split session setup code out of reply.c in preparation for adding

NTLMSSP and kerberos support in smbd
(This used to be commit 38a43d75e25bbebe0f6cdfcf389129a842ede842)

3 files changed, 357 insertions, 345 deletions

diff --git a/source3/Makefile.in b/source3/Makefile.in
index 9f4e48fc16..108c4f103e 100644
--- a/source3/Makefile.in
+++ b/source3/Makefile.in
@@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ SMBD_OBJ1 = smbd/server.o smbd/files.o smbd/chgpasswd.o smbd/connection.o \
             smbd/dfree.o smbd/dir.o smbd/password.o smbd/conn.o smbd/fileio.o \
             smbd/ipc.o smbd/lanman.o smbd/mangle.o smbd/negprot.o \
             smbd/message.o smbd/nttrans.o smbd/pipes.o \
-            smbd/reply.o smbd/trans2.o smbd/uid.o \
+            smbd/reply.o smbd/sesssetup.o smbd/trans2.o smbd/uid.o \
 	    smbd/dosmode.o smbd/filename.o smbd/open.o smbd/close.o \
 	    smbd/blocking.o smbd/sec_ctx.o \
 	    smbd/vfs.o smbd/vfs-wrap.o smbd/statcache.o \
diff --git a/source3/smbd/reply.c b/source3/smbd/reply.c
index 334a48e338..8b6e754549 100644
--- a/source3/smbd/reply.c
+++ b/source3/smbd/reply.c
@@ -44,20 +44,6 @@ unsigned int smb_echo_count = 0;
 extern fstring remote_machine;
 extern BOOL global_encrypted_passwords_negotiated;
 
-/****************************************************************************
-report a possible attack via the password buffer overflow bug
-****************************************************************************/
-
-static void overflow_attack(int len)
-{
-	if( DEBUGLVL( 0 ) ) {
-		dbgtext( "ERROR: Invalid password length %d.\n", len );
-		dbgtext( "Your machine may be under attack by someone " );
-		dbgtext( "attempting to exploit an old bug.\n" );
-		dbgtext( "Attack was from IP = %s.\n", client_addr() );
-	}
-}
-
 
 /****************************************************************************
   reply to an special message 
@@ -231,8 +217,7 @@ int reply_tcon_and_X(connection_struct *conn, char *inbuf,char *outbuf,int lengt
 	}
 
 	if (passlen > MAX_PASS_LEN) {
-		overflow_attack(passlen);
-		return(ERROR_DOS(ERRDOS,ERRbuftoosmall));
+		return ERROR_DOS(ERRDOS,ERRbuftoosmall);
 	}
  
 	memcpy(password,smb_buf(inbuf),passlen);
@@ -373,334 +358,6 @@ int reply_ioctl(connection_struct *conn,
 }
 
 /****************************************************************************
-reply to a session setup command
-****************************************************************************/
-
-int reply_sesssetup_and_X(connection_struct *conn, char *inbuf,char *outbuf,int length,int bufsize)
-{
-  int sess_vuid;
-  gid_t gid;
-  uid_t uid;
-  char* full_name;
-  int   smb_bufsize;    
-  int   smb_apasslen = 0;   
-  pstring smb_apasswd;
-  int   smb_ntpasslen = 0;   
-  pstring smb_ntpasswd;
-  pstring user;
-  pstring orig_user;
-  fstring domain;
-  fstring native_os;
-  fstring native_lanman;
-  BOOL guest=False;
-  static BOOL done_sesssetup = False;
-  BOOL doencrypt = global_encrypted_passwords_negotiated;
-  START_PROFILE(SMBsesssetupX);
-
-  *smb_apasswd = *smb_ntpasswd = 0;
-  
-  smb_bufsize = SVAL(inbuf,smb_vwv2);
-  
-  if (Protocol < PROTOCOL_NT1) {
-    smb_apasslen = SVAL(inbuf,smb_vwv7);
-    if (smb_apasslen > MAX_PASS_LEN) {
-	    overflow_attack(smb_apasslen);
-	    return(ERROR_DOS(ERRDOS,ERRbuftoosmall));
-    }
-
-    memcpy(smb_apasswd,smb_buf(inbuf),smb_apasslen);
-    srvstr_pull(inbuf, user, smb_buf(inbuf)+smb_apasslen, sizeof(user), -1, STR_TERMINATE);
-    
-    if (!doencrypt && (lp_security() != SEC_SERVER)) {
-      smb_apasslen = strlen(smb_apasswd);
-    }
-  } else {
-    uint16 passlen1 = SVAL(inbuf,smb_vwv7);
-    uint16 passlen2 = SVAL(inbuf,smb_vwv8);
-    enum remote_arch_types ra_type = get_remote_arch();
-    char *p = smb_buf(inbuf);    
-
-    if(global_client_caps == 0)
-      global_client_caps = IVAL(inbuf,smb_vwv11);
-
-    /* client_caps is used as final determination if client is NT or Win95. 
