s3-samr: move chgpasswd.c out of smbd and into the samr server.

Guenther

2 files changed, 1137 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/srv_samr_chgpasswd.c b/source3/rpc_server/srv_samr_chgpasswd.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2e76e55dfa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/source3/rpc_server/srv_samr_chgpasswd.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1123 @@
+/*
+   Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
+   Samba utility functions
+   Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 1992-1998
+   Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett 2001-2004
+
+   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+   the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+   (at your option) any later version.
+
+   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+   GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+   You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+   along with this program.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+*/
+
+/* These comments regard the code to change the user's unix password: */
+
+/* fork a child process to exec passwd and write to its
+ * tty to change a users password. This is running as the
+ * user who is attempting to change the password.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * This code was copied/borrowed and stolen from various sources.
+ * The primary source was the poppasswd.c from the authors of POPMail. This software
+ * was included as a client to change passwords using the 'passwd' program
+ * on the remote machine.
+ *
+ * This code has been hacked by Bob Nance (nance@niehs.nih.gov) and Evan Patterson
+ * (patters2@niehs.nih.gov) at the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences
+ * and rights to modify, distribute or incorporate this change to the CAP suite or
+ * using it for any other reason are granted, so long as this disclaimer is left intact.
+ */
+
+/*
+   This code was hacked considerably for inclusion in Samba, primarily
+   by Andrew.Tridgell@anu.edu.au. The biggest change was the addition
+   of the "password chat" option, which allows the easy runtime
+   specification of the expected sequence of events to change a
+   password.
+   */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include "../libcli/auth/libcli_auth.h"
+#include "../lib/crypto/arcfour.h"
+#include "rpc_server/srv_samr_util.h"
+
+#if ALLOW_CHANGE_PASSWORD
+
+static int findpty(char **slave)
+{
+	int master = -1;
+	char *line = NULL;
+	SMB_STRUCT_DIR *dirp = NULL;
+	const char *dpname;
+
+	*slave = NULL;
+
+#if defined(HAVE_GRANTPT)
+	/* Try to open /dev/ptmx. If that fails, fall through to old method. */
+	if ((master = sys_open("/dev/ptmx", O_RDWR, 0)) >= 0) {
+		grantpt(master);
+		unlockpt(master);
+		line = (char *)ptsname(master);
+		if (line) {
+			*slave = SMB_STRDUP(line);
+		}
+
+		if (*slave == NULL) {
+			DEBUG(0,
+			      ("findpty: Unable to create master/slave pty pair.\n"));
+			/* Stop fd leak on error. */
+			close(master);
+			return -1;
+		} else {
+			DEBUG(10,
+			      ("findpty: Allocated slave pty %s\n", *slave));
+			return (master);
+		}
+	}
+#endif /* HAVE_GRANTPT */
+
+	line = SMB_STRDUP("/dev/ptyXX");
+	if (!line) {
+		return (-1);
+	}
+
+	dirp = sys_opendir("/dev");
+	if (!dirp) {
+		SAFE_FREE(line);
+		return (-1);
+	}
+
+	while ((dpname = readdirname(dirp)) != NULL) {
+		if (strncmp(dpname, "pty", 3) == 0 && strlen(dpname) == 5) {
+			DEBUG(3,
+			      ("pty: try to open %s, line was %s\n", dpname,
+			       line));
+			line[8] = dpname[3];
+			line[9] = dpname[4];
+			if ((master = sys_open(line, O_RDWR, 0)) >= 0) {
+				DEBUG(3, ("pty: opened %s\n", line));
+				line[5] = 't';
+				*slave = line;
+				sys_closedir(dirp);
+				return (master);
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	sys_closedir(dirp);
+	SAFE_FREE(line);
+	return (-1);
+}
+
+static int dochild(int master, const char *slavedev, const struct passwd *pass,
+		   const char *passwordprogram, bool as_root)
+{
+	int slave;
+	struct termios stermios;
+	gid_t gid;
+	uid_t uid;
+	char * const eptrs[1] = { NULL };
+
+	if (pass == NULL)
+	{
+		DEBUG(0,
+		      ("dochild: user doesn't exist in the UNIX password database.\n"));
+		return False;
+	}
+
+	gid = pass->pw_gid;
+	uid = pass->pw_uid;
+
+	gain_root_privilege();
+
+	/* Start new session - gets rid of controlling terminal. */
+	if (setsid() < 0)
+	{
+		DEBUG(3,
+		      ("Weirdness, couldn't let go of controlling terminal\n"));
+		return (False);
+	}
+
+	/* Open slave pty and acquire as new controlling terminal. */
+	if ((slave = sys_open(slavedev, O_RDWR, 0)) < 0)
+	{
+		DEBUG(3, ("More weirdness, could not open %s\n", slavedev));
+		return (False);
+	}
+#if defined(TIOCSCTTY) && !defined(SUNOS5)
+	/*
+	 * On patched Solaris 10 TIOCSCTTY is defined but seems not to work,
+	 * see the discussion under
+	 * https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=5366.
