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authorAndrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>2003-07-14 08:46:32 +0000
committerAndrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>2003-07-14 08:46:32 +0000
commit456f51bcbe04ccbb37a27b6e115a851cc134adcd (patch)
treea68c7158940ad47fa856f894c6634a26669ef692 /source3
parent379367dd7607514c17bc8ea8aa60212b1c6070a7 (diff)
downloadsamba-456f51bcbe04ccbb37a27b6e115a851cc134adcd.tar.gz
samba-456f51bcbe04ccbb37a27b6e115a851cc134adcd.tar.bz2
samba-456f51bcbe04ccbb37a27b6e115a851cc134adcd.zip
Jeremy requested that I get my NTLMSSP patch into CVS. He didn't request
the schannel code, but I've included that anyway. :-) This patch revives the client-side NTLMSSP support for RPC named pipes in Samba, and cleans up the client and server schannel code. The use of the new code is enabled by the 'sign', 'seal' and 'schannel' commands in rpcclient. The aim was to prove that our separate NTLMSSP client library actually implements NTLMSSP signing and sealing as per Microsoft's NTLMv1 implementation, in the hope that knowing this will assist us in correctly implementing NTLMSSP signing for SMB packets. (Still not yet functional) This patch replaces the NTLMSSP implementation in rpc_client/cli_pipe.c with calls to libsmb/ntlmssp.c. In the process, we have gained the ability to use the more secure NT password, and the ability to sign-only, instead of having to seal the pipe connection. (Previously we were limited to sealing, and could only use the LM-password derived key). Our new client-side NTLMSSP code also needed alteration to cope with our comparatively simple server-side implementation. A future step is to replace it with calls to the same NTLMSSP library. Also included in this patch is the schannel 'sign only' patch I submitted to the team earlier. While not enabled (and not functional, at this stage) the work in this patch makes the code paths *much* easier to follow. I have also included similar hooks in rpccleint to allow the use of schannel on *any* pipe. rpcclient now defaults to not using schannel (or any other extra per-pipe authenticiation) for any connection. The 'schannel' command enables schannel for all pipes until disabled. This code is also much more secure than the previous code, as changes to our cli_pipe routines ensure that the authentication footer cannot be removed by an attacker, and more error states are correctly handled. (The same needs to be done to our server) Andrew Bartlett (This used to be commit 5472ddc9eaf4e79c5b2e1c8ee8c7f190dc285f19)
Diffstat (limited to 'source3')
-rw-r--r--source3/include/client.h15
-rw-r--r--source3/include/ntlmssp.h5
-rw-r--r--source3/include/rpc_dce.h26
-rw-r--r--source3/lib/util.c11
-rw-r--r--source3/libsmb/cliconnect.c6
-rw-r--r--source3/libsmb/clientgen.c42
-rw-r--r--source3/libsmb/ntlmssp.c107
-rw-r--r--source3/libsmb/ntlmssp_parse.c75
-rw-r--r--source3/libsmb/ntlmssp_sign.c206
-rw-r--r--source3/libsmb/pwd_cache.c14
-rw-r--r--source3/libsmb/smbencrypt.c31
-rw-r--r--source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c1057
-rw-r--r--source3/rpc_parse/parse_prs.c270
-rw-r--r--source3/rpc_parse/parse_rpc.c26
-rw-r--r--source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c40
-rw-r--r--source3/rpcclient/rpcclient.c153
16 files changed, 1272 insertions, 812 deletions
diff --git a/source3/include/client.h b/source3/include/client.h
index d75effd7d0..f3f4ef109a 100644
--- a/source3/include/client.h
+++ b/source3/include/client.h
@@ -131,25 +131,30 @@ struct cli_state {
* Only used in NT domain calls.
*/
+ int pipe_idx; /* Index (into list of known pipes)
+ of the pipe we're talking to,
+ if any */
+
uint16 nt_pipe_fnum; /* Pipe handle. */
+ /* Secure pipe parameters */
+ int pipe_auth_flags;
+
uint16 saved_netlogon_pipe_fnum; /* The "first" pipe to get
the session key for the
schannel. */
struct netsec_auth_struct auth_info;
+ NTLMSSP_CLIENT_STATE *ntlmssp_pipe_state;
+
unsigned char sess_key[16]; /* Current session key. */
- unsigned char ntlmssp_hash[258]; /* ntlmssp data. */
- uint32 ntlmssp_cli_flgs; /* ntlmssp client flags */
- uint32 ntlmssp_srv_flgs; /* ntlmssp server flags */
- uint32 ntlmssp_seq_num; /* ntlmssp sequence number */
DOM_CRED clnt_cred; /* Client credential. */
fstring mach_acct; /* MYNAME$. */
fstring srv_name_slash; /* \\remote server. */
fstring clnt_name_slash; /* \\local client. */
uint16 max_xmit_frag;
uint16 max_recv_frag;
- uint32 ntlmssp_flags;
+
BOOL use_kerberos;
BOOL use_spnego;
diff --git a/source3/include/ntlmssp.h b/source3/include/ntlmssp.h
index 067b2a5880..562e4853cc 100644
--- a/source3/include/ntlmssp.h
+++ b/source3/include/ntlmssp.h
@@ -129,5 +129,10 @@ typedef struct ntlmssp_client_state
/* ntlmv1 */
unsigned char ntlmssp_hash[258];
+ /* it turns out that we don't always get the
+ response in at the time we want to process it.
+ Store it here, until we need it */
+ DATA_BLOB stored_response;
+
} NTLMSSP_CLIENT_STATE;
diff --git a/source3/include/rpc_dce.h b/source3/include/rpc_dce.h
index b99639d68d..dc82f45368 100644
--- a/source3/include/rpc_dce.h
+++ b/source3/include/rpc_dce.h
@@ -51,17 +51,32 @@ enum RPC_PKT_TYPE
/* NTLMSSP signature version */
#define NTLMSSP_SIGN_VERSION 0x01
-/* NTLMSSP auth type and level. */
+/* NTLMSSP auth type */
#define NTLMSSP_AUTH_TYPE 0xa
-#define NTLMSSP_AUTH_LEVEL 0x6
+
+/* DCE-RPC standard identifiers to indicate
+ signing or sealing of an RPC pipe */
+#define RPC_PIPE_AUTH_SIGN_LEVEL 0x5
+#define RPC_PIPE_AUTH_SEAL_LEVEL 0x6
/* Netlogon schannel auth type and level */
#define NETSEC_AUTH_TYPE 0x44
-#define NETSEC_AUTH_LEVEL 0x6
#define NETSEC_SIGNATURE { 0x77, 0x00, 0x7a, 0x00, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00 }
#define RPC_AUTH_NETSEC_CHK_LEN 0x20
#define NETLOGON_NEG_SCHANNEL 0x40000000
+enum netsec_direction
+{
+ SENDER_IS_INITIATOR,
+ SENDER_IS_ACCEPTOR
+};
+
+/* Internal Flags to indicate what type of authentication on the pipe */
+#define AUTH_PIPE_SIGN 0x0001
+#define AUTH_PIPE_SEAL 0x0002
+#define AUTH_PIPE_NTLMSSP 0x0004
+#define AUTH_PIPE_NETSEC 0x0008
+
/* Maximum PDU fragment size. */
#define MAX_PDU_FRAG_LEN 0x1630
/* #define MAX_PDU_FRAG_LEN 0x10b8 this is what w2k sets */
@@ -222,8 +237,8 @@ typedef struct rpc_auth_netsec_neg_info
typedef struct rpc_auth_netsec_chk_info
{
uint8 sig [8]; /* 77 00 7a 00 ff ff 00 00 */
- uint8 data1[8];
- uint8 data3[8]; /* verifier, seq num */
+ uint8 packet_digest[8]; /* checksum over the packet, MD5'ed with session key */
+ uint8 seq_num[8]; /* verifier, seq num */
uint8 data8[8]; /* random 8-byte nonce */
} RPC_AUTH_NETSEC_CHK;
@@ -350,5 +365,4 @@ typedef struct rpc_auth_ntlmssp_chk_info
#define RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_CHK_LEN 16
-
#endif /* _DCE_RPC_H */
diff --git a/source3/lib/util.c b/source3/lib/util.c
index 6af82f24e5..a7c939fe5a 100644
--- a/source3/lib/util.c
+++ b/source3/lib/util.c
@@ -1911,6 +1911,17 @@ void dump_data(int level, const char *buf1,int len)
}
}
+void dump_data_pw(const char *msg, const uchar * data, size_t len)
+{
+#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
+ DEBUG(11, ("%s", msg));
+ if (data != NULL && len > 0)
+ {
+ dump_data(11, data, len);
+ }
+#endif
+}
+
char *tab_depth(int depth)
{
static pstring spaces;
diff --git a/source3/libsmb/cliconnect.c b/source3/libsmb/cliconnect.c
index 18125e26c3..cdd80b7f0c 100644
--- a/source3/libsmb/cliconnect.c
+++ b/source3/libsmb/cliconnect.c
@@ -540,6 +540,12 @@ static BOOL cli_session_setup_ntlmssp(struct cli_state *cli, const char *user,
ntlmssp_state->use_ntlmv2 = lp_client_ntlmv2_auth();
+ if (cli->sign_info.negotiated_smb_signing
+ || cli->sign_info.mandetory_signing) {
+ ntlmssp_state->neg_flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN;
+ ntlmssp_state->neg_flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_ALWAYS_SIGN;
+ }
+
do {
nt_status = ntlmssp_client_update(ntlmssp_state,
blob_in, &blob_out);
diff --git a/source3/libsmb/clientgen.c b/source3/libsmb/clientgen.c
index 8d4e8a266c..93fa94c1db 100644
--- a/source3/libsmb/clientgen.c
+++ b/source3/libsmb/clientgen.c
@@ -203,12 +203,9 @@ void cli_init_creds(struct cli_state *cli, const struct ntuser_creds *usr)
fstrcpy(cli->domain , usr->domain);
fstrcpy(cli->user_name, usr->user_name);
memcpy(&cli->pwd, &usr->pwd, sizeof(usr->pwd));
- cli->ntlmssp_flags = usr->ntlmssp_flags;
- cli->ntlmssp_cli_flgs = usr != NULL ? usr->ntlmssp_flags : 0;
- DEBUG(10,("cli_init_creds: user %s domain %s flgs: %x\nntlmssp_cli_flgs:%x\n",
- cli->user_name, cli->domain,
- cli->ntlmssp_flags,cli->ntlmssp_cli_flgs));
+ DEBUG(10,("cli_init_creds: user %s domain %s\n",
+ cli->user_name, cli->domain));
}
/****************************************************************************
@@ -287,6 +284,8 @@ struct cli_state *cli_initialise(struct cli_state *cli)
cli->initialised = 1;
cli->allocated = alloced_cli;
+ cli->pipe_idx = -1;
+
return cli;
/* Clean up after malloc() error */
@@ -303,17 +302,50 @@ struct cli_state *cli_initialise(struct cli_state *cli)
}
/****************************************************************************
+close the session
+****************************************************************************/
+
+void cli_nt_session_close(struct cli_state *cli)
+{
+ if (cli->ntlmssp_pipe_state) {
+ ntlmssp_client_end(&cli->ntlmssp_pipe_state);
+ }
+
+ cli_close(cli, cli->nt_pipe_fnum);
+ cli->nt_pipe_fnum = 0;
+ cli->pipe_idx = -1;
+}
+
+/****************************************************************************
+close the NETLOGON session holding the session key for NETSEC
+****************************************************************************/
+
+void cli_nt_netlogon_netsec_session_close(struct cli_state *cli)
+{
+ if (cli->saved_netlogon_pipe_fnum != 0) {
+ cli_close(cli, cli->saved_netlogon_pipe_fnum);
+ cli->saved_netlogon_pipe_fnum = 0;
+ }
+}
+
+/****************************************************************************
Close a client connection and free the memory without destroying cli itself.
****************************************************************************/
void cli_close_connection(struct cli_state *cli)
{
+ cli_nt_session_close(cli);
+ cli_nt_netlogon_netsec_session_close(cli);
+
SAFE_FREE(cli->outbuf);
SAFE_FREE(cli->inbuf);
cli_free_signing_context(cli);
data_blob_free(&cli->secblob);
+ if (cli->ntlmssp_pipe_state)
+ ntlmssp_client_end(&cli->ntlmssp_pipe_state);
+
if (cli->mem_ctx) {
talloc_destroy(cli->mem_ctx);
cli->mem_ctx = NULL;
diff --git a/source3/libsmb/ntlmssp.c b/source3/libsmb/ntlmssp.c
index 4dc9d42659..66dc6e08eb 100644
--- a/source3/libsmb/ntlmssp.c
+++ b/source3/libsmb/ntlmssp.c
@@ -409,6 +409,10 @@ static NTSTATUS ntlmssp_client_initial(struct ntlmssp_client_state *ntlmssp_stat
ntlmssp_state->neg_flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_UNICODE;
}
+ if (ntlmssp_state->use_ntlmv2) {
+ ntlmssp_state->neg_flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM2;
+ }
+
/* generate the ntlmssp negotiate packet */
msrpc_gen(next_request, "CddAA",
"NTLMSSP",
@@ -435,7 +439,7 @@ static NTSTATUS ntlmssp_client_challenge(struct ntlmssp_client_state *ntlmssp_st
uint32 chal_flags, ntlmssp_command, unkn1, unkn2;
DATA_BLOB server_domain_blob;
DATA_BLOB challenge_blob;
- DATA_BLOB struct_blob;
+ DATA_BLOB struct_blob = data_blob(NULL, 0);
char *server_domain;
const char *chal_parse_string;
const char *auth_gen_string;
@@ -443,28 +447,48 @@ static NTSTATUS ntlmssp_client_challenge(struct ntlmssp_client_state *ntlmssp_st
DATA_BLOB nt_response = data_blob(NULL, 0);
DATA_BLOB session_key = data_blob(NULL, 0);
uint8 datagram_sess_key[16];
+ size_t datagram_sess_key_len;
+#if 0 /* until we know what flag to tigger it on */
generate_random_buffer(datagram_sess_key, sizeof(datagram_sess_key), False);
+ datagram_sess_key_len = sizeof(datagram_sess_key);
+#else
+ ZERO_STRUCT(datagram_sess_key);
+ datagram_sess_key_len = 0;
+#endif
if (!msrpc_parse(&reply, "CdBd",
"NTLMSSP",
&ntlmssp_command,
&server_domain_blob,
&chal_flags)) {
- DEBUG(0, ("Failed to parse the NTLMSSP Challenge\n"));
+ DEBUG(1, ("Failed to parse the NTLMSSP Challenge: (#1)\n"));
+ dump_data(2, reply.data, reply.length);
+
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
data_blob_free(&server_domain_blob);
+ DEBUG(3, ("Got challenge flags:\n"));
+ debug_ntlmssp_flags(chal_flags);
+
if (chal_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_UNICODE) {
- chal_parse_string = "CdUdbddB";
+ if (chal_flags & NTLMSSP_CHAL_TARGET_INFO) {
+ chal_parse_string = "CdUdbddB";
+ } else {
+ chal_parse_string = "CdUdbdd";
+ }
auth_gen_string = "CdBBUUUBd";
ntlmssp_state->unicode = True;
ntlmssp_state->neg_flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_UNICODE;
ntlmssp_state->neg_flags &= ~NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_OEM;
} else if (chal_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_OEM) {
- chal_parse_string = "CdAdbddB";
+ if (chal_flags & NTLMSSP_CHAL_TARGET_INFO) {
+ chal_parse_string = "CdAdbddB";
+ } else {
+ chal_parse_string = "CdAdbdd";
+ }
auth_gen_string = "CdBBAAABd";
ntlmssp_state->unicode = False;
ntlmssp_state->neg_flags &= ~NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_UNICODE;