-       This is needed to return the correct error codes in some
-       circumstances.
-     */
-    
-    if(ra_type == RA_WINNT || ra_type == RA_WIN2K || ra_type == RA_WIN95) {
-      if(!(global_client_caps & (CAP_NT_SMBS | CAP_STATUS32))) {
-        set_remote_arch( RA_WIN95);
-      }
-    }
-
-    if (passlen1 != 24 && passlen2 < 24)
-	    doencrypt = False;
-
-    if (passlen1 > MAX_PASS_LEN) {
-	    overflow_attack(passlen1);
-	    return ERROR_DOS(ERRDOS,ERRbuftoosmall);
-    }
-
-    passlen1 = MIN(passlen1, MAX_PASS_LEN);
-    passlen2 = MIN(passlen2, MAX_PASS_LEN);
-
-    if (!doencrypt) {
-       /* both Win95 and WinNT stuff up the password lengths for
-          non-encrypting systems. Uggh. 
-      
-          if passlen1==24 its a win95 system, and its setting the
-          password length incorrectly. Luckily it still works with the
-          default code because Win95 will null terminate the password
-          anyway 
-
-          if passlen1>0 and passlen2>0 then maybe its a NT box and its
-          setting passlen2 to some random value which really stuffs
-          things up. we need to fix that one.  */
-
-      if (passlen1 > 0 && passlen2 > 0 && passlen2 != 24 && passlen2 != 1)
-        passlen2 = 0;
-    }
-
-    if (lp_restrict_anonymous()) {
-      /* there seems to be no reason behind the differences in MS clients formatting
-       * various info like the domain, NativeOS, and NativeLanMan fields. Win95
-       * in particular seems to have an extra null byte between the username and the
-       * domain, or the password length calculation is wrong, which throws off the
-       * string extraction routines below.  This makes the value of domain be the
-       * empty string, which fails the restrict anonymous check further down.
-       * This compensates for that, and allows browsing to work in mixed NT and
-       * win95 environments even when restrict anonymous is true. AAB
-       */
-      dump_data(100, p, 0x70);
-      DEBUG(9, ("passlen1=%d, passlen2=%d\n", passlen1, passlen2));
-      if (ra_type == RA_WIN95 && !passlen1 && !passlen2 && p[0] == 0 && p[1] == 0) {
-        DEBUG(0, ("restrict anonymous parameter used in a win95 environment!\n"));
-        DEBUG(0, ("client is win95 and broken passlen1 offset -- attempting fix\n"));
-        DEBUG(0, ("if win95 cilents are having difficulty browsing, you will be unable to use restrict anonymous\n"));
-        passlen1 = 1;
-      }
-    }
-
-    /* Save the lanman2 password and the NT md4 password. */
-    smb_apasslen = passlen1;
-    memcpy(smb_apasswd,p,smb_apasslen);
-
-    smb_ntpasslen = passlen2;
-    memcpy(smb_ntpasswd,p+passlen1,smb_ntpasslen);
-
-    if (smb_apasslen != 24 || !doencrypt) {
-	    /* trim the password */
-	    smb_apasslen = strlen(smb_apasswd);
-	    
-	    /* wfwg sometimes uses a space instead of a null */
-	    if (strequal(smb_apasswd," ")) {
-		    smb_apasslen = 0;
-		    *smb_apasswd = 0;
-	    }
-    }
-    
-    p += passlen1 + passlen2;
-    p += srvstr_pull(inbuf, user, p, sizeof(user), -1,
-    		STR_TERMINATE);
-    /*
-     * Incoming user and domain are in DOS codepage format. Convert
-     * to UNIX.
