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author | Volker Lendecke <vlendec@samba.org> | 2003-09-07 16:36:13 +0000 |
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committer | Volker Lendecke <vlendec@samba.org> | 2003-09-07 16:36:13 +0000 |
commit | 1c38391c704756c31c1d8d7f84f9ac6ffcaeda34 (patch) | |
tree | 441c2ae1a1649d71db20ef907c779f5c32a13e63 /source3 | |
parent | c4b69a9ca1e7881aa6d37056ed12d8ccd18b0a41 (diff) | |
download | samba-1c38391c704756c31c1d8d7f84f9ac6ffcaeda34.tar.gz samba-1c38391c704756c31c1d8d7f84f9ac6ffcaeda34.tar.bz2 samba-1c38391c704756c31c1d8d7f84f9ac6ffcaeda34.zip |
Nobody complained on the team-list, so commit it ...
This implements some kind of improved AFS support for Samba on Linux with
OpenAFS 1.2.10. ./configure --with-fake-kaserver assumes that you have
OpenAFS on your machine. To use this, you have to put the AFS server's KeyFile
into secrets.tdb with 'net afskey'. If this is done, on each tree connect
smbd creates a Kerberos V4 ticket suitable for use by the AFS client and
gives it to the kernel via the AFS syscall. This is meant to be very
light-weight, so I did not link in a whole lot of libraries to be more
platform-independent using the ka_SetToken function call.
Volker
(This used to be commit 5775690ee8e17d3e98355b5147e4aed47e8dc213)
Diffstat (limited to 'source3')
-rw-r--r-- | source3/Makefile.in | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | source3/configure.in | 16 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | source3/include/secrets.h | 17 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | source3/lib/afs.c | 248 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | source3/passdb/secrets.c | 53 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | source3/smbd/service.c | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | source3/utils/net.c | 47 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | source3/utils/net_help.c | 3 |
8 files changed, 390 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/source3/Makefile.in b/source3/Makefile.in index 00b98e79b2..f79af7cb4e 100644 --- a/source3/Makefile.in +++ b/source3/Makefile.in @@ -347,7 +347,7 @@ SMBD_OBJ_SRV = smbd/files.o smbd/chgpasswd.o smbd/connection.o \ smbd/process.o smbd/service.o smbd/error.o \ printing/printfsp.o lib/util_seaccess.o \ lib/sysquotas.o smbd/change_trust_pw.o smbd/fake_file.o \ - smbd/quotas.o smbd/ntquotas.o \ + smbd/quotas.o smbd/ntquotas.o lib/afs.o \ $(MANGLE_OBJ) @VFS_STATIC@ SMBD_OBJ_BASE = $(PARAM_OBJ) $(SMBD_OBJ_SRV) $(MSDFS_OBJ) $(LIBSMB_OBJ) \ @@ -492,7 +492,7 @@ NET_OBJ = $(NET_OBJ1) $(PARAM_OBJ) $(SECRETS_OBJ) $(LIBSMB_OBJ) \ $(KRBCLIENT_OBJ) $(UBIQX_OBJ) $(LIB_OBJ) \ $(LIBMSRPC_OBJ) $(IDMAP_OBJ) \ $(LIBADS_OBJ) $(LIBADS_SERVER_OBJ) $(POPT_LIB_OBJ) \ - $(SMBLDAP_OBJ) $(DCUTIL_OBJ) lib/dummyroot.o lib/server_mutex.o + $(SMBLDAP_OBJ) $(DCUTIL_OBJ) lib/dummyroot.o lib/server_mutex.o lib/afs.o CUPS_OBJ = client/smbspool.o $(PARAM_OBJ) $(LIBSMB_OBJ) $(UBIQX_OBJ) \ $(LIB_OBJ) $(KRBCLIENT_OBJ) $(SECRETS_OBJ) diff --git a/source3/configure.in b/source3/configure.in index 92fdfc10cd..27eeaaeab1 100644 --- a/source3/configure.in +++ b/source3/configure.in @@ -2181,6 +2181,22 @@ AC_ARG_WITH(afs, AC_MSG_RESULT(no) ) +#################################################### +# check for Linux-specific AFS fake-kaserver support +AC_MSG_CHECKING(whether to use AFS fake-kaserver) +AC_ARG_WITH(fake-kaserver, +[ --with-fake-kaserver Include AFS fake-kaserver support (default=no) ], +[ case "$withval" in + yes) + AC_MSG_RESULT(yes) + AC_DEFINE(WITH_FAKE_KASERVER,1,[Whether to include AFS fake-kaserver support]) + ;; + *) + AC_MSG_RESULT(no) + ;; + esac ], + AC_MSG_RESULT(no) +) ################################################# # check for the DFS clear-text auth system diff --git a/source3/include/secrets.h b/source3/include/secrets.h index dacfef26ea..cb4fbd043a 100644 --- a/source3/include/secrets.h +++ b/source3/include/secrets.h @@ -77,5 +77,22 @@ typedef struct trustdom { DOM_SID sid; } TRUSTDOM; +/* + * Format of an OpenAFS keyfile + */ + +#define SECRETS_AFS_MAXKEYS 8 + +struct afs_key { + uint32 kvno; + char key[8]; +}; + +struct afs_keyfile { + uint32 nkeys; + struct afs_key entry[SECRETS_AFS_MAXKEYS]; +}; + +#define SECRETS_AFS_KEYFILE "SECRETS/AFS_KEYFILE" #endif /* _SECRETS_H */ diff --git a/source3/lib/afs.c b/source3/lib/afs.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b96703e986 --- /dev/null +++ b/source3/lib/afs.c @@ -0,0 +1,248 @@ +/* + * Unix SMB/CIFS implementation. + * Generate AFS tickets + * Copyright (C) Volker Lendecke 2003 + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or + * (at your option) any later version. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software + * Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#ifdef WITH_FAKE_KASERVER + +#include <afs/stds.h> +#include <afs/afs.h> +#include <afs/auth.h> +#include <afs/venus.h> +#include <asm/unistd.h> +#include <openssl/des.h> + +_syscall5(int, afs_syscall, int, subcall, + char *, path, + int, cmd, + char *, cmarg, + int, follow); + +char *afs_cell(void) +{ + static char *cell = NULL; + + if (cell == NULL) { + cell = strdup(lp_realm()); + strlower_m(cell); + } + + return cell; +} + +struct ClearToken { + uint32 AuthHandle; + char HandShakeKey[8]; + uint32 ViceId; + uint32 BeginTimestamp; + uint32 EndTimestamp; +}; + +/* + Put an AFS token into the Kernel so that it can authenticate against + the AFS server. This assumes correct local uid settings. + + This is currently highly Linux and OpenAFS-specific. The correct API + call for this would be ktc_SetToken. But to do that we would have to + import a REALLY big bunch of libraries which I would currently like + to avoid. +*/ + +static BOOL afs_settoken(char *username, const struct ClearToken *ctok, + char *v4tkt_data, int v4tkt_length) +{ + int ret; + struct { + char *in, *out; + uint16 in_size, out_size; + } iob; + + char buf[1024]; + char *p = buf; + int tmp; + + memcpy(p, &v4tkt_length, sizeof(uint32)); + p += sizeof(uint32); + memcpy(p, v4tkt_data, v4tkt_length); + p += v4tkt_length; + + tmp = sizeof(struct ClearToken); + memcpy(p, &tmp, sizeof(uint32)); + p += sizeof(uint32); + memcpy(p, ctok, tmp); + p += tmp; + + tmp = 0; + + memcpy(p, &tmp, sizeof(uint32)); + p += sizeof(uint32); + + tmp = strlen(afs_cell()); + if (tmp >= MAXKTCREALMLEN) { + DEBUG(1, ("Realm too long\n")); + return False; + } + + strncpy(p, afs_cell(), tmp); + p += tmp; + *p = 0; + p +=1; + + iob.in = buf; + iob.in_size = PTR_DIFF(p,buf); + iob.out = buf; + iob.out_size = sizeof(buf); + +#if 0 + file_save("/tmp/ioctlbuf", iob.in, iob.in_size); +#endif + + ret = afs_syscall(AFSCALL_PIOCTL, 0, VIOCSETTOK, (char *)&iob, 0); + + DEBUG(10, ("afs VIOCSETTOK returned %d\n", ret)); + return (ret == 0); +} + +/* + This routine takes a radical approach completely defeating the + Kerberos idea of security and using AFS simply as an intelligent + file backend. Samba has persuaded itself somehow