@@ -473,6 +497,25 @@ static NTSTATUS ntlmssp_client_challenge(struct ntlmssp_client_state *ntlmssp_st
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
+ if (chal_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_LM_KEY && lp_client_lanman_auth()) {
+ /* server forcing us to use LM */
+ ntlmssp_state->neg_flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_LM_KEY;
+ ntlmssp_state->use_ntlmv2 = False;
+ } else {
+ ntlmssp_state->neg_flags &= ~NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_LM_KEY;
+ }
+
+ if (!(chal_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM2)) {
+ ntlmssp_state->neg_flags &= ~NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM2;
+ }
+
+ if (!(chal_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_128)) {
+ ntlmssp_state->neg_flags &= ~NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_128;
+ }
+
+ DEBUG(3, ("NTLMSSP: Set final flags:\n"));
+ debug_ntlmssp_flags(ntlmssp_state->neg_flags);
+
if (!msrpc_parse(&reply, chal_parse_string,
"NTLMSSP",
&ntlmssp_command,
@@ -481,7 +524,8 @@ static NTSTATUS ntlmssp_client_challenge(struct ntlmssp_client_state *ntlmssp_st
&challenge_blob, 8,
&unkn1, &unkn2,
&struct_blob)) {
- DEBUG(0, ("Failed to parse the NTLMSSP Challenge\n"));
+ DEBUG(1, ("Failed to parse the NTLMSSP Challenge: (#2)\n"));
+ dump_data(2, reply.data, reply.length);
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
@@ -493,6 +537,11 @@ static NTSTATUS ntlmssp_client_challenge(struct ntlmssp_client_state *ntlmssp_st
if (ntlmssp_state->use_ntlmv2) {
+ if (!struct_blob.length) {
+ /* be lazy, match win2k - we can't do NTLMv2 without it */
+ return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ }
+
/* TODO: if the remote server is standalone, then we should replace 'domain'
with the server name as supplied above */
@@ -506,10 +555,12 @@ static NTSTATUS ntlmssp_client_challenge(struct ntlmssp_client_state *ntlmssp_st
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
} else {
+ uchar lm_hash[16];
uchar nt_hash[16];
+ E_deshash(ntlmssp_state->password, lm_hash);
E_md4hash(ntlmssp_state->password, nt_hash);
- /* non encrypted password supplied. Ignore ntpass. */
+ /* lanman auth is insecure, it may be disabled */
if (lp_client_lanman_auth()) {
lm_response = data_blob(NULL, 24);
SMBencrypt(ntlmssp_state->password,challenge_blob.data,
@@ -519,8 +570,15 @@ static NTSTATUS ntlmssp_client_challenge(struct ntlmssp_client_state *ntlmssp_st
nt_response = data_blob(NULL, 24);
SMBNTencrypt(ntlmssp_state->password,challenge_blob.data,
nt_response.data);
+
session_key = data_blob(NULL, 16);
- SMBsesskeygen_ntv1(nt_hash, NULL, session_key.data);
+ if ((ntlmssp_state->neg_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_LM_KEY)
+ && lp_client_lanman_auth()) {
+ SMBsesskeygen_lmv1(lm_hash, lm_response.data,
+ session_key.data);
+ } else {
+ SMBsesskeygen_ntv1(nt_hash, NULL, session_key.data);
+ }
}
data_blob_free(&struct_blob);
@@ -533,7 +591,7 @@ static NTSTATUS ntlmssp_client_challenge(struct ntlmssp_client_state *ntlmssp_st
ntlmssp_state->domain,
ntlmssp_state->user,
ntlmssp_state->get_global_myname(),
- datagram_sess_key, 16,
+ datagram_sess_key, datagram_sess_key_len,
ntlmssp_state->neg_flags)) {
data_blob_free(&lm_response);
@@ -575,6 +633,8 @@ NTSTATUS ntlmssp_client_start(NTLMSSP_CLIENT_STATE **ntlmssp_state)
(*ntlmssp_state)->unicode = True;
+ (*ntlmssp_state)->use_ntlmv2 = lp_client_ntlmv2_auth();
+
(*ntlmssp_state)->neg_flags =
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_128 |
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM |
@@ -596,6 +656,7 @@ NTSTATUS ntlmssp_client_end(NTLMSSP_CLIENT_STATE **ntlmssp_state)
data_blob_free(&(*ntlmssp_state)->lm_resp);
data_blob_free(&(*ntlmssp_state)->nt_resp);
data_blob_free(&(*ntlmssp_state)->session_key);
+ data_blob_free(&(*ntlmssp_state)->stored_response);
talloc_destroy(mem_ctx);
}
@@ -606,12 +667,18 @@ NTSTATUS ntlmssp_client_end(NTLMSSP_CLIENT_STATE **ntlmssp_state)
NTSTATUS ntlmssp_client_update(NTLMSSP_CLIENT_STATE *ntlmssp_state,
DATA_BLOB reply, DATA_BLOB *next_request)
{
+ NTSTATUS nt_status = NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
uint32 ntlmssp_command;
*next_request = data_blob(NULL, 0);
if (!reply.length) {
- return ntlmssp_client_initial(ntlmssp_state, reply, next_request);
- }
+ /* If there is a cached reply, use it - otherwise this is the first packet */
+ if (!ntlmssp_state->stored_response.length) {
+ return ntlmssp_client_initial(ntlmssp_state, reply, next_request);
+ }
+
+ reply = ntlmssp_state->stored_response;
+ }
if (!msrpc_parse(&reply, "Cd",
"NTLMSSP",
@@ -620,9 +687,12 @@ NTSTATUS ntlmssp_client_update(NTLMSSP_CLIENT_STATE *ntlmssp_state,
}
if (ntlmssp_command == NTLMSSP_CHALLENGE) {
- return ntlmssp_client_challenge(ntlmssp_state, reply, next_request);
+ nt_status = ntlmssp_client_challenge(ntlmssp_state, reply, next_request);
}
- return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ if (ntlmssp_state->stored_response.length) {
+ data_blob_free(&ntlmssp_state->stored_response);
+ }
+ return nt_status;
}
NTSTATUS ntlmssp_set_username(NTLMSSP_CLIENT_STATE *ntlmssp_state, const char *user)
@@ -651,3 +721,16 @@ NTSTATUS ntlmssp_set_domain(NTLMSSP_CLIENT_STATE *ntlmssp_state, const char *dom
}
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
+
+/**
+ * Store a DATA_BLOB containing an NTLMSSP response, for use later.
+ * This 'keeps' the data blob - the caller must *not* free it.
+ */
+
+NTSTATUS ntlmssp_client_store_response(NTLMSSP_CLIENT_STATE *ntlmssp_state,
+ DATA_BLOB response)
+{
+ data_blob_free(&ntlmssp_state->stored_response);
+ ntlmssp_state->stored_response = response;
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
diff --git a/source3/libsmb/ntlmssp_parse.c b/source3/libsmb/ntlmssp_parse.c
index ac779a3906..f53afcdcd0 100644
--- a/source3/libsmb/ntlmssp_parse.c
+++ b/source3/libsmb/ntlmssp_parse.c
@@ -220,23 +220,27 @@ BOOL msrpc_parse(const DATA_BLOB *blob,
len2 = SVAL(blob->data, head_ofs); head_ofs += 2;
ptr = IVAL(blob->data, head_ofs); head_ofs += 4;
- /* make sure its in the right format - be strict */
- if (len1 != len2 || ptr + len1 > blob->length) {
- return False;
- }
- if (len1 & 1) {
- /* if odd length and unicode */
- return False;
- }
-
ps = va_arg(ap, char **);
- if (0 < len1) {
- pull_string(NULL, p, blob->data + ptr, sizeof(p),
- len1,
- STR_UNICODE|STR_NOALIGN);
- (*ps) = smb_xstrdup(p);
+ if (len1 == 0 && len2 == 0) {
+ *ps = smb_xstrdup("");
} else {
- (*ps) = smb_xstrdup("");
+ /* make sure its in the right format - be strict */
+ if (len1 != len2 || ptr + len1 > blob->length) {
+ return False;
+ }
+ if (len1 & 1) {
+ /* if odd length and unicode */
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ if (0 < len1) {
+ pull_string(NULL, p, blob->data + ptr, sizeof(p),
+ len1,
+ STR_UNICODE|STR_NOALIGN);
+ (*ps) = smb_xstrdup(p);
+ } else {
+ (*ps) = smb_xstrdup("");
+ }
}
break;
case 'A':
@@ -245,19 +249,23 @@ BOOL msrpc_parse(const DATA_BLOB *blob,
len2 = SVAL(blob->data, head_ofs); head_ofs += 2;
ptr = IVAL(blob->data, head_ofs); head_ofs += 4;
- /* make sure its in the right format - be strict */
- if (len1 != len2 || ptr + len1 > blob->length) {
- return False;
- }
-
ps = va_arg(ap, char **);
- if (0 < len1) {
- pull_string(NULL, p, blob->data + ptr, sizeof(p),
- len1,
- STR_ASCII|STR_NOALIGN);
- (*ps) = smb_xstrdup(p);
+ /* make sure its in the right format - be strict */
+ if (len1 == 0 && len2 == 0) {
+ *ps = smb_xstrdup("");
} else {
- (*ps) = smb_xstrdup("");
+ if (len1 != len2 || ptr + len1 > blob->length) {
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ if (0 < len1) {
+ pull_string(NULL, p, blob->data + ptr, sizeof(p),
+ len1,
+ STR_ASCII|STR_NOALIGN);
+ (*ps) = smb_xstrdup(p);
+ } else {
+ (*ps) = smb_xstrdup("");
+ }
}
break;
case 'B':
@@ -265,12 +273,17 @@ BOOL msrpc_parse(const DATA_BLOB *blob,
len1 = SVAL(blob->data, head_ofs); head_ofs += 2;
len2 = SVAL(blob->data, head_ofs); head_ofs += 2;
ptr = IVAL(blob->data, head_ofs); head_ofs += 4;
- /* make sure its in the right format - be strict */
- if (len1 != len2 || ptr + len1 > blob->length) {
- return False;
- }
+
b = (DATA_BLOB *)va_arg(ap, void *);
- *b = data_blob(blob->data + ptr, len1);
+ if (len1 == 0 && len2 == 0) {
+ *b = data_blob(NULL, 0);
+ } else {
+ /* make sure its in the right format - be strict */
+ if (len1 != len2 || ptr + len1 > blob->length) {
+ return False;
+ }
+ *b = data_blob(blob->data + ptr, len1);
+ }
break;
case 'b':
b = (DATA_BLOB *)va_arg(ap, void *);
diff --git a/source3/libsmb/ntlmssp_sign.c b/source3/libsmb/ntlmssp_sign.c
index 86faf1f5e6..748c008963 100644
--- a/source3/libsmb/ntlmssp_sign.c
+++ b/source3/libsmb/ntlmssp_sign.c
@@ -79,13 +79,18 @@ static void calc_hash(unsigned char *hash, const char *k2, int k2l)
}
static void calc_ntlmv2_hash(unsigned char hash[16], char digest[16],
- const char encrypted_response[16],
+ DATA_BLOB session_key,
const char *constant)
{
struct MD5Context ctx3;
+ /* NOTE: This code is currently complate fantasy - it's
+ got more in common with reality than the previous code
+ (the LM session key is not the right thing to use) but
+ it still needs work */
+
MD5Init(&ctx3);
- MD5Update(&ctx3, encrypted_response, 5);
+ MD5Update(&ctx3, session_key.data, session_key.length);
MD5Update(&ctx3, constant, strlen(constant));
MD5Final(digest, &ctx3);
@@ -113,25 +118,28 @@ static NTSTATUS ntlmssp_make_packet_signiture(NTLMSSP_CLIENT_STATE *ntlmssp_stat
hmac_md5_update(data, length, &ctx);
hmac_md5_final(digest, &ctx);
- if (!msrpc_gen(sig, "Bd", digest, sizeof(digest), ntlmssp_state->ntlmssp_seq_num)) {
+ if (!msrpc_gen(sig, "dBd", NTLMSSP_SIGN_VERSION, digest, 8 /* only copy first 8 bytes */
+ , ntlmssp_state->ntlmssp_seq_num)) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
switch (direction) {
case NTLMSSP_SEND:
- NTLMSSPcalc_ap(ntlmssp_state->cli_sign_hash, sig->data, sig->length);
+ NTLMSSPcalc_ap(ntlmssp_state->cli_sign_hash, sig->data+4, sig->length-4);
break;
case NTLMSSP_RECEIVE:
- NTLMSSPcalc_ap(ntlmssp_state->srv_sign_hash, sig->data, sig->length);
+ NTLMSSPcalc_ap(ntlmssp_state->srv_sign_hash, sig->data+4, sig->length-4);
break;
}
} else {
uint32 crc;
crc = crc32_calc_buffer(data, length);
- if (!msrpc_gen(sig, "ddd", 0, crc, ntlmssp_state->ntlmssp_seq_num)) {
+ if (!msrpc_gen(sig, "dddd", NTLMSSP_SIGN_VERSION, 0, crc, ntlmssp_state->ntlmssp_seq_num)) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
- NTLMSSPcalc_ap(ntlmssp_state->ntlmssp_hash, sig->data, sig->length);
+ dump_data_pw("ntlmssp hash:\n", ntlmssp_state->ntlmssp_hash,
+ sizeof(ntlmssp_state->ntlmssp_hash));
+ NTLMSSPcalc_ap(ntlmssp_state->ntlmssp_hash, sig->data+4, sig->length-4);
}
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
@@ -140,8 +148,11 @@ NTSTATUS ntlmssp_client_sign_packet(NTLMSSP_CLIENT_STATE *ntlmssp_state,
const uchar *data, size_t length,
DATA_BLOB *sig)
{
+ NTSTATUS nt_status = ntlmssp_make_packet_signiture(ntlmssp_state, data, length, NTLMSSP_SEND, sig);
+
+ /* increment counter on send */
ntlmssp_state->ntlmssp_seq_num++;
- return ntlmssp_make_packet_signiture(ntlmssp_state, data, length, NTLMSSP_SEND, sig);
+ return nt_status;
}
/**
@@ -151,8 +162,8 @@ NTSTATUS ntlmssp_client_sign_packet(NTLMSSP_CLIENT_STATE *ntlmssp_state,
*/
NTSTATUS ntlmssp_client_check_packet(NTLMSSP_CLIENT_STATE *ntlmssp_state,
- const uchar *data, size_t length,
- const DATA_BLOB *sig)
+ const uchar *data, size_t length,
+ const DATA_BLOB *sig)
{
DATA_BLOB local_sig;
NTSTATUS nt_status;
@@ -170,9 +181,7 @@ NTSTATUS ntlmssp_client_check_packet(NTLMSSP_CLIENT_STATE *ntlmssp_state,
return nt_status;
}
- if (memcmp(sig->data, local_sig.data, MIN(sig->length, local_sig.length)) == 0) {
- return NT_STATUS_OK;
- } else {
+ if (memcmp(sig->data+sig->length - 8, local_sig.data+local_sig.length - 8, 8) != 0) {
DEBUG(5, ("BAD SIG: wanted signature of\n"));
dump_data(5, local_sig.data, local_sig.length);
@@ -182,6 +191,97 @@ NTSTATUS ntlmssp_client_check_packet(NTLMSSP_CLIENT_STATE *ntlmssp_state,
DEBUG(0, ("NTLMSSP packet check failed due to invalid signiture!\n"));
return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
}
+
+ /* increment counter on recieive */
+ ntlmssp_state->ntlmssp_seq_num++;
+
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * Seal data with the NTLMSSP algorithm
+ *
+ */
+
+NTSTATUS ntlmssp_client_seal_packet(NTLMSSP_CLIENT_STATE *ntlmssp_state,
+ uchar *data, size_t length,
+ DATA_BLOB *sig)
+{
+ DEBUG(10,("ntlmssp_client_seal_data: seal\n"));
+ dump_data_pw("ntlmssp clear data\n", data, length);
+ if (ntlmssp_state->neg_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM2) {
+ HMACMD5Context ctx;
+ char seq_num[4];
+ uchar digest[16];
+ SIVAL(seq_num, 0, ntlmssp_state->ntlmssp_seq_num);
+
+ hmac_md5_init_limK_to_64(ntlmssp_state->cli_sign_const, 16, &ctx);
+ hmac_md5_update(seq_num, 4, &ctx);
+ hmac_md5_update(data, length, &ctx);
+ hmac_md5_final(digest, &ctx);
+
+ if (!msrpc_gen(sig, "dBd", NTLMSSP_SIGN_VERSION, digest, 8 /* only copy first 8 bytes */
+ , ntlmssp_state->ntlmssp_seq_num)) {
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+ dump_data_pw("ntlmssp client sealing hash:\n",
+ ntlmssp_state->cli_seal_hash,
+ sizeof(ntlmssp_state->cli_seal_hash));