-     */
-    p += srvstr_pull(inbuf, domain, p, sizeof(domain), 
-		     -1, STR_TERMINATE);
-    p += srvstr_pull(inbuf, native_os, p, sizeof(native_os), 
-		     -1, STR_TERMINATE);
-    p += srvstr_pull(inbuf, native_lanman, p, sizeof(native_lanman),
-		     -1, STR_TERMINATE);
-    DEBUG(3,("Domain=[%s]  NativeOS=[%s] NativeLanMan=[%s]\n",
-	     domain,native_os,native_lanman));
-  }
-  
-  /* don't allow for weird usernames or domains */
-  alpha_strcpy(user, user, ". _-$", sizeof(user));
-  alpha_strcpy(domain, domain, ". _-", sizeof(domain));
-  if (strstr(user, "..") || strstr(domain,"..")) {
-	  return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
-  }
-
-  if (lp_security() == SEC_SHARE) {
-	  /* in share level we should ignore any passwords */
-	  smb_ntpasslen = 0;
-	  smb_apasslen = 0;
-	  guest = True;
-  }
-
-
-  DEBUG(3,("sesssetupX:name=[%s]\\[%s]@[%s]\n",user, domain, remote_machine));
-
-  if (done_sesssetup && lp_restrict_anonymous()) {
-    /* tests show that even if browsing is done over already validated connections
-     * without a username and password the domain is still provided, which it
-     * wouldn't be if it was a purely anonymous connection.  So, in order to
-     * restrict anonymous, we only deny connections that have no session
-     * information.  If a domain has been provided, then it's not a purely
-     * anonymous connection. AAB
-     */
-    if (!*user && !*smb_apasswd && !*domain) {
-      DEBUG(0, ("restrict anonymous is True and anonymous connection attempted. Denying access.\n"));
-      END_PROFILE(SMBsesssetupX);
-      return ERROR_DOS(ERRDOS,ERRnoaccess);
-    }
-  }
-
-  /* If no username is sent use the guest account */
-  if (!*user) {
-	  pstrcpy(user,lp_guestaccount(-1));
-	  guest = True;
-  }
-
-  pstrcpy(current_user_info.smb_name,user);
-
-  reload_services(True);
-
-  /*
-   * Save the username before mapping. We will use
-   * the original username sent to us for security=server
-   * and security=domain checking.
-   */
-
-  pstrcpy( orig_user, user);
-
-  /*
-   * Always try the "DOMAIN\user" lookup first, as this is the most
-   * specific case. If this fails then try the simple "user" lookup.
-   * But don't do this for guests, as this is always a local user.
-   */
- 
-  if (!guest) {
-    pstring dom_user;
- 
-    /* Work out who's who */
- 
-    slprintf(dom_user, sizeof(dom_user) - 1,"%s%s%s",
-	     domain, lp_winbind_separator(), user);
- 
-    if (sys_getpwnam(dom_user) != NULL) {
-      pstrcpy(user, dom_user);
-      DEBUG(3,("Using unix username %s\n", dom_user));
-    }
-
-    /*
-     * Pass the user through the NT -> unix user mapping
-     * function.
-     */
-    
-    (void)map_username(user);
-    
-    /*
-     * Do any UNIX username case mangling.
