- group database API. oops and oh dear, the threat has been carried out:

  the pre-alpha "domain group" etc parameters have disappeared.

- interactive debug detection

- re-added mem_man (andrew's memory management, detects memory corruption)

- american spellings of "initialise" replaced with english spelling of
  "initialise".

- started on "lookup_name()" and "lookup_sid()" functions.  proper ones.

- moved lots of functions around.  created some modules of commonly used
  code.  e.g the password file locking code, which is used in groupfile.c
  and aliasfile.c and smbpass.c

- moved RID_TYPE_MASK up another bit.  this is really unfortunate, but
  there is no other "fast" way to identify users from groups from aliases.
  i do not believe that this code saves us anything (the multipliers)
  and puts us at a disadvantage (reduces the useable rid space).
  the designers of NT aren't silly: if they can get away with a user-
  interface-speed LsaLookupNames / LsaLookupSids, then so can we.  i
  spoke with isaac at the cifs conference, the only time for example that
  they do a security context check is on file create.  certainly not on
  individual file reads / writes, which would drastically hit their
  performance and ours, too.

- renamed myworkgroup to global_sam_name, amongst other things, when used
  in the rpc code.  there is also a global_member_name, as we are always
  responsible for a SAM database, the scope of which is limited by the role
  of the machine (e.g if a member of a workgroup, your SAM is for _local_
  logins only, and its name is the name of your server.  you even still
  have a SID.  see LsaQueryInfoPolicy, levels 3 and 5).

- updated functionality of groupname.c to be able to cope with names
  like DOMAIN\group and SERVER\alias.  used this code to be able to
  do aliases as well as groups.  this code may actually be better
  off being used in username mapping, too.

- created a connect to serverlist function in clientgen.c and used it
  in password.c

- initialisation in server.c depends on the role of the server.  well,
  it does now.

- rpctorture.  smbtorture.  EXERCISE EXTREME CAUTION.
(This used to be commit 0d21e1e6090b933f396c764af535ca3388a562db)

1 files changed, 225 insertions, 295 deletions

diff --git a/source3/passdb/smbpass.c b/source3/passdb/smbpass.c
index c8d817dc40..bdf01ee6a8 100644
--- a/source3/passdb/smbpass.c
+++ b/source3/passdb/smbpass.c
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
 
 #ifdef USE_SMBPASS_DB
 
-extern int pw_file_lock_depth;
+static int pw_file_lock_depth = 0;
 extern int DEBUGLEVEL;
 extern pstring samlogon_user;
 extern BOOL sam_logon_in_ssb;
@@ -35,37 +35,8 @@ static char s_readbuf[1024];
 
 static void *startsmbfilepwent(BOOL update)
 {
-  FILE *fp = NULL;
-  char *pfile = lp_smb_passwd_file();
-
-  if (!*pfile) {
-    DEBUG(0, ("startsmbfilepwent: No SMB password file set\n"));
-    return (NULL);
-  }
-  DEBUG(10, ("startsmbfilepwent: opening file %s\n", pfile));
-
-  fp = fopen(pfile, update ? "r+b" : "rb");
-
-  if (fp == NULL) {
-    DEBUG(0, ("startsmbfilepwent: unable to open file %s\n", pfile));
-    return NULL;
-  }
-
-  /* Set a buffer to do more efficient reads */
-  setvbuf(fp, s_readbuf, _IOFBF, sizeof(s_readbuf));
-
-  if (!pw_file_lock(fileno(fp), (update ? F_WRLCK : F_RDLCK), 5, &pw_file_lock_depth))
-  {
-    DEBUG(0, ("startsmbfilepwent: unable to lock file %s\n", pfile));
-    fclose(fp);
-    return NULL;
-  }
-
-  /* Make sure it is only rw by the owner */
-  chmod(pfile, 0600);
-
-  /* We have a lock on the file. */
-  return (void *)fp;
+	return startfilepwent(lp_smb_passwd_file(), s_readbuf, sizeof(s_readbuf),
+	                      &pw_file_lock_depth, update);
 }
 