+ NTLMSSPcalc_ap(ntlmssp_state->cli_seal_hash, data, length);
+ dump_data_pw("ntlmssp client signing hash:\n",
+ ntlmssp_state->cli_sign_hash,
+ sizeof(ntlmssp_state->cli_sign_hash));
+ NTLMSSPcalc_ap(ntlmssp_state->cli_sign_hash, sig->data+4, sig->length-4);
+ } else {
+ uint32 crc;
+ crc = crc32_calc_buffer(data, length);
+ if (!msrpc_gen(sig, "dddd", NTLMSSP_SIGN_VERSION, 0, crc, ntlmssp_state->ntlmssp_seq_num)) {
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+ /* The order of these two operations matters - we must first seal the packet,
+ then seal the sequence number - this is becouse the ntlmssp_hash is not
+ constant, but is is rather updated with each iteration */
+
+ dump_data_pw("ntlmssp hash:\n", ntlmssp_state->ntlmssp_hash,
+ sizeof(ntlmssp_state->ntlmssp_hash));
+ NTLMSSPcalc_ap(ntlmssp_state->ntlmssp_hash, data, length);
+
+ dump_data_pw("ntlmssp hash:\n", ntlmssp_state->ntlmssp_hash,
+ sizeof(ntlmssp_state->ntlmssp_hash));
+ NTLMSSPcalc_ap(ntlmssp_state->ntlmssp_hash, sig->data+4, sig->length-4);
+ }
+ dump_data_pw("ntlmssp sealed data\n", data, length);
+
+ /* increment counter on send */
+ ntlmssp_state->ntlmssp_seq_num++;
+
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Unseal data with the NTLMSSP algorithm
+ *
+ */
+
+NTSTATUS ntlmssp_client_unseal_packet(NTLMSSP_CLIENT_STATE *ntlmssp_state,
+ uchar *data, size_t length,
+ DATA_BLOB *sig)
+{
+ DEBUG(10,("ntlmssp_client_unseal_data: seal\n"));
+ dump_data_pw("ntlmssp sealed data\n", data, length);
+ if (ntlmssp_state->neg_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM2) {
+ NTLMSSPcalc_ap(ntlmssp_state->srv_seal_hash, data, length);
+ } else {
+ dump_data_pw("ntlmssp hash:\n", ntlmssp_state->ntlmssp_hash,
+ sizeof(ntlmssp_state->ntlmssp_hash));
+ NTLMSSPcalc_ap(ntlmssp_state->ntlmssp_hash, data, length);
+ }
+ dump_data_pw("ntlmssp clear data\n", data, length);
+
+ return ntlmssp_client_check_packet(ntlmssp_state, data, length, sig);
}
/**
@@ -190,37 +290,69 @@ NTSTATUS ntlmssp_client_check_packet(NTLMSSP_CLIENT_STATE *ntlmssp_state,
NTSTATUS ntlmssp_client_sign_init(NTLMSSP_CLIENT_STATE *ntlmssp_state)
{
unsigned char p24[24];
- unsigned char lm_hash[16];
+ ZERO_STRUCT(p24);
+
+ DEBUG(3, ("NTLMSSP Sign/Seal - Initialising with flags:\n"));
+ debug_ntlmssp_flags(ntlmssp_state->neg_flags);
- if (!ntlmssp_state->lm_resp.data) {
- /* can't sign or check signitures yet */
- return NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
- }
-
- E_deshash(ntlmssp_state->password, lm_hash);
-
- NTLMSSPOWFencrypt(lm_hash, ntlmssp_state->lm_resp.data, p24);
-
if (ntlmssp_state->neg_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM2)
{
- calc_ntlmv2_hash(ntlmssp_state->cli_sign_hash, ntlmssp_state->cli_sign_const, p24, CLI_SIGN);
- calc_ntlmv2_hash(ntlmssp_state->cli_seal_hash, ntlmssp_state->cli_seal_const, p24, CLI_SEAL);
- calc_ntlmv2_hash(ntlmssp_state->srv_sign_hash, ntlmssp_state->srv_sign_const, p24, SRV_SIGN);
- calc_ntlmv2_hash(ntlmssp_state->srv_seal_hash, ntlmssp_state->srv_seal_const, p24, SRV_SEAL);
- }
- else
- {
- char k2[8];
- memcpy(k2, p24, 5);
- k2[5] = 0xe5;
- k2[6] = 0x38;
- k2[7] = 0xb0;
+
+ calc_ntlmv2_hash(ntlmssp_state->cli_sign_hash,
+ ntlmssp_state->cli_sign_const,
+ ntlmssp_state->session_key, CLI_SIGN);
+ dump_data_pw("NTLMSSP client sign hash:\n",
+ ntlmssp_state->cli_sign_hash,
+ sizeof(ntlmssp_state->cli_sign_hash));
+
+ calc_ntlmv2_hash(ntlmssp_state->cli_seal_hash,
+ ntlmssp_state->cli_seal_const,
+ ntlmssp_state->session_key, CLI_SEAL);
+ dump_data_pw("NTLMSSP client sesl hash:\n",
+ ntlmssp_state->cli_seal_hash,
+ sizeof(ntlmssp_state->cli_seal_hash));
+
+ calc_ntlmv2_hash(ntlmssp_state->srv_sign_hash,
+ ntlmssp_state->srv_sign_const,
+ ntlmssp_state->session_key, SRV_SIGN);
+ dump_data_pw("NTLMSSP server sign hash:\n",
+ ntlmssp_state->srv_sign_hash,
+ sizeof(ntlmssp_state->srv_sign_hash));
+
+ calc_ntlmv2_hash(ntlmssp_state->srv_seal_hash,
+ ntlmssp_state->srv_seal_const,
+ ntlmssp_state->session_key, SRV_SEAL);
+ dump_data_pw("NTLMSSP server seal hash:\n",
+ ntlmssp_state->cli_sign_hash,
+ sizeof(ntlmssp_state->cli_sign_hash));
+ }
+ else if (ntlmssp_state->neg_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_LM_KEY) {
+ if (!ntlmssp_state->session_key.data || ntlmssp_state->session_key.length < 8) {
+ /* can't sign or check signitures yet */
+ DEBUG(5, ("NTLMSSP Sign/Seal - cannot use LM KEY yet\n"));
+ return NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
+ }
+
+ DEBUG(5, ("NTLMSSP Sign/Seal - using LM KEY\n"));
+
+ calc_hash(ntlmssp_state->ntlmssp_hash, ntlmssp_state->session_key.data, 8);
+ dump_data_pw("NTLMSSP hash:\n", ntlmssp_state->ntlmssp_hash,
+ sizeof(ntlmssp_state->ntlmssp_hash));
+ } else {
+ if (!ntlmssp_state->session_key.data || ntlmssp_state->session_key.length < 16) {
+ /* can't sign or check signitures yet */
+ DEBUG(5, ("NTLMSSP Sign/Seal - cannot use NT KEY yet\n"));
+ return NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
+ }
- calc_hash(ntlmssp_state->ntlmssp_hash, k2, 8);
+ DEBUG(5, ("NTLMSSP Sign/Seal - using NT KEY\n"));
+
+ calc_hash(ntlmssp_state->ntlmssp_hash, ntlmssp_state->session_key.data, 16);
+ dump_data_pw("NTLMSSP hash:\n", ntlmssp_state->ntlmssp_hash,
+ sizeof(ntlmssp_state->ntlmssp_hash));
}
ntlmssp_state->ntlmssp_seq_num = 0;
- ZERO_STRUCT(lm_hash);
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
diff --git a/source3/libsmb/pwd_cache.c b/source3/libsmb/pwd_cache.c
index 7ddcf853c4..f45832d7d7 100644
--- a/source3/libsmb/pwd_cache.c
+++ b/source3/libsmb/pwd_cache.c
@@ -43,15 +43,10 @@ static void pwd_init(struct pwd_info *pwd)
static void pwd_make_lm_nt_16(struct pwd_info *pwd, const char *clr)
{
- pstring dos_passwd;
-
pwd_init(pwd);
- push_ascii_pstring(dos_passwd, clr);
-
- nt_lm_owf_gen(dos_passwd, pwd->smb_nt_pwd, pwd->smb_lm_pwd);
+ nt_lm_owf_gen(clr, pwd->smb_nt_pwd, pwd->smb_lm_pwd);
pwd->null_pwd = False;
- pwd->cleartext = False;
pwd->crypted = False;
}
@@ -61,12 +56,9 @@ static void pwd_make_lm_nt_16(struct pwd_info *pwd, const char *clr)
void pwd_set_cleartext(struct pwd_info *pwd, const char *clr)
{
- pwd_init(pwd);
- push_ascii_fstring(pwd->password, clr);
- pwd->cleartext = True;
- pwd->null_pwd = False;
- pwd->crypted = False;
pwd_make_lm_nt_16(pwd, clr);
+ fstrcpy(pwd->password, clr);
+ pwd->cleartext = True;
}
/****************************************************************************
diff --git a/source3/libsmb/smbencrypt.c b/source3/libsmb/smbencrypt.c
index c1b3880299..7a1a2d7d18 100644
--- a/source3/libsmb/smbencrypt.c
+++ b/source3/libsmb/smbencrypt.c
@@ -271,6 +271,8 @@ void SMBOWFencrypt_ntv2(const uchar kr[16],
void SMBsesskeygen_ntv2(const uchar kr[16],
const uchar * nt_resp, uint8 sess_key[16])
{
+ /* a very nice, 128 bit, variable session key */
+
HMACMD5Context ctx;
hmac_md5_init_limK_to_64(kr, 16, &ctx);
@@ -286,6 +288,9 @@ void SMBsesskeygen_ntv2(const uchar kr[16],
void SMBsesskeygen_ntv1(const uchar kr[16],
const uchar * nt_resp, uint8 sess_key[16])
{
+ /* yes, this session key does not change - yes, this
+ is a problem - but it is 128 bits */
+
mdfour((unsigned char *)sess_key, kr, 16);
#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
@@ -294,6 +299,32 @@ void SMBsesskeygen_ntv1(const uchar kr[16],
#endif
}
+void SMBsesskeygen_lmv1(const uchar lm_hash[16],
+ const uchar lm_resp[24], /* only uses 8 */
+ uint8 sess_key[16])
+{
+ /* Calculate the LM session key (effective length 40 bits,
+ but changes with each session) */
+
+ uchar p24[24];
+ uchar partial_lm_hash[16];
+
+ memcpy(partial_lm_hash, lm_hash, 8);
+ memset(partial_lm_hash + 8, 0xbd, 8);
+
+ SMBOWFencrypt(lm_hash, lm_resp, p24);
+
+ memcpy(sess_key, p24, 16);
+ sess_key[5] = 0xe5;
+ sess_key[6] = 0x38;
+ sess_key[7] = 0xb0;
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
+ DEBUG(100, ("SMBsesskeygen_lmv1:\n"));
+ dump_data(100, sess_key, 16);
+#endif
+}
+
DATA_BLOB NTLMv2_generate_names_blob(const char *hostname,
const char *domain)
{
diff --git a/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c b/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c
index 5fb0205bfa..5ac7aaa441 100644
--- a/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c
+++ b/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c
@@ -28,6 +28,23 @@
extern struct pipe_id_info pipe_names[];
+void get_auth_type_level(int pipe_auth_flags, int *auth_type, int *auth_level)
+{
+ *auth_type = 0;
+ *auth_level = 0;
+ if (pipe_auth_flags & AUTH_PIPE_SEAL) {
+ *auth_level = RPC_PIPE_AUTH_SEAL_LEVEL;
+ } else if (pipe_auth_flags & AUTH_PIPE_SIGN) {
+ *auth_level = RPC_PIPE_AUTH_SIGN_LEVEL;
+ }
+
+ if (pipe_auth_flags & AUTH_PIPE_NETSEC) {
+ *auth_type = NETSEC_AUTH_TYPE;
+ } else if (pipe_auth_flags & AUTH_PIPE_NTLMSSP) {
+ *auth_type = NTLMSSP_AUTH_TYPE;
+ }
+}
+
/********************************************************************
Rpc pipe call id.
********************************************************************/
@@ -132,32 +149,6 @@ static BOOL rpc_check_hdr(prs_struct *rdata, RPC_HDR *rhdr,
return (rhdr->pkt_type != RPC_FAULT);
}
-static void NTLMSSPcalc_ap( struct cli_state *cli, unsigned char *data, uint32 len)
-{
- unsigned char *hash = cli->ntlmssp_hash;
- unsigned char index_i = hash[256];
- unsigned char index_j = hash[257];
- int ind;
-
- for( ind = 0; ind < len; ind++) {
- unsigned char tc;
- unsigned char t;
-
- index_i++;
- index_j += hash[index_i];
-
- tc = hash[index_i];
- hash[index_i] = hash[index_j];
- hash[index_j] = tc;
-
- t = hash[index_i] + hash[index_j];
- data[ind] = data[ind] ^ hash[t];
- }
-
- hash[256] = index_i;
- hash[257] = index_j;
-}
-
/****************************************************************************
Verify data on an rpc pipe.
The VERIFY & SEAL code is only executed on packets that look like this :
@@ -175,8 +166,10 @@ static void NTLMSSPcalc_ap( struct cli_state *cli, unsigned char *data, uint32 l
****************************************************************************/
static BOOL rpc_auth_pipe(struct cli_state *cli, prs_struct *rdata,
- uint32 fragment_start, int len, int auth_len, int *pauth_padding_len)
+ uint32 fragment_start, int len, int auth_len, uint8 pkt_type,
+ int *pauth_padding_len)
{
+
/*
* The following is that length of the data we must sign or seal.
* This doesn't include the RPC headers or the auth_len or the RPC_HDR_AUTH_LEN
@@ -190,190 +183,194 @@ static BOOL rpc_auth_pipe(struct cli_state *cli, prs_struct *rdata,
*/
char *reply_data = prs_data_p(rdata) + fragment_start + RPC_HEADER_LEN + RPC_HDR_REQ_LEN;
- BOOL auth_verify = ((cli->ntlmssp_srv_flgs & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN) != 0);
- BOOL auth_seal = ((cli->ntlmssp_srv_flgs & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL) != 0);
- BOOL auth_schannel = (cli->saved_netlogon_pipe_fnum != 0);
+ RPC_HDR_AUTH rhdr_auth;
*pauth_padding_len = 0;
- DEBUG(5,("rpc_auth_pipe: len: %d auth_len: %d verify %s seal %s schannel %s\n",
- len, auth_len, BOOLSTR(auth_verify), BOOLSTR(auth_seal), BOOLSTR(auth_schannel)));
-
- /*
- * Unseal any sealed data in the PDU, not including the
- * 8 byte auth_header or the auth_data.
- */
+ if (auth_len == 0) {
+ if (cli->pipe_auth_flags == 0) {
+ /* move along, nothing to see here */
+ return True;
+ }
- if (auth_seal) {
- DEBUG(10,("rpc_auth_pipe: unseal\n"));
- dump_data(100, reply_data, data_len);
- NTLMSSPcalc_ap(cli, (uchar*)reply_data, data_len);
- dump_data(100, reply_data, data_len);
+ DEBUG(2, ("No authenticaton header recienved on reply, but this pipe is authenticated\n"));
+ return False;
}
- if (auth_verify || auth_seal) {
- RPC_HDR_AUTH rhdr_auth;
- prs_struct auth_req;
- char data[RPC_HDR_AUTH_LEN];
- /*
- * We set dp to be the end of the packet, minus the auth_len
- * and the length of the header that preceeds the auth_data.
- */
- char *dp = prs_data_p(rdata) + len - auth_len - RPC_HDR_AUTH_LEN;
+ DEBUG(5,("rpc_auth_pipe: pkt_type: %d len: %d auth_len: %d NTLMSSP %s schannel %s sign %s seal %s \n",
+ pkt_type, len, auth_len,
+ BOOLSTR(cli->pipe_auth_flags & AUTH_PIPE_NTLMSSP),
+ BOOLSTR(cli->pipe_auth_flags & AUTH_PIPE_NETSEC),
+ BOOLSTR(cli->pipe_auth_flags & AUTH_PIPE_SIGN),
+ BOOLSTR(cli->pipe_auth_flags & AUTH_PIPE_SEAL)));
- if(dp - prs_data_p(rdata) > prs_data_size(rdata)) {
- DEBUG(0,("rpc_auth_pipe: auth data > data size !\n"));
+ {
+ int auth_type;
+ int auth_level;
+ char *dp = prs_data_p(rdata) + fragment_start + len -
+ RPC_HDR_AUTH_LEN - auth_len;
+ prs_struct auth_verf;
+
+ if (dp - prs_data_p(rdata) > prs_data_size(rdata)) {
+ DEBUG(0,("rpc_auth_pipe: schannel auth data > data size !\n"));
return False;
}
- memcpy(data, dp, sizeof(data));
-
- prs_init(&auth_req , 0, cli->mem_ctx, UNMARSHALL);
+ DEBUG(10,("rpc_auth_pipe: packet:\n"));
+ dump_data(100, dp, auth_len);
- /* The endianness must be preserved... JRA. */
+ prs_init(&auth_verf, RPC_HDR_AUTH_LEN, cli->mem_ctx, UNMARSHALL);
- prs_set_endian_data(&auth_req, rdata->bigendian_data);
+ /* The endinness must be preserved. JRA. */
+ prs_set_endian_data( &auth_verf, rdata->bigendian_data);
- prs_give_memory(&auth_req, data, RPC_HDR_AUTH_LEN, False);
+ prs_copy_data_in(&auth_verf, dp, RPC_HDR_AUTH_LEN);
+ prs_set_offset(&auth_verf, 0);
- /*
- * Unmarshall the 8 byte auth_header that comes before the
- * auth data.