+	 */
+	if (ioctl(slave, TIOCSCTTY, 0) < 0)
+	{
+		DEBUG(3, ("Error in ioctl call for slave pty\n"));
+		/* return(False); */
+	}
+#elif defined(I_PUSH) && defined(I_FIND)
+	if (ioctl(slave, I_FIND, "ptem") == 0) {
+		ioctl(slave, I_PUSH, "ptem");
+	}
+	if (ioctl(slave, I_FIND, "ldterm") == 0) {
+		ioctl(slave, I_PUSH, "ldterm");
+	}
+#endif
+
+	/* Close master. */
+	close(master);
+
+	/* Make slave stdin/out/err of child. */
+
+	if (dup2(slave, STDIN_FILENO) != STDIN_FILENO)
+	{
+		DEBUG(3, ("Could not re-direct stdin\n"));
+		return (False);
+	}
+	if (dup2(slave, STDOUT_FILENO) != STDOUT_FILENO)
+	{
+		DEBUG(3, ("Could not re-direct stdout\n"));
+		return (False);
+	}
+	if (dup2(slave, STDERR_FILENO) != STDERR_FILENO)
+	{
+		DEBUG(3, ("Could not re-direct stderr\n"));
+		return (False);
+	}
+	if (slave > 2)
+		close(slave);
+
+	/* Set proper terminal attributes - no echo, canonical input processing,
+	   no map NL to CR/NL on output. */
+
+	if (tcgetattr(0, &stermios) < 0)
+	{
+		DEBUG(3,
+		      ("could not read default terminal attributes on pty\n"));
+		return (False);
+	}
+	stermios.c_lflag &= ~(ECHO | ECHOE | ECHOK | ECHONL);
+	stermios.c_lflag |= ICANON;
+#ifdef ONLCR
+	stermios.c_oflag &= ~(ONLCR);
+#endif
+	if (tcsetattr(0, TCSANOW, &stermios) < 0)
+	{
+		DEBUG(3, ("could not set attributes of pty\n"));
+		return (False);
+	}
+
+	/* make us completely into the right uid */
+	if (!as_root)
+	{
+		become_user_permanently(uid, gid);
+	}
+
+	DEBUG(10,
+	      ("Invoking '%s' as password change program.\n",
+	       passwordprogram));
+
+	/* execl() password-change application */
+	if (execle("/bin/sh", "sh", "-c", passwordprogram, NULL, eptrs) < 0)
+	{
+		DEBUG(3, ("Bad status returned from %s\n", passwordprogram));
+		return (False);
+	}
+	return (True);
+}
+
+static int expect(int master, char *issue, char *expected)
+{
+	char buffer[1024];
+	int attempts, timeout, nread;
+	size_t len;
+	bool match = False;
+
+	for (attempts = 0; attempts < 2; attempts++) {
+		NTSTATUS status;
+		if (!strequal(issue, ".")) {
+			if (lp_passwd_chat_debug())
+				DEBUG(100, ("expect: sending [%s]\n", issue));
+
+			if ((len = sys_write(master, issue, strlen(issue))) != strlen(issue)) {
+				DEBUG(2,("expect: (short) write returned %d\n",
+					 (int)len ));
+				return False;
+			}
+		}
+
+		if (strequal(expected, "."))