 /***************************************************************
@@ -74,11 +45,27 @@ static void *startsmbfilepwent(BOOL update)
 
 static void endsmbfilepwent(void *vp)
 {
-  FILE *fp = (FILE *)vp;
+	endfilepwent(vp, &pw_file_lock_depth);
+}
 
-  pw_file_unlock(fileno(fp), &pw_file_lock_depth);
-  fclose(fp);
-  DEBUG(7, ("endsmbfilepwent: closed password file.\n"));
+/*************************************************************************
+ Return the current position in the smbpasswd list as an SMB_BIG_UINT.
+ This must be treated as an opaque token.
+*************************************************************************/
+
+static SMB_BIG_UINT getsmbfilepwpos(void *vp)
+{
+	return getfilepwpos(vp);
+}
+
+/*************************************************************************
+ Set the current position in the smbpasswd list from an SMB_BIG_UINT.
+ This must be treated as an opaque token.
+*************************************************************************/
+
+static BOOL setsmbfilepwpos(void *vp, SMB_BIG_UINT tok)
+{
+	return setfilepwpos(vp, tok);
 }
 
 /*************************************************************************
@@ -86,219 +73,182 @@ static void endsmbfilepwent(void *vp)
  *************************************************************************/
 static struct smb_passwd *getsmbfilepwent(void *vp)
 {
-  /* Static buffers we will return. */
-  static struct smb_passwd pw_buf;
-  static pstring  user_name;
-  static unsigned char smbpwd[16];
-  static unsigned char smbntpwd[16];
-  FILE *fp = (FILE *)vp;
-  char            linebuf[256];
-  unsigned char   c;
-  unsigned char  *p;
-  long            uidval;
-  size_t            linebuf_len;
-
-  if(fp == NULL) {
-    DEBUG(0,("getsmbfilepwent: Bad password file pointer.\n"));
-    return NULL;
-  }
-
-  pdb_init_smb(&pw_buf);
-
-  pw_buf.acct_ctrl = ACB_NORMAL;  
-
-  /*
-   * Scan the file, a line at a time and check if the name matches.
-   */
-  while (!feof(fp)) {
-    linebuf[0] = '\0';
-
-    fgets(linebuf, 256, fp);
-    if (ferror(fp)) {
-      return NULL;
-    }
-
-    /*
-     * Check if the string is terminated with a newline - if not
-     * then we must keep reading and discard until we get one.
-     */
-    linebuf_len = strlen(linebuf);
-    if (linebuf[linebuf_len - 1] != '\n') {
-      c = '\0';
-      while (!ferror(fp) && !feof(fp)) {
-        c = fgetc(fp);
-        if (c == '\n')
-          break;
-      }
-    } else
-      linebuf[linebuf_len - 1] = '\0';
-
-#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
-    DEBUG(100, ("getsmbfilepwent: got line |%s|\n", linebuf));
-#endif
-    if ((linebuf[0] == 0) && feof(fp)) {
-      DEBUG(4, ("getsmbfilepwent: end of file reached\n"));
-      break;
-    }
-    /*
-     * The line we have should be of the form :-
-     * 
-     * username:uid:32hex bytes:[Account type]:LCT-12345678....other flags presently
-     * ignored....
-     * 
-     * or,
-     *
-     * username:uid:32hex bytes:32hex bytes:[Account type]:LCT-12345678....ignored....
-     *
-     * if Windows NT compatible passwords are also present.
-     * [Account type] is an ascii encoding of the type of account.
-     * LCT-(8 hex digits) is the time_t value of the last change time.
-     */
-
-    if (linebuf[0] == '#' || linebuf[0] == '\0') {
-      DEBUG(6, ("getsmbfilepwent: skipping comment or blank line\n"));
-      continue;
-    }
-    p = (unsigned char *) strchr(linebuf, ':');
-    if (p == NULL) {
-      DEBUG(0, ("getsmbfilepwent: malformed password entry (no :)\n"));
-      continue;
-    }
-    /*
-     * As 256 is shorter than a pstring we don't need to check
-     * length here - if this ever changes....
-     */
-    strncpy(user_name, linebuf, PTR_DIFF(p, linebuf));
-    user_name[PTR_DIFF(p, linebuf)] = '\0';
-
-    /* Get smb uid. */
-
-    p++;		/* Go past ':' */
-    if (!isdigit(*p)) {
-      DEBUG(0, ("getsmbfilepwent: malformed password entry (uid not number)\n"));
-      continue;
-    }
-
-    uidval = atoi((char *) p);
-
-    while (*p && isdigit(*p))
-      p++;
-
-    if (*p != ':') {
-      DEBUG(0, ("getsmbfilepwent: malformed password entry (no : after uid)\n"));
-      continue;
-    }
-
-    pw_buf.smb_name = user_name;
-    pw_buf.smb_userid = uidval;
-
-    /*
-     * Now get the password value - this should be 32 hex digits
-     * which are the ascii representations of a 16 byte string.
-     * Get two at a time and put them into the password.
-     */
-
-    /* Skip the ':' */
-    p++;
-
-    if (*p == '*' || *p == 'X') {
-      /* Password deliberately invalid - end here. */
-      DEBUG(10, ("getsmbfilepwent: entry invalidated for user %s\n", user_name));
-      pw_buf.smb_nt_passwd = NULL;
-      pw_buf.smb_passwd = NULL;
-      pw_buf.acct_ctrl |= ACB_DISABLED;
-      return &pw_buf;
-    }
-
-    if (linebuf_len < (PTR_DIFF(p, linebuf) + 33)) {
-      DEBUG(0, ("getsmbfilepwent: malformed password entry (passwd too short)\n"));
-      continue;
-    }
-
-    if (p[32] != ':') {
-      DEBUG(0, ("getsmbfilepwent: malformed password entry (no terminating :)\n"));
-      continue;
-    }
+	/* Static buffers we will return. */
+	static struct smb_passwd pw_buf;
+	static pstring  user_name;
+	static unsigned char smbpwd[16];
+	static unsigned char smbntpwd[16];
+	struct passwd *pwfile;
+	char            linebuf[256];
+	unsigned char  *p;
+	int            uidval;
+	size_t            linebuf_len;
 