- */
- if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr_auth("hdr_auth", &rhdr_auth, &auth_req, 0)) {
- DEBUG(0,("rpc_auth_pipe: unmarshalling RPC_HDR_AUTH failed.\n"));
+ if (!smb_io_rpc_hdr_auth("auth_hdr", &rhdr_auth, &auth_verf, 0)) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("rpc_auth_pipe: Could not parse auth header\n"));
return False;
}
- if (!rpc_hdr_auth_chk(&rhdr_auth)) {
- DEBUG(0,("rpc_auth_pipe: rpc_hdr_auth_chk failed.\n"));
+ /* Let the caller know how much padding at the end of the data */
+ *pauth_padding_len = rhdr_auth.padding;
+
+ /* Check it's the type of reply we were expecting to decode */
+
+ get_auth_type_level(cli->pipe_auth_flags, &auth_type, &auth_level);
+ if (rhdr_auth.auth_type != auth_type) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("BAD auth type %d (should be %d)\n",
+ rhdr_auth.auth_type, auth_type));
return False;
}
- }
-
- /*
- * Now unseal and check the auth verifier in the auth_data at
- * then end of the packet. The 4 bytes skipped in the unseal
- * seem to be a buffer pointer preceeding the sealed data.
- */
-
- if (auth_verify) {
- RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_CHK chk;
- uint32 crc32;
- prs_struct auth_verf;
- char data[RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_CHK_LEN];
- char *dp = prs_data_p(rdata) + len - auth_len;
-
- if(dp - prs_data_p(rdata) > prs_data_size(rdata)) {
- DEBUG(0,("rpc_auth_pipe: auth data > data size !\n"));
+
+ if (rhdr_auth.auth_level != auth_level) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("BAD auth level %d (should be %d)\n",
+ rhdr_auth.auth_level, auth_level));
return False;
}
+ }
- DEBUG(10,("rpc_auth_pipe: verify\n"));
- dump_data(100, dp, auth_len);
- NTLMSSPcalc_ap(cli, (uchar*)(dp+4), auth_len - 4);
-
- memcpy(data, dp, RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_CHK_LEN);
- dump_data(100, data, auth_len);
-
- prs_init(&auth_verf, 0, cli->mem_ctx, UNMARSHALL);
-
- /* The endinness must be preserved. JRA. */
- prs_set_endian_data( &auth_verf, rdata->bigendian_data);
+ if (pkt_type == RPC_BINDACK) {
+ if (cli->pipe_auth_flags & AUTH_PIPE_NTLMSSP) {
+ char *dp = prs_data_p(rdata) + len - auth_len;
+
+ if(dp - prs_data_p(rdata) > prs_data_size(rdata)) {
+ DEBUG(0,("rpc_auth_pipe: auth data > data size !\n"));
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ /* save the reply away, for use a little later */
+ return (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ntlmssp_client_store_response(cli->ntlmssp_pipe_state,
+ data_blob(dp, auth_len))));
+ }
+ if (cli->pipe_auth_flags & AUTH_PIPE_NETSEC) {
+ /* nothing to do here - we don't seem to be able to validate the
+ bindack based on VL's comments */
+ return True;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (cli->pipe_auth_flags & AUTH_PIPE_NTLMSSP) {
+ NTSTATUS nt_status;
+ DATA_BLOB sig;
+ if ((cli->pipe_auth_flags & AUTH_PIPE_SIGN) ||
+ (cli->pipe_auth_flags & AUTH_PIPE_SEAL)) {
+ char *dp = prs_data_p(rdata) + len - auth_len;
+
+ if(dp - prs_data_p(rdata) > prs_data_size(rdata)) {
+ DEBUG(0,("rpc_auth_pipe: auth data > data size !\n"));
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ if (auth_len != RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_CHK_LEN) {
+ DEBUG(0,("rpc_auth_pipe: wrong ntlmssp auth len %d\n", auth_len));
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ sig = data_blob(dp, auth_len);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Unseal any sealed data in the PDU, not including the
+ * 8 byte auth_header or the auth_data.
+ */
- prs_give_memory(&auth_verf, data, RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_CHK_LEN, False);
+ /*
+ * Now unseal and check the auth verifier in the auth_data at
+ * the end of the packet.
+ */
- if(!smb_io_rpc_auth_ntlmssp_chk("auth_sign", &chk, &auth_verf, 0)) {
- DEBUG(0,("rpc_auth_pipe: unmarshalling RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_CHK failed.\n"));
- return False;
+ if (cli->pipe_auth_flags & AUTH_PIPE_SEAL) {
+ if (data_len < 0) {
+ DEBUG(1, ("Can't unseal - data_len < 0!!\n"));
+ return False;
+ }
+ nt_status = ntlmssp_client_unseal_packet(cli->ntlmssp_pipe_state,
+ reply_data, data_len,
+ &sig);
+ }
+ else if (cli->pipe_auth_flags & AUTH_PIPE_SIGN) {
+ nt_status = ntlmssp_client_check_packet(cli->ntlmssp_pipe_state,
+ reply_data, data_len,
+ &sig);
}
- crc32 = crc32_calc_buffer(reply_data, data_len);
+ data_blob_free(&sig);
- if (!rpc_auth_ntlmssp_chk(&chk, crc32 , cli->ntlmssp_seq_num)) {
- DEBUG(0,("rpc_auth_pipe: rpc_auth_ntlmssp_chk failed.\n"));
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("rpc_auth_pipe: could not validate "
+ "incoming NTLMSSP packet!\n"));
return False;
}
- cli->ntlmssp_seq_num++;
}
- if (auth_schannel) {
+ if (cli->pipe_auth_flags & AUTH_PIPE_NETSEC) {
RPC_AUTH_NETSEC_CHK chk;
- RPC_HDR_AUTH rhdr_auth;
- char data[RPC_HDR_AUTH_LEN+RPC_AUTH_NETSEC_CHK_LEN];
- char *dp = prs_data_p(rdata) + fragment_start + len -
- RPC_HDR_AUTH_LEN - RPC_AUTH_NETSEC_CHK_LEN;
- prs_struct auth_verf;
-
- if (auth_len != RPC_AUTH_NETSEC_CHK_LEN) {
-
- if ( (auth_len == 12) &&
- (cli->auth_info.seq_num == 0) ) {
-
- /* This is the reply to our bind. Ok,
- the sequence number can wrap
- around. But this only means that
- every 4 billion request we
- misdetect a wrong length in a
- reply. This is an error condition
- which will lead to failure anyway
- later.
-
- The reply contains a
- RPC_AUTH_VERIFIER with no content
- (12 bytes), so ignore it.
- */
- return True;
- }
+ prs_struct netsec_verf;
- DEBUG(0,("rpc_auth_pipe: wrong schannel auth len %d\n", auth_len));
+ char *dp = prs_data_p(rdata) + len - auth_len;
+
+ if(dp - prs_data_p(rdata) > prs_data_size(rdata)) {
+ DEBUG(0,("rpc_auth_pipe: auth data > data size !\n"));
return False;
}
- if (dp - prs_data_p(rdata) > prs_data_size(rdata)) {
- DEBUG(0,("rpc_auth_pipe: schannel auth data > data size !\n"));
+ if (auth_len != RPC_AUTH_NETSEC_CHK_LEN) {
+ DEBUG(0,("rpc_auth_pipe: wrong schannel auth len %d\n", auth_len));
return False;
}
- DEBUG(10,("rpc_auth_pipe: schannel verify netsec\n"));
- dump_data(100, dp, auth_len);
-
- memcpy(data, dp, sizeof(data));
- dump_data(100, data, sizeof(data));
-
- prs_init(&auth_verf, 0, cli->mem_ctx, UNMARSHALL);
+ prs_init(&netsec_verf, RPC_AUTH_NETSEC_CHK_LEN,
+ cli->mem_ctx, UNMARSHALL);
/* The endinness must be preserved. JRA. */
- prs_set_endian_data( &auth_verf, rdata->bigendian_data);
-
- prs_give_memory(&auth_verf, data, sizeof(data), False);
-
- if (!smb_io_rpc_hdr_auth("auth_hdr", &rhdr_auth, &auth_verf, 0)) {
- DEBUG(0, ("rpc_auth_pipe: Could not parse schannel auth header\n"));
- return False;
- }
+ prs_set_endian_data( &netsec_verf, rdata->bigendian_data);
- if ((rhdr_auth.auth_type != NETSEC_AUTH_TYPE) ||
- (rhdr_auth.auth_level != NETSEC_AUTH_LEVEL)) {
- DEBUG(0, ("rpc_auth_pipe: Got wrong schannel auth type/level: %d/%d\n",
- rhdr_auth.auth_type, rhdr_auth.auth_level));
- return False;
- }
+ prs_copy_data_in(&netsec_verf, dp, auth_len);
+ prs_set_offset(&netsec_verf, 0);
- if (!smb_io_rpc_auth_netsec_chk("schannel_auth_sign", &chk, &auth_verf, 0)) {
+ if (!smb_io_rpc_auth_netsec_chk("schannel_auth_sign",
+ &chk, &netsec_verf, 0)) {
DEBUG(0, ("rpc_auth_pipe: schannel unmarshalling "
"RPC_AUTH_NETSECK_CHK failed\n"));
+ prs_mem_free(&netsec_verf);
return False;
}
- cli->auth_info.seq_num++;
-
- if (!netsec_decode(&cli->auth_info, &chk, reply_data, data_len)) {
+ if (!netsec_decode(&cli->auth_info,
+ cli->pipe_auth_flags,
+ SENDER_IS_ACCEPTOR,
+ &chk, reply_data, data_len)) {
DEBUG(0, ("rpc_auth_pipe: Could not decode schannel\n"));
+ prs_mem_free(&netsec_verf);
return False;
}
- *pauth_padding_len = rhdr_auth.padding;
+
+ cli->auth_info.seq_num++;
+
+ prs_mem_free(&netsec_verf);
}
return True;
}
@@ -403,7 +400,8 @@ static BOOL rpc_auth_pipe(struct cli_state *cli, prs_struct *rdata,
****************************************************************************/
-static BOOL rpc_api_pipe(struct cli_state *cli, prs_struct *data, prs_struct *rdata)
+static BOOL rpc_api_pipe(struct cli_state *cli, prs_struct *data, prs_struct *rdata,
+ uint8 expected_pkt_type)
{
uint32 len;
char *rparam = NULL;
@@ -419,6 +417,7 @@ static BOOL rpc_api_pipe(struct cli_state *cli, prs_struct *data, prs_struct *rd
uint32 current_offset = 0;
uint32 fragment_start = 0;
uint32 max_data = cli->max_xmit_frag ? cli->max_xmit_frag : 1024;
+ int auth_padding_len = 0;
/* Create setup parameters - must be in native byte order. */
@@ -476,6 +475,12 @@ static BOOL rpc_api_pipe(struct cli_state *cli, prs_struct *data, prs_struct *rd
}
}
+ if (rhdr.pkt_type == RPC_BINDNACK) {
+ DEBUG(3, ("Bind NACK received on pipe %x!\n", (int)cli->nt_pipe_fnum));
+ prs_mem_free(rdata);
+ return False;
+ }
+
if (rhdr.pkt_type == RPC_RESPONSE) {
RPC_HDR_RESP rhdr_resp;
if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr_resp("rpc_hdr_resp", &rhdr_resp, rdata, 0)) {
@@ -485,6 +490,12 @@ static BOOL rpc_api_pipe(struct cli_state *cli, prs_struct *data, prs_struct *rd
}
}
+ if (rhdr.pkt_type != expected_pkt_type) {
+ DEBUG(3, ("Connection to pipe %x got an unexpected RPC packet type - %d, not %d\n", (int)cli->nt_pipe_fnum, rhdr.pkt_type, expected_pkt_type));
+ prs_mem_free(rdata);
+ return False;
+ }
+
DEBUG(5,("rpc_api_pipe: len left: %u smbtrans read: %u\n",
(unsigned int)len, (unsigned int)rdata_len ));
@@ -507,12 +518,13 @@ static BOOL rpc_api_pipe(struct cli_state *cli, prs_struct *data, prs_struct *rd
* Now we have a complete PDU, check the auth struct if any was sent.
*/
- if (rhdr.auth_len != 0) {
- int auth_padding_len = 0;
+ if(!rpc_auth_pipe(cli, rdata, fragment_start, rhdr.frag_len,
+ rhdr.auth_len, rhdr.pkt_type, &auth_padding_len)) {
+ prs_mem_free(rdata);
+ return False;
+ }
- if(!rpc_auth_pipe(cli, rdata, fragment_start, rhdr.frag_len,
- rhdr.auth_len, &auth_padding_len))
- return False;
+ if (rhdr.auth_len != 0) {
/*
* Drop the auth footers from the current offset.
* We need this if there are more fragments.
@@ -543,7 +555,7 @@ static BOOL rpc_api_pipe(struct cli_state *cli, prs_struct *data, prs_struct *rd
prs_struct hps;
uint8 eclass;
uint32 ecode;
-
+
/*
* First read the header of the next PDU.
*/
@@ -596,8 +608,10 @@ static BOOL rpc_api_pipe(struct cli_state *cli, prs_struct *data, prs_struct *rd
* Now read the rest of the PDU.
*/
- if (!rpc_read(cli, rdata, len, &current_offset))
+ if (!rpc_read(cli, rdata, len, &current_offset)) {
+ prs_mem_free(rdata);
return False;
+ }
fragment_start = current_offset - len - RPC_HEADER_LEN - RPC_HDR_RESP_LEN;
@@ -605,12 +619,15 @@ static BOOL rpc_api_pipe(struct cli_state *cli, prs_struct *data, prs_struct *rd
* Verify any authentication footer.
*/
+
+ if(!rpc_auth_pipe(cli, rdata, fragment_start, rhdr.frag_len,
+ rhdr.auth_len, rhdr.pkt_type, &auth_padding_len)) {
+ prs_mem_free(rdata);
+ return False;
+ }
+
if (rhdr.auth_len != 0 ) {
- int auth_padding_len = 0;
-
- if(!rpc_auth_pipe(cli, rdata, fragment_start, rhdr.frag_len,
- rhdr.auth_len, &auth_padding_len))
- return False;
+
/*
* Drop the auth footers from the current offset.
* The auth footers consist of the auth_data and the
@@ -633,70 +650,72 @@ static BOOL rpc_api_pipe(struct cli_state *cli, prs_struct *data, prs_struct *rd
********************************************************************/
-static BOOL create_rpc_bind_req(prs_struct *rpc_out, BOOL do_auth, BOOL do_netsec, uint32 rpc_call_id,
- RPC_IFACE *abstract, RPC_IFACE *transfer,
- const char *my_name, const char *domain, uint32 neg_flags)
+static NTSTATUS create_rpc_bind_req(struct cli_state *cli, prs_struct *rpc_out,
+ uint32 rpc_call_id,
+ RPC_IFACE *abstract, RPC_IFACE *transfer,
+ const char *my_name, const char *domain)
{
RPC_HDR hdr;
RPC_HDR_RB hdr_rb;
- char buffer[4096];
- prs_struct auth_info;
+ RPC_HDR_AUTH hdr_auth;
int auth_len = 0;
+ int auth_type, auth_level;
+ size_t saved_hdr_offset;
- prs_init(&auth_info, 0, prs_get_mem_context(rpc_out), MARSHALL);
-
- if (do_auth) {
- RPC_HDR_AUTH hdr_auth;
- RPC_AUTH_VERIFIER auth_verifier;
- RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_NEG ntlmssp_neg;
+ prs_struct auth_info;
+ prs_init(&auth_info, RPC_HDR_AUTH_LEN, /* we will need at least this much */
+ prs_get_mem_context(rpc_out), MARSHALL);
+ if (cli->pipe_auth_flags) {
+ get_auth_type_level(cli->pipe_auth_flags, &auth_type, &auth_level);
+
/*
* Create the auth structs we will marshall.
*/
-
- init_rpc_hdr_auth(&hdr_auth, NTLMSSP_AUTH_TYPE, NTLMSSP_AUTH_LEVEL, 0x00, 1);
- init_rpc_auth_verifier(&auth_verifier, "NTLMSSP", NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE);
- init_rpc_auth_ntlmssp_neg(&ntlmssp_neg, neg_flags, my_name, domain);
-
- /*
- * Use the 4k buffer to store the auth info.
- */
-
- prs_give_memory( &auth_info, buffer, sizeof(buffer), False);
-
+
+ init_rpc_hdr_auth(&hdr_auth, auth_type, auth_level, 0x00, 1);
+
/*
* Now marshall the data into the temporary parse_struct.
