diff options
author | Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org> | 2000-03-09 21:45:16 +0000 |
---|---|---|
committer | Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org> | 2000-03-09 21:45:16 +0000 |
commit | 6bb92a6d38db41a11e80c4369623d137763f0f52 (patch) | |
tree | b1b08e75fccec7c0b1352d12c00e62431759daea /source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c | |
parent | 18465ec2cd94dc0f4da0a2984d395c18a23291f1 (diff) | |
download | samba-6bb92a6d38db41a11e80c4369623d137763f0f52.tar.gz samba-6bb92a6d38db41a11e80c4369623d137763f0f52.tar.bz2 samba-6bb92a6d38db41a11e80c4369623d137763f0f52.zip |
Big update moving the multi-pdu support from 2.0.x into HEAD for JF
and the printer functions.
Also tidied up some header includes and got the order right so you
can now do a :
make proto
make clean
make
Jeremy.
(This used to be commit 833cd9fba92e4ad5297b235d108dd2be8c17079b)
Diffstat (limited to 'source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c')
-rw-r--r-- | source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c | 1099 |
1 files changed, 1056 insertions, 43 deletions
diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c index f8439de9a7..11822e7d03 100644 --- a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c +++ b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c @@ -1,4 +1,3 @@ - /* * Unix SMB/Netbios implementation. * Version 1.9. @@ -6,6 +5,7 @@ * Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 1992-1998 * Copyright (C) Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton 1996-1998, * Copyright (C) Paul Ashton 1997-1998. + * Copyright (C) Jeremy Allison 1999. * * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by @@ -43,82 +43,1095 @@ extern int DEBUGLEVEL; +static void NTLMSSPcalc_p( pipes_struct *p, unsigned char *data, int len) +{ + unsigned char *hash = p->ntlmssp_hash; + unsigned char index_i = hash[256]; + unsigned char index_j = hash[257]; + int ind; + + for( ind = 0; ind < len; ind++) { + unsigned char tc; + unsigned char t; + + index_i++; + index_j += hash[index_i]; + + tc = hash[index_i]; + hash[index_i] = hash[index_j]; + hash[index_j] = tc; + + t = hash[index_i] + hash[index_j]; + data[ind] = data[ind] ^ hash[t]; + } + + hash[256] = index_i; + hash[257] = index_j; +} + /******************************************************************* - entry point from msrpc to smb. adds data received to pdu; checks - pdu; hands pdu off to msrpc, which gets a pdu back (except in the - case of the RPC_BINDCONT pdu). + Generate the next PDU to be returned from the data in p->rdata. + We cheat here as this function doesn't handle the special auth + footers of the authenticated bind response reply. ********************************************************************/ -BOOL readwrite_pipe(pipes_struct *p, char *data, int len, - char **rdata, int *rlen) + +BOOL create_next_pdu(pipes_struct *p) { - DEBUG(10,("rpc_to_smb_readwrite: len %d\n", len)); + RPC_HDR_RESP hdr_resp; + BOOL auth_verify = IS_BITS_SET_ALL(p->ntlmssp_chal_flags, NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN); + BOOL auth_seal = IS_BITS_SET_ALL(p->ntlmssp_chal_flags, NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL); + uint32 data_len; + uint32 data_space_available; + uint32 data_len_left; + prs_struct outgoing_pdu; + char *data; + char *data_from; + uint32 data_pos; - if (write(p->m->fd, data, len) != len) - { + /* + * If we're in the fault state, keep returning fault PDU's until + * the pipe gets closed. JRA. + */ + + if(p->fault_state) { + setup_fault_pdu(p); + return True; + } + + memset((char *)&hdr_resp, '\0', sizeof(hdr_resp)); + + /* Change the incoming request header to a response. */ + p->hdr.pkt_type = RPC_RESPONSE; + + /* Set up rpc header flags. */ + if (p->out_data.data_sent_length == 0) + p->hdr.flags = RPC_FLG_FIRST; + else + p->hdr.flags = 0; + + /* + * Work out how much we can fit in a sigle PDU. + */ + + data_space_available = sizeof(p->out_data.current_pdu) - RPC_HEADER_LEN - RPC_HDR_RESP_LEN; + if(p->ntlmssp_auth_validated) + data_space_available -= (RPC_HDR_AUTH_LEN + RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_CHK_LEN); + + /* + * The amount we send is the minimum of the available + * space and the amount left to send. + */ + + data_len_left = prs_offset(&p->out_data.rdata) - p->out_data.data_sent_length; + + /* + * Ensure there really is data left to send. + */ + + if(!data_len_left) { + DEBUG(0,("create_next_pdu: no data left to send !