Changes all over the shop, but all towards:

 - NTLM2 support in the server
 - KEY_EXCH support in the server
 - variable length session keys.

In detail:

 - NTLM2 is an extension of NTLMv1, that is compatible with existing
domain controllers (unlike NTLMv2, which requires a DC upgrade).

 * This is known as 'NTLMv2 session security' *

(This is not yet implemented on the RPC pipes however, so there may
well still be issues for PDC setups, particuarly around password
changes.  We do not fully understand the sign/seal implications of
NTLM2 on RPC pipes.)

This requires modifications to our authentication subsystem, as we
must handle the 'challege' input into the challenge-response algorithm
being changed.  This also needs to be turned off for
'security=server', which does not support this.

- KEY_EXCH is another 'security' mechanism, whereby the session key
actually used by the server is sent by the client, rather than being
the shared-secret directly or indirectly.

- As both these methods change the session key, the auth subsystem
needed to be changed, to 'override' session keys provided by the
backend.

- There has also been a major overhaul of the NTLMSSP subsystem, to merge the 'client' and 'server' functions, so they both operate on a single structure.  This should help the SPNEGO implementation.

- The 'names blob' in NTLMSSP is always in unicode - never in ascii.
Don't make an ascii version ever.

- The other big change is to allow variable length session keys.  We
have always assumed that session keys are 16 bytes long - and padded
to this length if shorter.  However, Kerberos session keys are 8 bytes
long, when the krb5 login uses DES.

 * This fix allows SMB signging on machines not yet running MIT KRB5 1.3.1. *

- Add better DEBUG() messages to ntlm_auth, warning administrators of
misconfigurations that prevent access to the privileged pipe.  This
should help reduce some of the 'it just doesn't work' issues.

- Fix data_blob_talloc() to behave the same way data_blob() does when
passed a NULL data pointer.  (just allocate)


REMEMBER to make clean after this commit - I have changed plenty of data structures...
(This used to be commit f3bbc87b0dac63426cda6fac7a295d3aad810ecc)

1 files changed, 21 insertions, 11 deletions

diff --git a/source3/smbd/sesssetup.c b/source3/smbd/sesssetup.c
index 314ffbb4a9..64c25db2ab 100644
--- a/source3/smbd/sesssetup.c
+++ b/source3/smbd/sesssetup.c
@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ static int reply_spnego_kerberos(connection_struct *conn,
 	DATA_BLOB auth_data;
 	DATA_BLOB ap_rep, ap_rep_wrapped, response;
 	auth_serversupplied_info *server_info = NULL;
-	uint8 session_key[16];
+	DATA_BLOB session_key;
 	uint8 tok_id[2];
 	BOOL foreign = False;
 	DATA_BLOB nullblob = data_blob(NULL, 0);
@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ static int reply_spnego_kerberos(connection_struct *conn,
 		return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
 	}
 
-	ret = ads_verify_ticket(lp_realm(), &ticket, &client, &auth_data, &ap_rep, session_key);
+	ret = ads_verify_ticket(lp_realm(), &ticket, &client, &auth_data, &ap_rep, &session_key);
 
 	data_blob_free(&ticket);
 
@@ -223,11 +223,8 @@ static int reply_spnego_kerberos(connection_struct *conn,
 		return ERROR_NT(ret);
 	}
 
-	/* Copy out the session key from the AP_REQ. */
-	memcpy(server_info->session_key, session_key, sizeof(session_key));
-
 	/* register_vuid keeps the server info */
-	sess_vuid = register_vuid(server_info, nullblob, user);
+	sess_vuid = register_vuid(server_info, session_key, nullblob, user);
 
 	free(user);
 
@@ -297,9 +294,10 @@ static BOOL reply_spnego_ntlmssp(connection_struct *conn, char *inbuf, char *out
 	if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
 		int sess_vuid;
 		DATA_BLOB nullblob = data_blob(NULL, 0);
+		DATA_BLOB session_key = data_blob((*auth_ntlmssp_state)->ntlmssp_state->session_key.data, (*auth_ntlmssp_state)->ntlmssp_state->session_key.length);
 
 		/* register_vuid keeps the server info */
-		sess_vuid = register_vuid(server_info, nullblob, (*auth_ntlmssp_state)->ntlmssp_state->user);
+		sess_vuid = register_vuid(server_info, session_key, nullblob, (*auth_ntlmssp_state)->ntlmssp_state->user);
 		(*auth_ntlmssp_state)->server_info = NULL;
 
 		if (sess_vuid == -1) {
@@ -566,6 +564,8 @@ int reply_sesssetup_and_X(connection_struct *conn, char *inbuf,char *outbuf,
 	NTSTATUS nt_status;
 
 	BOOL doencrypt = global_encrypted_passwords_negotiated;
+
+	DATA_BLOB session_key;
 	
 	START_PROFILE(SMBsesssetupX);
 
@@ -766,18 +766,28 @@ int reply_sesssetup_and_X(connection_struct *conn, char *inbuf,char *outbuf,
 
 	free_user_info(&user_info);
 	
-	data_blob_free(&lm_resp);
-	data_blob_clear_free(&plaintext_password);
-	
 	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
 		nt_status = do_map_to_guest(nt_status, &server_info, user, domain);
 	}
 	
 	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
 		data_blob_free(&nt_resp);
+		data_blob_free(&lm_resp);
+		data_blob_clear_free(&plaintext_password);
 		return ERROR_NT(nt_status_squash(nt_status));
 	}
 
+	if (server_info->nt_session_key.data) {
+		session_key = data_blob(server_info->nt_session_key.data, server_info->nt_session_key.length);
+	} else if (server_info->lm_session_key.length >= 8 && lm_resp.length == 24) {
+		session_key = data_blob(NULL, 16);
+		SMBsesskeygen_lmv1(server_info->lm_session_key.data, lm_resp.data, 
+				   session_key.data);
+	}
+
+	data_blob_free(&lm_resp);
+	data_blob_clear_free(&plaintext_password);
+	
 	/* it's ok - setup a reply */
 	set_message(outbuf,3,0,True);
 	if (Protocol >= PROTOCOL_NT1) {
@@ -795,7 +805,7 @@ int reply_sesssetup_and_X(connection_struct *conn, char *inbuf,char *outbuf,
 	   to a uid can get through without a password, on the same VC */
 
 	/* register_vuid keeps the server info */
-	sess_vuid = register_vuid(server_info, nt_resp, sub_user);
+	sess_vuid = register_vuid(server_info, session_key, nt_resp, sub_user);
 	data_blob_free(&nt_resp);
 
 	if (sess_vuid == -1) {