Changes all over the shop, but all towards:

 - NTLM2 support in the server
 - KEY_EXCH support in the server
 - variable length session keys.

In detail:

 - NTLM2 is an extension of NTLMv1, that is compatible with existing
domain controllers (unlike NTLMv2, which requires a DC upgrade).

 * This is known as 'NTLMv2 session security' *

(This is not yet implemented on the RPC pipes however, so there may
well still be issues for PDC setups, particuarly around password
changes.  We do not fully understand the sign/seal implications of
NTLM2 on RPC pipes.)

This requires modifications to our authentication subsystem, as we
must handle the 'challege' input into the challenge-response algorithm
being changed.  This also needs to be turned off for
'security=server', which does not support this.

- KEY_EXCH is another 'security' mechanism, whereby the session key
actually used by the server is sent by the client, rather than being
the shared-secret directly or indirectly.

- As both these methods change the session key, the auth subsystem
needed to be changed, to 'override' session keys provided by the
backend.

- There has also been a major overhaul of the NTLMSSP subsystem, to merge the 'client' and 'server' functions, so they both operate on a single structure.  This should help the SPNEGO implementation.

- The 'names blob' in NTLMSSP is always in unicode - never in ascii.
Don't make an ascii version ever.

- The other big change is to allow variable length session keys.  We
have always assumed that session keys are 16 bytes long - and padded
to this length if shorter.  However, Kerberos session keys are 8 bytes
long, when the krb5 login uses DES.

 * This fix allows SMB signging on machines not yet running MIT KRB5 1.3.1. *

- Add better DEBUG() messages to ntlm_auth, warning administrators of
misconfigurations that prevent access to the privileged pipe.  This
should help reduce some of the 'it just doesn't work' issues.

- Fix data_blob_talloc() to behave the same way data_blob() does when
passed a NULL data pointer.  (just allocate)


REMEMBER to make clean after this commit - I have changed plenty of data structures...
(This used to be commit f3bbc87b0dac63426cda6fac7a295d3aad810ecc)

4 files changed, 42 insertions, 13 deletions

diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/srv_netlog_nt.c b/source3/rpc_server/srv_netlog_nt.c
index e6d005b157..e8bc6345de 100644
--- a/source3/rpc_server/srv_netlog_nt.c
+++ b/source3/rpc_server/srv_netlog_nt.c
@@ -683,7 +683,8 @@ NTSTATUS _net_sam_logon(pipes_struct *p, NET_Q_SAM_LOGON *q_u, NET_R_SAM_LOGON *
 		pstring my_name;
 		fstring user_sid_string;
 		fstring group_sid_string;
-		uchar user_sess_key[16];
+		uchar nt_session_key[16];
+		uchar lm_session_key[16];
 		uchar netlogon_sess_key[16];
 
 		sampw = server_info->sam_account;
@@ -718,10 +719,18 @@ NTSTATUS _net_sam_logon(pipes_struct *p, NET_Q_SAM_LOGON *q_u, NET_R_SAM_LOGON *
 
 		ZERO_STRUCT(netlogon_sess_key);
 		memcpy(netlogon_sess_key, p->dc.sess_key, 8);
-		memcpy(user_sess_key, server_info->session_key, sizeof(user_sess_key));
-		SamOEMhash(user_sess_key, netlogon_sess_key, 16);
+		if (server_info->nt_session_key.length) {
+			memcpy(nt_session_key, server_info->nt_session_key.data, 
+			       MIN(sizeof(nt_session_key), server_info->nt_session_key.length));
+			SamOEMhash(nt_session_key, netlogon_sess_key, 16);
+		}
+		if (server_info->lm_session_key.length) {
+			memcpy(lm_session_key, server_info->lm_session_key.data, 
+			       MIN(sizeof(lm_session_key), server_info->lm_session_key.length));
+			SamOEMhash(lm_session_key, netlogon_sess_key, 16);
+		}
 		ZERO_STRUCT(netlogon_sess_key);
-
+		
 		init_net_user_info3(p->mem_ctx, usr_info, 
 				    user_rid,
 				    group_rid,   
@@ -743,14 +752,16 @@ NTSTATUS _net_sam_logon(pipes_struct *p, NET_Q_SAM_LOGON *q_u, NET_R_SAM_LOGON *
 				    num_gids,    /* uint32 num_groups */
 				    gids    , /* DOM_GID *gids */
 				    0x20    , /* uint32 user_flgs (?) */
-				    user_sess_key,
+				    server_info->nt_session_key.length ? nt_session_key : NULL,
+				    server_info->lm_session_key.length ? lm_session_key : NULL,
 				    my_name     , /* char *logon_srv */
 				    pdb_get_domain(sampw),
 				    &domain_sid,     /* DOM_SID *dom_sid */  
 				    /* Should be users domain sid, not servers - for trusted domains */
 				  
