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author | Gerald Carter <jerry@samba.org> | 2007-05-14 14:23:51 +0000 |
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committer | Gerald (Jerry) Carter <jerry@samba.org> | 2007-10-10 12:22:02 -0500 |
commit | d34f6bb969092166c961e328229b1b05a30f6930 (patch) | |
tree | 5cad4256a4dab7d6a7545188f877b7c78cf7c8f0 /source3/lib | |
parent | 00790cb8afaf768ba650ee40796ccdafc535ae8d (diff) | |
download | samba-d34f6bb969092166c961e328229b1b05a30f6930.tar.gz samba-d34f6bb969092166c961e328229b1b05a30f6930.tar.bz2 samba-d34f6bb969092166c961e328229b1b05a30f6930.zip |
r22852: merge fixes for CVE-2007-2446 and CVE-2007-2447 to all branches
(This used to be commit f65214be68c1a59d9598bfb9f3b19e71cc3fa07b)
Diffstat (limited to 'source3/lib')
-rw-r--r-- | source3/lib/smbrun.c | 31 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | source3/lib/util_str.c | 163 |
2 files changed, 190 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/source3/lib/smbrun.c b/source3/lib/smbrun.c index 4400aeb443..e81224b5af 100644 --- a/source3/lib/smbrun.c +++ b/source3/lib/smbrun.c @@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ run a command being careful about uid/gid handling and putting the output in outfd (or discard it if outfd is NULL). ****************************************************************************/ -int smbrun(const char *cmd, int *outfd) +static int smbrun_internal(const char *cmd, int *outfd, BOOL sanitize) { pid_t pid; uid_t uid = current_user.ut.uid; @@ -173,13 +173,36 @@ int smbrun(const char *cmd, int *outfd) } #endif - execl("/bin/sh","sh","-c",cmd,NULL); + { + const char *newcmd = sanitize ? escape_shell_string(cmd) : cmd; + if (!newcmd) { + exit(82); + } + execl("/bin/sh","sh","-c",newcmd,NULL); + } /* not reached */ - exit(82); + exit(83); return 1; } +/**************************************************************************** + Use only in known safe shell calls (printing). +****************************************************************************/ + +int smbrun_no_sanitize(const char *cmd, int *outfd) +{ + return smbrun_internal(cmd, outfd, False); +} + +/**************************************************************************** + By default this now sanitizes shell expansion. +****************************************************************************/ + +int smbrun(const char *cmd, int *outfd) +{ + return smbrun_internal(cmd, outfd, True); +} /**************************************************************************** run a command being careful about uid/gid handling and putting the output in @@ -302,7 +325,7 @@ int smbrunsecret(const char *cmd, const char *secret) #endif execl("/bin/sh", "sh", "-c", cmd, NULL); - + /* not reached */ exit(82); return 1; diff --git a/source3/lib/util_str.c b/source3/lib/util_str.c index 457232c2b2..1439ac6fcd 100644 --- a/source3/lib/util_str.c +++ b/source3/lib/util_str.c @@ -2616,3 +2616,166 @@ size_t utf16_len_n(const void *src, size_t n) return len; } + +/******************************************************************* + Add a shell escape character '\' to any character not in a known list + of characters. UNIX charset format. +*******************************************************************/ + +#define INCLUDE_LIST "0123456789ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz_/ \t.," +#define INSIDE_DQUOTE_LIST "$`\n\"\\" + +char *escape_shell_string(const char *src) +{ + size_t srclen = strlen(src); + char *ret = SMB_MALLOC((srclen * 2) + 1); + char *dest = ret; + BOOL in_s_quote = False; + BOOL in_d_quote = False; + BOOL next_escaped = False; + + if (!ret) { + return NULL; + } + + while (*src) { + size_t c_size; + codepoint_t c = next_codepoint(src, &c_size); + + if (c == INVALID_CODEPOINT) { + SAFE_FREE(ret); + return NULL; + } + + if (c_size > 1) { + memcpy(dest, src, c_size); + src += c_size; + dest += c_size; + next_escaped = False; + continue; + } + + /* + * Deal with backslash escaped state. + * This only lasts for one character. + */ + + if (next_escaped) { + *dest++ = *src++; + next_escaped = False; + continue; + } + + /* + * Deal with single quote state. The + * only thing we care about is exiting + * this state. + */ + + if (in_s_quote) { + if (*src == '\'') { + in_s_quote = False; + } + *dest++ = *src++; + continue; + } + + /* + * Deal with double quote state. The most + * complex state. We must cope with \, meaning + * possibly escape next char (depending what it + * is), ", meaning exit this state, and possibly + * add an \ escape to any unprotected character + * (listed in INSIDE_DQUOTE_LIST). + */ + + if (in_d_quote) { + if (*src == '\\') { + /* + * Next character might be escaped. + * We have to peek. Inside double + * quotes only INSIDE_DQUOTE_LIST + * characters are escaped by a \. + */ + + char nextchar; + + c = next_codepoint(&src[1], &c_size); + if (c == INVALID_CODEPOINT) { + SAFE_FREE(ret); + return NULL; + } + if (c_size > 1) { + /* + * Don't escape the next char. + * Just copy the \. + */ + *dest++ = *src++; + continue; + } + + nextchar = src[1]; + + if (nextchar && strchr(INSIDE_DQUOTE_LIST, (int)nextchar)) { + next_escaped = True; + } + *dest++ = *src++; + continue; + } + + if (*src == '\"') { + /* Exit double quote state. */ + in_d_quote = False; + *dest++ = *src++; + continue; + } + + /* + * We know the character isn't \ or ", + * so escape it if it's any of the other + * possible unprotected characters. + */ + + if (strchr(INSIDE_DQUOTE_LIST, (int)*src)) { + *dest++ = '\\'; + } + *dest++ = *src++; + continue; + } + + /* + * From here to the end of the loop we're + * not in the single or double quote state. + */ + + if (*src == '\\') { + /* Next character must be escaped. */ + next_escaped = True; + *dest++ = *src++; + continue; + } + + if (*src == '\'') { + /* Go into single quote state. */ + in_s_quote = True; + *dest++ = *src++; + continue; + } + + if (*src == '\"') { + /* Go into double quote state. */ + in_d_quote = True; + *dest++ = *src++; + continue; + } + + /* Check if we need to escape the character. */ + + if (!strchr(INCLUDE_LIST, (int)*src)) { + *dest++ = '\\'; + } + *dest++ = *src++; + } + *dest++ = '\0'; + return ret; +} |