*/
-
+
if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr_auth("hdr_auth", &hdr_auth, &auth_info, 0)) {
DEBUG(0,("create_rpc_bind_req: failed to marshall RPC_HDR_AUTH.\n"));
- return False;
+ prs_mem_free(&auth_info);
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
+ saved_hdr_offset = prs_offset(&auth_info);
+ }
+
+ if (cli->pipe_auth_flags & AUTH_PIPE_NTLMSSP) {
- if(!smb_io_rpc_auth_verifier("auth_verifier", &auth_verifier, &auth_info, 0)) {
- DEBUG(0,("create_rpc_bind_req: failed to marshall RPC_AUTH_VERIFIER.\n"));
- return False;
- }
+ NTSTATUS nt_status;
+ DATA_BLOB null_blob = data_blob(NULL, 0);
+ DATA_BLOB request;
- if(!smb_io_rpc_auth_ntlmssp_neg("ntlmssp_neg", &ntlmssp_neg, &auth_info, 0)) {
- DEBUG(0,("create_rpc_bind_req: failed to marshall RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_NEG.\n"));
- return False;
+ DEBUG(5, ("Processing NTLMSSP Negotiate\n"));
+ nt_status = ntlmssp_client_update(cli->ntlmssp_pipe_state,
+ null_blob,
+ &request);
+
+ if (!NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status,
+ NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED)) {
+ prs_mem_free(&auth_info);
+ return nt_status;
}
/* Auth len in the rpc header doesn't include auth_header. */
- auth_len = prs_offset(&auth_info) - RPC_HDR_AUTH_LEN;
- }
+ auth_len = request.length;
+ prs_copy_data_in(&auth_info, request.data, request.length);
- if (do_netsec) {
- RPC_HDR_AUTH hdr_auth;
- RPC_AUTH_NETSEC_NEG netsec_neg;
+ DEBUG(5, ("NTLMSSP Negotiate:\n"));
+ dump_data(5, request.data, request.length);
- /*
- * Create the auth structs we will marshall.
- */
+ data_blob_free(&request);
- init_rpc_hdr_auth(&hdr_auth, NETSEC_AUTH_TYPE, NETSEC_AUTH_LEVEL,
- 0x00, 1);
+ }
+ else if (cli->pipe_auth_flags & AUTH_PIPE_NETSEC) {
+ RPC_AUTH_NETSEC_NEG netsec_neg;
/* Use lp_workgroup() if domain not specified */
@@ -706,30 +725,19 @@ static BOOL create_rpc_bind_req(prs_struct *rpc_out, BOOL do_auth, BOOL do_netse
init_rpc_auth_netsec_neg(&netsec_neg, domain, my_name);
/*
- * Use the 4k buffer to store the auth info.
- */
-
- prs_give_memory( &auth_info, buffer, sizeof(buffer), False);
-
- /*
* Now marshall the data into the temporary parse_struct.
*/
- if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr_auth("hdr_auth", &hdr_auth, &auth_info, 0)) {
- DEBUG(0,("Failed to marshall RPC_HDR_AUTH.\n"));
- return False;
- }
-
if(!smb_io_rpc_auth_netsec_neg("netsec_neg",
&netsec_neg, &auth_info, 0)) {
DEBUG(0,("Failed to marshall RPC_AUTH_NETSEC_NEG.\n"));
- return False;
+ prs_mem_free(&auth_info);
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
/* Auth len in the rpc header doesn't include auth_header. */
- auth_len = prs_offset(&auth_info) - RPC_HDR_AUTH_LEN;
+ auth_len = prs_offset(&auth_info) - saved_hdr_offset;
}
-
/* create the request RPC_HDR */
init_rpc_hdr(&hdr, RPC_BIND, 0x3, rpc_call_id,
RPC_HEADER_LEN + RPC_HDR_RB_LEN + prs_offset(&auth_info),
@@ -737,7 +745,8 @@ static BOOL create_rpc_bind_req(prs_struct *rpc_out, BOOL do_auth, BOOL do_netse
if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr("hdr" , &hdr, rpc_out, 0)) {
DEBUG(0,("create_rpc_bind_req: failed to marshall RPC_HDR.\n"));
- return False;
+ prs_mem_free(&auth_info);
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
/* create the bind request RPC_HDR_RB */
@@ -747,21 +756,22 @@ static BOOL create_rpc_bind_req(prs_struct *rpc_out, BOOL do_auth, BOOL do_netse
/* Marshall the bind request data */
if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr_rb("", &hdr_rb, rpc_out, 0)) {
DEBUG(0,("create_rpc_bind_req: failed to marshall RPC_HDR_RB.\n"));
- return False;
+ prs_mem_free(&auth_info);
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
/*
* Grow the outgoing buffer to store any auth info.
*/
- if(hdr.auth_len != 0) {
+ if(auth_len != 0) {
if(!prs_append_prs_data( rpc_out, &auth_info)) {
DEBUG(0,("create_rpc_bind_req: failed to grow parse struct to add auth.\n"));
- return False;
+ prs_mem_free(&auth_info);
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
}
-
- return True;
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
/*******************************************************************
@@ -771,90 +781,71 @@ static BOOL create_rpc_bind_req(prs_struct *rpc_out, BOOL do_auth, BOOL do_netse
the authentication handshake.
********************************************************************/
-static BOOL create_rpc_bind_resp(struct pwd_info *pwd,
- const char *domain, const char *user_name, const char *my_name,
- uint32 ntlmssp_cli_flgs,
- uint32 rpc_call_id,
- prs_struct *rpc_out)
+static NTSTATUS create_rpc_bind_resp(struct cli_state *cli,
+ uint32 rpc_call_id,
+ prs_struct *rpc_out)
{
- unsigned char lm_owf[24];
- unsigned char nt_owf[24];
+ NTSTATUS nt_status;
RPC_HDR hdr;
RPC_HDR_AUTHA hdr_autha;
- RPC_AUTH_VERIFIER auth_verifier;
- RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_RESP ntlmssp_resp;
- char buffer[4096];
- prs_struct auth_info;
-
- /*
- * Marshall the variable length data into a temporary parse
- * struct, pointing into a 4k local buffer.
- */
- prs_init(&auth_info, 0, prs_get_mem_context(rpc_out), MARSHALL);
-
- /*
- * Use the 4k buffer to store the auth info.
- */
-
- prs_give_memory( &auth_info, buffer, sizeof(buffer), False);
-
- /*
- * Create the variable length auth_data.
- */
-
- init_rpc_auth_verifier(&auth_verifier, "NTLMSSP", NTLMSSP_AUTH);
-
- pwd_get_lm_nt_owf(pwd, lm_owf, nt_owf);
-
- init_rpc_auth_ntlmssp_resp(&ntlmssp_resp,
- lm_owf, nt_owf,
- domain, user_name, my_name,
- ntlmssp_cli_flgs);
-
- /*
- * Marshall the variable length auth_data into a temp parse_struct.
- */
-
- if(!smb_io_rpc_auth_verifier("auth_verifier", &auth_verifier, &auth_info, 0)) {
- DEBUG(0,("create_rpc_bind_resp: failed to marshall RPC_AUTH_VERIFIER.\n"));
- return False;
- }
-
- if(!smb_io_rpc_auth_ntlmssp_resp("ntlmssp_resp", &ntlmssp_resp, &auth_info, 0)) {
- DEBUG(0,("create_rpc_bind_resp: failed to marshall RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_RESP.\n"));
- return False;
+ DATA_BLOB ntlmssp_null_response = data_blob(NULL, 0);
+ DATA_BLOB ntlmssp_reply;
+ int auth_type, auth_level;
+
+ /* The response is picked up from the internal cache,
+ where it was placed by the rpc_auth_pipe() code */
+ nt_status = ntlmssp_client_update(cli->ntlmssp_pipe_state,
+ ntlmssp_null_response,
+ &ntlmssp_reply);
+
+ if (!NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED)) {
+ return nt_status;
}
/* Create the request RPC_HDR */
init_rpc_hdr(&hdr, RPC_BINDRESP, 0x0, rpc_call_id,
- RPC_HEADER_LEN + RPC_HDR_AUTHA_LEN + prs_offset(&auth_info),
- prs_offset(&auth_info) );
-
+ RPC_HEADER_LEN + RPC_HDR_AUTHA_LEN + ntlmssp_reply.length,
+ ntlmssp_reply.length );
+
/* Marshall it. */
if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr("hdr", &hdr, rpc_out, 0)) {
DEBUG(0,("create_rpc_bind_resp: failed to marshall RPC_HDR.\n"));
- return False;
+ data_blob_free(&ntlmssp_reply);
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
+ get_auth_type_level(cli->pipe_auth_flags, &auth_type, &auth_level);
+
/* Create the request RPC_HDR_AUTHA */
init_rpc_hdr_autha(&hdr_autha, MAX_PDU_FRAG_LEN, MAX_PDU_FRAG_LEN,
- NTLMSSP_AUTH_TYPE, NTLMSSP_AUTH_LEVEL, 0x00);
+ auth_type, auth_level, 0x00);
if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr_autha("hdr_autha", &hdr_autha, rpc_out, 0)) {
DEBUG(0,("create_rpc_bind_resp: failed to marshall RPC_HDR_AUTHA.\n"));
- return False;
+ data_blob_free(&ntlmssp_reply);
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
/*
* Append the auth data to the outgoing buffer.
*/
- if(!prs_append_prs_data(rpc_out, &auth_info)) {
+ if(!prs_copy_data_in(rpc_out, ntlmssp_reply.data, ntlmssp_reply.length)) {
DEBUG(0,("create_rpc_bind_req: failed to grow parse struct to add auth.\n"));
- return False;
+ data_blob_free(&ntlmssp_reply);
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
- return True;
+ if (cli->pipe_auth_flags & AUTH_PIPE_SIGN) {
+ nt_status = ntlmssp_client_sign_init(cli->ntlmssp_pipe_state);
+
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+ return nt_status;
+ }
+ }
+
+ data_blob_free(&ntlmssp_reply);
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
@@ -905,34 +896,17 @@ static uint32 create_rpc_request(prs_struct *rpc_out, uint8 op_num, int data_len
}
/*******************************************************************
- Puts an NTLMSSP auth header into an rpc request.
- ********************************************************************/
-
-static BOOL create_ntlmssp_auth_hdr(prs_struct *outgoing_packet, BOOL auth_verify)
-{
- RPC_HDR_AUTH hdr_auth;
-
- init_rpc_hdr_auth(&hdr_auth, NTLMSSP_AUTH_TYPE,
- NTLMSSP_AUTH_LEVEL, 0x08,
- (auth_verify ? 1 : 0));
- if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr_auth("hdr_auth", &hdr_auth,
- outgoing_packet, 0)) {
- DEBUG(0,("create_auth_hdr:Failed to marshal RPC_HDR_AUTH.\n"));
- return False;
- }
- return True;
-}
-
-/*******************************************************************
- Puts a NETLOGON schannel auth header into an rpc request.
+ Puts an auth header into an rpc request.
********************************************************************/
-static BOOL create_netsec_auth_hdr(prs_struct *outgoing_packet, int padding)
+static BOOL create_auth_hdr(prs_struct *outgoing_packet,
+ int auth_type,
+ int auth_level, int padding)
{
RPC_HDR_AUTH hdr_auth;
- init_rpc_hdr_auth(&hdr_auth, NETSEC_AUTH_TYPE,
- NETSEC_AUTH_LEVEL, padding, 1);
+ init_rpc_hdr_auth(&hdr_auth, auth_type, auth_level,
+ padding, 1);
if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr_auth("hdr_auth", &hdr_auth,
outgoing_packet, 0)) {
DEBUG(0,("create_auth_hdr:Failed to marshal RPC_HDR_AUTH.\n"));
@@ -941,30 +915,6 @@ static BOOL create_netsec_auth_hdr(prs_struct *outgoing_packet, int padding)
return True;
}
-/*******************************************************************
- Puts auth data into an rpc request.
- ********************************************************************/
-
-static BOOL create_auth_data(struct cli_state *cli, uint32 crc32,
- prs_struct *outgoing_packet)
-{
- char *pdata_out = prs_data_p(outgoing_packet);
- RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_CHK chk;
- uint32 current_offset = prs_offset(outgoing_packet);
-
- init_rpc_auth_ntlmssp_chk(&chk, NTLMSSP_SIGN_VERSION,
- crc32, cli->ntlmssp_seq_num++);
- if(!smb_io_rpc_auth_ntlmssp_chk("auth_sign", &chk,
- outgoing_packet, 0)) {
- DEBUG(0,("create_auth_data: Failed to marshal RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_CHK.\n"));
- return False;
- }
- NTLMSSPcalc_ap(cli, (unsigned char*)
- &pdata_out[current_offset+4],
- RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_CHK_LEN - 4);
- return True;
-}
-
/**
* Send a request on an RPC pipe and get a response.
*
@@ -975,43 +925,60 @@ static BOOL create_auth_data(struct cli_state *cli, uint32 crc32,
BOOL rpc_api_pipe_req(struct cli_state *cli, uint8 op_num,
prs_struct *data, prs_struct *rdata)
{
- uint32 auth_len, max_data, data_left, data_sent;
+ uint32 auth_len, real_auth_len, auth_hdr_len, max_data, data_left, data_sent;
+ NTSTATUS nt_status;
BOOL ret = False;
- BOOL auth_verify, auth_seal, auth_schannel;
uint32 callid = 0;
fstring dump_name;
- auth_verify = ((cli->ntlmssp_srv_flgs & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN) != 0);
- auth_seal = ((cli->ntlmssp_srv_flgs & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL) != 0);
- auth_schannel = (cli->saved_netlogon_pipe_fnum != 0);
-
auth_len = 0;
+ real_auth_len = 0;
+ auth_hdr_len = 0;
- if (auth_verify)
- auth_len = RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_CHK_LEN;
-
- if (auth_schannel)
- auth_len = RPC_AUTH_NETSEC_CHK_LEN;
+ if (cli->pipe_auth_flags & AUTH_PIPE_SIGN) {
+ if (cli->pipe_auth_flags & AUTH_PIPE_NTLMSSP) {
+ auth_len = RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_CHK_LEN;
+ }
+ if (cli->pipe_auth_flags & AUTH_PIPE_NETSEC) {
+ auth_len = RPC_AUTH_NETSEC_CHK_LEN;
+ }
+ auth_hdr_len = RPC_HDR_AUTH_LEN;
+ }
/*
* calc how much actual data we can send in a PDU fragment
*/
max_data = cli->max_xmit_frag - RPC_HEADER_LEN - RPC_HDR_REQ_LEN -
- (auth_verify ? RPC_HDR_AUTH_LEN : 0) - auth_len - 8;
-
+ auth_hdr_len - auth_len - 8;
+
for (data_left = prs_offset(data), data_sent = 0; data_left > 0;) {
prs_struct outgoing_packet;
+ prs_struct sec_blob;
uint32 data_len, send_size;
uint8 flags = 0;
- uint32 crc32 = 0;
uint32 auth_padding = 0;
RPC_AUTH_NETSEC_CHK verf;
+ DATA_BLOB sign_blob;
/*
* how much will we send this time
*/
send_size = MIN(data_left, max_data);
+ if (!prs_init(&sec_blob, send_size, /* will need at least this much */
+ cli->mem_ctx, MARSHALL)) {
+ DEBUG(0,("Could not malloc %u bytes",
+ send_size+auth_padding));
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ if(!prs_append_some_prs_data(&sec_blob, data,
+ data_sent, send_size)) {
+ DEBUG(0,("Failed to append data to netsec blob\n"));
+ prs_mem_free(&sec_blob);
+ return False;
+ }
+
/*
* NT expects the data that is sealed to be 8-byte
* aligned. The padding must be encrypted as well and
@@ -1020,14 +987,105 @@ BOOL rpc_api_pipe_req(struct cli_state *cli, uint8 op_num,
* be stored in the auth header.
*/
- if (auth_schannel) {
- if (send_size % 8)
- auth_padding = 8 - (send_size % 8);
+ if (cli->pipe_auth_flags) {
+ size_t data_and_padding_size;
+ prs_align_uint64(&sec_blob);
+ int auth_type = 0;
+ int auth_level = 0;
+
+ if (cli->pipe_auth_flags & AUTH_PIPE_SEAL) {
+ auth_level = RPC_PIPE_AUTH_SEAL_LEVEL;
+ } else if (cli->pipe_auth_flags & AUTH_PIPE_SIGN) {
+ auth_level = RPC_PIPE_AUTH_SIGN_LEVEL;
+ }
+
+ if (cli->pipe_auth_flags & AUTH_PIPE_NETSEC) {
+ auth_type = NETSEC_AUTH_TYPE;
+ } else if (cli->pipe_auth_flags & AUTH_PIPE_NTLMSSP) {
+ auth_type = NTLMSSP_AUTH_TYPE;
+ }
+
+ data_and_padding_size = prs_offset(&sec_blob);
+ auth_padding = data_and_padding_size - send_size;
+
+ /* insert the auth header */
+
+ if(!create_auth_hdr(&sec_blob, auth_type, auth_level, auth_padding)) {
+ prs_mem_free(&sec_blob);
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ /* create an NTLMSSP signature */
+ if (cli->pipe_auth_flags & AUTH_PIPE_NTLMSSP) {
+ /*
+ * Seal the outgoing data if requested.