+			return True;
+
+		/* Initial timeout. */
+		timeout = lp_passwd_chat_timeout() * 1000;
+		nread = 0;
+		buffer[nread] = 0;
+
+		while (True) {
+			status = read_fd_with_timeout(
+				master, buffer + nread, 1,
+				sizeof(buffer) - nread - 1,
+				timeout, &len);
+
+			if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+				break;
+			}
+			nread += len;
+			buffer[nread] = 0;
+
+			{
+				/* Eat leading/trailing whitespace before match. */
+				char *str = SMB_STRDUP(buffer);
+				if (!str) {
+					DEBUG(2,("expect: ENOMEM\n"));
+					return False;
+				}
+				trim_char(str, ' ', ' ');
+
+				if ((match = unix_wild_match(expected, str)) == True) {
+					/* Now data has started to return, lower timeout. */
+					timeout = lp_passwd_chat_timeout() * 100;
+				}
+				SAFE_FREE(str);
+			}
+		}
+
+		if (lp_passwd_chat_debug())
+			DEBUG(100, ("expect: expected [%s] received [%s] match %s\n",
+				    expected, buffer, match ? "yes" : "no" ));
+
+		if (match)
+			break;
+
+		if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+			DEBUG(2, ("expect: %s\n", nt_errstr(status)));
+			return False;
+		}
+	}
+
+	DEBUG(10,("expect: returning %s\n", match ? "True" : "False" ));
+	return match;
+}
+
+static void pwd_sub(char *buf)
+{
+	all_string_sub(buf, "\\n", "\n", 0);
+	all_string_sub(buf, "\\r", "\r", 0);
+	all_string_sub(buf, "\\s", " ", 0);
+	all_string_sub(buf, "\\t", "\t", 0);
+}
+
+static int talktochild(int master, const char *seq)
+{
+	TALLOC_CTX *frame = talloc_stackframe();
+	int count = 0;
+	char *issue;
+	char *expected;
+
+	issue = talloc_strdup(frame, ".");
+	if (!issue) {
+		TALLOC_FREE(frame);
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	while (next_token_talloc(frame, &seq, &expected, NULL)) {
+		pwd_sub(expected);
+		count++;
+
+		if (!expect(master, issue, expected)) {
+			DEBUG(3, ("Response %d incorrect\n", count));
+			TALLOC_FREE(frame);
+			return false;
+		}
+
+		if (!next_token_talloc(frame, &seq, &issue, NULL)) {
+			issue = talloc_strdup(frame, ".");
+			if (!issue) {
+				TALLOC_FREE(frame);
+				return false;
+			}
+		}
+		pwd_sub(issue);
+	}
+
+	if (!strequal(issue, ".")) {
+		/* we have one final issue to send */
+		expected = talloc_strdup(frame, ".");
+		if (!expected) {
+			TALLOC_FREE(frame);
+			return false;
+		}
+		if (!expect(master, issue, expected)) {
+			TALLOC_FREE(frame);
+			return False;
+		}
+	}
+	TALLOC_FREE(frame);
+	return (count > 0);
+}
+
+static bool chat_with_program(char *passwordprogram, const struct passwd *pass,
+			      char *chatsequence, bool as_root)
+{
+	char *slavedev = NULL;
+	int master;
+	pid_t pid, wpid;
+	int wstat;
+	bool chstat = False;
+
+	if (pass == NULL) {
+		DEBUG(0, ("chat_with_program: user doesn't exist in the UNIX password database.\n"));
+		return False;
+	}
+
+	/* allocate a pseudo-terminal device */
+	if ((master = findpty(&slavedev)) < 0) {
+		DEBUG(3, ("chat_with_program: Cannot Allocate pty for password change: %s\n", pass->pw_name));
+		return (False);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * We need to temporarily stop CatchChild from eating
+	 * SIGCLD signals as it also eats the exit status code. JRA.
+	 */
+
+	CatchChildLeaveStatus();
+
+	if ((pid = sys_fork()) < 0) {
+		DEBUG(3, ("chat_with_program: Cannot fork() child for password change: %s\n", pass->pw_name));
+		SAFE_FREE(slavedev);
+		close(master);
+		CatchChild();
+		return (False);
+	}
+
+	/* we now have a pty */
+	if (pid > 0) {			/* This is the parent process */
+		/* Don't need this anymore in parent. */
+		SAFE_FREE(slavedev);
+
+		if ((chstat = talktochild(master, chatsequence)) == False) {
+			DEBUG(3, ("chat_with_program: Child failed to change password: %s\n", pass->pw_name));
+			kill(pid, SIGKILL);	/* be sure to end this process */
+		}
+
+		while ((wpid = sys_waitpid(pid, &wstat, 0)) < 0) {
+			if (errno == EINTR) {
+				errno = 0;
+				continue;
+			}
+			break;
+		}
+
+		if (wpid < 0) {
+			DEBUG(3, ("chat_with_program: The process is no longer waiting!\n\n"));
+			close(master);
+			CatchChild();
+			return (False);
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Go back to ignoring children.
+		 */
+		CatchChild();
+
+		close(master);
+
+		if (pid != wpid) {
+			DEBUG(3, ("chat_with_program: We were waiting for the wrong process ID\n"));
+			return (False);
+		}
+		if (WIFEXITED(wstat) && (WEXITSTATUS(wstat) != 0)) {
+			DEBUG(3, ("chat_with_program: The process exited with status %d \
+while we were waiting\n", WEXITSTATUS(wstat)));
+			return (False);
+		}
+#if defined(WIFSIGNALLED) && defined(WTERMSIG)
+		else if (WIFSIGNALLED(wstat)) {
+                        DEBUG(3, ("chat_with_program: The process was killed by signal %d \
+while we were waiting\n", WTERMSIG(wstat)));
+			return (False);
+		}
+#endif
+	} else {
+		/* CHILD */
+
+		/*
+		 * Lose any elevated privileges.
