Changes all over the shop, but all towards:

 - NTLM2 support in the server
 - KEY_EXCH support in the server
 - variable length session keys.

In detail:

 - NTLM2 is an extension of NTLMv1, that is compatible with existing
domain controllers (unlike NTLMv2, which requires a DC upgrade).

 * This is known as 'NTLMv2 session security' *

(This is not yet implemented on the RPC pipes however, so there may
well still be issues for PDC setups, particuarly around password
changes.  We do not fully understand the sign/seal implications of
NTLM2 on RPC pipes.)

This requires modifications to our authentication subsystem, as we
must handle the 'challege' input into the challenge-response algorithm
being changed.  This also needs to be turned off for
'security=server', which does not support this.

- KEY_EXCH is another 'security' mechanism, whereby the session key
actually used by the server is sent by the client, rather than being
the shared-secret directly or indirectly.

- As both these methods change the session key, the auth subsystem
needed to be changed, to 'override' session keys provided by the
backend.

- There has also been a major overhaul of the NTLMSSP subsystem, to merge the 'client' and 'server' functions, so they both operate on a single structure.  This should help the SPNEGO implementation.

- The 'names blob' in NTLMSSP is always in unicode - never in ascii.
Don't make an ascii version ever.

- The other big change is to allow variable length session keys.  We
have always assumed that session keys are 16 bytes long - and padded
to this length if shorter.  However, Kerberos session keys are 8 bytes
long, when the krb5 login uses DES.

 * This fix allows SMB signging on machines not yet running MIT KRB5 1.3.1. *

- Add better DEBUG() messages to ntlm_auth, warning administrators of
misconfigurations that prevent access to the privileged pipe.  This
should help reduce some of the 'it just doesn't work' issues.

- Fix data_blob_talloc() to behave the same way data_blob() does when
passed a NULL data pointer.  (just allocate)


REMEMBER to make clean after this commit - I have changed plenty of data structures...
(This used to be commit f3bbc87b0dac63426cda6fac7a295d3aad810ecc)

1 files changed, 19 insertions, 4 deletions

diff --git a/source3/smbd/password.c b/source3/smbd/password.c
index 958ed663e6..494d9ecd43 100644
--- a/source3/smbd/password.c
+++ b/source3/smbd/password.c
@@ -77,6 +77,8 @@ void invalidate_vuid(uint16 vuid)
 
 	free_server_info(&vuser->server_info);
 
+	data_blob_free(&vuser->session_key);
+
 	DLIST_REMOVE(validated_users, vuser);
 
 	/* clear the vuid from the 'cache' on each connection, and
@@ -109,25 +111,36 @@ void invalidate_all_vuids(void)
  *  @param server_info The token returned from the authentication process. 
  *   (now 'owned' by register_vuid)
  *
+ *  @param session_key The User session key for the login session (now also 'owned' by register_vuid)
+ *
+ *  @param respose_blob The NT challenge-response, if available.  (May be freed after this call)
+ *
+ *  @param smb_name The untranslated name of the user
+ *
  *  @return Newly allocated vuid, biased by an offset. (This allows us to
  *   tell random client vuid's (normally zero) from valid vuids.)
  *
  */
 
-int register_vuid(auth_serversupplied_info *server_info, DATA_BLOB response_blob, const char *smb_name)
+int register_vuid(auth_serversupplied_info *server_info, DATA_BLOB session_key, DATA_BLOB response_blob, const char *smb_name)
 {
 	user_struct *vuser = NULL;
 
 	/* Ensure no vuid gets registered in share level security. */
-	if(lp_security() == SEC_SHARE)
+	if(lp_security() == SEC_SHARE) {
+		data_blob_free(&session_key);
 		return UID_FIELD_INVALID;
+	}
 
 	/* Limit allowed vuids to 16bits - VUID_OFFSET. */
-	if (num_validated_vuids >= 0xFFFF-VUID_OFFSET)
+	if (num_validated_vuids >= 0xFFFF-VUID_OFFSET) {
+		data_blob_free(&session_key);
 		return UID_FIELD_INVALID;
+	}
 
 	if((vuser = (user_struct *)malloc( sizeof(user_struct) )) == NULL) {
 		DEBUG(0,("Failed to malloc users struct!\n"));
+		data_blob_free(&session_key);
 		return UID_FIELD_INVALID;
 	}
 
@@ -156,6 +169,7 @@ int register_vuid(auth_serversupplied_info *server_info, DATA_BLOB response_blob
 	if (vuser->n_groups) {
 		if (!(vuser->groups = memdup(server_info->groups, sizeof(gid_t) * vuser->n_groups))) {
 			DEBUG(0,("register_vuid: failed to memdup vuser->groups\n"));
+			data_blob_free(&session_key);
 			free(vuser);
 			free_server_info(&server_info);
 			return UID_FIELD_INVALID;
@@ -197,7 +211,7 @@ int register_vuid(auth_serversupplied_info *server_info, DATA_BLOB response_blob
 		}
 	}
 
-	memcpy(vuser->session_key, server_info->session_key, sizeof(vuser->session_key));
+	vuser->session_key = session_key;
 
 	DEBUG(10,("register_vuid: (%u,%u) %s %s %s guest=%d\n", 
 		  (unsigned int)vuser->uid, 
@@ -211,6 +225,7 @@ int register_vuid(auth_serversupplied_info *server_info, DATA_BLOB response_blob
 	} else {
 		DEBUG(1, ("server_info does not contain a user_token - cannot continue\n"));
 		free_server_info(&server_info);
+		data_blob_free(&session_key);
 		SAFE_FREE(vuser->homedir);
 		SAFE_FREE(vuser->unix_homedir);
 		SAFE_FREE(vuser->logon_script);