset,BOOL (*fn)(char *),int N)
+{
+	int len = strlen(s);
+	int i;
+
+#ifdef PASSWORD_LENGTH
+	len = MIN(len,PASSWORD_LENGTH);
+#endif
+
+	if (N <= 0 || offset >= len) {
+		return(fn(s));
+	}
+
+	for (i=offset;i<(len-(N-1));i++) {      
+		char c = s[i];
+		if (!islower(c)) continue;
+		s[i] = toupper(c);
+		if (string_combinations2(s,i+1,fn,N-1))
+			return(True);
+		s[i] = c;
+	}
+	return(False);
+}
+
+/****************************************************************************
+apply a function to upper/lower case combinations
+of a string and return true if one of them returns true.
+try all combinations with up to N uppercase letters.
+offset is the first char to try and change (start with 0)
+it assumes the string starts lowercased
+****************************************************************************/
+static BOOL string_combinations(char *s,BOOL (*fn)(char *),int N)
+{
+	int n;
+	for (n=1;n<=N;n++)
+		if (string_combinations2(s,0,fn,n)) return(True);
+	return(False);
+}
+
+
+/****************************************************************************
+core of password checking routine
+****************************************************************************/
+static BOOL password_check(char *password)
+{
+
+#ifdef HAVE_PAM
+	/* This falls through if the password check fails
+	   - if HAVE_CRYPT is not defined this causes an error msg
+	   saying Warning - no crypt available
+	   - if HAVE_CRYPT is defined this is a potential security hole
+	   as it may authenticate via the crypt call when PAM
+	   settings say it should fail.
+	   if (pam_auth(this_user,password)) return(True);
+	   Hence we make a direct return to avoid a second chance!!!
+	*/
+	return (pam_auth(this_user,password));
+#endif
+	
+#ifdef WITH_AFS
+	if (afs_auth(this_user,password)) return(True);
+#endif
+	
+#ifdef WITH_DFS
+	if (dfs_auth(this_user,password)) return(True);
+#endif 
+
+#ifdef KRB5_AUTH
+	if (krb5_auth(this_user,password)) return(True);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef KRB4_AUTH
+	if (krb4_auth(this_user,password)) return(True);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef OSF1_ENH_SEC
+	{
+	  BOOL ret = (strcmp(osf1_bigcrypt(password,this_salt),this_crypted) == 0);
+	  if(!ret) {
+		  DEBUG(2,("OSF1_ENH_SEC failed. Trying normal crypt.\n"));
+		  ret = (strcmp((char *)crypt(password,this_salt),this_crypted) == 0);
+	  }
+	  return ret;
+	}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef ULTRIX_AUTH
+	return (strcmp((char *)crypt16(password, this_salt ),this_crypted) == 0);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef LINUX_BIGCRYPT
+	return(linux_bigcrypt(password,this_salt,this_crypted));
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_BIGCRYPT
+	return(strcmp(bigcrypt(password,this_salt),this_crypted) == 0);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_CRYPT
+	DEBUG(1,("Warning - no crypt available\n"));
+	return(False);
+#else
+	return(strcmp((char *)crypt(password,this_salt),this_crypted) == 0);
+#endif
+}
+
+
+
+/****************************************************************************
+check if a username/password is OK
+the function pointer fn() points to a function to call when a successful
+match is found and is used to update the encrypted password file 
+return True on correct match, False otherwise
+****************************************************************************/
+BOOL pass_check(char *user,char *password, int pwlen, struct passwd *pwd,
+		BOOL (*fn)(char *, char *))
+{
+	pstring pass2;
+	int level = lp_passwordlevel();
+	struct passwd *pass;
+
+	if (password) password[pwlen] = 0;
+
+#if DEBUG_PASSWORD
+	DEBUG(100,("checking user=[%s] pass=[%s]\n",user,password));
+#endif
+
+	if (!password) {