\n")); return False; } - if ((*rlen) == 0) - { + data_len = MIN(data_len_left, data_space_available); + + /* + * Set up the alloc hint. This should be the data left to + * send. + */ + + hdr_resp.alloc_hint = data_len_left; + + /* + * Set up the header lengths. + */ + + if (p->ntlmssp_auth_validated) { + p->hdr.frag_len = RPC_HEADER_LEN + RPC_HDR_RESP_LEN + data_len + + RPC_HDR_AUTH_LEN + RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_CHK_LEN; + p->hdr.auth_len = RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_CHK_LEN; + } else { + p->hdr.frag_len = RPC_HEADER_LEN + RPC_HDR_RESP_LEN + data_len; + p->hdr.auth_len = 0; + } + + /* + * Work out if this PDU will be the last. + */ + + if(p->out_data.data_sent_length + data_len >= prs_offset(&p->out_data.rdata)) + p->hdr.flags |= RPC_FLG_LAST; + + /* + * Init the parse struct to point at the outgoing + * data. + */ + + prs_init( &outgoing_pdu, 0, 4, MARSHALL); + prs_give_memory( &outgoing_pdu, (char *)p->out_data.current_pdu, sizeof(p->out_data.current_pdu), False); + + /* Store the header in the data stream. */ + if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr("hdr", &p->hdr, &outgoing_pdu, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("create_next_pdu: failed to marshall RPC_HDR.\n")); return False; } - (*rdata) = (char*)Realloc((*rdata), (*rlen)); - if ((*rdata) == NULL) - { + if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr_resp("resp", &hdr_resp, &outgoing_pdu, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("create_next_pdu: failed to marshall RPC_HDR_RESP.\n")); return False; } - /* read a minimum of an rpc header, then wait for up to 10 seconds - * to read up to a maximum of the SMBtrans max data size + /* Store the current offset. */ + data_pos = prs_offset(&outgoing_pdu); + + /* Copy the data into the PDU. */ + data_from = prs_data_p(&p->out_data.rdata) + p->out_data.data_sent_length; + + if(!prs_append_data(&outgoing_pdu, data_from, data_len)) { + DEBUG(0,("create_next_pdu: failed to copy %u bytes of data.\n", (unsigned int)data_len)); + return False; + } + + /* + * Set data to point to where we copied the data into. + */ + + data = prs_data_p(&outgoing_pdu) + data_pos; + + if (p->hdr.auth_len > 0) { + uint32 crc32 = 0; + + DEBUG(5,("create_next_pdu: sign: %s seal: %s data %d auth %d\n", + BOOLSTR(auth_verify), BOOLSTR(auth_seal), data_len, p->hdr.auth_len)); + + if (auth_seal) { + crc32 = crc32_calc_buffer(data, data_len); + NTLMSSPcalc_p(p, (uchar*)data, data_len); + } + + if (auth_seal || auth_verify) { + RPC_HDR_AUTH auth_info; + + init_rpc_hdr_auth(&auth_info, NTLMSSP_AUTH_TYPE, NTLMSSP_AUTH_LEVEL, + (auth_verify ? RPC_HDR_AUTH_LEN : 0), (auth_verify ? 1 : 0)); + if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr_auth("hdr_auth", &auth_info, &outgoing_pdu, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("create_next_pdu: failed to marshall RPC_HDR_AUTH.\n")); + return False; + } + } + + if (auth_verify) { + RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_CHK ntlmssp_chk; + char *auth_data = prs_data_p(&outgoing_pdu); + + p->ntlmssp_seq_num++; + init_rpc_auth_ntlmssp_chk(&ntlmssp_chk, NTLMSSP_SIGN_VERSION, + crc32, p->ntlmssp_seq_num++); + auth_data = prs_data_p(&outgoing_pdu) + prs_offset(&outgoing_pdu) + 4; + if(!smb_io_rpc_auth_ntlmssp_chk("auth_sign", &ntlmssp_chk, &outgoing_pdu, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("create_next_pdu: failed to marshall RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_CHK.\n")); + return False; + } + NTLMSSPcalc_p(p, (uchar*)auth_data, RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_CHK_LEN - 4); + } + } + + /* + * Setup the counts for this PDU. + */ + + p->out_data.data_sent_length += data_len; + p->out_data.current_pdu_len = p->hdr.frag_len; + p->out_data.current_pdu_sent = 0; + + return True; +} + +/******************************************************************* + Process an NTLMSSP authentication response. + If this function succeeds, the user has been authenticated + and their domain, name and calling workstation stored in + the pipe struct. + The initial challenge is stored in p->challenge. + *******************************************************************/ + +static BOOL api_pipe_ntlmssp_verify(pipes_struct *p, RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_RESP *ntlmssp_resp) +{ + uchar lm_owf[24]; + uchar nt_owf[24]; + fstring user_name; + fstring unix_user_name; + fstring domain; + fstring wks; + BOOL guest_user = False; + struct smb_passwd *smb_pass = NULL; + struct passwd *pass = NULL; + uchar null_smb_passwd[16]; + uchar *smb_passwd_ptr = NULL; + + DEBUG(5,("api_pipe_ntlmssp_verify: checking user details\n")); + + memset(p->user_name, '\0', sizeof(p->user_name)); + memset(p->unix_user_name, '\0', sizeof(p->unix_user_name)); + memset(p->domain, '\0', sizeof(p->domain)); + memset(p->wks, '\0', sizeof(p->wks)); + + /* + * Setup an empty password for a guest user. */ - (*rlen) = read_with_timeout(p->m->fd, (*rdata), 16, (*rlen), 10000); - if ((*rlen) < 0) + + memset(null_smb_passwd,0,16); + + /* + * We always negotiate UNICODE. + */ + + if (IS_BITS_SET_ALL(p->ntlmssp_chal_flags, NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_UNICODE)) { + fstrcpy(user_name, dos_unistrn2((uint16*)ntlmssp_resp->user, ntlmssp_resp->hdr_usr.str_str_len/2)); + fstrcpy(domain, dos_unistrn2((uint16*)ntlmssp_resp->domain, ntlmssp_resp->hdr_domain.str_str_len/2)); + fstrcpy(wks, dos_unistrn2((uint16*)ntlmssp_resp->wks, ntlmssp_resp->hdr_wks.str_str_len/2)); + } else { + fstrcpy(user_name, ntlmssp_resp->user); + fstrcpy(domain, ntlmssp_resp->domain); + fstrcpy(wks, ntlmssp_resp->wks); + } + + DEBUG(5,("user: %s domain: %s wks: %s\n", user_name, domain, wks)); + + memcpy(lm_owf, ntlmssp_resp->lm_resp, sizeof(lm_owf)); + memcpy(nt_owf, ntlmssp_resp->nt_resp, sizeof(nt_owf)); + +#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD + DEBUG(100,("lm, nt owfs, chal\n")); + dump_data(100, (char *)lm_owf, sizeof(lm_owf)); + dump_data(100, (char *)nt_owf, sizeof(nt_owf)); + dump_data(100, (char *)p->challenge, 8); +#endif + + /* + * Allow guest access. Patch from Shirish Kalele <kalele@veritas.com>. + */ + + if((strlen(user_name) == 0) && (ntlmssp_resp->hdr_lm_resp.str_str_len==0) && + (ntlmssp_resp->hdr_nt_resp.str_str_len==0)) { + + guest_user = True; + + fstrcpy(unix_user_name, lp_guestaccount(-1)); + DEBUG(100,("Null user in NTLMSSP verification. Using guest = %s\n", unix_user_name)); + + smb_passwd_ptr = null_smb_passwd; + + } else { + + /* + * Pass the user through the NT -> unix user mapping + * function. + */ + + fstrcpy(unix_user_name, user_name); + (void)map_username(unix_user_name); + + /* + * Do the length checking only if user is not NULL. + */ + + if (ntlmssp_resp->hdr_lm_resp.str_str_len == 0) + return False; + if (ntlmssp_resp->hdr_nt_resp.str_str_len == 0) + return False; + if (ntlmssp_resp->hdr_usr.str_str_len == 0) + return False; + if (ntlmssp_resp->hdr_domain.str_str_len == 0) + return False; + if (ntlmssp_resp->hdr_wks.str_str_len == 0) + return False; + + } + + /* + * Find the user in the unix password db. + */ + + if(!(pass = Get_Pwnam(unix_user_name,True))) { + DEBUG(1,("Couldn't find user '%s' in UNIX password database.\n",unix_user_name)); + return(False); + } + + if(!guest_user) { + + become_root(True); + + if(!(p->ntlmssp_auth_validated = pass_check_smb(unix_user_name, domain, + (uchar*)p->challenge, lm_owf, nt_owf, NULL))) { + DEBUG(1,("api_pipe_ntlmssp_verify: User %s\\%s from machine %s \ +failed authentication on named pipe %s.\n", domain, unix_user_name, wks, p->name )); + unbecome_root(True); + return False; + } + + if(!(smb_pass = getsmbpwnam(unix_user_name))) { + DEBUG(1,("api_pipe_ntlmssp_verify: Cannot find user %s in smb passwd database.\n", + unix_user_name)); + unbecome_root(True); + return False; + } + + unbecome_root(True); + + if (smb_pass == NULL) { + DEBUG(1,("api_pipe_ntlmssp_verify: Couldn't find user '%s' in smb_passwd file.\n", + unix_user_name)); + return(False); + } + + /* Quit if the account was disabled. */ + if((smb_pass->acct_ctrl & ACB_DISABLED) || !smb_pass->smb_passwd) { + DEBUG(1,("Account for user '%s' was disabled.\n", unix_user_name)); + return(False); + } + + if(!smb_pass->smb_nt_passwd) { + DEBUG(1,("Account for user '%s' has no NT password hash.