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authorAndrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>2003-11-22 13:29:02 +0000
committerAndrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>2003-11-22 13:29:02 +0000
commit354c0fbc91c49f71c4760f88c0fb9e7fba11413c (patch)
tree5874890e27f569ae0ccb9e02c81bc88f6db0ab73 /source3/smbd/password.c
parenta2b82b408b528a99037a390aabad867c25604836 (diff)
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(merge from 3.0)
Changes all over the shop, but all towards: - NTLM2 support in the server - KEY_EXCH support in the server - variable length session keys. In detail: - NTLM2 is an extension of NTLMv1, that is compatible with existing domain controllers (unlike NTLMv2, which requires a DC upgrade). * This is known as 'NTLMv2 session security' * (This is not yet implemented on the RPC pipes however, so there may well still be issues for PDC setups, particuarly around password changes. We do not fully understand the sign/seal implications of NTLM2 on RPC pipes.) This requires modifications to our authentication subsystem, as we must handle the 'challege' input into the challenge-response algorithm being changed. This also needs to be turned off for 'security=server', which does not support this. - KEY_EXCH is another 'security' mechanism, whereby the session key actually used by the server is sent by the client, rather than being the shared-secret directly or indirectly. - As both these methods change the session key, the auth subsystem needed to be changed, to 'override' session keys provided by the backend. - There has also been a major overhaul of the NTLMSSP subsystem, to merge the 'client' and 'server' functions, so they both operate on a single structure. This should help the SPNEGO implementation. - The 'names blob' in NTLMSSP is always in unicode - never in ascii. Don't make an ascii version ever. - The other big change is to allow variable length session keys. We have always assumed that session keys are 16 bytes long - and padded to this length if shorter. However, Kerberos session keys are 8 bytes long, when the krb5 login uses DES. * This fix allows SMB signging on machines not yet running MIT KRB5 1.3.1. * - Add better DEBUG() messages to ntlm_auth, warning administrators of misconfigurations that prevent access to the privileged pipe. This should help reduce some of the 'it just doesn't work' issues. - Fix data_blob_talloc() to behave the same way data_blob() does when passed a NULL data pointer. (just allocate) REMEMBER to make clean after this commit - I have changed plenty of data structures... Andrew Bartlett (This used to be commit 57a895aaabacc0c9147344d097d333793b77c947)
Diffstat (limited to 'source3/smbd/password.c')
-rw-r--r--source3/smbd/password.c23
1 files changed, 19 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/source3/smbd/password.c b/source3/smbd/password.c
index 958ed663e6..494d9ecd43 100644
--- a/source3/smbd/password.c
+++ b/source3/smbd/password.c
@@ -77,6 +77,8 @@ void invalidate_vuid(uint16 vuid)
free_server_info(&vuser->server_info);
+ data_blob_free(&vuser->session_key);
+
DLIST_REMOVE(validated_users, vuser);
/* clear the vuid from the 'cache' on each connection, and
@@ -109,25 +111,36 @@ void invalidate_all_vuids(void)
* @param server_info The token returned from the authentication process.
* (now 'owned' by register_vuid)
*
+ * @param session_key The User session key for the login session (now also 'owned' by register_vuid)
+ *
+ * @param respose_blob The NT challenge-response, if available. (May be freed after this call)
+ *
+ * @param smb_name The untranslated name of the user
+ *
* @return Newly allocated vuid, biased by an offset. (This allows us to
* tell random client vuid's (normally zero) from valid vuids.)
*
*/
-int register_vuid(auth_serversupplied_info *server_info, DATA_BLOB response_blob, const char *smb_name)
+int register_vuid(auth_serversupplied_info *server_info, DATA_BLOB session_key, DATA_BLOB response_blob, const char *smb_name)
{
user_struct *vuser = NULL;
/* Ensure no vuid gets registered in share level security. */
- if(lp_security() == SEC_SHARE)
+ if(lp_security() == SEC_SHARE) {
+ data_blob_free(&session_key);
return UID_FIELD_INVALID;
+ }
/* Limit allowed vuids to 16bits - VUID_OFFSET. */
- if (num_validated_vuids >= 0xFFFF-VUID_OFFSET)
+ if (num_validated_vuids >= 0xFFFF-VUID_OFFSET) {
+ data_blob_free(&session_key);
return UID_FIELD_INVALID;
+ }
if((vuser = (user_struct *)malloc( sizeof(user_struct) )) == NULL) {
DEBUG(0,("Failed to malloc users struct!\n"));
+ data_blob_free(&session_key);
return UID_FIELD_INVALID;
}
@@ -156,6 +169,7 @@ int register_vuid(auth_serversupplied_info *server_info, DATA_BLOB response_blob
if (vuser->n_groups) {
if (!(vuser->groups = memdup(server_info->groups, sizeof(gid_t) * vuser->n_groups))) {
DEBUG(0,("register_vuid: failed to memdup vuser->groups\n"));
+ data_blob_free(&session_key);
free(vuser);
free_server_info(&server_info);
return UID_FIELD_INVALID;
@@ -197,7 +211,7 @@ int register_vuid(auth_serversupplied_info *server_info, DATA_BLOB response_blob
}
}
- memcpy(vuser->session_key, server_info->session_key, sizeof(vuser->session_key));
+ vuser->session_key = session_key;
DEBUG(10,("register_vuid: (%u,%u) %s %s %s guest=%d\n",
(unsigned int)vuser->uid,
@@ -211,6 +225,7 @@ int register_vuid(auth_serversupplied_info *server_info, DATA_BLOB response_blob
} else {
DEBUG(1, ("server_info does not contain a user_token - cannot continue\n"));
free_server_info(&server_info);
+ data_blob_free(&session_key);
SAFE_FREE(vuser->homedir);
SAFE_FREE(vuser->unix_homedir);
SAFE_FREE(vuser->logon_script);