+		 */
+		drop_effective_capability(KERNEL_OPLOCK_CAPABILITY);
+		drop_effective_capability(DMAPI_ACCESS_CAPABILITY);
+
+		/* make sure it doesn't freeze */
+		alarm(20);
+
+		if (as_root)
+			become_root();
+
+		DEBUG(3, ("chat_with_program: Dochild for user %s (uid=%d,gid=%d) (as_root = %s)\n", pass->pw_name,
+		       (int)getuid(), (int)getgid(), BOOLSTR(as_root) ));
+		chstat = dochild(master, slavedev, pass, passwordprogram, as_root);
+
+		if (as_root)
+			unbecome_root();
+
+		/*
+		 * The child should never return from dochild() ....
+		 */
+
+		DEBUG(0, ("chat_with_program: Error: dochild() returned %d\n", chstat));
+		exit(1);
+	}
+
+	if (chstat)
+		DEBUG(3, ("chat_with_program: Password change %ssuccessful for user %s\n",
+		       (chstat ? "" : "un"), pass->pw_name));
+	return (chstat);
+}
+
+bool chgpasswd(const char *name, const struct passwd *pass,
+	       const char *oldpass, const char *newpass, bool as_root)
+{
+	char *passwordprogram = NULL;
+	char *chatsequence = NULL;
+	size_t i;
+	size_t len;
+	TALLOC_CTX *ctx = talloc_tos();
+
+	if (!oldpass) {
+		oldpass = "";
+	}
+
+	DEBUG(3, ("chgpasswd: Password change (as_root=%s) for user: %s\n", BOOLSTR(as_root), name));
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
+	DEBUG(100, ("chgpasswd: Passwords: old=%s new=%s\n", oldpass, newpass));
+#endif
+
+	/* Take the passed information and test it for minimum criteria */
+
+	/* Password is same as old password */
+	if (strcmp(oldpass, newpass) == 0) {
+		/* don't allow same password */
+		DEBUG(2, ("chgpasswd: Password Change: %s, New password is same as old\n", name));	/* log the attempt */
+		return (False);	/* inform the user */
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Check the old and new passwords don't contain any control
+	 * characters.
+	 */
+
+	len = strlen(oldpass);
+	for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+		if (iscntrl((int)oldpass[i])) {
+			DEBUG(0, ("chgpasswd: oldpass contains control characters (disallowed).\n"));
+			return False;
+		}
+	}
+
+	len = strlen(newpass);
+	for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+		if (iscntrl((int)newpass[i])) {
+			DEBUG(0, ("chgpasswd: newpass contains control characters (disallowed).\n"));
+			return False;
+		}
+	}
+
+#ifdef WITH_PAM
+	if (lp_pam_password_change()) {
+		bool ret;
+#ifdef HAVE_SETLOCALE
+		const char *prevlocale = setlocale(LC_ALL, "C");
+#endif
+
+		if (as_root)
+			become_root();
+
+		if (pass) {
+			ret = smb_pam_passchange(pass->pw_name, oldpass, newpass);
+		} else {
+			ret = smb_pam_passchange(name, oldpass, newpass);
+		}
+
+		if (as_root)
+			unbecome_root();
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SETLOCALE
+		setlocale(LC_ALL, prevlocale);
+#endif
+
+		return ret;
+	}
+#endif
+
+	/* A non-PAM password change just doen't make sense without a valid local user */
+
+	if (pass == NULL) {
+		DEBUG(0, ("chgpasswd: user %s doesn't exist in the UNIX password database.\n", name));
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	passwordprogram = talloc_strdup(ctx, lp_passwd_program());
+	if (!passwordprogram || !*passwordprogram) {
+		DEBUG(2, ("chgpasswd: Null password program - no password changing\n"));
+		return false;
+	}
+	chatsequence = talloc_strdup(ctx, lp_passwd_chat());
+	if (!chatsequence || !*chatsequence) {
+		DEBUG(2, ("chgpasswd: Null chat sequence - no password changing\n"));
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	if (as_root) {
+		/* The password program *must* contain the user name to work. Fail if not. */
+		if (strstr_m(passwordprogram, "%u") == NULL) {
+			DEBUG(0,("chgpasswd: Running as root the 'passwd program' parameter *MUST* contain \
+the string %%u, and the given string %s does not.\n", passwordprogram ));
+			return false;
+		}
+	}
+
+	passwordprogram = talloc_string_sub(ctx, passwordprogram, "%u", name);
+	if (!passwordprogram) {
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	/* note that we do NOT substitute the %o and %n in the password program
+	   as this would open up a security hole where the user could use
+	   a new password containing shell escape characters */
+
+	chatsequence = talloc_string_sub(ctx, chatsequence, "%u", name);
+	if (!chatsequence) {
+		return false;
+	}
+	chatsequence = talloc_all_string_sub(ctx,
+					chatsequence,
+					"%o",
+					oldpass);
+	if (!chatsequence) {
+		return false;
+	}
+	chatsequence = talloc_all_string_sub(ctx,
+					chatsequence,
+					"%n",
+					newpass);
+	return chat_with_program(passwordprogram,
+				pass,
+				chatsequence,
+				as_root);
+}
+
+#else /* ALLOW_CHANGE_PASSWORD */
+
+bool chgpasswd(const char *name, const struct passwd *pass,
+	       const char *oldpass, const char *newpass, bool as_root)
+{
+	DEBUG(0, ("chgpasswd: Unix Password changing not compiled in (user=%s)\n", name));
+	return (False);
+}
+#endif /* ALLOW_CHANGE_PASSWORD */
+
+/***********************************************************
+ Decrypt and verify a user password change.