-     */
-    smb_getpwnam(user, True);
-  }
-  
-  add_session_user(user);
-
-  if (!guest) {
-	  NTSTATUS nt_status;
-	  nt_status = pass_check_smb(orig_user, user, 
-				     domain, remote_machine,
-				     (unsigned char *)smb_apasswd, 
-				     smb_apasslen, 
-				     (unsigned char *)smb_ntpasswd,
-				     smb_ntpasslen);
-	  
-	  if NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status) {
-
-	  } else if NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER) {
-		  if ((lp_map_to_guest() == MAP_TO_GUEST_ON_BAD_USER) || 
-		      (lp_map_to_guest() ==  MAP_TO_GUEST_ON_BAD_PASSWORD)) {
-			  DEBUG(3,("No such user %s [%s] - using guest account\n",user, domain));
-			  pstrcpy(user,lp_guestaccount(-1));
-			  guest = True;
-		  } else {
-			  /* Match WinXP and don't give the game away */
-			  return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
-		  }
-	  } else if NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD) {
-		  if (lp_map_to_guest() ==  MAP_TO_GUEST_ON_BAD_PASSWORD) {
-			  pstrcpy(user,lp_guestaccount(-1));
-			  DEBUG(3,("Registered username %s for guest access\n",user));
-			  guest = True;
-		  } else {
-			  /* Match WinXP and don't give the game away */
-			  return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
-		  }
-	  } else {
-		  return ERROR_NT(nt_status);
-	  }
-  }
-  
-  if (!strequal(user,lp_guestaccount(-1)) &&
-      lp_servicenumber(user) < 0)      
-  {
-	add_home_service(user,get_user_home_dir(user));
-  }
-
-
-  /* it's ok - setup a reply */
-  if (Protocol < PROTOCOL_NT1) {
-    set_message(outbuf,3,0,True);
-  } else {
-    char *p;
-    set_message(outbuf,3,0,True);
-    p = smb_buf(outbuf);
-    p += srvstr_push(outbuf, p, "Unix", -1, STR_TERMINATE);
-    p += srvstr_push(outbuf, p, "Samba", -1, STR_TERMINATE);
-    p += srvstr_push(outbuf, p, lp_workgroup(), -1, STR_TERMINATE);
-    set_message_end(outbuf,p);
-    /* perhaps grab OS version here?? */
-  }
-
-  /* Set the correct uid in the outgoing and incoming packets
-     We will use this on future requests to determine which
-     user we should become.
-     */
-  {
-    const struct passwd *pw = smb_getpwnam(user,False);
-    if (!pw) {
-      DEBUG(1,("Username %s is invalid on this system\n",user));
-      END_PROFILE(SMBsesssetupX);
-      return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
-    }
-    gid = pw->pw_gid;
-    uid = pw->pw_uid;
-    full_name = pw->pw_gecos;
-  }
-
-  if (guest)
-    SSVAL(outbuf,smb_vwv2,1);
-
-  /* register the name and uid as being validated, so further connections
-     to a uid can get through without a password, on the same VC */
-
-  sess_vuid = register_vuid(uid,gid,user,orig_user,domain,guest, full_name);
-  
-  if (sess_vuid == -1) {
-      return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
-  }
-
- 
-  SSVAL(outbuf,smb_uid,sess_vuid);
-  SSVAL(inbuf,smb_uid,sess_vuid);
-
-  if (!done_sesssetup)
-    max_send = MIN(max_send,smb_bufsize);
-
-  DEBUG(6,("Client requested max send size of %d\n", max_send));
-
-  done_sesssetup = True;
-
-  END_PROFILE(SMBsesssetupX);
-  return chain_reply(inbuf,outbuf,length,bufsize);
-}
-
-/****************************************************************************
   reply to a chkpth
 ****************************************************************************/
 int reply_chkpth(connection_struct *conn, char *inbuf,char *outbuf, int dum_size, int dum_buffsize)
diff --git a/source3/smbd/sesssetup.c b/source3/smbd/sesssetup.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..45fa2d6a4a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/source3/smbd/sesssetup.c
@@ -0,0 +1,355 @@
+/* 
+   Unix SMB/Netbios implementation.
+   Version 3.0
+   handle SMBsessionsetup
+   Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 1998-2001
+   Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett      2001
+
+   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+   the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+   (at your option) any later version.
+   
+   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+   GNU General Public License for more details.