+		return(False);
+	}
+
+	if (((!*password) || (!pwlen)) && !lp_null_passwords()) {
+		return(False);
+	}
+
+	if (pwd && !user) {
+		pass = (struct passwd *) pwd;
+		user = pass->pw_name;
+	} else {
+		pass = Get_Pwnam(user,True);
+	}
+
+
+	DEBUG(4,("Checking password for user %s (l=%d)\n",user,pwlen));
+
+	if (!pass) {
+		DEBUG(3,("Couldn't find user %s\n",user));
+		return(False);
+	}
+
+#ifdef HAVE_GETSPNAM
+	{
+		struct spwd *spass;
+
+		/* many shadow systems require you to be root to get
+		   the password, in most cases this should already be
+		   the case when this function is called, except
+		   perhaps for IPC password changing requests */
+
+		spass = getspnam(pass->pw_name);
+		if (spass && spass->sp_pwdp) {
+			pass->pw_passwd = spass->sp_pwdp;
+		}
+	}
+#elif defined(IA_UINFO)
+	{
+		/* Need to get password with SVR4.2's ia_ functions
+		   instead of get{sp,pw}ent functions. Required by
+		   UnixWare 2.x, tested on version
+		   2.1. (tangent@cyberport.com) */
+		uinfo_t uinfo;
+		if (ia_openinfo(pass->pw_name, &uinfo) != -1) {
+			ia_get_logpwd(uinfo, &(pass->pw_passwd));
+		}
+	}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_GETPRPWNAM
+	{
+		struct pr_passwd *pr_pw = getprpwnam(pass->pw_name);
+		if (pr_pw && pr_pw->ufld.fd_encrypt)
+			pass->pw_passwd = pr_pw->ufld.fd_encrypt;
+	}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef OSF1_ENH_SEC
+	{
+		struct pr_passwd *mypasswd;
+		DEBUG(5,("Checking password for user %s in OSF1_ENH_SEC\n",
+			 user));
+		mypasswd = getprpwnam (user);
+		if (mypasswd) { 
+			fstrcpy(pass->pw_name,mypasswd->ufld.fd_name);
+			fstrcpy(pass->pw_passwd,mypasswd->ufld.fd_encrypt);
+		} else {
+			DEBUG(5,("No entry for user %s in protected database !\n",
+				 user));
+			return(False);
+		}
+	}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef ULTRIX_AUTH
+	{
+		AUTHORIZATION *ap = getauthuid(pass->pw_uid);
+		if (ap) {
+			fstrcpy(pass->pw_passwd, ap->a_password);
+			endauthent();
+		}
+	}
+#endif
+
+	/* extract relevant info */
+	fstrcpy(this_user,pass->pw_name);  
+	fstrcpy(this_salt,pass->pw_passwd);
+	/* crypt on some platforms (HPUX in particular)
+	   won't work with more than 2 salt characters. */
+	this_salt[2] = 0;
+	
+	fstrcpy(this_crypted,pass->pw_passwd);
+	
+	if (!*this_crypted) {
+		if (!lp_null_passwords()) {
+			DEBUG(2,("Disallowing %s with null password\n",
+				 this_user));
+			return(False);
+		}
+		if (!*password) {
+			DEBUG(3,("Allowing access to %s with null password\n",
+				 this_user));
+			return(True);
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* try it as it came to us */
+	if (password_check(password)) {
+		update_protected_database(user,True);
+		if (fn) fn(user,password);
+		return(True);
+	}
+
+	/* if the password was given to us with mixed case then we don't
+	   need to proceed as we know it hasn't been case modified by the
+	   client */
+	if (strhasupper(password) && strhaslower(password)) {
+		return(False);
+	}
+
+	/* make a copy of it */
+	StrnCpy(pass2,password,sizeof(pstring)-1);
+  
+	/* try all lowercase */
+	strlower(password);
+	if (password_check(password)) {
+		update_protected_database(user,True);
+		if (fn) fn(user,password);
+		return(True);
+	}
+
+	/* give up? */
+	if (level < 1) {
+		update_protected_database(user,False);
+
+		/* restore it */
+		fstrcpy(password,pass2);
+		
+		return(False);
+	}
+
+	/* last chance - all combinations of up to level chars upper! */
+	strlower(password);
+
+	if (string_combinations(password,password_check,level)) {
+		update_protected_database(user,True);
+		if (fn) fn(user,password);
+		return(True);
+	}
+
+	update_protected_database(user,False);
+  
+	/* restore it */
+	fstrcpy(password,pass2);
+  
+	return(False);
+}