+
+ The 516 byte long buffers are encrypted with the old NT and
+ old LM passwords, and if the NT passwords are present, both
+ buffers contain a unicode string.
+
+ After decrypting the buffers, check the password is correct by
+ matching the old hashed passwords with the passwords in the passdb.
+
+************************************************************/
+
+static NTSTATUS check_oem_password(const char *user,
+				   uchar password_encrypted_with_lm_hash[516],
+				   const uchar old_lm_hash_encrypted[16],
+				   uchar password_encrypted_with_nt_hash[516],
+				   const uchar old_nt_hash_encrypted[16],
+				   struct samu *sampass,
+				   char **pp_new_passwd)
+{
+	uchar null_pw[16];
+	uchar null_ntpw[16];
+	uint8 *password_encrypted;
+	const uint8 *encryption_key;
+	const uint8 *lanman_pw, *nt_pw;
+	uint32 acct_ctrl;
+	size_t new_pw_len;
+	uchar new_nt_hash[16];
+	uchar new_lm_hash[16];
+	uchar verifier[16];
+	char no_pw[2];
+
+	bool nt_pass_set = (password_encrypted_with_nt_hash && old_nt_hash_encrypted);
+	bool lm_pass_set = (password_encrypted_with_lm_hash && old_lm_hash_encrypted);
+
+	acct_ctrl = pdb_get_acct_ctrl(sampass);
+#if 0
+	/* I am convinced this check here is wrong, it is valid to
+	 * change a password of a user that has a disabled account - gd */
+
+	if (acct_ctrl & ACB_DISABLED) {
+		DEBUG(2,("check_lanman_password: account %s disabled.\n", user));
+		return NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_DISABLED;
+	}
+#endif
+	if ((acct_ctrl & ACB_PWNOTREQ) && lp_null_passwords()) {
+		/* construct a null password (in case one is needed */
+		no_pw[0] = 0;
+		no_pw[1] = 0;
+		nt_lm_owf_gen(no_pw, null_ntpw, null_pw);
+		lanman_pw = null_pw;
+		nt_pw = null_pw;
+
+	} else {
+		/* save pointers to passwords so we don't have to keep looking them up */
+		if (lp_lanman_auth()) {
+			lanman_pw = pdb_get_lanman_passwd(sampass);
+		} else {
+			lanman_pw = NULL;
+		}
+		nt_pw = pdb_get_nt_passwd(sampass);
+	}
+
+	if (nt_pw && nt_pass_set) {
+		/* IDEAL Case: passwords are in unicode, and we can
+		 * read use the password encrypted with the NT hash
+		 */
+		password_encrypted = password_encrypted_with_nt_hash;
+		encryption_key = nt_pw;
+	} else if (lanman_pw && lm_pass_set) {
+		/* password may still be in unicode, but use LM hash version */
+		password_encrypted = password_encrypted_with_lm_hash;
+		encryption_key = lanman_pw;
+	} else if (nt_pass_set) {
+		DEBUG(1, ("NT password change supplied for user %s, but we have no NT password to check it with\n",
+			  user));
+		return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
+	} else if (lm_pass_set) {
+		if (lp_lanman_auth()) {
+			DEBUG(1, ("LM password change supplied for user %s, but we have no LanMan password to check it with\n",
+				  user));
+		} else {
+			DEBUG(1, ("LM password change supplied for user %s, but we have disabled LanMan authentication\n",
+				  user));
+		}
+		return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
+	} else {
+		DEBUG(1, ("password change requested for user %s, but no password supplied!\n",
+			  user));
+		return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Decrypt the password with the key
+	 */
+	arcfour_crypt( password_encrypted, encryption_key, 516);
+
+	if (!decode_pw_buffer(talloc_tos(),
+				password_encrypted,
+				pp_new_passwd,
+				&new_pw_len,
+				nt_pass_set ? CH_UTF16 : CH_DOS)) {
+		return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * To ensure we got the correct new password, hash it and
+	 * use it as a key to test the passed old password.
