diff options
author | Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org> | 2008-02-14 13:12:28 +0100 |
---|---|---|
committer | Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org> | 2008-02-14 13:12:28 +0100 |
commit | d0ae7cfb6fb3ed85d87334ce42ed7d3ce84a91a0 (patch) | |
tree | 8087f5d0483332f101717c417590682d001a224d /source3/rpc_server | |
parent | 4583389f9323cc6b405b6d54125ee2d7e21707b8 (diff) | |
download | samba-d0ae7cfb6fb3ed85d87334ce42ed7d3ce84a91a0.tar.gz samba-d0ae7cfb6fb3ed85d87334ce42ed7d3ce84a91a0.tar.bz2 samba-d0ae7cfb6fb3ed85d87334ce42ed7d3ce84a91a0.zip |
Remove white space.
Guenther
(This used to be commit a33ed085094b200e153939cb1b02e567f07b1e50)
Diffstat (limited to 'source3/rpc_server')
-rw-r--r-- | source3/rpc_server/srv_lsa_nt.c | 120 |
1 files changed, 60 insertions, 60 deletions
diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/srv_lsa_nt.c b/source3/rpc_server/srv_lsa_nt.c index 4e2884ccdb..ef09b28dde 100644 --- a/source3/rpc_server/srv_lsa_nt.c +++ b/source3/rpc_server/srv_lsa_nt.c @@ -15,12 +15,12 @@ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by * the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or * (at your option) any later version. - * + * * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the * GNU General Public License for more details. - * + * * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License * along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. */ @@ -467,7 +467,7 @@ static void init_dns_dom_info(LSA_DNS_DOM_INFO *r_l, const char *nb_name, r_l->hdr_nb_dom_name.uni_max_len += 2; r_l->uni_nb_dom_name.uni_max_len += 1; } - + if (dns_name && *dns_name) { init_unistr2(&r_l->uni_dns_dom_name, dns_name, UNI_FLAGS_NONE); init_uni_hdr(&r_l->hdr_dns_dom_name, &r_l->uni_dns_dom_name); @@ -486,7 +486,7 @@ static void init_dns_dom_info(LSA_DNS_DOM_INFO *r_l, const char *nb_name, if (dom_guid) { memcpy(&r_l->dom_guid, dom_guid, sizeof(struct GUID)); } - + if (dom_sid) { r_l->ptr_dom_sid = 1; init_dom_sid2(&r_l->dom_sid, dom_sid); @@ -874,7 +874,7 @@ static NTSTATUS _lsa_lookup_sids_internal(pipes_struct *p, * RID as 8 bytes hex, in others it returns the full * SID. We (Jerry/VL) could not figure out which the * hard cases are, so leave it with the SID. */ - name->name = talloc_asprintf(p->mem_ctx, "%s", + name->name = talloc_asprintf(p->mem_ctx, "%s", sid_to_fstring(tmp, sids[i])); if (name->name == NULL) { @@ -942,7 +942,7 @@ NTSTATUS _lsa_lookup_sids(pipes_struct *p, r_u->status = _lsa_lookup_sids_internal(p, q_u->level, - num_sids, + num_sids, q_u->sids.sid, &ref, &names, @@ -991,7 +991,7 @@ NTSTATUS _lsa_lookup_sids2(pipes_struct *p, r_u->status = _lsa_lookup_sids_internal(p, q_u->level, - num_sids, + num_sids, q_u->sids.sid, &ref, &r_u->names, @@ -1032,7 +1032,7 @@ NTSTATUS _lsa_lookup_sids3(pipes_struct *p, r_u->status = _lsa_lookup_sids_internal(p, q_u->level, - num_sids, + num_sids, q_u->sids.sid, &ref, &r_u->names, @@ -1085,7 +1085,7 @@ NTSTATUS _lsa_lookup_names(pipes_struct *p,LSA_Q_LOOKUP_NAMES *q_u, LSA_R_LOOKUP num_entries = MAX_LOOKUP_SIDS; DEBUG(5,("_lsa_lookup_names: truncating name lookup list to %d\n", num_entries)); } - + flags = lsa_lookup_level_to_flags(q_u->lookup_level); ref = TALLOC_ZERO_P(p->mem_ctx, DOM_R_REF); @@ -1230,7 +1230,7 @@ NTSTATUS _lsa_lookup_names3(pipes_struct *p, LSA_Q_LOOKUP_NAMES3 *q_u, LSA_R_LOO num_entries = MAX_LOOKUP_SIDS; DEBUG(5,("_lsa_lookup_names3: truncating name lookup list to %d\n", num_entries)); } - + /* Probably the lookup_level is some sort of bitmask. */ if (q_u->lookup_level == 1) { flags = LOOKUP_NAME_ALL; @@ -1297,7 +1297,7 @@ NTSTATUS _lsa_lookup_names4(pipes_struct *p, LSA_Q_LOOKUP_NAMES4 *q_u, LSA_R_LOO num_entries = MAX_LOOKUP_SIDS; DEBUG(5,("_lsa_lookup_names4: truncating name lookup list to %d\n", num_entries)); } - + /* Probably the lookup_level is some sort of bitmask. */ if (q_u->lookup_level == 1) { flags = LOOKUP_NAME_ALL; @@ -1650,17 +1650,17 @@ NTSTATUS _lsa_CreateAccount(pipes_struct *p, if (!(handle->access & POLICY_GET_PRIVATE_INFORMATION)) return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; - /* check to see if the pipe_user is a Domain Admin since + /* check to see if the pipe_user is a Domain Admin since account_pol.tdb was already opened as root, this is all we have */ - + if ( !nt_token_check_domain_rid( p->pipe_user.nt_user_token, DOMAIN_GROUP_RID_ADMINS ) ) return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; - + if ( is_privileged_sid( r->in.sid ) ) return NT_STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_COLLISION; /* associate the user/group SID with the (unique) handle. */ - + if ((info = SMB_MALLOC_P(struct lsa_info)) == NULL) return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; @@ -1807,7 +1807,7 @@ NTSTATUS _lsa_GetSystemAccessAccount(pipes_struct *p, 0x02 -> Access this computer from network 0x04 -> Log on as a batch job 0x10 -> Log on as a service - + they can be ORed together */ @@ -1830,9 +1830,9 @@ NTSTATUS _lsa_SetSystemAccessAccount(pipes_struct *p, if (!find_policy_by_hnd(p, r->in.handle, (void **)(void *)&info)) return NT_STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE; - /* check to see if the pipe_user is a Domain Admin since + /* check to see if the pipe_user is a Domain Admin since account_pol.tdb was already opened as root, this is all we have */ - + if ( !nt_token_check_domain_rid( p->pipe_user.nt_user_token, DOMAIN_GROUP_RID_ADMINS ) ) return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; @@ -1855,11 +1855,11 @@ NTSTATUS _lsa_addprivs(pipes_struct *p, LSA_Q_ADDPRIVS *q_u, LSA_R_ADDPRIVS *r_u /* find the connection policy handle. */ if (!find_policy_by_hnd(p, &q_u->pol, (void **)(void *)&info)) return NT_STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE; - - /* check to see if the pipe_user is root or a Domain Admin since + + /* check to see if the pipe_user is root or a Domain Admin since account_pol.tdb was already opened as root, this is all we have */ - - if ( p->pipe_user.ut.uid != sec_initial_uid() + + if ( p->pipe_user.ut.uid != sec_initial_uid() && !nt_token_check_domain_rid( p->pipe_user.nt_user_token, DOMAIN_GROUP_RID_ADMINS ) ) { return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; @@ -1895,11 +1895,11 @@ NTSTATUS _lsa_removeprivs(pipes_struct *p, LSA_Q_REMOVEPRIVS *q_u, LSA_R_REMOVEP if (!find_policy_by_hnd(p, &q_u->pol, (void **)(void *)&info)) return NT_STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE; - /* check