+   
+   You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+   along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+   Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
+*/
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+/****************************************************************************
+reply to a session setup command
+****************************************************************************/
+int reply_sesssetup_and_X(connection_struct *conn, char *inbuf,char *outbuf,
+			  int length,int bufsize)
+{
+	int sess_vuid;
+	gid_t gid;
+	uid_t uid;
+	char* full_name;
+	int   smb_bufsize;    
+	int   smb_apasslen = 0;   
+	pstring smb_apasswd;
+	int   smb_ntpasslen = 0;   
+	pstring smb_ntpasswd;
+	pstring user;
+	pstring orig_user;
+	fstring domain;
+	fstring native_os;
+	fstring native_lanman;
+	BOOL guest=False;
+	static BOOL done_sesssetup = False;
+	extern BOOL global_encrypted_passwords_negotiated;
+	extern uint32 global_client_caps;
+	extern int Protocol;
+	extern fstring remote_machine;
+	extern userdom_struct current_user_info;
+	extern int max_send;
+	BOOL doencrypt = global_encrypted_passwords_negotiated;
+	START_PROFILE(SMBsesssetupX);
+	
+	*smb_apasswd = *smb_ntpasswd = 0;
+	
+	smb_bufsize = SVAL(inbuf,smb_vwv2);
+	
+	if (Protocol < PROTOCOL_NT1) {
+		smb_apasslen = SVAL(inbuf,smb_vwv7);
+		if (smb_apasslen > MAX_PASS_LEN) {
+			return ERROR_DOS(ERRDOS,ERRbuftoosmall);
+		}
+
+		memcpy(smb_apasswd,smb_buf(inbuf),smb_apasslen);
+		srvstr_pull(inbuf, user, smb_buf(inbuf)+smb_apasslen, sizeof(user), -1, STR_TERMINATE);
+		
+		if (!doencrypt && (lp_security() != SEC_SERVER)) {
+			smb_apasslen = strlen(smb_apasswd);
+		}
+	} else {
+		uint16 passlen1 = SVAL(inbuf,smb_vwv7);
+		uint16 passlen2 = SVAL(inbuf,smb_vwv8);
+		enum remote_arch_types ra_type = get_remote_arch();
+		char *p = smb_buf(inbuf);    
+		
+		if(global_client_caps == 0)
+			global_client_caps = IVAL(inbuf,smb_vwv11);
+		
+		/* client_caps is used as final determination if client is NT or Win95. 
+		   This is needed to return the correct error codes in some
+		   circumstances.
+		*/
+		
+		if(ra_type == RA_WINNT || ra_type == RA_WIN2K || ra_type == RA_WIN95) {
+			if(!(global_client_caps & (CAP_NT_SMBS | CAP_STATUS32))) {
+				set_remote_arch( RA_WIN95);
+			}
+		}
+		
+		if (passlen1 != 24 && passlen2 < 24)
+			doencrypt = False;
+		
+		if (passlen1 > MAX_PASS_LEN) {
+			return ERROR_DOS(ERRDOS,ERRbuftoosmall);
+		}
+		
+		passlen1 = MIN(passlen1, MAX_PASS_LEN);
+		passlen2 = MIN(passlen2, MAX_PASS_LEN);
+		
+		if (!doencrypt) {
+			/* both Win95 and WinNT stuff up the password lengths for
+			   non-encrypting systems. Uggh. 