-    if (!strncasecmp((char *) p, "NO PASSWORD", 11)) {
-      pw_buf.smb_passwd = NULL;
-      pw_buf.acct_ctrl |= ACB_PWNOTREQ;
-    } else {
-      if (!pdb_gethexpwd((char *)p, (char *)smbpwd)) {
-        DEBUG(0, ("getsmbfilepwent: Malformed Lanman password entry (non hex chars)\n"));
-        continue;
-      }
-      pw_buf.smb_passwd = smbpwd;
-    }
+	if (vp == NULL)
+	{
+		DEBUG(0,("getsmbfilepwent: Bad password file pointer.\n"));
+		return NULL;
+	}
 
-    /* 
-     * Now check if the NT compatible password is
-     * available.
-     */
-    pw_buf.smb_nt_passwd = NULL;
-
-    p += 33; /* Move to the first character of the line after
-                the lanman password. */
-    if ((linebuf_len >= (PTR_DIFF(p, linebuf) + 33)) && (p[32] == ':')) {
-      if (*p != '*' && *p != 'X') {
-        if(pdb_gethexpwd((char *)p,(char *)smbntpwd))
-          pw_buf.smb_nt_passwd = smbntpwd;
-      }
-      p += 33; /* Move to the first character of the line after
-                  the NT password. */
-    }
+	pwdb_init_smb(&pw_buf);
 
-    DEBUG(5,("getsmbfilepwent: returning passwd entry for user %s, uid %ld\n",
-	     user_name, uidval));
+	pw_buf.acct_ctrl = ACB_NORMAL;  
 