\n", unix_user_name)); + return(False); + } + + smb_passwd_ptr = smb_pass->smb_passwd; + } + + /* + * Set up the sign/seal data. + */ + { + uchar p24[24]; + NTLMSSPOWFencrypt(smb_passwd_ptr, lm_owf, p24); + { + unsigned char j = 0; + int ind; + + unsigned char k2[8]; + + memcpy(k2, p24, 5); + k2[5] = 0xe5; + k2[6] = 0x38; + k2[7] = 0xb0; + + for (ind = 0; ind < 256; ind++) + p->ntlmssp_hash[ind] = (unsigned char)ind; + + for( ind = 0; ind < 256; ind++) { + unsigned char tc; + + j += (p->ntlmssp_hash[ind] + k2[ind%8]); + + tc = p->ntlmssp_hash[ind]; + p->ntlmssp_hash[ind] = p->ntlmssp_hash[j]; + p->ntlmssp_hash[j] = tc; + } + + p->ntlmssp_hash[256] = 0; + p->ntlmssp_hash[257] = 0; + } +/* NTLMSSPhash(p->ntlmssp_hash, p24); */ + p->ntlmssp_seq_num = 0; + + } + + fstrcpy(p->user_name, user_name); + fstrcpy(p->unix_user_name, unix_user_name); + fstrcpy(p->domain, domain); + fstrcpy(p->wks, wks); + + /* + * Store the UNIX credential data (uid/gid pair) in the pipe structure. + */ + + p->uid = pass->pw_uid; + p->gid = pass->pw_gid; + + p->ntlmssp_auth_validated = True; + return True; +} + +/******************************************************************* + The switch table for the pipe names and the functions to handle them. + *******************************************************************/ + +struct api_cmd +{ + char * pipe_clnt_name; + char * pipe_srv_name; + BOOL (*fn) (pipes_struct *, prs_struct *); +}; + +static struct api_cmd api_fd_commands[] = +{ + { "lsarpc", "lsass", api_ntlsa_rpc }, + { "samr", "lsass", api_samr_rpc }, + { "srvsvc", "ntsvcs", api_srvsvc_rpc }, + { "wkssvc", "ntsvcs", api_wkssvc_rpc }, + { "NETLOGON", "lsass", api_netlog_rpc }, +#if 1 /* DISABLED_IN_2_0 JRATEST */ + { "winreg", "winreg", api_reg_rpc }, +#endif + { NULL, NULL, NULL } +}; + +/******************************************************************* + This is the client reply to our challenge for an authenticated + bind request. The challenge we sent is in p->challenge. +*******************************************************************/ + +BOOL api_pipe_bind_auth_resp(pipes_struct *p, prs_struct *rpc_in_p) +{ + RPC_HDR_AUTHA autha_info; + RPC_AUTH_VERIFIER auth_verifier; + RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_RESP ntlmssp_resp; + + DEBUG(5,("api_pipe_bind_auth_resp: decode request. %d\n", __LINE__)); + + /* + * Create the response data buffer. + */ + + if(!pipe_init_outgoing_data(&p->out_data)) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_auth_resp: failed to create outgoing buffer.\n")); return False; } - (*rdata) = (char*)Realloc((*rdata), (*rlen)); - if ((*rdata) == NULL) - { + + if (p->hdr.auth_len == 0) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_auth_resp: No auth field sent !\n")); + return False; + } + + /* + * Decode the authentication verifier response. + */ + + if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr_autha("", &autha_info, rpc_in_p, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_auth_resp: unmarshall of RPC_HDR_AUTHA failed.\n")); + return False; + } + + if (autha_info.auth_type != NTLMSSP_AUTH_TYPE || autha_info.auth_level != NTLMSSP_AUTH_LEVEL) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_auth_resp: incorrect auth type (%d) or level (%d).\n", + (int)autha_info.auth_type, (int)autha_info.auth_level )); return False; } + + if(!smb_io_rpc_auth_verifier("", &auth_verifier, rpc_in_p, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_auth_resp: unmarshall of RPC_AUTH_VERIFIER failed.\n")); + return False; + } + + /* + * Ensure this is a NTLMSSP_AUTH packet type. + */ + + if (!rpc_auth_verifier_chk(&auth_verifier, "NTLMSSP", NTLMSSP_AUTH)) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_auth_resp: rpc_auth_verifier_chk failed.\n")); + return False; + } + + if(!smb_io_rpc_auth_ntlmssp_resp("", &ntlmssp_resp, rpc_in_p, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_auth_resp: Failed to unmarshall RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_RESP.\n")); + return False; + } + + /* + * The following call actually checks the challenge/response data. + * for correctness against the given DOMAIN\user name. + */ + + if (!api_pipe_ntlmssp_verify(p, &ntlmssp_resp)) + return False; + + p->pipe_bound = True +; return True; } -/**************************************************************************** - writes data to a pipe. - ****************************************************************************/ -ssize_t write_pipe(pipes_struct *p, char *data, size_t n) +/******************************************************************* + Marshall a bind_nak pdu. +*******************************************************************/ + +static BOOL setup_bind_nak(pipes_struct *p) { - DEBUG(6,("write_pipe: %x", p->pnum)); - DEBUG(6,("name: %s open: %s len: %d", - p->name, BOOLSTR(p->open), n)); + prs_struct