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author | Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> | 2001-09-19 05:26:11 +0000 |
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committer | Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> | 2001-09-19 05:26:11 +0000 |
commit | 6adafe50d4a9a75a6fe1f666232e0af1ac717513 (patch) | |
tree | e29f4759588fadfc5c81d6674f91d3568556c726 /source3 | |
parent | 2309cd7f6415e2908f25c73440e49818bd426de0 (diff) | |
download | samba-6adafe50d4a9a75a6fe1f666232e0af1ac717513.tar.gz samba-6adafe50d4a9a75a6fe1f666232e0af1ac717513.tar.bz2 samba-6adafe50d4a9a75a6fe1f666232e0af1ac717513.zip |
Remove the ugly hacks to get around the Get_Pwnam() calls in pass_check.c by
simply not doing Get_Pwnam() calls in pass_check.c
We now make *one* sys_getpnam() call in cgi.c and we always call PAM no matter
what it returns. We also no longer run the password cracker for these logins.
The truly parinod will note the slight difference in call paths, in that we only
call crypt for valid password structs (if not --with-pam). The truly parinoid
don't run SWAT either, so I don't think this is an issue.
Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit 9020d884935243f28c19cedc88f076f0709e12cb)
Diffstat (limited to 'source3')
-rw-r--r-- | source3/auth/auth_unix.c | 14 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | source3/auth/pass_check.c | 11 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | source3/passdb/pass_check.c | 11 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | source3/smbd/auth_unix.c | 14 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | source3/web/cgi.c | 71 |
5 files changed, 56 insertions, 65 deletions
diff --git a/source3/auth/auth_unix.c b/source3/auth/auth_unix.c index ea32a65457..7c6c58cafa 100644 --- a/source3/auth/auth_unix.c +++ b/source3/auth/auth_unix.c @@ -71,13 +71,19 @@ in PLAIN TEXT NTSTATUS check_unix_security(const auth_usersupplied_info *user_info, auth_serversupplied_info *server_info) { NTSTATUS nt_status; - + struct passwd *pass = NULL; + become_root(); - nt_status = (pass_check(user_info->unix_username.str, - user_info->plaintext_password.str, + + pass = Get_Pwnam(user_info->unix_username.str, False); + + nt_status = (pass_check(pass, + user_info->unix_username.str, + user_info->plaintext_password.str, user_info->plaintext_password.len, lp_update_encrypted() ? - update_smbpassword_file : NULL) + update_smbpassword_file : NULL, + True) ? NT_STATUS_OK : NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE); unbecome_root(); diff --git a/source3/auth/pass_check.c b/source3/auth/pass_check.c index 59fc9e2eac..7426bfcbe3 100644 --- a/source3/auth/pass_check.c +++ b/source3/auth/pass_check.c @@ -682,12 +682,11 @@ match is found and is used to update the encrypted password file return True on correct match, False otherwise ****************************************************************************/ -BOOL pass_check(char *user, char *password, int pwlen, - BOOL (*fn) (char *, char *)) +BOOL pass_check(struct passwd *pass, char *user, char *password, int pwlen, + BOOL (*fn) (char *, char *), BOOL run_cracker) { pstring pass2; int level = lp_passwordlevel(); - struct passwd *pass = NULL; if (password) password[pwlen] = 0; @@ -702,8 +701,6 @@ BOOL pass_check(char *user, char *password, int pwlen, if (((!