 				    NULL); /* char *other_sids */
-		ZERO_STRUCT(user_sess_key);
+		ZERO_STRUCT(nt_session_key);
+		ZERO_STRUCT(lm_session_key);
 	}
 	free_server_info(&server_info);
 	return status;
diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
index 96261c665f..fa24efe589 100644
--- a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
+++ b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
@@ -420,9 +420,15 @@ failed authentication on named pipe %s.\n", domain, user_name, wks, p->name ));
 	 * Set up the sign/seal data.
 	 */
 
-	{
+	if (server_info->lm_session_key.length != 16) {
+		DEBUG(1,("api_pipe_ntlmssp_verify: User [%s]\\[%s] from machine %s \
+succeeded authentication on named pipe %s, but session key was of incorrect length [%u].\n", 
+			 domain, user_name, wks, p->name, server_info->lm_session_key.length));
+		free_server_info(&server_info);
+		return False;
+	} else {
 		uchar p24[24];
-		NTLMSSPOWFencrypt(server_info->first_8_lm_hash, lm_owf, p24);
+		NTLMSSPOWFencrypt(server_info->lm_session_key.data, lm_owf, p24);
 		{
 			unsigned char j = 0;
 			int ind;
@@ -468,7 +474,7 @@ failed authentication on named pipe %s.\n", domain, user_name, wks, p->name ));
 	 * Store the UNIX credential data (uid/gid pair) in the pipe structure.
 	 */
 
-	memcpy(p->session_key, server_info->session_key, sizeof(p->session_key));
+	p->session_key = data_blob(server_info->lm_session_key.data, server_info->lm_session_key.length);
 
 	p->pipe_user.uid = server_info->uid;
 	p->pipe_user.gid = server_info->gid;
diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe_hnd.c b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe_hnd.c
index 57e45d477f..a9fd9ec652 100644
--- a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe_hnd.c
+++ b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe_hnd.c
@@ -342,7 +342,7 @@ static void *make_internal_rpc_pipe_p(char *pipe_name,
 	
 	/* Store the session key and NT_TOKEN */
 	if (vuser) {
-		memcpy(p->session_key, vuser->session_key, sizeof(p->session_key));
+		p->session_key = data_blob(vuser->session_key.data, vuser->session_key.length);
 		p->pipe_user.nt_user_token = dup_nt_token(vuser->nt_user_token);
 	}
 
diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/srv_samr_nt.c b/source3/rpc_server/srv_samr_nt.c
index 1cfa8b2853..1debf90d23 100644
--- a/source3/rpc_server/srv_samr_nt.c
+++ b/source3/rpc_server/srv_samr_nt.c
@@ -2953,7 +2953,13 @@ NTSTATUS _samr_set_userinfo(pipes_struct *p, SAMR_Q_SET_USERINFO *q_u, SAMR_R_SE
 			break;
 
 		case 24:
-			SamOEMhash(ctr->info.id24->pass, p->session_key, 516);
+			if (p->session_key.length != 16) {
+				/* we may have no session key at all, 
+				   and we don't know how to do the SamOEMhash 
+				   for length != 16 */
+				return NT_STATUS_NO_USER_SESSION_KEY;
+			}
+			SamOEMhash(ctr->info.id24->pass, p->session_key.data, 516);
 
 			dump_data(100, (char *)ctr->info.id24->pass, 516);
 
@@ -2971,7 +2977,10 @@ NTSTATUS _samr_set_userinfo(pipes_struct *p, SAMR_Q_SET_USERINFO *q_u, SAMR_R_SE
 			 * info level and W2K SP2 drops down to level 23... JRA.
 			 */
 
-			SamOEMhash(ctr->info.id25->pass, p->session_key, 532);
+			if (p->session_key.length != 16) {
+				return NT_STATUS_NO_USER_SESSION_KEY;
+			}
+			SamOEMhash(ctr->info.id25->pass, p->session_key.data, 532);
 
 			dump_data(100, (char *)ctr->info.id25->pass, 532);
 
@@ -2982,7 +2991,10 @@ NTSTATUS _samr_set_userinfo(pipes_struct *p, SAMR_Q_SET_USERINFO *q_u, SAMR_R_SE
 			return NT_STATUS_INVALID_INFO_CLASS;
 
 		case 23:
-			SamOEMhash(ctr->info.id23->pass, p->session_key, 516);
+			if (p->session_key.length != 16) {
+				return NT_STATUS_NO_USER_SESSION_KEY;
+			}
+			SamOEMhash(ctr->info.id23->pass, p->session_key.data, 516);
 
 			dump_data(100, (char *)ctr->info.id23->pass, 516);