to see if the pipe_user is root or a Domain Admin since + /* check to see if the pipe_user is root or a Domain Admin since account_pol.tdb was already opened as root, this is all we have */ - + if ( p->pipe_user.ut.uid != sec_initial_uid() - && !nt_token_check_domain_rid( p->pipe_user.nt_user_token, DOMAIN_GROUP_RID_ADMINS ) ) + && !nt_token_check_domain_rid( p->pipe_user.nt_user_token, DOMAIN_GROUP_RID_ADMINS ) ) { return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; } @@ -2020,7 +2020,7 @@ NTSTATUS _lsa_QuerySecurity(pipes_struct *p, default: return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO; } - init_dns_dom_info(&r_u->info.dns_dom_info, nb_name, dns_name, + init_dns_dom_info(&r_u->info.dns_dom_info, nb_name, dns_name, forest_name,&guid,sid); break; default: @@ -2048,33 +2048,33 @@ NTSTATUS _lsa_add_acct_rights(pipes_struct *p, LSA_Q_ADD_ACCT_RIGHTS *q_u, LSA_R DOM_SID sid; fstring privname; UNISTR4_ARRAY *uni_privnames = q_u->rights; - + /* find the connection policy handle. */ if (!find_policy_by_hnd(p, &q_u->pol, (void **)(void *)&info)) return NT_STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE; - - /* check to see if the pipe_user is a Domain Admin since + + /* check to see if the pipe_user is a Domain Admin since account_pol.tdb was already opened as root, this is all we have */ - + if ( p->pipe_user.ut.uid != sec_initial_uid() - && !nt_token_check_domain_rid( p->pipe_user.nt_user_token, DOMAIN_GROUP_RID_ADMINS ) ) + && !nt_token_check_domain_rid( p->pipe_user.nt_user_token, DOMAIN_GROUP_RID_ADMINS ) ) { return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; } /* according to an NT4 PDC, you can add privileges to SIDs even without call_lsa_create_account() first. And you can use any arbitrary SID. */ - + sid_copy( &sid, &q_u->sid.sid ); - + /* just a little sanity check */ - + if ( q_u->count != uni_privnames->count ) { DEBUG(0,("_lsa_add_acct_rights: count != number of UNISTR2 elements!\n")); - return NT_STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE; + return NT_STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE; } - + for ( i=0; i<q_u->count; i++ ) { UNISTR4 *uni4_str = &uni_privnames->strings[i]; @@ -2084,7 +2084,7 @@ NTSTATUS _lsa_add_acct_rights(pipes_struct *p, LSA_Q_ADD_ACCT_RIGHTS *q_u, LSA_R continue; rpcstr_pull( privname, uni4_str->string->buffer, sizeof(privname), -1, STR_TERMINATE ); - + if ( !grant_privilege_by_name( &sid, privname ) ) { DEBUG(2,("_lsa_add_acct_rights: Failed to add privilege [%s]\n", privname )); return NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_PRIVILEGE; @@ -2104,15 +2104,15 @@ NTSTATUS _lsa_remove_acct_rights(pipes_struct *p, LSA_Q_REMOVE_ACCT_RIGHTS *q_u, DOM_SID sid; fstring privname; UNISTR4_ARRAY *uni_privnames = q_u->rights; - + /* find the connection policy handle. */ if (!find_policy_by_hnd(p, &q_u->pol, (void **)(void *)&info)) return NT_STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE; - - /* check to see if the pipe_user is a Domain Admin since + + /* check to see if the pipe_user is a Domain Admin since account_pol.tdb was already opened as root, this is all we have */ - + if ( p->pipe_user.ut.uid != sec_initial_uid() && !nt_token_check_domain_rid( p->pipe_user.nt_user_token, DOMAIN_GROUP_RID_ADMINS ) ) { @@ -2122,19 +2122,19 @@ NTSTATUS _lsa_remove_acct_rights(pipes_struct *p, LSA_Q_REMOVE_ACCT_RIGHTS *q_u, sid_copy( &sid, &q_u->sid.sid ); if ( q_u->removeall ) { - if ( !revoke_all_privileges( &sid ) ) + if ( !revoke_all_privileges( &sid ) ) return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; - + return NT_STATUS_OK; } - + /* just a little sanity check */ - + if ( q_u->count != uni_privnames->count ) { DEBUG(0,("_lsa_add_acct_rights: count != number of UNISTR2 elements!\n")); - return NT_STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE; + return NT_STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE; } - + for ( i=0; i<q_u->count; i++ ) { UNISTR4 *uni4_str = &uni_privnames->strings[i]; @@ -2144,7 +2144,7 @@ NTSTATUS _lsa_remove_acct_rights(pipes_struct *p, LSA_Q_REMOVE_ACCT_RIGHTS *q_u, continue; rpcstr_pull( privname, uni4_str->string->buffer, sizeof(privname), -1, STR_TERMINATE ); - + if ( !revoke_privilege_by_name( &sid, privname ) ) { DEBUG(2,("_lsa_remove_acct_rights: Failed to revoke privilege [%s]\n", privname )); return NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_PRIVILEGE; @@ -2164,18 +2164,18 @@ NTSTATUS _lsa_enum_acct_rights(pipes_struct *p, LSA_Q_ENUM_ACCT_RIGHTS *q_u, LSA DOM_SID sid; PRIVILEGE_SET privileges; SE_PRIV mask; - + /* find the connection policy handle. */ - + if (!find_policy_by_hnd(p, &q_u->pol, (void **)(void *)&info)) return NT_STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE; - + /* according to an NT4 PDC, you can add privileges to SIDs even without call_lsa_create_account() first. And you can use any arbitrary SID. */ - + sid_copy( &sid, &q_u->sid.sid ); - + if ( !get_privileges_for_sids( &mask, &sid, 1 ) ) return NT_STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND; @@ -2188,7 +2188,7 @@ NTSTATUS _lsa_enum_acct_rights(pipes_struct *p, LSA_Q_ENUM_ACCT_RIGHTS *q_u, LSA r_u->status = init_r_enum_acct_rights( r_u, &privileges ); } - else + else r_u->status = NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_PRIVILEGE; privilege_set_free( &privileges ); @@ -2206,14 +2206,14 @@ NTSTATUS _lsa_lookup_priv_value(pipes_struct *p, LSA_Q_LOOKUP_PRIV_VALUE *q_u, L fstring name; LUID_ATTR priv_luid; SE_PRIV mask; - + /* find the connection policy handle. */ - + if (!find_policy_by_hnd(p, &q_u->pol, (void **)(void *)&info)) return NT_STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE; - + unistr2_to_ascii(name, &q_u->privname.unistring, sizeof(name)); - + DEBUG(10,("_lsa_lookup_priv_value: name = %s\n", name)); if ( !se_priv_from_name( name, &mask ) ) @@ -2223,7 +2223,7 @@ NTSTATUS _lsa_lookup_priv_value(pipes_struct *p, LSA_Q_LOOKUP_PRIV_VALUE *q_u, L r_u->luid.low = priv_luid.luid.low; r_u->luid.high = priv_luid.luid.high; - + return NT_STATUS_OK; } @@ -2233,7 +2233,7 @@ NTSTATUS _lsa_lookup_priv_value(pipes_struct *p, LSA_Q_LOOKUP_PRIV_VALUE *q_u, L * From here on the server routines are just dummy ones to make smbd link with * librpc/gen_ndr/srv_lsa.c. These routines are actually never called, we are * pulling the server stubs across one by one. - */ + */ NTSTATUS _lsa_Delete(pipes_struct *p, struct lsa_Delete *r) { |