-    if (*p == '[')
+	/*
+	 * Scan the file, a line at a time.
+	 */
+	while ((linebuf_len = getfileline(vp, linebuf, sizeof(linebuf))) > 0)
 	{
-      pw_buf.acct_ctrl = pdb_decode_acct_ctrl((char*)p);
-
-      /* Must have some account type set. */
-      if(pw_buf.acct_ctrl == 0)
-        pw_buf.acct_ctrl = ACB_NORMAL;
-
-      /* Now try and get the last change time. */
-      if(*p == ']')
-        p++;
-      if(*p == ':') {
-        p++;
-        if(*p && (StrnCaseCmp((char *)p, "LCT-", 4)==0)) {
-          int i;
-          p += 4;
-          for(i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
-            if(p[i] == '\0' || !isxdigit(p[i]))
-              break;
-          }
-          if(i == 8) {
-            /*
-             * p points at 8 characters of hex digits - 
-             * read into a time_t as the seconds since
-             * 1970 that the password was last changed.
-             */
-            pw_buf.pass_last_set_time = (time_t)strtol((char *)p, NULL, 16);
-          }
-        }
-      }
-    } else {
-      /* 'Old' style file. Fake up based on user name. */
-      /*
-       * Currently trust accounts are kept in the same
-       * password file as 'normal accounts'. If this changes
-       * we will have to fix this code. JRA.
-       */
-      if(pw_buf.smb_name[strlen(pw_buf.smb_name) - 1] == '$') {
-        pw_buf.acct_ctrl &= ~ACB_NORMAL;
-        pw_buf.acct_ctrl |= ACB_WSTRUST;
-      }
-    }
-
-    return &pw_buf;
-  }
+		/*
+		 * The line we have should be of the form :-
+		 * 
+		 * username:uid:32hex bytes:[Account type]:LCT-12345678....other flags presently
+		 * ignored....
+		 * 
+		 * or,
+		 *
+		 * username:uid:32hex bytes:32hex bytes:[Account type]:LCT-12345678....ignored....
+		 *
+		 * if Windows NT compatible passwords are also present.
+		 * [Account type] is an ascii encoding of the type of account.
+		 * LCT-(8 hex digits) is the time_t value of the last change time.
+		 */
+
+		/*
+		 * As 256 is shorter than a pstring we don't need to check
+		 * length here - if this ever changes....
+		 */
+		p = strncpyn(user_name, linebuf, sizeof(user_name), ':');
+
+		/* Go past ':' */
+		p++;
+
+		/* Get smb uid. */
+
+		p = Atoic((char *) p, &uidval, ":");
+
+		pw_buf.smb_name = user_name;
+		pw_buf.smb_userid = uidval;
+
+		/*
+		 * Now get the password value - this should be 32 hex digits
+		 * which are the ascii representations of a 16 byte string.
+		 * Get two at a time and put them into the password.
+		 */
+
+		/* Skip the ':' */
+		p++;
+
+		if (*p == '*' || *p == 'X')
+		{
+			/* Password deliberately invalid - end here. */
+			DEBUG(10, ("getsmbfilepwent: entry invalidated for user %s\n", user_name));
+			pw_buf.smb_nt_passwd = NULL;
+			pw_buf.smb_passwd = NULL;
+			pw_buf.acct_ctrl |= ACB_DISABLED;
+			return &pw_buf;
+		}
+
+		if (linebuf_len < (PTR_DIFF(p, linebuf) + 33))
+		{
+			DEBUG(0, ("getsmbfilepwent: malformed password entry (passwd too short)\n"));
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		if (p[32] != ':')
+		{
+			DEBUG(0, ("getsmbfilepwent: malformed password entry (no terminating :)\n"));
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		if (!strncasecmp((char *) p, "NO PASSWORD", 11))
+		{
+			pw_buf.smb_passwd = NULL;
+			pw_buf.acct_ctrl |= ACB_PWNOTREQ;
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			if (!pwdb_gethexpwd((char *)p, (char *)smbpwd))
+			{
+				DEBUG(0, ("getsmbfilepwent: Malformed Lanman password entry (non hex chars)\n"));
+				continue;
+			}
+			pw_buf.smb_passwd = smbpwd;
+		}
+
+		/* 
+		 * Now check if the NT compatible password is
+		 * available.
+		 */
+		pw_buf.smb_nt_passwd = NULL;
+
+		/* Move to the first character of the line after the lanman password. */
+		p += 33;
+		if ((linebuf_len >= (PTR_DIFF(p, linebuf) + 33)) && (p[32] == ':'))
+		{
+			if (*p != '*' && *p != 'X')
+			{
+				if(pwdb_gethexpwd((char *)p,(char *)smbntpwd))
+				{
+					pw_buf.smb_nt_passwd = smbntpwd;
+				}
+			}
+			/* Move to the first character of the line after the NT password. */
+			p += 33;
+		}
+
+		DEBUG(5,("getsmbfilepwent: returning passwd entry for user %s, uid %d\n",
+		          user_name, uidval));
+
+		if (*p == '[')
+		{
+			pw_buf.acct_ctrl = pwdb_decode_acct_ctrl((char*)p);
+
+			/* Must have some account type set. */
+			if (pw_buf.acct_ctrl == 0)
+			{
+				pw_buf.acct_ctrl = ACB_NORMAL;
+			}
+
+			/* Now try and get the last change time. */
+			if (*p == ']')
+			{
+				p++;
+			}
+			if (*p == ':')
+			{
+				p++;
+				pw_buf.pass_last_set_time = pwdb_get_last_set_time(p);
+			}
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			/* 'Old' style file. Fake up based on user name. */
+			/*
+			 * Currently trust accounts are kept in the same
+			 * password file as 'normal accounts'. If this changes
+			 * we will have to fix this code. JRA.
+			 */
+			if (pw_buf.smb_name[strlen(pw_buf.smb_name) - 1] == '$')	
+			{
+				pw_buf.acct_ctrl &= ~ACB_NORMAL;
+				pw_buf.acct_ctrl |= ACB_WSTRUST;
+			}
+		}
+
+		pwfile = Get_Pwnam(pw_buf.smb_name, False);
+		if (pwfile == NULL)
+		{
+			DEBUG(0,("getsmbfilepwent: smbpasswd database is corrupt!\n"));
+			DEBUG(0,("getsmbfilepwent: username %s not in unix passwd database!\n", pw_buf.smb_name));
+			return NULL;
+		}
+
+		return &pw_buf;
+	}
 