+			   
+			   if passlen1==24 its a win95 system, and its setting the
+			   password length incorrectly. Luckily it still works with the
+			   default code because Win95 will null terminate the password
+			   anyway 
+			   
+			   if passlen1>0 and passlen2>0 then maybe its a NT box and its
+			   setting passlen2 to some random value which really stuffs
+			   things up. we need to fix that one.  */
+			
+			if (passlen1 > 0 && passlen2 > 0 && passlen2 != 24 && passlen2 != 1)
+				passlen2 = 0;
+		}
+		
+		if (lp_restrict_anonymous()) {
+			/* there seems to be no reason behind the
+			 * differences in MS clients formatting
+			 * various info like the domain, NativeOS, and
+			 * NativeLanMan fields. Win95 in particular
+			 * seems to have an extra null byte between
+			 * the username and the domain, or the
+			 * password length calculation is wrong, which
+			 * throws off the string extraction routines
+			 * below.  This makes the value of domain be
+			 * the empty string, which fails the restrict
+			 * anonymous check further down.  This
+			 * compensates for that, and allows browsing
+			 * to work in mixed NT and win95 environments
+			 * even when restrict anonymous is true. AAB
+			 * */
+			dump_data(100, p, 0x70);
+			DEBUG(9, ("passlen1=%d, passlen2=%d\n", passlen1, passlen2));
+			if (ra_type == RA_WIN95 && !passlen1 && !passlen2 && p[0] == 0 && p[1] == 0) {
+				DEBUG(0, ("restrict anonymous parameter used in a win95 environment!\n"));
+				DEBUG(0, ("client is win95 and broken passlen1 offset -- attempting fix\n"));
+				DEBUG(0, ("if win95 cilents are having difficulty browsing, you will be unable to use restrict anonymous\n"));
+				passlen1 = 1;
+			}
+		}
+
+		/* Save the lanman2 password and the NT md4 password. */
+		smb_apasslen = passlen1;
+		memcpy(smb_apasswd,p,smb_apasslen);
+
+		smb_ntpasslen = passlen2;
+		memcpy(smb_ntpasswd,p+passlen1,smb_ntpasslen);
+
+		if (smb_apasslen != 24 || !doencrypt) {
+			/* trim the password */
+			smb_apasslen = strlen(smb_apasswd);
+			
+			/* wfwg sometimes uses a space instead of a null */
+			if (strequal(smb_apasswd," ")) {
+				smb_apasslen = 0;
+				*smb_apasswd = 0;
+			}
+		}
+		
+		p += passlen1 + passlen2;
+		p += srvstr_pull(inbuf, user, p, sizeof(user), -1,
+				 STR_TERMINATE);
+		p += srvstr_pull(inbuf, domain, p, sizeof(domain), 
+				 -1, STR_TERMINATE);
+		p += srvstr_pull(inbuf, native_os, p, sizeof(native_os), 
+				 -1, STR_TERMINATE);
+		p += srvstr_pull(inbuf, native_lanman, p, sizeof(native_lanman),
+				 -1, STR_TERMINATE);
+		DEBUG(3,("Domain=[%s]  NativeOS=[%s] NativeLanMan=[%s]\n",
+			 domain,native_os,native_lanman));
+	}
+	
+	/* don't allow for weird usernames or domains */
+	alpha_strcpy(user, user, ". _-$", sizeof(user));
+	alpha_strcpy(domain, domain, ". _-", sizeof(domain));
+	if (strstr(user, "..") || strstr(domain,"..")) {
+		return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
+	}
+
+	if (lp_security() == SEC_SHARE) {
+		/* in share level we should ignore any passwords */
+		smb_ntpasslen = 0;
+		smb_apasslen = 0;
+		guest = True;
+	}
+
+
+	DEBUG(3,("sesssetupX:name=[%s]\\[%s]@[%s]\n",user, domain, remote_machine));
+	
+	if (done_sesssetup && lp_restrict_anonymous()) {
+		/* tests show that even if browsing is done over
+		 * already validated connections without a username
+		 * and password the domain is still provided, which it
+		 * wouldn't be if it was a purely anonymous
+		 * connection.  So, in order to restrict anonymous, we
+		 * only deny connections that have no session
+		 * information.  If a domain has been provided, then
+		 * it's not a purely anonymous connection. AAB */
+		if (!*user && !*smb_apasswd && !*domain) {
+			DEBUG(0, ("restrict anonymous is True and anonymous connection attempted. Denying access.\n"));
+			END_PROFILE(SMBsesssetupX);
+			return ERROR_DOS(ERRDOS,ERRnoaccess);
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* If no username is sent use the guest account */
+	if (!*user) {
+		pstrcpy(user,lp_guestaccount(-1));
+		guest = True;
+	}
+	
+	pstrcpy(current_user_info.smb_name,user);
+	
+	reload_services(True);
+	
+	/*
+	 * Save the username before mapping. We will use
+	 * the original username sent to us for security=server
+	 * and security=domain checking.
+	 */
+	
+	pstrcpy( orig_user, user);
+	
+	/*
+	 * Always try the "DOMAIN\user" lookup first, as this is the most
+	 * specific case. If this fails then try the simple "user" lookup.
+	 * But don't do this for guests, as this is always a local user.