+ */
+ if (cli->pipe_auth_flags & AUTH_PIPE_SEAL) {
+
+ nt_status = ntlmssp_client_seal_packet(cli->ntlmssp_pipe_state,
+ (unsigned char*)prs_data_p(&sec_blob),
+ data_and_padding_size,
+ &sign_blob);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+ prs_mem_free(&sec_blob);
+ return False;
+ }
+ }
+ else if (cli->pipe_auth_flags & AUTH_PIPE_SIGN) {
+
+ nt_status = ntlmssp_client_sign_packet(cli->ntlmssp_pipe_state,
+ (unsigned char*)prs_data_p(&sec_blob),
+ data_and_padding_size, &sign_blob);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+ prs_mem_free(&sec_blob);
+ return False;
+ }
+ }
+
+
+ /* write auth footer onto the packet */
+ real_auth_len = sign_blob.length;
+
+ prs_copy_data_in(&sec_blob, sign_blob.data, sign_blob.length);
+ data_blob_free(&sign_blob);
+
+ }
+ else if (cli->pipe_auth_flags & AUTH_PIPE_NETSEC) {
+ static const uchar netsec_sig[8] = NETSEC_SIGNATURE;
+ static const uchar nullbytes[8] = { 0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0 };
+ size_t parse_offset_marker;
+ if ((cli->auth_info.seq_num & 1) != 0) {
+ DEBUG(0,("SCHANNEL ERROR: seq_num must be even in client (seq_num=%d)\n",
+ cli->auth_info.seq_num));
+ }
+
+ DEBUG(10,("SCHANNEL seq_num=%d\n", cli->auth_info.seq_num));
+
+ init_rpc_auth_netsec_chk(&verf, netsec_sig, nullbytes,
+ nullbytes, nullbytes);
+
+ netsec_encode(&cli->auth_info,
+ cli->pipe_auth_flags,
+ SENDER_IS_INITIATOR,
+ &verf,
+ prs_data_p(&sec_blob),
+ data_and_padding_size);
+
+ cli->auth_info.seq_num++;
+
+ /* write auth footer onto the packet */
+
+ parse_offset_marker = prs_offset(&sec_blob);
+ if (!smb_io_rpc_auth_netsec_chk("", &verf,
+ &sec_blob, 0)) {
+ prs_mem_free(&sec_blob);
+ return False;
+ }
+ real_auth_len = prs_offset(&sec_blob) - parse_offset_marker;
+ }
}
- data_len = RPC_HEADER_LEN + RPC_HDR_REQ_LEN + send_size +
- ((auth_verify|auth_schannel) ? RPC_HDR_AUTH_LEN : 0) +
- auth_len + auth_padding;
+ data_len = RPC_HEADER_LEN + RPC_HDR_REQ_LEN + prs_offset(&sec_blob);
/*
* Malloc parse struct to hold it (and enough for alignments).
@@ -1047,128 +1105,23 @@ BOOL rpc_api_pipe_req(struct cli_state *cli, uint8 op_num,
* Write out the RPC header and the request header.
*/
if(!(callid = create_rpc_request(&outgoing_packet, op_num,
- data_len, auth_len, flags,
+ data_len, real_auth_len, flags,
callid, data_left))) {
DEBUG(0,("rpc_api_pipe_req: Failed to create RPC request.\n"));
prs_mem_free(&outgoing_packet);
+ prs_mem_free(&sec_blob);
return False;
}
- /*
- * Seal the outgoing data if requested.
- */
- if (auth_seal) {
- crc32 = crc32_calc_buffer(prs_data_p(data) + data_sent,
- send_size);
- NTLMSSPcalc_ap(cli, (unsigned char*)prs_data_p(data) +
- data_sent, send_size);
- }
-
- /*
- * Now copy the data into the outgoing packet.
- */
-
- if (auth_schannel) {
- static const uchar netsec_sig[8] = NETSEC_SIGNATURE;
- static const uchar nullbytes[8] = { 0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0 };
- uchar sign[8];
- prs_struct netsec_blob;
-
- if ((cli->auth_info.seq_num & 1) != 0) {
- DEBUG(0,("SCHANNEL ERROR: seq_num must be even in client (seq_num=%d)\n",
- cli->auth_info.seq_num));
- }
-
- DEBUG(10,("SCHANNEL seq_num=%d\n", cli->auth_info.seq_num));
-
- RSIVAL(sign, 0, cli->auth_info.seq_num);
- SIVAL(sign, 4, 0x80);
-
- if (!prs_init(&netsec_blob, send_size+auth_padding,
- cli->mem_ctx, MARSHALL)) {
- DEBUG(0,("Could not malloc %u bytes",
- send_size+auth_padding));
- prs_mem_free(&outgoing_packet);
- return False;
- }
-
- if(!prs_append_some_prs_data(&netsec_blob, data,
- data_sent, send_size)) {
- DEBUG(0,("Failed to append data to netsec blob\n"));
- prs_mem_free(&outgoing_packet);
- return False;
- }
-
- netsec_blob.align = 8;
-
- if (!prs_align(&netsec_blob)) {
- DEBUG(0,("Could not align netsec blob\n"));
- prs_mem_free(&outgoing_packet);
- return False;
- }
-
- init_rpc_auth_netsec_chk(&verf, netsec_sig, nullbytes,
- sign, nullbytes);
-
- netsec_encode(&cli->auth_info, &verf,
- prs_data_p(&netsec_blob),
- prs_data_size(&netsec_blob));
-
- prs_append_prs_data(&outgoing_packet, &netsec_blob);
- prs_mem_free(&netsec_blob);
-
- cli->auth_info.seq_num++;
-
- } else {
- if(!prs_append_some_prs_data(&outgoing_packet, data,
- data_sent, send_size)) {
- DEBUG(0,("rpc_api_pipe_req: Failed to append "
- "data to outgoing packet.\n"));
- prs_mem_free(&outgoing_packet);
- return False;
- }
- }
-
- /*
- * Add a trailing auth_verifier if needed.
- */
- if (auth_seal || auth_verify) {
- if(!create_ntlmssp_auth_hdr(&outgoing_packet, auth_verify)) {
- prs_mem_free(&outgoing_packet);
- return False;
- }
- }
-
- /*
- * Finally the auth data itself.
- */
- if (auth_verify) {
- if (!create_auth_data(cli, crc32, &outgoing_packet)) {
- prs_mem_free(&outgoing_packet);
- return False;
- }
- }
-
- if (auth_schannel) {
-
- if (!create_netsec_auth_hdr(&outgoing_packet,
- auth_padding)) {
- prs_mem_free(&outgoing_packet);
- return False;
- }
-
- if (!smb_io_rpc_auth_netsec_chk("", &verf,
- &outgoing_packet, 0)) {
- prs_mem_free(&outgoing_packet);
- return False;
- }
- }
+ prs_append_prs_data(&outgoing_packet, &sec_blob);
+ prs_mem_free(&sec_blob);
DEBUG(100,("data_len: %x data_calc_len: %x\n", data_len,
prs_offset(&outgoing_packet)));
if (flags & RPC_FLG_LAST)
- ret = rpc_api_pipe(cli, &outgoing_packet, rdata);
+ ret = rpc_api_pipe(cli, &outgoing_packet,
+ rdata, RPC_RESPONSE);
else {
cli_write(cli, cli->nt_pipe_fnum, 0x0008,
prs_data_p(&outgoing_packet),
@@ -1352,84 +1305,23 @@ static BOOL check_bind_response(RPC_HDR_BA *hdr_ba, const int pipe_idx, RPC_IFAC
static BOOL rpc_send_auth_reply(struct cli_state *cli, prs_struct *rdata, uint32 rpc_call_id)
{
- RPC_HDR_AUTH rhdr_auth;
- RPC_AUTH_VERIFIER rhdr_verf;
- RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_CHAL rhdr_chal;
- char buffer[MAX_PDU_FRAG_LEN];
prs_struct rpc_out;
ssize_t ret;
- unsigned char p24[24];
- unsigned char lm_owf[24];
- unsigned char lm_hash[16];
+ prs_init(&rpc_out, RPC_HEADER_LEN + RPC_HDR_AUTHA_LEN, /* need at least this much */
+ cli->mem_ctx, MARSHALL);
- if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr_auth("", &rhdr_auth, rdata, 0)) {
- DEBUG(0,("rpc_send_auth_reply: Failed to unmarshall RPC_HDR_AUTH.\n"));
- return False;
- }
- if(!smb_io_rpc_auth_verifier("", &rhdr_verf, rdata, 0)) {
- DEBUG(0,("rpc_send_auth_reply: Failed to unmarshall RPC_AUTH_VERIFIER.\n"));
- return False;
- }
- if(!smb_io_rpc_auth_ntlmssp_chal("", &rhdr_chal, rdata, 0)) {
- DEBUG(0,("rpc_send_auth_reply: Failed to unmarshall RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_CHAL.\n"));
- return False;
- }
-
- cli->ntlmssp_cli_flgs = rhdr_chal.neg_flags;
-
- pwd_make_lm_nt_owf(&cli->pwd, rhdr_chal.challenge);
-
- prs_init(&rpc_out, 0, cli->mem_ctx, MARSHALL);
-
- prs_give_memory( &rpc_out, buffer, sizeof(buffer), False);
-
- create_rpc_bind_resp(&cli->pwd, cli->domain,
- cli->user_name, global_myname(),
- cli->ntlmssp_cli_flgs, rpc_call_id,
+ create_rpc_bind_resp(cli, rpc_call_id,
&rpc_out);
-
- pwd_get_lm_nt_owf(&cli->pwd, lm_owf, NULL);
- pwd_get_lm_nt_16(&cli->pwd, lm_hash, NULL);
-
- NTLMSSPOWFencrypt(lm_hash, lm_owf, p24);
-
- {
- unsigned char j = 0;
- int ind;
- unsigned char k2[8];
-
- memcpy(k2, p24, 5);
- k2[5] = 0xe5;
- k2[6] = 0x38;
- k2[7] = 0xb0;
-
- for (ind = 0; ind < 256; ind++)
- cli->ntlmssp_hash[ind] = (unsigned char)ind;
-
- for( ind = 0; ind < 256; ind++) {
- unsigned char tc;
-
- j += (cli->ntlmssp_hash[ind] + k2[ind%8]);
-
- tc = cli->ntlmssp_hash[ind];
- cli->ntlmssp_hash[ind] = cli->ntlmssp_hash[j];
- cli->ntlmssp_hash[j] = tc;
- }
-
- cli->ntlmssp_hash[256] = 0;
- cli->ntlmssp_hash[257] = 0;
- }
-
- memset((char *)lm_hash, '\0', sizeof(lm_hash));
if ((ret = cli_write(cli, cli->nt_pipe_fnum, 0x8, prs_data_p(&rpc_out),
0, (size_t)prs_offset(&rpc_out))) != (ssize_t)prs_offset(&rpc_out)) {
DEBUG(0,("rpc_send_auth_reply: cli_write failed. Return was %d\n", (int)ret));
+ prs_mem_free(&rpc_out);
return False;
}
- cli->ntlmssp_srv_flgs = rhdr_chal.neg_flags;
+ prs_mem_free(&rpc_out);
return True;
}
@@ -1437,14 +1329,12 @@ static BOOL rpc_send_auth_reply(struct cli_state *cli, prs_struct *rdata, uint32
Do an rpc bind.
****************************************************************************/
-static BOOL rpc_pipe_bind(struct cli_state *cli, int pipe_idx, const char *my_name,
- BOOL do_netsec)
+static BOOL rpc_pipe_bind(struct cli_state *cli, int pipe_idx, const char *my_name)
{
RPC_IFACE abstract;
RPC_IFACE transfer;
prs_struct rpc_out;
prs_struct rdata;
- BOOL do_auth = (cli->ntlmssp_cli_flgs != 0);
uint32 rpc_call_id;
char buffer[MAX_PDU_FRAG_LEN];
@@ -1466,16 +1356,54 @@ static BOOL rpc_pipe_bind(struct cli_state *cli, int pipe_idx, const char *my_na
rpc_call_id = get_rpc_call_id();
+ if (cli->pipe_auth_flags & AUTH_PIPE_NTLMSSP) {
+ NTSTATUS nt_status;
+ fstring password;
+
+ DEBUG(5, ("NTLMSSP authenticated pipe selected\n"));
+
+ nt_status = ntlmssp_client_start(&cli->ntlmssp_pipe_state);
+
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status))
+ return False;
+
+ nt_status = ntlmssp_set_username(cli->ntlmssp_pipe_state,
+ cli->user_name);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status))
+ return False;
+
+ nt_status = ntlmssp_set_domain(cli->ntlmssp_pipe_state,
+ cli->domain);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status))
+ return False;
+
+ pwd_get_cleartext(&cli->pwd, password);
+ nt_status = ntlmssp_set_password(cli->ntlmssp_pipe_state,
+ password);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status))
+ return False;
+
+ if (cli->pipe_auth_flags & AUTH_PIPE_SIGN) {
+ cli->ntlmssp_pipe_state->neg_flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN;
+ }
+
+ if (cli->pipe_auth_flags & AUTH_PIPE_SEAL) {
+ cli->ntlmssp_pipe_state->neg_flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL;
+ }
+ } else if (cli->pipe_auth_flags & AUTH_PIPE_NETSEC) {
+ cli->auth_info.seq_num = 0;
+ }
+
/* Marshall the outgoing data. */
- create_rpc_bind_req(&rpc_out, do_auth, do_netsec, rpc_call_id,
+ create_rpc_bind_req(cli, &rpc_out, rpc_call_id,
&abstract, &transfer,
- global_myname(), cli->domain, cli->ntlmssp_cli_flgs);
+ global_myname(), cli->domain);
/* Initialize the incoming data struct. */
prs_init(&rdata, 0, cli->mem_ctx, UNMARSHALL);
/* send data on \PIPE\. receive a response */
- if (rpc_api_pipe(cli, &rpc_out, &rdata)) {
+ if (rpc_api_pipe(cli, &rpc_out, &rdata, RPC_BINDACK)) {
RPC_HDR_BA hdr_ba;
DEBUG(5, ("rpc_pipe_bind: rpc_api_pipe returned OK.\n"));
@@ -1501,15 +1429,17 @@ static BOOL rpc_pipe_bind(struct cli_state *cli, int pipe_idx, const char *my_na
* handshake.
*/
- if (do_auth && !rpc_send_auth_reply(cli, &rdata, rpc_call_id)) {
+ if ((cli->pipe_auth_flags & AUTH_PIPE_NTLMSSP)
+ && !rpc_send_auth_reply(cli, &rdata, rpc_call_id)) {
DEBUG(0,("rpc_pipe_bind: rpc_send_auth_reply failed.\n"));
prs_mem_free(&rdata);
return False;
}
+ prs_mem_free(&rdata);
+ return True;
}
- prs_mem_free(&rdata);
- return True;
+ return False;
}
/****************************************************************************
@@ -1557,7 +1487,7 @@ BOOL cli_nt_session_open(struct cli_state *cli, const int pipe_idx)
/******************* bind request on pipe *****************/
- if (!rpc_pipe_bind(cli, pipe_idx, global_myname(), False)) {
+ if (!rpc_pipe_bind(cli, pipe_idx, global_myname())) {
DEBUG(2,("cli_nt_session_open: rpc bind to %s failed\n",
get_pipe_name_from_index(pipe_idx)));
cli_close(cli, cli->nt_pipe_fnum);
@@ -1589,15 +1519,19 @@ BOOL cli_nt_session_open(struct cli_state *cli, const int pipe_idx)
/****************************************************************************
Open a session to the NETLOGON pipe using schannel.