-  DEBUG(5,("getsmbfilepwent: end of file reached.\n"));
-  return NULL;
+	DEBUG(5,("getsmbfilepwent: end of file reached.\n"));
+	return NULL;
 }
 
 /*************************************************************************
@@ -327,7 +277,9 @@ static struct sam_passwd *getsmbfile21pwent(void *vp)
 
 	if (pw_buf == NULL) return NULL;
 
-	pwfile = getpwnam(pw_buf->smb_name);
+	pwdb_init_sam(&user);
+
+	pwfile = Get_Pwnam(pw_buf->smb_name, False);
 	if (pwfile == NULL)
 	{
 		DEBUG(0,("getsmbfile21pwent: smbpasswd database is corrupt!\n"));
@@ -335,8 +287,6 @@ static struct sam_passwd *getsmbfile21pwent(void *vp)
 		return NULL;
 	}
 
-	pdb_init_sam(&user);
-
 	pstrcpy(samlogon_user, pw_buf->smb_name);
 
 	if (samlogon_user[strlen(samlogon_user)-1] != '$')
@@ -348,8 +298,8 @@ static struct sam_passwd *getsmbfile21pwent(void *vp)
 		user.smb_userid    = pw_buf->smb_userid;
 		user.smb_grpid     = pwfile->pw_gid;
 
-		user.user_rid  = pdb_uid_to_user_rid (user.smb_userid);
-		user.group_rid = pdb_gid_to_group_rid(user.smb_grpid );
+		user.user_rid  = pwdb_uid_to_user_rid (user.smb_userid);
+		user.group_rid = pwdb_gid_to_group_rid(user.smb_grpid );
 
 		pstrcpy(full_name    , pwfile->pw_gecos        );
 		pstrcpy(logon_script , lp_logon_script       ());
@@ -366,7 +316,7 @@ static struct sam_passwd *getsmbfile21pwent(void *vp)
 		user.smb_userid    = pw_buf->smb_userid;
 		user.smb_grpid     = pwfile->pw_gid;
 