+	 */
+
+	if (nt_pass_set) {
+		/* NT passwords, verify the NT hash. */
+
+		/* Calculate the MD4 hash (NT compatible) of the password */
+		memset(new_nt_hash, '\0', 16);
+		E_md4hash(*pp_new_passwd, new_nt_hash);
+
+		if (nt_pw) {
+			/*
+			 * check the NT verifier
+			 */
+			E_old_pw_hash(new_nt_hash, nt_pw, verifier);
+			if (memcmp(verifier, old_nt_hash_encrypted, 16)) {
+				DEBUG(0, ("check_oem_password: old nt "
+					  "password doesn't match.\n"));
+				return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
+			}
+
+			/* We could check the LM password here, but there is
+			 * little point, we already know the password is
+			 * correct, and the LM password might not even be
+			 * present. */
+
+			/* Further, LM hash generation algorithms
+			 * differ with charset, so we could
+			 * incorrectly fail a perfectly valid password
+			 * change */
+#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
+			DEBUG(100,
+			      ("check_oem_password: password %s ok\n", *pp_new_passwd));
+#endif
+			return NT_STATUS_OK;
+		}
+
+		if (lanman_pw) {
+			/*
+			 * check the lm verifier
+			 */
+			E_old_pw_hash(new_nt_hash, lanman_pw, verifier);
+			if (memcmp(verifier, old_lm_hash_encrypted, 16)) {
+				DEBUG(0,("check_oem_password: old lm password doesn't match.\n"));
+				return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
+			}
+#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
+			DEBUG(100,
+			      ("check_oem_password: password %s ok\n", *pp_new_passwd));
+#endif
+			return NT_STATUS_OK;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (lanman_pw && lm_pass_set) {
+
+		E_deshash(*pp_new_passwd, new_lm_hash);
+
+		/*
+		 * check the lm verifier
+		 */
+		E_old_pw_hash(new_lm_hash, lanman_pw, verifier);
+		if (memcmp(verifier, old_lm_hash_encrypted, 16)) {
+			DEBUG(0,("check_oem_password: old lm password doesn't match.\n"));
+			return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
+		}
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
+		DEBUG(100,
+		      ("check_oem_password: password %s ok\n", *pp_new_passwd));
+#endif
+		return NT_STATUS_OK;
+	}
+
+	/* should not be reached */
+	return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
+}
+
+static bool password_in_history(uint8_t nt_pw[NT_HASH_LEN],
+				uint32_t pw_history_len,
+				const uint8_t *pw_history)
+{
+	static const uint8_t zero_md5_nt_pw[SALTED_MD5_HASH_LEN] = { 0, };
+	int i;
+
+	dump_data(100, nt_pw, NT_HASH_LEN);
+	dump_data(100, pw_history, PW_HISTORY_ENTRY_LEN * pw_history_len);
+
+	for (i=0; i<pw_history_len; i++) {
+		uint8_t new_nt_pw_salted_md5_hash[SALTED_MD5_HASH_LEN];
+		const uint8_t *current_salt;
+		const uint8_t *old_nt_pw_salted_md5_hash;
+
+		current_salt = &pw_history[i*PW_HISTORY_ENTRY_LEN];
+		old_nt_pw_salted_md5_hash = current_salt + PW_HISTORY_SALT_LEN;
+
+		if (memcmp(zero_md5_nt_pw, old_nt_pw_salted_md5_hash,
+			   SALTED_MD5_HASH_LEN) == 0) {
+			/* Ignore zero valued entries. */
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		if (memcmp(zero_md5_nt_pw, current_salt,
+			   PW_HISTORY_SALT_LEN) == 0)
+		{
+			/*
+			 * New format: zero salt and then plain nt hash.
+			 * Directly compare the hashes.
+			 */
+			if (memcmp(nt_pw, old_nt_pw_salted_md5_hash,
+				   SALTED_MD5_HASH_LEN) == 0)
+			{
+				return true;
+			}
+		} else {
+			/*
+			 * Old format: md5sum of salted nt hash.
+			 * Create salted version of new pw to compare.
+			 */
+			E_md5hash(current_salt, nt_pw, new_nt_pw_salted_md5_hash);
+
+			if (memcmp(new_nt_pw_salted_md5_hash,
+				   old_nt_pw_salted_md5_hash,
+				   SALTED_MD5_HASH_LEN) == 0) {
+				return true;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return false;
+}
+
+/***********************************************************
+ This routine takes the given password and checks it against
+ the password history. Returns True if this password has been
+ found in the history list.