outgoing_rpc; + RPC_HDR nak_hdr; + uint16 zero = 0; + + /* Free any memory in the current return data buffer. */ + prs_mem_free(&p->out_data.rdata); + + /* + * Marshall directly into the outgoing PDU space. We + * must do this as we need to set to the bind response + * header and are never sending more than one PDU here. + */ + + prs_init( &outgoing_rpc, 0, 4, MARSHALL); + prs_give_memory( &outgoing_rpc, (char *)p->out_data.current_pdu, sizeof(p->out_data.current_pdu), False); + + + /* + * Initialize a bind_nak header. + */ + + init_rpc_hdr(&nak_hdr, RPC_BINDNACK, RPC_FLG_FIRST | RPC_FLG_LAST, + p->hdr.call_id, RPC_HEADER_LEN + sizeof(uint16), 0); + + /* + * Marshall the header into the outgoing PDU. + */ + + if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr("", &nak_hdr, &outgoing_rpc, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("setup_bind_nak: marshalling of RPC_HDR failed.\n")); + return False; + } + + /* + * Now add the reject reason. + */ + + if(!prs_uint16("reject code", &outgoing_rpc, 0, &zero)) + return False; - dump_data(50, data, n); + p->out_data.data_sent_length = 0; + p->out_data.current_pdu_len = prs_offset(&outgoing_rpc); + p->out_data.current_pdu_sent = 0; - return write(p->m->fd, data, n); + p->pipe_bound = False; + + return True; } +/******************************************************************* + Marshall a fault pdu. +*******************************************************************/ + +BOOL setup_fault_pdu(pipes_struct *p) +{ + prs_struct outgoing_pdu; + RPC_HDR fault_hdr; + RPC_HDR_RESP hdr_resp; + RPC_HDR_FAULT fault_resp; + + /* Free any memory in the current return data buffer. */ + prs_mem_free(&p->out_data.rdata); + + /* + * Marshall directly into the outgoing PDU space. We + * must do this as we need to set to the bind response + * header and are never sending more than one PDU here. + */ + + prs_init( &outgoing_pdu, 0, 4, MARSHALL); + prs_give_memory( &outgoing_pdu, (char *)p->out_data.current_pdu, sizeof(p->out_data.current_pdu), False); + + /* + * Initialize a fault header. + */ + + init_rpc_hdr(&fault_hdr, RPC_FAULT, RPC_FLG_FIRST | RPC_FLG_LAST | RPC_FLG_NOCALL, + p->hdr.call_id, RPC_HEADER_LEN + RPC_HDR_RESP_LEN + RPC_HDR_FAULT_LEN, 0); + + /* + * Initialize the HDR_RESP and FAULT parts of the PDU. + */ + + memset((char *)&hdr_resp, '\0', sizeof(hdr_resp)); + + fault_resp.status = 0x1c010002; + fault_resp.reserved = 0; + + /* + * Marshall the header into the outgoing PDU. + */ + + if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr("", &fault_hdr, &outgoing_pdu, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("setup_fault_pdu: marshalling of RPC_HDR failed.\n")); + return False; + } + + if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr_resp("resp", &hdr_resp, &outgoing_pdu, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("setup_fault_pdu: failed to marshall RPC_HDR_RESP.\n")); + return False; + } + + if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr_fault("fault", &fault_resp, &outgoing_pdu, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("setup_fault_pdu: failed to marshall RPC_HDR_FAULT.\n")); + return False; + } + + p->out_data.data_sent_length = 0; + p->out_data.current_pdu_len = prs_offset(&outgoing_pdu); + p->out_data.current_pdu_sent = 0; + + return True; +} + +/******************************************************************* + Respond to a pipe bind request. +*******************************************************************/ + +BOOL api_pipe_bind_req(pipes_struct *p, prs_struct *rpc_in_p) +{ + RPC_HDR_BA hdr_ba; + RPC_HDR_RB hdr_rb; + RPC_HDR_AUTH auth_info; + uint16 assoc_gid; + fstring ack_pipe_name; + prs_struct out_hdr_ba; + prs_struct out_auth; + prs_struct outgoing_rpc; + int i = 0; + int auth_len = 0; + enum RPC_PKT_TYPE reply_pkt_type; + + p->ntlmssp_auth_requested = False; + + DEBUG(5,("api_pipe_bind_req: decode request. %d\n", __LINE__)); + + /* + * Create the response data buffer. + */ + + if(!pipe_init_outgoing_data(&p->out_data)) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_req: failed to create outgoing buffer.\n")); + return False; + } + + /* + * Try and find the correct pipe name to ensure + * that this is a pipe name we support. + */ + + for (i = 0; api_fd_commands[i].pipe_clnt_name; i++) { + if (strequal(api_fd_commands[i].pipe_clnt_name, p->name) && + api_fd_commands[i].fn != NULL) { + DEBUG(3,("api_pipe_bind_req: \\PIPE\\%s -> \\PIPE\\%s\n", + api_fd_commands[i].pipe_clnt_name, + api_fd_commands[i].pipe_srv_name)); + fstrcpy(p->pipe_srv_name, api_fd_commands[i].pipe_srv_name); + break; + } + } + + if (api_fd_commands[i].fn == NULL) { + DEBUG(3,("api_pipe_bind_req: Unknown pipe name %s in bind request.