-		user.user_rid  = pdb_uid_to_user_rid (user.smb_userid);
+		user.user_rid  = pwdb_uid_to_user_rid (user.smb_userid);
 		user.group_rid = DOMAIN_GROUP_RID_USERS; /* lkclXXXX this is OBSERVED behaviour by NT PDCs, enforced here. */
 
 		pstrcpy(full_name    , "");
@@ -405,26 +355,6 @@ static struct sam_passwd *getsmbfile21pwent(void *vp)
 	return &user;
 }
 
-/*************************************************************************
- Return the current position in the smbpasswd list as an SMB_BIG_UINT.
- This must be treated as an opaque token.
-*************************************************************************/
-
-static SMB_BIG_UINT getsmbfilepwpos(void *vp)
-{
-  return (SMB_BIG_UINT)sys_ftell((FILE *)vp);
-}
-
-/*************************************************************************
- Set the current position in the smbpasswd list from an SMB_BIG_UINT.
- This must be treated as an opaque token.
-*************************************************************************/
-
-static BOOL setsmbfilepwpos(void *vp, SMB_BIG_UINT tok)
-{
-  return !sys_fseek((FILE *)vp, (SMB_OFF_T)tok, SEEK_SET);
-}
-
 /************************************************************************
  Routine to add an entry to the smbpasswd file.
 *************************************************************************/
@@ -525,7 +455,7 @@ Error was %s\n", newpwd->smb_name, pfile, strerror(errno)));
 
   /* Add the account encoding and the last change time. */
   slprintf((char *)p, new_entry_length - 1 - (p - new_entry),  "%s:LCT-%08X:\n",
-           pdb_encode_acct_ctrl(newpwd->acct_ctrl, NEW_PW_FORMAT_SPACE_PADDED_LEN), (uint32)time(NULL));
+           pwdb_encode_acct_ctrl(newpwd->acct_ctrl, NEW_PW_FORMAT_SPACE_PADDED_LEN), (uint32)time(NULL));
 
 #ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
   DEBUG(100, ("add_smbfilepwd_entry(%d): new_entry_len %d entry_len %d made line |%s|", 
@@ -603,7 +533,7 @@ static BOOL mod_smbfilepwd_entry(struct smb_passwd* pwd, BOOL override)
 
   lockfd = fileno(fp);
 
-  if (!pw_file_lock(lockfd, F_WRLCK, 5, &pw_file_lock_depth)) {
+  if (!file_lock(lockfd, F_WRLCK, 5, &pw_file_lock_depth)) {
     DEBUG(0, ("mod_smbfilepwd_entry: unable to lock file %s\n", pfile));
     fclose(fp);
     return False;
@@ -623,7 +553,7 @@ static BOOL mod_smbfilepwd_entry(struct smb_passwd* pwd, BOOL override)
 
     fgets(linebuf, sizeof(linebuf), fp);
     if (ferror(fp)) {
-      pw_file_unlock(lockfd, &pw_file_lock_depth);
+      file_unlock(lockfd, &pw_file_lock_depth);
       fclose(fp);
       return False;
     }
@@ -692,7 +622,7 @@ static BOOL mod_smbfilepwd_entry(struct smb_passwd* pwd, BOOL override)
   }
 
   if (!found_entry) {
-    pw_file_unlock(lockfd, &pw_file_lock_depth);
+    file_unlock(lockfd, &pw_file_lock_depth);
     fclose(fp);
     return False;
   }
@@ -704,7 +634,7 @@ static BOOL mod_smbfilepwd_entry(struct smb_passwd* pwd, BOOL override)
 
