diff options
| author | Gerald Carter <jerry@samba.org> | 2005-01-28 16:55:09 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Gerald (Jerry) Carter <jerry@samba.org> | 2007-10-10 10:55:12 -0500 |
| commit | 962a5c95528932fde64c8c8b70b0a81c382c2905 (patch) | |
| tree | f55bbdd1d293dc0a3c86c3571f434520c021ad60 /source3/rpc_server/srv_lsa_nt.c | |
| parent | 6441450e9306b1b09ca2a085d47992867acdd4ec (diff) | |
| download | samba-962a5c95528932fde64c8c8b70b0a81c382c2905.tar.gz samba-962a5c95528932fde64c8c8b70b0a81c382c2905.tar.bz2 samba-962a5c95528932fde64c8c8b70b0a81c382c2905.zip | |
r5056: * correct STANDARD_RIGHTS_WRITE_ACCESS bitmask define
* make sure to apply the rights_mask and not just the saved
bits from the mask in access_check_samr_object()
* allow root to grant/revoke privileges (in addition to Domain
Admins) as suggested by Volker.
Tested machine joins from XP, 2K, and NT4 with and without
pre-existing machine trust accounts. Also tested basic file
operations using cmd.exe and explorer.exe after changing the
STANDARD_RIGHTS_WRITE_ACCESS bitmask.
(This used to be commit c0e7f7ff60a4110809b8f500fdc68a1bf963da36)
Diffstat (limited to 'source3/rpc_server/srv_lsa_nt.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | source3/rpc_server/srv_lsa_nt.c | 22 |
1 files changed, 16 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/srv_lsa_nt.c b/source3/rpc_server/srv_lsa_nt.c index 13053d9877..da00d2d6c4 100644 --- a/source3/rpc_server/srv_lsa_nt.c +++ b/source3/rpc_server/srv_lsa_nt.c @@ -1134,16 +1134,21 @@ NTSTATUS _lsa_addprivs(pipes_struct *p, LSA_Q_ADDPRIVS *q_u, LSA_R_ADDPRIVS *r_u struct lsa_info *info = NULL; SE_PRIV mask; PRIVILEGE_SET *set = NULL; + struct current_user user; /* find the connection policy handle. */ if (!find_policy_by_hnd(p, &q_u->pol, (void **)&info)) return NT_STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE; - /* check to see if the pipe_user is a Domain Admin since + /* check to see if the pipe_user is root or a Domain Admin since account_pol.tdb was already opened as root, this is all we have */ - - if ( !nt_token_check_domain_rid( p->pipe_user.nt_user_token, DOMAIN_GROUP_RID_ADMINS ) ) + + get_current_user( &user, p ); + if ( user.uid != sec_initial_uid() + && !nt_token_check_domain_rid( p->pipe_user.nt_user_token, DOMAIN_GROUP_RID_ADMINS ) ) + { return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; + } set = &q_u->set; @@ -1170,16 +1175,21 @@ NTSTATUS _lsa_removeprivs(pipes_struct *p, LSA_Q_REMOVEPRIVS *q_u, LSA_R_REMOVEP struct lsa_info *info = NULL; SE_PRIV mask; PRIVILEGE_SET *set = NULL; + struct current_user user; /* find the connection policy handle. */ if (!find_policy_by_hnd(p, &q_u->pol, (void **)&info)) return NT_STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE; - /* check to see if the pipe_user is a Domain Admin since + /* check to see if the pipe_user is root or a Domain Admin since account_pol.tdb was already opened as root, this is all we have */ - - if ( !nt_token_check_domain_rid( p->pipe_user.nt_user_token, DOMAIN_GROUP_RID_ADMINS ) ) + + get_current_user( &user, p ); + if ( user.uid != sec_initial_uid() + && !nt_token_check_domain_rid( p->pipe_user.nt_user_token, DOMAIN_GROUP_RID_ADMINS ) ) + { return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; + } set = &q_u->set; |