\n", + p->name )); + if(!setup_bind_nak(p)) + return False; + return True; + } + + /* decode the bind request */ + if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr_rb("", &hdr_rb, rpc_in_p, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_req: unable to unmarshall RPC_HDR_RB struct.\n")); + return False; + } + + /* + * Check if this is an authenticated request. + */ + + if (p->hdr.auth_len != 0) { + RPC_AUTH_VERIFIER auth_verifier; + RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_NEG ntlmssp_neg; + + /* + * Decode the authentication verifier. + */ + + if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr_auth("", &auth_info, rpc_in_p, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_req: unable to unmarshall RPC_HDR_AUTH struct.\n")); + return False; + } + + /* + * We only support NTLMSSP_AUTH_TYPE requests. + */ + + if(auth_info.auth_type != NTLMSSP_AUTH_TYPE) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_req: unknown auth type %x requested.\n", + auth_info.auth_type )); + return False; + } + + if(!smb_io_rpc_auth_verifier("", &auth_verifier, rpc_in_p, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_req: unable to unmarshall RPC_HDR_AUTH struct.\n")); + return False; + } + + if(!strequal(auth_verifier.signature, "NTLMSSP")) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_req: auth_verifier.signature != NTLMSSP\n")); + return False; + } + + if(auth_verifier.msg_type != NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_req: auth_verifier.msg_type (%d) != NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE\n", + auth_verifier.msg_type)); + return False; + } + + if(!smb_io_rpc_auth_ntlmssp_neg("", &ntlmssp_neg, rpc_in_p, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_req: Failed to unmarshall RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_NEG.\n")); + return False; + } + + p->ntlmssp_chal_flags = SMBD_NTLMSSP_NEG_FLAGS; + p->ntlmssp_auth_requested = True; + } + + switch(p->hdr.pkt_type) { + case RPC_BIND: + /* name has to be \PIPE\xxxxx */ + fstrcpy(ack_pipe_name, "\\PIPE\\"); + fstrcat(ack_pipe_name, p->pipe_srv_name); + reply_pkt_type = RPC_BINDACK; + break; + case RPC_ALTCONT: + /* secondary address CAN be NULL + * as the specs say it's ignored. + * It MUST NULL to have the spoolss working. + */ + fstrcpy(ack_pipe_name,""); + reply_pkt_type = RPC_ALTCONTRESP; + break; + default: + return False; + } + + DEBUG(5,("api_pipe_bind_req: make response. %d\n", __LINE__)); + + /* + * Marshall directly into the outgoing PDU space. We + * must do this as we need to set to the bind response + * header and are never sending more than one PDU here. + */ + + prs_init( &outgoing_rpc, 0, 4, MARSHALL); + prs_give_memory( &outgoing_rpc, (char *)p->out_data.current_pdu, sizeof(p->out_data.current_pdu), False); + + /* + * Setup the memory to marshall the ba header, and the + * auth footers. + */ + + if(!prs_init(&out_hdr_ba, 1024, 4, MARSHALL)) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_req: malloc out_hdr_ba failed.\n")); + return False; + } + + if(!prs_init(&out_auth, 1024, 4, MARSHALL)) { + DEBUG(0,("pi_pipe_bind_req: malloc out_auth failed.\n")); + prs_mem_free(&out_hdr_ba); + return False; + } + + if (p->ntlmssp_auth_requested) + assoc_gid = 0x7a77; + else + assoc_gid = hdr_rb.bba.assoc_gid; + + /* + * Create the bind response struct. + */ + + init_rpc_hdr_ba(&hdr_ba, + MAX_PDU_FRAG_LEN, + MAX_PDU_FRAG_LEN, + assoc_gid, + ack_pipe_name, + 0x1, 0x0, 0x0, + &hdr_rb.transfer); + + /* + * and marshall it. + */ + + if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr_ba("", &hdr_ba, &out_hdr_ba, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_req: marshalling of RPC_HDR_BA failed.\n")); + goto err_exit; + } + + /* + * Now the authentication. + */ + + if (p->ntlmssp_auth_requested) { + RPC_AUTH_VERIFIER auth_verifier; + RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_CHAL ntlmssp_chal; + + generate_random_buffer(p->challenge, 8, False); + + /*** Authentication info ***/ + + init_rpc_hdr_auth(&auth_info, NTLMSSP_AUTH_TYPE, NTLMSSP_AUTH_LEVEL, RPC_HDR_AUTH_LEN, 1); + if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr_auth("", &auth_info, &out_auth, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_req: marshalling of RPC_HDR_AUTH failed.