   if (!isdigit(*p)) {
     DEBUG(0, ("mod_smbfilepwd_entry: malformed password entry (uid not number)\n"));
-    pw_file_unlock(lockfd, &pw_file_lock_depth);
+    file_unlock(lockfd, &pw_file_lock_depth);
     fclose(fp);
     return False;
   }
@@ -713,7 +643,7 @@ static BOOL mod_smbfilepwd_entry(struct smb_passwd* pwd, BOOL override)
     p++;
   if (*p != ':') {
     DEBUG(0, ("mod_smbfilepwd_entry: malformed password entry (no : after uid)\n"));
-    pw_file_unlock(lockfd, &pw_file_lock_depth);
+    file_unlock(lockfd, &pw_file_lock_depth);
     fclose(fp);
     return False;
   }
@@ -731,27 +661,27 @@ static BOOL mod_smbfilepwd_entry(struct smb_passwd* pwd, BOOL override)
   if (!override && (*p == '*' || *p == 'X')) {
     /* Password deliberately invalid - end here. */
     DEBUG(10, ("mod_smbfilepwd_entry: entry invalidated for user %s\n", user_name));
-    pw_file_unlock(lockfd, &pw_file_lock_depth);
+    file_unlock(lockfd, &pw_file_lock_depth);
     fclose(fp);
     return False;
   }
 
   if (linebuf_len < (PTR_DIFF(p, linebuf) + 33)) {
     DEBUG(0, ("mod_smbfilepwd_entry: malformed password entry (passwd too short)\n"));
-    pw_file_unlock(lockfd,&pw_file_lock_depth);
+    file_unlock(lockfd,&pw_file_lock_depth);
     fclose(fp);
     return (False);
   }
 
   if (p[32] != ':') {
     DEBUG(0, ("mod_smbfilepwd_entry: malformed password entry (no terminating :)\n"));
-    pw_file_unlock(lockfd,&pw_file_lock_depth);
+    file_unlock(lockfd,&pw_file_lock_depth);
     fclose(fp);
     return False;
   }
 
   if (!override && (*p == '*' || *p == 'X')) {
-    pw_file_unlock(lockfd,&pw_file_lock_depth);
+    file_unlock(lockfd,&pw_file_lock_depth);
     fclose(fp);
     return False;
   }
@@ -762,14 +692,14 @@ static BOOL mod_smbfilepwd_entry(struct smb_passwd* pwd, BOOL override)
               the lanman password. */
   if (linebuf_len < (PTR_DIFF(p, linebuf) + 33)) {
     DEBUG(0, ("mod_smbfilepwd_entry: malformed password entry (passwd too short)\n"));
-    pw_file_unlock(lockfd,&pw_file_lock_depth);
+    file_unlock(lockfd,&pw_file_lock_depth);
     fclose(fp);
     return (False);
   }
 
   if (p[32] != ':') {
     DEBUG(0, ("mod_smbfilepwd_entry: malformed password entry (no terminating :)\n"));
-    pw_file_unlock(lockfd,&pw_file_lock_depth);
+    file_unlock(lockfd,&pw_file_lock_depth);
     fclose(fp);
     return False;
   }
@@ -807,7 +737,7 @@ static BOOL mod_smbfilepwd_entry(struct smb_passwd* pwd, BOOL override)
        * acct ctrl field. Encode the given acct ctrl
        * bits into it.
        */
-      fstrcpy(encode_bits, pdb_encode_acct_ctrl(pwd->acct_ctrl, NEW_PW_FORMAT_SPACE_PADDED_LEN));
+      fstrcpy(encode_bits, pwdb_encode_acct_ctrl(pwd->acct_ctrl, NEW_PW_FORMAT_SPACE_PADDED_LEN));
     } else {
       /*
        * If using the old format and the ACB_DISABLED or
@@ -897,7 +827,7 @@ static BOOL mod_smbfilepwd_entry(struct smb_passwd* pwd, BOOL override)
 
   if(wr_len > sizeof(linebuf)) {
     DEBUG(0, ("mod_smbfilepwd_entry: line to write (%d) is too long.\n", wr_len+1));
-    pw_file_unlock(lockfd,&pw_file_lock_depth);
+    file_unlock(lockfd,&pw_file_lock_depth);
     fclose(fp);
     return (False);
   }
@@ -915,7 +845,7 @@ static BOOL mod_smbfilepwd_entry(struct smb_passwd* pwd, BOOL override)
 