+************************************************************/
+
+static bool check_passwd_history(struct samu *sampass, const char *plaintext)
+{
+	uchar new_nt_p16[NT_HASH_LEN];
+	const uint8 *nt_pw;
+	const uint8 *pwhistory;
+	uint32 pwHisLen, curr_pwHisLen;
+
+	pdb_get_account_policy(PDB_POLICY_PASSWORD_HISTORY, &pwHisLen);
+	if (pwHisLen == 0) {
+		return False;
+	}
+
+	pwhistory = pdb_get_pw_history(sampass, &curr_pwHisLen);
+	if (!pwhistory || curr_pwHisLen == 0) {
+		return False;
+	}
+
+	/* Only examine the minimum of the current history len and
+	   the stored history len. Avoids race conditions. */
+	pwHisLen = MIN(pwHisLen,curr_pwHisLen);
+
+	nt_pw = pdb_get_nt_passwd(sampass);
+
+	E_md4hash(plaintext, new_nt_p16);
+
+	if (!memcmp(nt_pw, new_nt_p16, NT_HASH_LEN)) {
+		DEBUG(10,("check_passwd_history: proposed new password for user %s is the same as the current password !\n",
+			pdb_get_username(sampass) ));
+		return True;
+	}
+
+	if (password_in_history(new_nt_p16, pwHisLen, pwhistory)) {
+		DEBUG(1,("check_passwd_history: proposed new password for "
+			 "user %s found in history list !\n",
+			 pdb_get_username(sampass) ));
+		return true;
+	}
+	return false;
+}
+
+/***********************************************************
+************************************************************/
+
+NTSTATUS check_password_complexity(const char *username,
+				   const char *password,
+				   enum samPwdChangeReason *samr_reject_reason)
+{
+	TALLOC_CTX *tosctx = talloc_tos();
+	int check_ret;
+	char *cmd;
+
+	/* Use external script to check password complexity */
+	if ((lp_check_password_script() == NULL)
+	    || (*(lp_check_password_script()) == '\0')) {
+		return NT_STATUS_OK;
+	}
+
+	cmd = talloc_string_sub(tosctx, lp_check_password_script(), "%u",
+				username);
+	if (!cmd) {
+		return NT_STATUS_PASSWORD_RESTRICTION;
+	}
+
+	check_ret = smbrunsecret(cmd, password);
+	DEBUG(5,("check_password_complexity: check password script (%s) "
+		 "returned [%d]\n", cmd, check_ret));
+	TALLOC_FREE(cmd);
+
+	if (check_ret != 0) {
+		DEBUG(1,("check_password_complexity: "
+			 "check password script said new password is not good "
+			 "enough!\n"));
+		if (samr_reject_reason) {
+			*samr_reject_reason = SAM_PWD_CHANGE_NOT_COMPLEX;
+		}
+		return NT_STATUS_PASSWORD_RESTRICTION;
+	}
+
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+/***********************************************************
+ Code to change the oem password. Changes both the lanman
+ and NT hashes.  Old_passwd is almost always NULL.
+ NOTE this function is designed to be called as root. Check the old password
+ is correct before calling. JRA.
+************************************************************/
+
+static NTSTATUS change_oem_password(struct samu *hnd, char *old_passwd, char *new_passwd, bool as_root, enum samPwdChangeReason *samr_reject_reason)
+{
+	uint32 min_len;
+	uint32 refuse;
+	TALLOC_CTX *tosctx = talloc_tos();
+	struct passwd *pass = NULL;
+	const char *username = pdb_get_username(hnd);
+	time_t can_change_time = pdb_get_pass_can_change_time(hnd);
+	NTSTATUS status;
+
+	if (samr_reject_reason) {
+		*samr_reject_reason = SAM_PWD_CHANGE_NO_ERROR;
+	}
+
+	/* check to see if the secdesc has previously been set to disallow */
+	if (!pdb_get_pass_can_change(hnd)) {
+		DEBUG(1, ("user %s does not have permissions to change password\n", username));
+		if (samr_reject_reason) {
+			*samr_reject_reason = SAM_PWD_CHANGE_NO_ERROR;
+		}
+		return NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_RESTRICTION;
+	}
+
+	/* check to see if it is a Machine account and if the policy
+	 * denies machines to change the password. *
+	 * Should we deny also SRVTRUST and/or DOMSTRUST ? .SSS. */
+	if (pdb_get_acct_ctrl(hnd) & ACB_WSTRUST) {
+		if (pdb_get_account_policy(PDB_POLICY_REFUSE_MACHINE_PW_CHANGE, &refuse) && refuse) {
+			DEBUG(1, ("Machine %s cannot change password now, "
+				  "denied by Refuse Machine Password Change policy\n",
+				  username));
+			if (samr_reject_reason) {
+				*samr_reject_reason = SAM_PWD_CHANGE_NO_ERROR;
+			}
+			return NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_RESTRICTION;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* removed calculation here, because passdb now calculates
+	   based on policy.  jmcd */
+	if ((can_change_time != 0) && (time(NULL) < can_change_time)) {
+		DEBUG(1, ("user %s cannot change password now, must "
+			  "wait until %s\n", username,
+			  http_timestring(tosctx, can_change_time)));
+		if (samr_reject_reason) {
+			*samr_reject_reason = SAM_PWD_CHANGE_NO_ERROR;
+		}
+		return NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_RESTRICTION;
+	}
+
+	if (pdb_get_account_policy(PDB_POLICY_MIN_PASSWORD_LEN, &min_len) && (str_charnum(new_passwd) < min_len)) {
+		DEBUG(1, ("user %s cannot change password - password too short\n",
+			  username));
+		DEBUGADD(1, (" account policy min password len = %d\n", min_len));
+		if (samr_reject_reason) {
+			*samr_reject_reason = SAM_PWD_CHANGE_PASSWORD_TOO_SHORT;
+		}
+		return NT_STATUS_PASSWORD_RESTRICTION;
+/* 		return NT_STATUS_PWD_TOO_SHORT; */
+	}
+
+	if (check_passwd_history(hnd,new_passwd)) {
+		if (samr_reject_reason) {
+			*samr_reject_reason = SAM_PWD_CHANGE_PWD_IN_HISTORY;
+		}
+		return NT_STATUS_PASSWORD_RESTRICTION;
+	}
+
+	pass = Get_Pwnam_alloc(tosctx, username);
+	if (!pass) {
+		DEBUG(1, ("change_oem_password: Username %s does not exist in system !?!\n", username));
+		return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
+	}
+
+	status = check_password_complexity(username, new_passwd, samr_reject_reason);
+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+		TALLOC_FREE(pass);
+		return status;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * If unix password sync was requested, attempt to change
+	 * the /etc/passwd database first. Return failure if this cannot
+	 * be done.