\n")); + goto err_exit; + } + + /*** NTLMSSP verifier ***/ + + init_rpc_auth_verifier(&auth_verifier, "NTLMSSP", NTLMSSP_CHALLENGE); + if(!smb_io_rpc_auth_verifier("", &auth_verifier, &out_auth, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_req: marshalling of RPC_AUTH_VERIFIER failed.\n")); + goto err_exit; + } + + /* NTLMSSP challenge ***/ + + init_rpc_auth_ntlmssp_chal(&ntlmssp_chal, p->ntlmssp_chal_flags, p->challenge); + if(!smb_io_rpc_auth_ntlmssp_chal("", &ntlmssp_chal, &out_auth, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_req: marshalling of RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_CHAL failed.\n")); + goto err_exit; + } + + /* Auth len in the rpc header doesn't include auth_header. */ + auth_len = prs_offset(&out_auth) - RPC_HDR_AUTH_LEN; + } + + /* + * Create the header, now we know the length. + */ + + init_rpc_hdr(&p->hdr, reply_pkt_type, RPC_FLG_FIRST | RPC_FLG_LAST, + p->hdr.call_id, + RPC_HEADER_LEN + prs_offset(&out_hdr_ba) + prs_offset(&out_auth), + auth_len); + + /* + * Marshall the header into the outgoing PDU. + */ + + if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr("", &p->hdr, &outgoing_rpc, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("pi_pipe_bind_req: marshalling of RPC_HDR failed.\n")); + goto err_exit; + } + + /* + * Now add the RPC_HDR_BA and any auth needed. + */ + + if(!prs_append_prs_data( &outgoing_rpc, &out_hdr_ba)) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_req: append of RPC_HDR_BA failed.\n")); + goto err_exit; + } + + if(p->ntlmssp_auth_requested && !prs_append_prs_data( &outgoing_rpc, &out_auth)) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_req: append of auth info failed.\n")); + goto err_exit; + } + + if(!p->ntlmssp_auth_requested) + p->pipe_bound = True; + + /* + * Setup the lengths for the initial reply. + */ + + p->out_data.data_sent_length = 0; + p->out_data.current_pdu_len = prs_offset(&outgoing_rpc); + p->out_data.current_pdu_sent = 0; + + prs_mem_free(&out_hdr_ba); + prs_mem_free(&out_auth); + + return True; + + err_exit: + + prs_mem_free(&out_hdr_ba); + prs_mem_free(&out_auth); + return False; +} /**************************************************************************** - reads data from a pipe. + Deal with sign & seal processing on an RPC request. +****************************************************************************/ + +BOOL api_pipe_auth_process(pipes_struct *p, prs_struct *rpc_in) +{ + /* + * We always negotiate the following two bits.... + */ + BOOL auth_verify = IS_BITS_SET_ALL(p->ntlmssp_chal_flags, NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN); + BOOL auth_seal = IS_BITS_SET_ALL(p->ntlmssp_chal_flags, NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL); + int data_len; + int auth_len; + uint32 old_offset; + uint32 crc32 = 0; + + auth_len = p->hdr.auth_len; + + if ((auth_len != RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_CHK_LEN) && auth_verify) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_auth_process: Incorrect auth_len %d.\n", auth_len )); + return False; + } + + /* + * The following is that length of the data we must verify or unseal. + * This doesn't include the RPC headers or the auth_len or the RPC_HDR_AUTH_LEN + * preceeding the auth_data. + */ + + data_len = p->hdr.frag_len - RPC_HEADER_LEN - RPC_HDR_REQ_LEN - + (auth_verify ? RPC_HDR_AUTH_LEN : 0) - auth_len; + + DEBUG(5,("api_pipe_auth_process: sign: %s seal: %s data %d auth %d\n", + BOOLSTR(auth_verify), BOOLSTR(auth_seal), data_len, auth_len)); + + if (auth_seal) { + char *data = prs_data_p(rpc_in) + RPC_HEADER_LEN + RPC_HDR_REQ_LEN; + NTLMSSPcalc_p(p, (uchar*)data, data_len); + crc32 = crc32_calc_buffer(data, data_len); + } + + old_offset = prs_offset(rpc_in); + + if (auth_seal || auth_verify) { + RPC_HDR_AUTH auth_info; - headers are interspersed with the data at regular intervals. by the time - this function is called, the start of the data could possibly have been - read by an SMBtrans (file_offset != 0). + if(!prs_set_offset(rpc_in, old_offset + data_len)) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_auth_process: cannot move offset to %u.