   if (sys_lseek(fd, pwd_seekpos - 1, SEEK_SET) != pwd_seekpos - 1) {
     DEBUG(0, ("mod_smbfilepwd_entry: seek fail on file %s.\n", pfile));
-    pw_file_unlock(lockfd,&pw_file_lock_depth);
+    file_unlock(lockfd,&pw_file_lock_depth);
     fclose(fp);
     return False;
   }
@@ -923,33 +853,33 @@ static BOOL mod_smbfilepwd_entry(struct smb_passwd* pwd, BOOL override)
   /* Sanity check - ensure the areas we are writing are framed by ':' */
   if (read(fd, linebuf, wr_len+1) != wr_len+1) {
     DEBUG(0, ("mod_smbfilepwd_entry: read fail on file %s.\n", pfile));
-    pw_file_unlock(lockfd,&pw_file_lock_depth);
+    file_unlock(lockfd,&pw_file_lock_depth);
     fclose(fp);
     return False;
   }
 
   if ((linebuf[0] != ':') || (linebuf[wr_len] != ':'))	{
     DEBUG(0, ("mod_smbfilepwd_entry: check on passwd file %s failed.\n", pfile));
-    pw_file_unlock(lockfd,&pw_file_lock_depth);
+    file_unlock(lockfd,&pw_file_lock_depth);
     fclose(fp);
     return False;
   }
  
   if (sys_lseek(fd, pwd_seekpos, SEEK_SET) != pwd_seekpos) {
     DEBUG(0, ("mod_smbfilepwd_entry: seek fail on file %s.\n", pfile));
-    pw_file_unlock(lockfd,&pw_file_lock_depth);
+    file_unlock(lockfd,&pw_file_lock_depth);
     fclose(fp);
     return False;
   }
 
   if (write(fd, ascii_p16, wr_len) != wr_len) {
     DEBUG(0, ("mod_smbfilepwd_entry: write failed in passwd file %s\n", pfile));
-    pw_file_unlock(lockfd,&pw_file_lock_depth);
+    file_unlock(lockfd,&pw_file_lock_depth);
     fclose(fp);
     return False;
   }
 
-  pw_file_unlock(lockfd,&pw_file_lock_depth);
+  file_unlock(lockfd,&pw_file_lock_depth);
   fclose(fp);
   return True;
 }
@@ -960,27 +890,27 @@ static BOOL mod_smbfilepwd_entry(struct smb_passwd* pwd, BOOL override)
 
 static BOOL mod_smbfile21pwd_entry(struct sam_passwd* pwd, BOOL override)
 {
- 	return mod_smbfilepwd_entry(pdb_sam_to_smb(pwd), override);
+ 	return mod_smbfilepwd_entry(pwdb_sam_to_smb(pwd), override);
 }
 
 static BOOL add_smbfile21pwd_entry(struct sam_passwd *newpwd)
 {
- 	return add_smbfilepwd_entry(pdb_sam_to_smb(newpwd));
+ 	return add_smbfilepwd_entry(pwdb_sam_to_smb(newpwd));
 }
 
 static struct sam_disp_info *getsmbfiledispnam(char *name)
 {
-	return pdb_sam_to_dispinfo(getsam21pwnam(name));
+	return pwdb_sam_to_dispinfo(getsam21pwnam(name));
 }
 
 static struct sam_disp_info *getsmbfiledisprid(uint32 rid)
 {
-	return pdb_sam_to_dispinfo(getsam21pwrid(rid));
+	return pwdb_sam_to_dispinfo(getsam21pwrid(rid));
 }
 
 static struct sam_disp_info *getsmbfiledispent(void *vp)
 {
-	return pdb_sam_to_dispinfo(getsam21pwent(vp));
+	return pwdb_sam_to_dispinfo(getsam21pwent(vp));
 }
 
 static struct passdb_ops file_ops = {
@@ -1005,7 +935,7 @@ static struct passdb_ops file_ops = {
   getsmbfiledispent
 };
 
-struct passdb_ops *file_initialize_password_db(void)
+struct passdb_ops *file_initialise_password_db(void)
 {    
   return &file_ops;
 }