+
+ (Assumes that the netlogon pipe is already open)
****************************************************************************/
NTSTATUS cli_nt_establish_netlogon(struct cli_state *cli, int sec_chan,
- const char *trust_password)
+ const uchar trust_password[16])
{
- NTSTATUS result;
+ NTSTATUS result;
uint32 neg_flags = 0x000001ff;
int fnum;
+ cli_nt_netlogon_netsec_session_close(cli);
+
if (lp_client_schannel() != False)
neg_flags |= NETLOGON_NEG_SCHANNEL;
@@ -1620,22 +1554,27 @@ NTSTATUS cli_nt_establish_netlogon(struct cli_state *cli, int sec_chan,
if ((lp_client_schannel() == False) ||
((neg_flags & NETLOGON_NEG_SCHANNEL) == 0)) {
return NT_STATUS_OK;
+
+ /* keep the existing connection to NETLOGON open */
+
}
/* Server offered schannel, so try it. */
- cli->auth_info.seq_num = 0;
memcpy(cli->auth_info.sess_key, cli->sess_key,
sizeof(cli->auth_info.sess_key));
cli->saved_netlogon_pipe_fnum = cli->nt_pipe_fnum;
+ cli->pipe_auth_flags = AUTH_PIPE_NETSEC;
+ cli->pipe_auth_flags |= AUTH_PIPE_SIGN;
+ cli->pipe_auth_flags |= AUTH_PIPE_SEAL;
+
if (cli->capabilities & CAP_NT_SMBS) {
/* The secure channel connection must be opened on the same
session (TCP connection) as the one the challenge was
requested from. */
-
if ((fnum = cli_nt_create(cli, PIPE_NETLOGON_PLAIN,
DESIRED_ACCESS_PIPE)) == -1) {
DEBUG(0,("cli_nt_create failed to %s machine %s. "
@@ -1666,8 +1605,11 @@ NTSTATUS cli_nt_establish_netlogon(struct cli_state *cli, int sec_chan,
return NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
}
}
-
- if (!rpc_pipe_bind(cli, PI_NETLOGON, global_myname(), True)) {
+
+ /* doing schannel, not per-user auth */
+ cli->pipe_auth_flags = AUTH_PIPE_NETSEC | AUTH_PIPE_SIGN | AUTH_PIPE_SEAL;
+
+ if (!rpc_pipe_bind(cli, PI_NETLOGON, global_myname())) {
DEBUG(2,("rpc bind to %s failed\n", PIPE_NETLOGON));
cli_close(cli, cli->nt_pipe_fnum);
return NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
@@ -1683,16 +1625,3 @@ const char *cli_pipe_get_name(struct cli_state *cli)
}
-/****************************************************************************
-close the session
-****************************************************************************/
-
-void cli_nt_session_close(struct cli_state *cli)
-{
- if (cli->saved_netlogon_pipe_fnum != 0) {
- cli_close(cli, cli->saved_netlogon_pipe_fnum);
- cli->saved_netlogon_pipe_fnum = 0;
- }
- cli_close(cli, cli->nt_pipe_fnum);
- cli->nt_pipe_fnum = 0;
-}
diff --git a/source3/rpc_parse/parse_prs.c b/source3/rpc_parse/parse_prs.c
index 88150c718b..efd4914c66 100644
--- a/source3/rpc_parse/parse_prs.c
+++ b/source3/rpc_parse/parse_prs.c
@@ -1378,141 +1378,221 @@ static void netsechash(uchar * key, uchar * data, int data_len)
}
}
-void dump_data_pw(const char *msg, const uchar * data, size_t len)
+
+/*******************************************************************
+ Create a digest over the entire packet (including the data), and
+ MD5 it with the session key.
+ ********************************************************************/
+static void netsec_digest(struct netsec_auth_struct *a,
+ int auth_flags,
+ RPC_AUTH_NETSEC_CHK * verf,
+ char *data, size_t data_len,
+ uchar digest_final[16])
{
-#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
- DEBUG(11, ("%s", msg));
- if (data != NULL && len > 0)
- {
- dump_data(11, data, len);
+ uchar whole_packet_digest[16];
+ static uchar zeros[4];
+ struct MD5Context ctx3;
+
+ /* verfiy the signature on the packet by MD5 over various bits */
+ MD5Init(&ctx3);
+ /* use our sequence number, which ensures the packet is not
+ out of order */
+ MD5Update(&ctx3, zeros, sizeof(zeros));
+ MD5Update(&ctx3, verf->sig, sizeof(verf->sig));
+ if (auth_flags & AUTH_PIPE_SEAL) {
+ MD5Update(&ctx3, verf->data8, sizeof(verf->data8));
}
-#endif
+ MD5Update(&ctx3, data, data_len);
+ MD5Final(whole_packet_digest, &ctx3);
+ dump_data_pw("whole_packet_digest:\n", whole_packet_digest, sizeof(whole_packet_digest));
+
+ /* MD5 this result and the session key, to prove that
+ only a valid client could had produced this */
+ hmac_md5(a->sess_key, whole_packet_digest, sizeof(whole_packet_digest), digest_final);
}
-void netsec_encode(struct netsec_auth_struct *a,
- RPC_AUTH_NETSEC_CHK * verf, char *data, size_t data_len)
+/*******************************************************************
+ Calculate the key with which to encode the data payload
+ ********************************************************************/
+static void netsec_get_sealing_key(struct netsec_auth_struct *a,
+ RPC_AUTH_NETSEC_CHK *verf,
+ uchar sealing_key[16])
{
- uchar dataN[4];
- uchar digest1[16];
- struct MD5Context ctx3;
+ static uchar zeros[4];
+ uchar digest2[16];
uchar sess_kf0[16];
int i;
- SIVAL(dataN, 0, 0);
-
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(sess_kf0); i++) {
sess_kf0[i] = a->sess_key[i] ^ 0xf0;
}
+
+ dump_data_pw("sess_kf0:\n", sess_kf0, sizeof(sess_kf0));
+
+ /* MD5 of sess_kf0 and the high bytes of the sequence number */
+ hmac_md5(sess_kf0, zeros, 0x4, digest2);
+ dump_data_pw("digest2:\n", digest2, sizeof(digest2));
+
+ /* MD5 of the above result, plus 8 bytes of sequence number */
+ hmac_md5(digest2, verf->seq_num, sizeof(verf->seq_num), sealing_key);
+ dump_data_pw("sealing_key:\n", sealing_key, 16);
+}
- DEBUG(10,("SCHANNEL: netsec_encode seq_num=%d data_len=%d\n", a->seq_num, data_len));
- dump_data_pw("a->sess_key:\n", a->sess_key, sizeof(a->sess_key));
- dump_data_pw("a->seq_num :\n", dataN, sizeof(dataN));
+/*******************************************************************
+ Encode or Decode the sequence number (which is symmetric)
+ ********************************************************************/
+static void netsec_deal_with_seq_num(struct netsec_auth_struct *a,
+ RPC_AUTH_NETSEC_CHK *verf)
+{
+ static uchar zeros[4];
+ uchar sequence_key[16];
+ uchar digest1[16];
- MD5Init(&ctx3);
- MD5Update(&ctx3, dataN, 0x4);
- MD5Update(&ctx3, verf->sig, 8);
+ hmac_md5(a->sess_key, zeros, sizeof(zeros), digest1);
+ dump_data_pw("(sequence key) digest1:\n", digest1, sizeof(digest1));
- MD5Update(&ctx3, verf->data8, 8);
+ hmac_md5(digest1, verf->packet_digest, 8, sequence_key);
- dump_data_pw("verf->data8:\n", verf->data8, sizeof(verf->data8));
- dump_data_pw("sess_kf0:\n", sess_kf0, sizeof(sess_kf0));
+ dump_data_pw("sequence_key:\n", sequence_key, sizeof(sequence_key));
- hmac_md5(sess_kf0, dataN, 0x4, digest1);
- dump_data_pw("digest1 (ebp-8):\n", digest1, sizeof(digest1));
- hmac_md5(digest1, verf->data3, 8, digest1);
- dump_data_pw("netsechashkey:\n", digest1, sizeof(digest1));
- netsechash(digest1, verf->data8, 8);
+ dump_data_pw("seq_num (before):\n", verf->seq_num, sizeof(verf->seq_num));
+ netsechash(sequence_key, verf->seq_num, 8);
+ dump_data_pw("seq_num (after):\n", verf->seq_num, sizeof(verf->seq_num));
+}
- dump_data_pw("verf->data8:\n", verf->data8, sizeof(verf->data8));
- dump_data_pw("data :\n", data, data_len);
- MD5Update(&ctx3, data, data_len);
+/*******************************************************************
+ Encode a blob of data using the netsec (schannel) alogrithm, also produceing
+ a checksum over the original data. We currently only support
+ signing and sealing togeather - the signing-only code is close, but not
+ quite compatible with what MS does.
+ ********************************************************************/
+void netsec_encode(struct netsec_auth_struct *a, int auth_flags,
+ enum netsec_direction direction,
+ RPC_AUTH_NETSEC_CHK * verf, char *data, size_t data_len)
+{
+ uchar digest_final[16];
- {
- char digest_tmp[16];
- char digest2[16];
- MD5Final(digest_tmp, &ctx3);
- hmac_md5(a->sess_key, digest_tmp, 16, digest2);
- dump_data_pw("digest_tmp:\n", digest_tmp, sizeof(digest_tmp));
- dump_data_pw("digest:\n", digest2, sizeof(digest2));
- memcpy(verf->data1, digest2, sizeof(verf->data1));
+ DEBUG(10,("SCHANNEL: netsec_encode seq_num=%d data_len=%d\n", a->seq_num, data_len));
+ dump_data_pw("a->sess_key:\n", a->sess_key, sizeof(a->sess_key));
+
+ RSIVAL(verf->seq_num, 0, a->seq_num);
+
+ switch (direction) {
+ case SENDER_IS_INITIATOR:
+ SIVAL(verf->seq_num, 4, 0x80);
+ break;
+ case SENDER_IS_ACCEPTOR:
+ SIVAL(verf->seq_num, 4, 0x0);
+ break;
}
- netsechash(digest1, data, data_len);
- dump_data_pw("data:\n", data, data_len);
+ dump_data_pw("verf->seq_num:\n", verf->seq_num, sizeof(verf->seq_num));
- hmac_md5(a->sess_key, dataN, 0x4, digest1);
- dump_data_pw("ctx:\n", digest1, sizeof(digest1));
+ /* produce a digest of the packet to prove it's legit (before we seal it) */
+ netsec_digest(a, auth_flags, verf, data, data_len, digest_final);
+ memcpy(verf->packet_digest, digest_final, sizeof(verf->packet_digest));
- hmac_md5(digest1, verf->data1, 8, digest1);
+ if (auth_flags & AUTH_PIPE_SEAL) {
+ uchar sealing_key[16];
- dump_data_pw("netsechashkey:\n", digest1, sizeof(digest1));
+ /* get the key to encode the data with */
+ netsec_get_sealing_key(a, verf, sealing_key);
- dump_data_pw("verf->data3:\n", verf->data3, sizeof(verf->data3));
- netsechash(digest1, verf->data3, 8);
- dump_data_pw("verf->data3:\n", verf->data3, sizeof(verf->data3));
+ /* encode the verification data */
+ dump_data_pw("verf->data8:\n", verf->data8, sizeof(verf->data8));
+ netsechash(sealing_key, verf->data8, 8);
+
+ dump_data_pw("verf->data8_enc:\n", verf->data8, sizeof(verf->data8));
+
+ /* encode the packet payload */
+ dump_data_pw("data:\n", data, data_len);
+ netsechash(sealing_key, data, data_len);
+ dump_data_pw("data_enc:\n", data, data_len);
+ }
+
+ /* encode the sequence number (key based on packet digest) */
+ /* needs to be done after the sealing, as the original version
+ is used in the sealing stuff... */
+ netsec_deal_with_seq_num(a, verf);
return;
}
-BOOL netsec_decode(struct netsec_auth_struct *a,
+/*******************************************************************
+ Decode a blob of data using the netsec (schannel) alogrithm, also verifiying
+ a checksum over the original data. We currently can verify signed messages,
+ as well as decode sealed messages
+ ********************************************************************/
+
+BOOL netsec_decode(struct netsec_auth_struct *a, int auth_flags,
+ enum netsec_direction direction,
RPC_AUTH_NETSEC_CHK * verf, char *data, size_t data_len)
{
- uchar dataN[4];
- uchar digest1[16];
- struct MD5Context ctx3;
- uchar sess_kf0[16];
- int i;
-
- SIVAL(dataN, 0, 0);
-
- for (i = 0; i < sizeof(sess_kf0); i++) {
- sess_kf0[i] = a->sess_key[i] ^ 0xf0;
+ uchar digest_final[16];
+
+ /* Create the expected sequence number for comparison */
+ uchar seq_num[8];
+ RSIVAL(seq_num, 0, a->seq_num);
+
+ switch (direction) {
+ case SENDER_IS_INITIATOR:
+ SIVAL(seq_num, 4, 0x80);
+ break;
+ case SENDER_IS_ACCEPTOR:
+ SIVAL(seq_num, 4, 0x0);
+ break;
}
DEBUG(10,("SCHANNEL: netsec_decode seq_num=%d data_len=%d\n", a->seq_num, data_len));
dump_data_pw("a->sess_key:\n", a->sess_key, sizeof(a->sess_key));
- dump_data_pw("a->seq_num :\n", dataN, sizeof(dataN));
- hmac_md5(a->sess_key, dataN, 0x4, digest1);
- dump_data_pw("ctx:\n", digest1, sizeof(digest1));
-
- hmac_md5(digest1, verf->data1, 8, digest1);
-
- dump_data_pw("netsechashkey:\n", digest1, sizeof(digest1));
- dump_data_pw("verf->data3:\n", verf->data3, sizeof(verf->data3));
- netsechash(digest1, verf->data3, 8);
- dump_data_pw("verf->data3_dec:\n", verf->data3, sizeof(verf->data3));
-
- MD5Init(&ctx3);
- MD5Update(&ctx3, dataN, 0x4);
- MD5Update(&ctx3, verf->sig, 8);
-
- dump_data_pw("sess_kf0:\n", sess_kf0, sizeof(sess_kf0));
- hmac_md5(sess_kf0, dataN, 0x4, digest1);
- dump_data_pw("digest1 (ebp-8):\n", digest1, sizeof(digest1));
- hmac_md5(digest1, verf->data3, 8, digest1);
- dump_data_pw("netsechashkey:\n", digest1, sizeof(digest1));
+ dump_data_pw("seq_num:\n", seq_num, sizeof(seq_num));
- dump_data_pw("verf->data8:\n", verf->data8, sizeof(verf->data8));
- netsechash(digest1, verf->data8, 8);
- dump_data_pw("verf->data8_dec:\n", verf->data8, sizeof(verf->data8));
- MD5Update(&ctx3, verf->data8, 8);
+ /* extract the sequence number (key based on supplied packet digest) */
+ /* needs to be done before the sealing, as the original version
+ is used in the sealing stuff... */
+ netsec_deal_with_seq_num(a, verf);
- dump_data_pw("data :\n", data, data_len);
- netsechash(digest1, data, data_len);
- dump_data_pw("datadec:\n", data, data_len);
+ if (memcmp(verf->seq_num, seq_num, sizeof(seq_num))) {
+ /* don't even bother with the below if the sequence number is out */
+ /* The sequence number is MD5'ed with a key based on the whole-packet
+ digest, as supplied by the client. We check that it's a valid
+ checksum after the decode, below
+ */
+ return False;
+ }
- MD5Update(&ctx3, data, data_len);
- {
- uchar digest_tmp[16];
- MD5Final(digest_tmp, &ctx3);
- hmac_md5(a->sess_key, digest_tmp, 16, digest1);
- dump_data_pw("digest_tmp:\n", digest_tmp, sizeof(digest_tmp));
+ if (auth_flags & AUTH_PIPE_SEAL) {
+ uchar sealing_key[16];
+
+ /* get the key to extract the data with */
+ netsec_get_sealing_key(a, verf, sealing_key);
+
+ /* extract the verification data */
+ dump_data_pw("verf->data8:\n", verf->data8,
+ sizeof(verf->data8));
+ netsechash(sealing_key, verf->data8, 8);
+
+ dump_data_pw("verf->data8_dec:\n", verf->data8,
+ sizeof(verf->data8));
+
+ /* extract the packet payload */
+ dump_data_pw("data :\n", data, data_len);
+ netsechash(sealing_key, data, data_len);
+ dump_data_pw("datadec:\n", data, data_len);
}
- dump_data_pw("digest:\n", digest1, sizeof(digest1));
- dump_data_pw("verf->data1:\n", verf->data1, sizeof(verf->data1));
+ /* digest includes 'data' after unsealing */
+ netsec_digest(a, auth_flags, verf, data, data_len, digest_final);
- return memcmp(digest1, verf->data1, sizeof(verf->data1)) == 0;
+ dump_data_pw("Calculated digest:\n", digest_final,
+ sizeof(digest_final));
+ dump_data_pw("verf->packet_digest:\n", verf->packet_digest,
+ sizeof(verf->packet_digest));
+
+ /* compare - if the client got the same result as us, then
+ it must know the session key */
+ return (memcmp(digest_final, verf->packet_digest,
+ sizeof(verf->packet_digest)) == 0);
}
diff --git a/source3/rpc_parse/parse_rpc.c b/source3/rpc_parse/parse_rpc.c
index be3a04e31c..34ba62caa9 100644
--- a/source3/rpc_parse/parse_rpc.c
+++ b/source3/rpc_parse/parse_rpc.c
@@ -603,15 +603,6 @@ BOOL smb_io_rpc_hdr_autha(const char *desc, RPC_HDR_AUTHA *rai, prs_struct *ps,
}
/*******************************************************************
- Checks an RPC_HDR_AUTH structure.
-********************************************************************/
-
-BOOL rpc_hdr_auth_chk(RPC_HDR_AUTH *rai)
-{
- return (rai->auth_type == NTLMSSP_AUTH_TYPE && rai->auth_level == NTLMSSP_AUTH_LEVEL);
-}
-
-/*******************************************************************
Inits an RPC_HDR_AUTH structure.
********************************************************************/
@@ -1088,9 +1079,10 @@ BOOL rpc_auth_ntlmssp_chk(RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_CHK *chk, uint32 crc32, uint32 seq_nu
chk->seq_num != seq_num)
{
DEBUG(5,("verify failed - crc %x ver %x seq %d\n",
- crc32, NTLMSSP_SIGN_VERSION, seq_num));
+ chk->crc32, chk->ver, chk->seq_num));
+
DEBUG(5,("verify expect - crc %x ver %x seq %d\n",
- chk->crc32, chk->ver, chk->seq_num));
+ crc32, NTLMSSP_SIGN_VERSION, seq_num));
return False;
}
return True;
@@ -1182,15 +1174,15 @@ creates an RPC_AUTH_NETSEC_CHK structure.