+	 */
+	
+	if (!guest) {
+		pstring dom_user;
+		
+		/* Work out who's who */
+		
+		slprintf(dom_user, sizeof(dom_user) - 1,"%s%s%s",
+			 domain, lp_winbind_separator(), user);
+		
+		if (sys_getpwnam(dom_user) != NULL) {
+			pstrcpy(user, dom_user);
+			DEBUG(3,("Using unix username %s\n", dom_user));
+		}
+		
+		/*
+		 * Pass the user through the NT -> unix user mapping
+		 * function.
+		 */
+		
+		(void)map_username(user);
+		
+		/*
+		 * Do any UNIX username case mangling.
+		 */
+		smb_getpwnam(user, True);
+	}
+	
+	add_session_user(user);
+	
+	if (!guest) {
+		NTSTATUS nt_status;
+		nt_status = pass_check_smb(orig_user, user, 
+					   domain, remote_machine,
+					   (unsigned char *)smb_apasswd, 
+					   smb_apasslen, 
+					   (unsigned char *)smb_ntpasswd,
+					   smb_ntpasslen);
+	  
+		if NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status) {
+
+		} else if NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER) {
+			if ((lp_map_to_guest() == MAP_TO_GUEST_ON_BAD_USER) || 
+			    (lp_map_to_guest() ==  MAP_TO_GUEST_ON_BAD_PASSWORD)) {
+				DEBUG(3,("No such user %s [%s] - using guest account\n",user, domain));
+				pstrcpy(user,lp_guestaccount(-1));
+				guest = True;
+			} else {
+				/* Match WinXP and don't give the game away */
+				return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
+			}
+		} else if NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD) {
+			if (lp_map_to_guest() ==  MAP_TO_GUEST_ON_BAD_PASSWORD) {
+				pstrcpy(user,lp_guestaccount(-1));
+				DEBUG(3,("Registered username %s for guest access\n",user));
+				guest = True;
+			} else {
+				/* Match WinXP and don't give the game away */
+				return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
+			}
+		} else {
+			return ERROR_NT(nt_status);
+		}
+	}
+	
+	if (!strequal(user,lp_guestaccount(-1)) &&
+	    lp_servicenumber(user) < 0) {
+		add_home_service(user,get_user_home_dir(user));
+	}
+
+
+	/* it's ok - setup a reply */
+	if (Protocol < PROTOCOL_NT1) {
+		set_message(outbuf,3,0,True);
+	} else {
+		char *p;
+		set_message(outbuf,3,0,True);
+		p = smb_buf(outbuf);
+		p += srvstr_push(outbuf, p, "Unix", -1, STR_TERMINATE);
+		p += srvstr_push(outbuf, p, "Samba", -1, STR_TERMINATE);
+		p += srvstr_push(outbuf, p, lp_workgroup(), -1, STR_TERMINATE);
+		set_message_end(outbuf,p);
+		/* perhaps grab OS version here?? */
+	}
+	
+	/* Set the correct uid in the outgoing and incoming packets
+	   We will use this on future requests to determine which
+	   user we should become.
+	*/
+	{
+		const struct passwd *pw = smb_getpwnam(user,False);
+		if (!pw) {
+			DEBUG(1,("Username %s is invalid on this system\n",user));
+			END_PROFILE(SMBsesssetupX);
+			return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
+		}
+		gid = pw->pw_gid;
+		uid = pw->pw_uid;
+		full_name = pw->pw_gecos;
+	}
+	
+	if (guest)
+		SSVAL(outbuf,smb_vwv2,1);
+	
+	/* register the name and uid as being validated, so further connections
+	   to a uid can get through without a password, on the same VC */
+	
+	sess_vuid = register_vuid(uid,gid,user,orig_user,domain,guest, full_name);
+	
+	if (sess_vuid == -1) {
+		return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
+	}
+
+ 
+	SSVAL(outbuf,smb_uid,sess_vuid);
+	SSVAL(inbuf,smb_uid,sess_vuid);
+	
+	if (!done_sesssetup)
+		max_send = MIN(max_send,smb_bufsize);
+	
+	done_sesssetup = True;
+	
+	END_PROFILE(SMBsesssetupX);
+	return chain_reply(inbuf,outbuf,length,bufsize);
+}