\n", + (unsigned int)old_offset + data_len )); + return False; + } - ****************************************************************************/ -int read_pipe(pipes_struct *p, char *data, int n) + if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr_auth("hdr_auth", &auth_info, rpc_in, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_auth_process: failed to unmarshall RPC_HDR_AUTH.\n")); + return False; + } + } + + if (auth_verify) { + RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_CHK ntlmssp_chk; + char *req_data = prs_data_p(rpc_in) + prs_offset(rpc_in) + 4; + + DEBUG(5,("api_pipe_auth_process: auth %d\n", prs_offset(rpc_in) + 4)); + + /* + * Ensure we have RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_CHK_LEN - 4 more bytes in the + * incoming buffer. + */ + if(prs_mem_get(rpc_in, RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_CHK_LEN - 4) == NULL) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_auth_process: missing %d bytes in buffer.\n", + RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_CHK_LEN - 4 )); + return False; + } + + NTLMSSPcalc_p(p, (uchar*)req_data, RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_CHK_LEN - 4); + if(!smb_io_rpc_auth_ntlmssp_chk("auth_sign", &ntlmssp_chk, rpc_in, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_auth_process: failed to unmarshall RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_CHK.\n")); + return False; + } + + if (!rpc_auth_ntlmssp_chk(&ntlmssp_chk, crc32, p->ntlmssp_seq_num)) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_auth_process: NTLMSSP check failed.\n")); + return False; + } + } + + /* + * Return the current pointer to the data offset. + */ + + if(!prs_set_offset(rpc_in, old_offset)) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_auth_process: failed to set offset back to %u\n", + (unsigned int)old_offset )); + return False; + } + + return True; +} + +/**************************************************************************** + Find the correct RPC function to call for this request. + If the pipe is authenticated then become the correct UNIX user + before doing the call. +****************************************************************************/ + +BOOL api_pipe_request(pipes_struct *p) { - DEBUG(6,("read_pipe: %x name: %s open: %s len: %d", - p->pnum, p->name, BOOLSTR(p->open), n)); + int i = 0; + BOOL ret = False; + BOOL changed_user_id = False; - if (!p || !p->open) - { - DEBUG(6,("pipe not open\n")); - return -1; + /* + * Create the response data buffer. + */ + + if(!pipe_init_outgoing_data(&p->out_data)) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_request: failed to create outgoing buffer.\n")); + return False; } - return read_data(p->m->fd, data, n); + if (p->ntlmssp_auth_validated) { + + if(!become_authenticated_pipe_user(p)) { + prs_mem_free(&p->out_data.rdata); + return False; + } + + changed_user_id = True; + } + + for (i = 0; api_fd_commands[i].pipe_clnt_name; i++) { + if (strequal(api_fd_commands[i].pipe_clnt_name, p->name) && + api_fd_commands[i].fn != NULL) { + DEBUG(3,("Doing \\PIPE\\%s\n", api_fd_commands[i].pipe_clnt_name)); + ret = api_fd_commands[i].fn(p, &p->in_data.data); + } + } + + if(changed_user_id) + unbecome_authenticated_pipe_user(p); + + return ret; } +/******************************************************************* + Calls the underlying RPC function for a named pipe. + ********************************************************************/ + +BOOL api_rpcTNP(pipes_struct *p, char *rpc_name, struct api_struct *api_rpc_cmds, + prs_struct *rpc_in) +{ + int fn_num; + + /* interpret the command */ + DEBUG(4,("api_rpcTNP: %s op 0x%x - ", rpc_name, p->hdr_req.opnum)); + + for (fn_num = 0; api_rpc_cmds[fn_num].name; fn_num++) { + if (api_rpc_cmds[fn_num].opnum == p->hdr_req.opnum && api_rpc_cmds[fn_num].fn != NULL) { + DEBUG(3,("api_rpcTNP: rpc command: %s\n", api_rpc_cmds[fn_num].name)); + break; + } + } + + if (api_rpc_cmds[fn_num].name == NULL) { + /* + * For an unknown RPC just return a fault PDU but + * return True to allow RPC's on the pipe to continue + * and not put the pipe into fault state. JRA. + */ + DEBUG(4, ("unknown\n")); + setup_fault_pdu(p); + return True; + } + + /* do the actual command */ + if(!api_rpc_cmds[fn_num].fn(p->vuid, rpc_in, &p->out_data.rdata)) { + DEBUG(0,("api_rpcTNP: %s: failed.\n", rpc_name)); + prs_mem_free(&p->out_data.rdata); + return False; + } + + DEBUG(5,("api_rpcTNP: called %s successfully\n", rpc_name)); + + return True; +} |