********************************************************************/
BOOL init_rpc_auth_netsec_chk(RPC_AUTH_NETSEC_CHK * chk,
const uchar sig[8],
- const uchar data1[8],
- const uchar data3[8], const uchar data8[8])
+ const uchar packet_digest[8],
+ const uchar seq_num[8], const uchar data8[8])
{
if (chk == NULL)
return False;
memcpy(chk->sig, sig, sizeof(chk->sig));
- memcpy(chk->data1, data1, sizeof(chk->data1));
- memcpy(chk->data3, data3, sizeof(chk->data3));
+ memcpy(chk->packet_digest, packet_digest, sizeof(chk->packet_digest));
+ memcpy(chk->seq_num, seq_num, sizeof(chk->seq_num));
memcpy(chk->data8, data8, sizeof(chk->data8));
return True;
@@ -1209,8 +1201,8 @@ BOOL smb_io_rpc_auth_netsec_chk(const char *desc, RPC_AUTH_NETSEC_CHK * chk,
depth++;
prs_uint8s(False, "sig ", ps, depth, chk->sig, sizeof(chk->sig));
- prs_uint8s(False, "data3", ps, depth, chk->data3, sizeof(chk->data3));
- prs_uint8s(False, "data1", ps, depth, chk->data1, sizeof(chk->data1));
+ prs_uint8s(False, "seq_num", ps, depth, chk->seq_num, sizeof(chk->seq_num));
+ prs_uint8s(False, "packet_digest", ps, depth, chk->packet_digest, sizeof(chk->packet_digest));
prs_uint8s(False, "data8", ps, depth, chk->data8, sizeof(chk->data8));
return True;
diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
index f7663204b2..9a63ebc7a3 100644
--- a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
+++ b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
@@ -227,7 +227,7 @@ BOOL create_next_pdu(pipes_struct *p)
if (auth_seal || auth_verify) {
RPC_HDR_AUTH auth_info;
- init_rpc_hdr_auth(&auth_info, NTLMSSP_AUTH_TYPE, NTLMSSP_AUTH_LEVEL,
+ init_rpc_hdr_auth(&auth_info, NTLMSSP_AUTH_TYPE, RPC_PIPE_AUTH_SEAL_LEVEL,
(auth_verify ? RPC_HDR_AUTH_LEN : 0), (auth_verify ? 1 : 0));
if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr_auth("hdr_auth", &auth_info, &outgoing_pdu, 0)) {
DEBUG(0,("create_next_pdu: failed to marshall RPC_HDR_AUTH.\n"));
@@ -263,11 +263,9 @@ BOOL create_next_pdu(pipes_struct *p)
prs_struct rverf;
prs_struct rauth;
- uchar sign[8];
-
data = prs_data_p(&outgoing_pdu) + data_pos;
- init_rpc_hdr_auth(&auth_info, NETSEC_AUTH_TYPE, NETSEC_AUTH_LEVEL,
+ init_rpc_hdr_auth(&auth_info, NETSEC_AUTH_TYPE, RPC_PIPE_AUTH_SEAL_LEVEL,
RPC_HDR_AUTH_LEN, 1);
if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr_auth("hdr_auth", &auth_info, &outgoing_pdu, 0)) {
@@ -284,12 +282,12 @@ BOOL create_next_pdu(pipes_struct *p)
p->netsec_auth.seq_num));
}
- RSIVAL(sign, 0, p->netsec_auth.seq_num);
- SIVAL(sign, 4, 0);
-
- init_rpc_auth_netsec_chk(&verf, netsec_sig, nullbytes, sign, nullbytes);
+ init_rpc_auth_netsec_chk(&verf, netsec_sig, nullbytes, nullbytes, nullbytes);
- netsec_encode(&p->netsec_auth, &verf, data, data_len);
+ netsec_encode(&p->netsec_auth,
+ AUTH_PIPE_NETSEC|AUTH_PIPE_SIGN|AUTH_PIPE_SEAL,
+ SENDER_IS_ACCEPTOR,
+ &verf, data, data_len);
smb_io_rpc_auth_netsec_chk("", &verf, &outgoing_pdu, 0);
@@ -458,6 +456,10 @@ failed authentication on named pipe %s.\n", domain, user_name, wks, p->name ));
p->ntlmssp_hash[256] = 0;
p->ntlmssp_hash[257] = 0;
}
+
+ dump_data_pw("NTLMSSP hash (v1)\n", p->ntlmssp_hash,
+ sizeof(p->ntlmssp_hash));
+
/* NTLMSSPhash(p->ntlmssp_hash, p24); */
p->ntlmssp_seq_num = 0;
@@ -546,7 +548,7 @@ BOOL api_pipe_bind_auth_resp(pipes_struct *p, prs_struct *rpc_in_p)
return False;
}
- if (autha_info.auth_type != NTLMSSP_AUTH_TYPE || autha_info.auth_level != NTLMSSP_AUTH_LEVEL) {
+ if (autha_info.auth_type != NTLMSSP_AUTH_TYPE || autha_info.auth_level != RPC_PIPE_AUTH_SEAL_LEVEL) {
DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_auth_resp: incorrect auth type (%d) or level (%d).\n",
(int)autha_info.auth_type, (int)autha_info.auth_level ));
return False;
@@ -1070,7 +1072,7 @@ BOOL api_pipe_bind_req(pipes_struct *p, prs_struct *rpc_in_p)
/*** Authentication info ***/
- init_rpc_hdr_auth(&auth_info, NTLMSSP_AUTH_TYPE, NTLMSSP_AUTH_LEVEL, RPC_HDR_AUTH_LEN, 1);
+ init_rpc_hdr_auth(&auth_info, NTLMSSP_AUTH_TYPE, RPC_PIPE_AUTH_SEAL_LEVEL, RPC_HDR_AUTH_LEN, 1);
if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr_auth("", &auth_info, &out_auth, 0)) {
DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_req: marshalling of RPC_HDR_AUTH failed.\n"));
goto err_exit;
@@ -1105,7 +1107,7 @@ BOOL api_pipe_bind_req(pipes_struct *p, prs_struct *rpc_in_p)
re-used from the auth2 the client did before. */
p->dc = last_dcinfo;
- init_rpc_hdr_auth(&auth_info, NETSEC_AUTH_TYPE, NETSEC_AUTH_LEVEL, RPC_HDR_AUTH_LEN, 1);
+ init_rpc_hdr_auth(&auth_info, NETSEC_AUTH_TYPE, RPC_PIPE_AUTH_SEAL_LEVEL, RPC_HDR_AUTH_LEN, 1);
if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr_auth("", &auth_info, &out_auth, 0)) {
DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_req: marshalling of RPC_HDR_AUTH failed.\n"));
goto err_exit;
@@ -1226,7 +1228,14 @@ BOOL api_pipe_auth_process(pipes_struct *p, prs_struct *rpc_in)
* has already been consumed.
*/
char *data = prs_data_p(rpc_in) + RPC_HDR_REQ_LEN;
+ dump_data_pw("NTLMSSP hash (v1)\n", p->ntlmssp_hash,
+ sizeof(p->ntlmssp_hash));
+
+ dump_data_pw("Incoming RPC PDU (NTLMSSP sealed)\n",
+ data, data_len);
NTLMSSPcalc_p(p, (uchar*)data, data_len);
+ dump_data_pw("Incoming RPC PDU (NTLMSSP unsealed)\n",
+ data, data_len);
crc32 = crc32_calc_buffer(data, data_len);
}
@@ -1335,7 +1344,7 @@ BOOL api_pipe_netsec_process(pipes_struct *p, prs_struct *rpc_in)
}
if ((auth_info.auth_type != NETSEC_AUTH_TYPE) ||
- (auth_info.auth_level != NETSEC_AUTH_LEVEL)) {
+ (auth_info.auth_level != RPC_PIPE_AUTH_SEAL_LEVEL)) {
DEBUG(0,("Invalid auth info %d or level %d on schannel\n",
auth_info.auth_type, auth_info.auth_level));
return False;
@@ -1346,7 +1355,10 @@ BOOL api_pipe_netsec_process(pipes_struct *p, prs_struct *rpc_in)
return False;
}
- if (!netsec_decode(&p->netsec_auth, &netsec_chk,
+ if (!netsec_decode(&p->netsec_auth,
+ AUTH_PIPE_NETSEC|AUTH_PIPE_SIGN|AUTH_PIPE_SEAL,
+ SENDER_IS_INITIATOR,
+ &netsec_chk,
prs_data_p(rpc_in)+old_offset, data_len)) {
DEBUG(0,("failed to decode PDU\n"));
return False;
diff --git a/source3/rpcclient/rpcclient.c b/source3/rpcclient/rpcclient.c
index 7c382a9813..af021962f5 100644
--- a/source3/rpcclient/rpcclient.c
+++ b/source3/rpcclient/rpcclient.c
@@ -319,6 +319,119 @@ static NTSTATUS cmd_quit(struct cli_state *cli, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
return NT_STATUS_OK; /* NOTREACHED */
}
+static NTSTATUS cmd_sign(struct cli_state *cli, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ int argc, const char **argv)
+{
+ if (cli->pipe_auth_flags == (AUTH_PIPE_NTLMSSP|AUTH_PIPE_SIGN)) {
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+ } else {
+ /* still have session, just need to use it again */
+ cli->pipe_auth_flags = AUTH_PIPE_NTLMSSP;
+ cli->pipe_auth_flags |= AUTH_PIPE_SIGN;
+ if (cli->nt_pipe_fnum != 0)
+ cli_nt_session_close(cli);
+ }
+
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+static NTSTATUS cmd_seal(struct cli_state *cli, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ int argc, const char **argv)
+{
+ if (cli->pipe_auth_flags == (AUTH_PIPE_NTLMSSP|AUTH_PIPE_SIGN|AUTH_PIPE_SEAL)) {
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+ } else {
+ /* still have session, just need to use it again */
+ cli->pipe_auth_flags = AUTH_PIPE_NTLMSSP;
+ cli->pipe_auth_flags |= AUTH_PIPE_SIGN;
+ cli->pipe_auth_flags |= AUTH_PIPE_SEAL;
+ if (cli->nt_pipe_fnum != 0)
+ cli_nt_session_close(cli);
+ }
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+static NTSTATUS cmd_none(struct cli_state *cli, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ int argc, const char **argv)
+{
+ if (cli->pipe_auth_flags == 0) {
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+ } else {
+ /* still have session, just need to use it again */
+ cli->pipe_auth_flags = 0;
+ if (cli->nt_pipe_fnum != 0)
+ cli_nt_session_close(cli);
+ }
+ cli->pipe_auth_flags = 0;
+
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+static NTSTATUS cmd_schannel(struct cli_state *cli, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ int argc, const char **argv)
+{
+ uchar trust_password[16];
+ uint32 sec_channel_type;
+ uint32 neg_flags = 0x000001ff;
+ NTSTATUS result;
+ static uchar zeros[16];
+
+ /* Cleanup */
+
+ if ((memcmp(cli->auth_info.sess_key, zeros, sizeof(cli->auth_info.sess_key)) != 0)
+ && (cli->saved_netlogon_pipe_fnum != 0)) {
+ if (cli->pipe_auth_flags == (AUTH_PIPE_NETSEC|AUTH_PIPE_SIGN|AUTH_PIPE_SEAL)) {
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+ } else {
+ /* still have session, just need to use it again */
+ cli->pipe_auth_flags = AUTH_PIPE_NETSEC;
+ cli->pipe_auth_flags |= AUTH_PIPE_SIGN;
+ cli->pipe_auth_flags |= AUTH_PIPE_SEAL;
+ if (cli->nt_pipe_fnum != 0)
+ cli_nt_session_close(cli);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (cli->nt_pipe_fnum != 0)
+ cli_nt_session_close(cli);
+
+ cli->pipe_auth_flags = 0;
+
+ if (!secrets_fetch_trust_account_password(lp_workgroup(),
+ trust_password,
+ NULL, &sec_channel_type)) {
+ return NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
+ }
+
+ if (!cli_nt_session_open(cli, PI_NETLOGON)) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("Could not initialise %s\n",
+ get_pipe_name_from_index(PI_NETLOGON)));
+ return NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
+ }
+
+ neg_flags |= NETLOGON_NEG_SCHANNEL;
+
+ result = cli_nt_setup_creds(cli, sec_channel_type, trust_password,
+ &neg_flags, 2);
+
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
+ ZERO_STRUCT(cli->auth_info.sess_key);
+ cli->pipe_auth_flags = 0;
+ return result;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(cli->auth_info.sess_key, cli->sess_key,
+ sizeof(cli->auth_info.sess_key));
+
+ cli->saved_netlogon_pipe_fnum = cli->nt_pipe_fnum;
+
+ cli->pipe_auth_flags = AUTH_PIPE_NETSEC;
+ cli->pipe_auth_flags |= AUTH_PIPE_SIGN;
+ cli->pipe_auth_flags |= AUTH_PIPE_SEAL;
+
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
/* Built in rpcclient commands */
static struct cmd_set rpcclient_commands[] = {
@@ -331,6 +444,10 @@ static struct cmd_set rpcclient_commands[] = {
{ "list", RPC_RTYPE_NTSTATUS, cmd_listcommands, NULL, -1, "List available commands on <pipe>", "pipe" },
{ "exit", RPC_RTYPE_NTSTATUS, cmd_quit, NULL, -1, "Exit program", "" },
{ "quit", RPC_RTYPE_NTSTATUS, cmd_quit, NULL, -1, "Exit program", "" },
+ { "sign", RPC_RTYPE_NTSTATUS, cmd_sign, NULL, -1, "Force RPC pipe connections to be signed", "" },
+ { "seal", RPC_RTYPE_NTSTATUS, cmd_seal, NULL, -1, "Force RPC pipe connections to be sealed", "" },
+ { "schannel", RPC_RTYPE_NTSTATUS, cmd_schannel, NULL, -1, "Force RPC pipe connections to be sealed with 'schannel' (NETSEC). Assumes valid machine account to this domain controller.", "" },
+ { "none", RPC_RTYPE_NTSTATUS, cmd_none, NULL, -1, "Force RPC pipe connections to have no special properties", "" },
{ NULL }
};
@@ -392,8 +509,9 @@ static NTSTATUS do_cmd(struct cli_state *cli,
struct cmd_set *cmd_entry,
int argc, char **argv)
{
- NTSTATUS ntresult;
- WERROR wresult;
+ NTSTATUS ntresult;
+ WERROR wresult;
+ uchar trust_password[16];
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
@@ -401,12 +519,16 @@ static NTSTATUS do_cmd(struct cli_state *cli,
if (!(mem_ctx = talloc_init("do_cmd"))) {
DEBUG(0, ("talloc_init() failed\n"));
- return NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
/* Open pipe */
- if (cmd_entry->pipe_idx != -1) {
+ if (cmd_entry->pipe_idx != -1
+ && cmd_entry->pipe_idx != cli->pipe_idx) {
+ if (cli->nt_pipe_fnum != 0)
+ cli_nt_session_close(cli);
+
if (!cli_nt_session_open(cli, cmd_entry->pipe_idx)) {
DEBUG(0, ("Could not initialise %s\n",
get_pipe_name_from_index(cmd_entry->pipe_idx)));
@@ -414,21 +536,25 @@ static NTSTATUS do_cmd(struct cli_state *cli,
}
}
- if (cmd_entry->pipe_idx == PI_NETLOGON) {
- uchar trust_password[16];
+ if ((cmd_entry->pipe_idx == PI_NETLOGON) && !(cli->pipe_auth_flags & AUTH_PIPE_NETSEC)) {
+ uint32 neg_flags = 0x000001ff;
uint32 sec_channel_type;
-
+
if (!secrets_fetch_trust_account_password(lp_workgroup(),
trust_password,
NULL, &sec_channel_type)) {
return NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
}
-
- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(cli_nt_establish_netlogon(cli, sec_channel_type,
- trust_password))) {
- DEBUG(0, ("Could not initialise NETLOGON pipe\n"));
- return NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
+
+ ntresult = cli_nt_setup_creds(cli, sec_channel_type,
+ trust_password,
+ &neg_flags, 2);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ntresult)) {
+ ZERO_STRUCT(cli->auth_info.sess_key);
+ printf("nt_setup_creds failed with %s\n", nt_errstr(ntresult));
+ return ntresult;
}
+
}
/* Run command */
@@ -450,9 +576,6 @@ static NTSTATUS do_cmd(struct cli_state *cli,
/* Cleanup */
- if (cmd_entry->pipe_idx != -1)
- cli_nt_session_close(cli);
-
talloc_destroy(mem_ctx);
return ntresult;
generated by cgit (git 2.34.1) at 2024-11-29 09:09:59 +0000