that the user is + actually correctly identified and then we create a ticket that the + AFS server hopefully accepts using its KeyFile that the admin has + kindly stored to our secrets.tdb. + + Thanks to the book "Network Security -- PRIVATE Communication in a + PUBLIC World" by Charlie Kaufman, Radia Perlman and Mike Speciner + Kerberos 4 tickets are not really hard to construct. + + For the comments "Alice" is the User to be auth'ed, and "Bob" is the + AFS server. */ + +BOOL afs_login(char *username) +{ + fstring ticket; + char *p = ticket; + uint32 len; + struct afs_key key; + + struct ClearToken ct; + + uint32 now; /* I assume time() returns 32 bit */ + + des_key_schedule key_schedule; + + DEBUG(10, ("Trying to log into AFS for user %s@%s\n", + username, afs_cell())); + + if (!secrets_init()) + return False; + + if (!secrets_fetch_afs_key(afs_cell(), &key)) { + DEBUG(5, ("Could not fetch AFS service key\n")); + return False; + } + + ct.AuthHandle = key.kvno; + + /* Build the ticket. This is going to be encrypted, so in our + way we fill in ct while we still have the unencrypted + form. */ + + p = ticket; + + /* The byte-order */ + *p = 1; + p += 1; + + /* "Alice", the client username */ + strncpy(p, username, sizeof(ticket)-PTR_DIFF(p,ticket)-1); + p += strlen(p)+1; + strncpy(p, "", sizeof(ticket)-PTR_DIFF(p,ticket)-1); + p += strlen(p)+1; + strncpy(p, afs_cell(), sizeof(ticket)-PTR_DIFF(p,ticket)-1); + p += strlen(p)+1; + + ct.ViceId = getuid(); + DEBUG(10, ("Creating Token for uid %d\n", ct.ViceId)); + + /* Alice's network layer address. At least Openafs-1.2.10 + ignores this, so we fill in a dummy value here. */ + SIVAL(p, 0, 0); + p += 4; + + /* We need to create a session key */ + generate_random_buffer(p, 8, False); + + /* Our client code needs the the key in the clear, it does not + know the server-key ... */ + memcpy(ct.HandShakeKey, p, 8); + + p += 8; + + /* Ticket lifetime. We fake everything here, so go as long as + possible. This is in 5-minute intervals, so 255 is 21 hours + and 15 minutes.*/ + *p = 255; + p += 1; + + /* Ticket creation time */ + now = time(NULL); + SIVAL(p, 0, now); + ct.BeginTimestamp = now; + + ct.EndTimestamp = now + (255*60*5); + if (((ct.EndTimestamp - ct.BeginTimestamp) & 1) == 1) { + ct.BeginTimestamp += 1; /* Lifetime must be even */ + } + p += 4; + + /* And here comes Bob's name and instance, in this case the + AFS server. */ + strncpy(p, "afs", sizeof(ticket)-PTR_DIFF(p,ticket)-1); + p += strlen(p)+1; + strncpy(p, "", sizeof(ticket)-PTR_DIFF(p,ticket)-1); + p += strlen(p)+1; + + /* And zero-pad to a multiple of 8 bytes */ + len = PTR_DIFF(p, ticket); + if (len & 7) { + uint32 extra_space = 8-(len & 7); + memset(p, 0, extra_space); + p+=extra_space; + } + len = PTR_DIFF(p, ticket); + + des_key_sched((const_des_cblock *)key.key, key_schedule); + des_pcbc_encrypt(ticket, ticket, + len, key_schedule, (C_Block *)key.key, 1); + + ZERO_STRUCT(key); + + return afs_settoken(username, &ct, ticket, len); +} + +#else + +BOOL afs_login(char *username) +{ + return True; +} + +#endif /* WITH_FAKE_KASERVER */ diff --git a/source3/passdb/secrets.c b/source3/passdb/secrets.c index 2c99631e13..8a146f0d68 100644 --- a/source3/passdb/secrets.c +++ b/source3/passdb/secrets.c @@ -738,3 +738,56 @@ BOOL must_use_pdc( const char *domain ) } +/******************************************************************************* + Store a complete AFS keyfile into secrets.tdb. +*******************************************************************************/ + +BOOL secrets_store_afs_keyfile(const char *cell, const struct afs_keyfile *keyfile) +{ + fstring key; + + if ((cell == NULL) || (keyfile == NULL)) + return False; + + if (ntohl(keyfile->nkeys) > SECRETS_AFS_MAXKEYS) + return False; + + slprintf(key, sizeof(key)-1, "%s/%s", SECRETS_AFS_KEYFILE, cell); + return secrets_store(key, keyfile, sizeof(struct afs_keyfile)); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + Fetch the current (highest) AFS key from secrets.tdb +*******************************************************************************/ +BOOL secrets_fetch_afs_key(const char *cell, struct afs_key *result) +{ + fstring key; + struct afs_keyfile *keyfile; + size_t size; + uint32 i; + + slprintf(key, sizeof(key)-1, "%s/%s", SECRETS_AFS_KEYFILE, cell); + + keyfile = (struct afs_keyfile *)secrets_fetch(key, &size); + + if (keyfile == NULL) + return False; + + if (size != sizeof(struct afs_keyfile)) { + SAFE_FREE(keyfile); + return False; + } + + i = ntohl(keyfile->nkeys); + + if (i > SECRETS_AFS_MAXKEYS) { + SAFE_FREE(keyfile); + return False; + } + + *result = keyfile->entry[i-1]; + + result->kvno = ntohl(result->kvno); + + return True; +} diff --git a/source3/smbd/service.c b/source3/smbd/service.c index f75c920069..f9f264c270 100644 --- a/source3/smbd/service.c +++ b/source3/smbd/service.c @@ -642,6 +642,10 @@ static connection_struct *make_connection_snum(int snum, user_struct *vuser, return NULL; } } + +#ifdef WITH_FAKE_KASERVER + afs_login(user); +#endif #if CHECK_PATH_ON_TCONX /* win2000 does not check the permissions on the directory diff --git a/source3/utils/net.c b/source3/utils/net.c index 080b0f4c8a..e5c078da29 100644 --- a/source3/utils/net.c +++ b/source3/utils/net.c @@ -462,6 +462,50 @@ static int net_getdomainsid(int argc, const char **argv) return 0; } +#ifdef WITH_FAKE_KASERVER + +int net_afskey_usage(int argc, const char **argv) +{ + d_printf(" net afskey filename\n" + "\tImports a OpenAFS KeyFile into our secrets.tdb\n\n"); + return -1; +} + +static int net_afskey(int argc, const char **argv) +{ + int fd; + struct afs_keyfile keyfile; + + if (argc != 1) { + d_printf("usage: 'net afskey <keyfile>'\n"); + return -1; + } + + if (!secrets_init()) { + d_printf("Could not open secrets.tdb\n"); + return -1; + } + + if ((fd = open(argv[0], O_RDONLY, 0)) < 0) { + d_printf("Could not open %s\n", argv[0]); + return -1; + } + + if (read(fd, &keyfile, sizeof(keyfile)) != sizeof(keyfile)) { + d_printf("Could not read keyfile\n"); + return -1; + } + + if (!secrets_store_afs_keyfile(afs_cell(), &keyfile)) { + d_printf("Could not write keyfile to secrets.tdb\n"); + return -1; + } + + return 0; +} + +#endif /* WITH_FAKE_KASERVER */ + static uint32 get_maxrid(void) { SAM_ACCOUNT *pwd = NULL; @@ -572,6 +616,9 @@ static struct functable net_func[] = { {"GETDOMAINSID", net_getdomainsid}, {"MAXRID", net_maxrid}, {"IDMAP", net_idmap}, +#ifdef WITH_FAKE_KASERVER + {"AFSKEY", net_afskey}, +#endif {"HELP", net_help}, {NULL, NULL} diff --git a/source3/utils/net_help.c b/source3/utils/net_help.c index 272a06bc90..95116a4d2a 100644 --- a/source3/utils/net_help.c +++ b/source3/utils/net_help.c @@ -196,6 +196,9 @@ int net_help(int argc, const char **argv) {"PASSWORD", net_rap_password_usage}, {"TIME", net_time_usage}, {"LOOKUP", net_lookup_usage}, +#ifdef WITH_FAKE_KASERVER + {"AFSKEY", net_afskey_usage}, +#endif {"HELP", help_usage}, {NULL, NULL}}; 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