+	 *
+	 * This occurs before the oem change, because we don't want to
+	 * update it if chgpasswd failed.
+	 *
+	 * Conditional on lp_unix_password_sync() because we don't want
+	 * to touch the unix db unless we have admin permission.
+	 */
+
+	if(lp_unix_password_sync() &&
+		!chgpasswd(username, pass, old_passwd, new_passwd, as_root)) {
+		TALLOC_FREE(pass);
+		return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
+	}
+
+	TALLOC_FREE(pass);
+
+	if (!pdb_set_plaintext_passwd (hnd, new_passwd)) {
+		return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
+	}
+
+	/* Now write it into the file. */
+	return pdb_update_sam_account (hnd);
+}
+
+/***********************************************************
+ Code to check and change the OEM hashed password.
+************************************************************/
+
+NTSTATUS pass_oem_change(char *user,
+			 uchar password_encrypted_with_lm_hash[516],
+			 const uchar old_lm_hash_encrypted[16],
+			 uchar password_encrypted_with_nt_hash[516],
+			 const uchar old_nt_hash_encrypted[16],
+			 enum samPwdChangeReason *reject_reason)
+{
+	char *new_passwd = NULL;
+	struct samu *sampass = NULL;
+	NTSTATUS nt_status;
+	bool ret = false;
+
+	if (!(sampass = samu_new(NULL))) {
+		return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+	}
+
+	become_root();
+	ret = pdb_getsampwnam(sampass, user);
+	unbecome_root();
+
+	if (ret == false) {
+		DEBUG(0,("pass_oem_change: getsmbpwnam returned NULL\n"));
+		TALLOC_FREE(sampass);
+		return NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER;
+	}
+
+	nt_status = check_oem_password(user,
+				       password_encrypted_with_lm_hash,
+				       old_lm_hash_encrypted,
+				       password_encrypted_with_nt_hash,
+				       old_nt_hash_encrypted,
+				       sampass,
+				       &new_passwd);
+
+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+		TALLOC_FREE(sampass);
+		return nt_status;
+	}
+
+	/* We've already checked the old password here.... */
+	become_root();
+	nt_status = change_oem_password(sampass, NULL, new_passwd, True, reject_reason);
+	unbecome_root();
+
+	memset(new_passwd, 0, strlen(new_passwd));
+
+	TALLOC_FREE(sampass);
+
+	return nt_status;
+}
diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/srv_samr_util.h b/source3/rpc_server/srv_samr_util.h
index 9dbc8b5ad6..fb6d02620d 100644
--- a/source3/rpc_server/srv_samr_util.h
+++ b/source3/rpc_server/srv_samr_util.h
@@ -61,3 +61,17 @@ void copy_id25_to_sam_passwd(struct samu *to,
 			     struct samr_UserInfo25 *from);
 void copy_id26_to_sam_passwd(struct samu *to,
 			     struct samr_UserInfo26 *from);
+
+/* The following definitions come from rpc_server/srv_samr_chgpasswd.c  */
+
+bool chgpasswd(const char *name, const struct passwd *pass,
+	       const char *oldpass, const char *newpass, bool as_root);
+NTSTATUS pass_oem_change(char *user,
+			 uchar password_encrypted_with_lm_hash[516],
+			 const uchar old_lm_hash_encrypted[16],
+			 uchar password_encrypted_with_nt_hash[516],
+			 const uchar old_nt_hash_encrypted[16],
+			 enum samPwdChangeReason *reject_reason);
+NTSTATUS check_password_complexity(const char *username,
+				   const char *password,
+				   enum samPwdChangeReason *samr_reject_reason);