*password) || (!pwlen)) && !lp_null_passwords()) return (False); - pass = Get_Pwnam(user, True); - #ifdef WITH_PAM /* @@ -819,6 +816,10 @@ BOOL pass_check(char *user, char *password, int pwlen, return (True); } + if (!run_cracker) { + return False; + } + /* if the password was given to us with mixed case then we don't need to proceed as we know it hasn't been case modified by the client */ diff --git a/source3/passdb/pass_check.c b/source3/passdb/pass_check.c index 59fc9e2eac..7426bfcbe3 100644 --- a/source3/passdb/pass_check.c +++ b/source3/passdb/pass_check.c @@ -682,12 +682,11 @@ match is found and is used to update the encrypted password file return True on correct match, False otherwise ****************************************************************************/ -BOOL pass_check(char *user, char *password, int pwlen, - BOOL (*fn) (char *, char *)) +BOOL pass_check(struct passwd *pass, char *user, char *password, int pwlen, + BOOL (*fn) (char *, char *), BOOL run_cracker) { pstring pass2; int level = lp_passwordlevel(); - struct passwd *pass = NULL; if (password) password[pwlen] = 0; @@ -702,8 +701,6 @@ BOOL pass_check(char *user, char *password, int pwlen, if (((!*password) || (!pwlen)) && !lp_null_passwords()) return (False); - pass = Get_Pwnam(user, True); - #ifdef WITH_PAM /* @@ -819,6 +816,10 @@ BOOL pass_check(char *user, char *password, int pwlen, return (True); } + if (!run_cracker) { + return False; + } + /* if the password was given to us with mixed case then we don't need to proceed as we know it hasn't been case modified by the client */ diff --git a/source3/smbd/auth_unix.c b/source3/smbd/auth_unix.c index ea32a65457..7c6c58cafa 100644 --- a/source3/smbd/auth_unix.c +++ b/source3/smbd/auth_unix.c @@ -71,13 +71,19 @@ in PLAIN TEXT NTSTATUS check_unix_security(const auth_usersupplied_info *user_info, auth_serversupplied_info *server_info) { NTSTATUS nt_status; - + struct passwd *pass = NULL; + become_root(); - nt_status = (pass_check(user_info->unix_username.str, - user_info->plaintext_password.str, + + pass = Get_Pwnam(user_info->unix_username.str, False); + + nt_status = (pass_check(pass, + user_info->unix_username.str, + user_info->plaintext_password.str, user_info->plaintext_password.len, lp_update_encrypted() ? - update_smbpassword_file : NULL) + update_smbpassword_file : NULL, + True) ? NT_STATUS_OK : NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE); unbecome_root(); diff --git a/source3/web/cgi.c b/source3/web/cgi.c index 3547379084..b4356af46e 100644 --- a/source3/web/cgi.c +++ b/source3/web/cgi.c @@ -362,14 +362,6 @@ static BOOL cgi_handle_authorization(char *line) { char *p, *user, *user_pass; struct passwd *pass = NULL; - BOOL got_name = False; - BOOL tested_pass = False; - fstring default_user_lookup; - fstring default_user_pass; - - /* Dummy user lookup to take the same time as a valid user. */ - fstrcpy(default_user_lookup, "zzzz bibble"); - fstrcpy(default_user_pass, "123456789"); if (strncasecmp(line,"Basic ", 6)) { goto err; @@ -387,55 +379,40 @@ static BOOL cgi_handle_authorization(char *line) *p = 0; user = line; user_pass = p+1; - + /* * Try and get the user from the UNIX password file. */ - - if(!(pass = Get_Pwnam(user,False))) { - /* - * Always give the same error so a cracker - * cannot tell why we fail. - */ - got_name = True; - goto err; - } - + + pass = sys_getpwnam(user); + /* * Validate the password they have given. */ - - tested_pass = True; - - if(pass_check(user, user_pass, strlen(user_pass), NULL) == True) { - - /* - * Password was ok. - */ - - if(pass->pw_uid != 0) { + + if (pass_check(pass, user, user_pass, + strlen(user_pass), NULL, False)) { + + if (pass) { /* - * We have not authenticated as root, - * become the user *permanently*. + * Password was ok. */ - become_user_permanently(pass->pw_uid, pass->pw_gid); + + if(pass->pw_uid != 0) { + /* + * We have not authenticated as root, + * become the user *permanently*. + */ + become_user_permanently(pass->pw_uid, pass->pw_gid); + } + + /* Save the users name */ + C_user = strdup(user); + return True; } - - /* Save the users name */ - C_user = strdup(user); - return True; } - - err: - - /* Always take the same time. */ - if (!got_name) - Get_Pwnam(default_user_lookup,False); - - if (!tested_pass) - pass_check(default_user_lookup, default_user_pass, - strlen(default_user_pass), NULL); - + +err: cgi_setup_error("401 Bad Authorization", "", "username or password incorrect"); |