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authorVolker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>2007-12-11 11:14:30 +0100
committerVolker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>2007-12-11 16:16:54 +0100
commit39ea0edbbede873986a4dd333c3ec70ab1b5410c (patch)
tree9069d47762673a81adf007312a20b60f5fa37e46 /source3
parent3063f85a72e77d0b7dab66882cf08a45e1db539d (diff)
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separate out create_file_unixpath()
(This used to be commit deaacf971e0fbffd0e5fe24f225ebf645a77e133)
Diffstat (limited to 'source3')
-rw-r--r--source3/smbd/open.c413
1 files changed, 242 insertions, 171 deletions
diff --git a/source3/smbd/open.c b/source3/smbd/open.c
index 007b64abf2..b83d6844d6 100644
--- a/source3/smbd/open.c
+++ b/source3/smbd/open.c
@@ -2444,6 +2444,243 @@ static struct case_semantics_state *set_posix_case_semantics(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx
* Wrapper around open_file_ntcreate and open_directory
*/
+NTSTATUS create_file_unixpath(connection_struct *conn,
+ struct smb_request *req,
+ const char *fname,
+ uint32_t access_mask,
+ uint32_t share_access,
+ uint32_t create_disposition,
+ uint32_t create_options,
+ uint32_t file_attributes,
+ uint32_t oplock_request,
+ SMB_BIG_UINT allocation_size,
+ struct security_descriptor *sd,
+ struct ea_list *ea_list,
+
+ files_struct **result,
+ int *pinfo,
+ SMB_STRUCT_STAT *psbuf)
+{
+ SMB_STRUCT_STAT sbuf;
+ int info = FILE_WAS_OPENED;
+ files_struct *fsp = NULL;
+ NTSTATUS status;
+
+ DEBUG(10,("create_file_unixpath: access_mask = 0x%x "
+ "file_attributes = 0x%x, share_access = 0x%x, "
+ "create_disposition = 0x%x create_options = 0x%x "
+ "oplock_request = 0x%x ea_list = 0x%p, sd = 0x%p, "
+ "fname = %s\n",
+ (unsigned int)access_mask,
+ (unsigned int)file_attributes,
+ (unsigned int)share_access,
+ (unsigned int)create_disposition,
+ (unsigned int)create_options,
+ (unsigned int)oplock_request,
+ ea_list, sd, fname));
+
+ if (create_options & FILE_OPEN_BY_FILE_ID) {
+ status = NT_STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ if (req == NULL) {
+ oplock_request |= INTERNAL_OPEN_ONLY;
+ }
+
+ if (psbuf != NULL) {
+ sbuf = *psbuf;
+ }
+ else {
+ SET_STAT_INVALID(sbuf);
+ }
+
+ /* This is the correct thing to do (check every time) but can_delete
+ * is expensive (it may have to read the parent directory
+ * permissions). So for now we're not doing it unless we have a strong
+ * hint the client is really going to delete this file. If the client
+ * is forcing FILE_CREATE let the filesystem take care of the
+ * permissions. */
+
+ /* Setting FILE_SHARE_DELETE is the hint. */
+
+ if (lp_acl_check_permissions(SNUM(conn))
+ && (create_disposition != FILE_CREATE)
+ && (share_access & FILE_SHARE_DELETE)
+ && (access_mask & DELETE_ACCESS)
+ && (((dos_mode(conn, fname, &sbuf) & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_READONLY)
+ && !lp_delete_readonly(SNUM(conn)))
+ || !can_delete_file_in_directory(conn, fname))) {
+ status = NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+#if 0
+ /* We need to support SeSecurityPrivilege for this. */
+ if ((access_mask & SEC_RIGHT_SYSTEM_SECURITY) &&
+ !user_has_privileges(current_user.nt_user_token,
+ &se_security)) {
+ status = NT_STATUS_PRIVILEGE_NOT_HELD;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * If it's a request for a directory open, deal with it separately.
+ */
+
+ if (create_options & FILE_DIRECTORY_FILE) {
+
+ /* Can't open a temp directory. IFS kit test. */
+ if (file_attributes & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_TEMPORARY) {
+ status = NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We will get a create directory here if the Win32
+ * app specified a security descriptor in the
+ * CreateDirectory() call.
+ */
+
+ oplock_request = 0;
+ status = open_directory(
+ conn, req, fname, &sbuf, access_mask, share_access,
+ create_disposition, create_options, file_attributes,
+ &info, &fsp);
+ } else {
+
+ /*
+ * Ordinary file case.
+ */
+
+ status = open_file_ntcreate(
+ conn, req, fname, &sbuf, access_mask, share_access,
+ create_disposition, create_options, file_attributes,
+ oplock_request, &info, &fsp);
+
+ if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_FILE_IS_A_DIRECTORY)) {
+
+ /*
+ * Fail the open if it was explicitly a non-directory
+ * file.
+ */
+
+ if (create_options & FILE_NON_DIRECTORY_FILE) {
+ status = NT_STATUS_FILE_IS_A_DIRECTORY;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ oplock_request = 0;
+ status = open_directory(
+ conn, req, fname, &sbuf, access_mask,
+ share_access, create_disposition,
+ create_options, file_attributes,
+ &info, &fsp);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * According to the MS documentation, the only time the security
+ * descriptor is applied to the opened file is iff we *created* the
+ * file; an existing file stays the same.
+ *
+ * Also, it seems (from observation) that you can open the file with
+ * any access mask but you can still write the sd. We need to override
+ * the granted access before we call set_sd
+ * Patch for bug #2242 from Tom Lackemann <cessnatomny@yahoo.com>.
+ */
+
+ if ((sd != NULL) && (info == FILE_WAS_CREATED)
+ && lp_nt_acl_support(SNUM(conn))) {
+
+ uint32_t sec_info_sent = ALL_SECURITY_INFORMATION;
+ uint32_t saved_access_mask = fsp->access_mask;
+
+ if (sd->owner_sid==0) {
+ sec_info_sent &= ~OWNER_SECURITY_INFORMATION;
+ }
+ if (sd->group_sid==0) {
+ sec_info_sent &= ~GROUP_SECURITY_INFORMATION;
+ }
+ if (sd->sacl==0) {
+ sec_info_sent &= ~SACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION;
+ }
+ if (sd->dacl==0) {
+ sec_info_sent &= ~DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION;
+ }
+
+ fsp->access_mask = FILE_GENERIC_ALL;
+
+ status = SMB_VFS_FSET_NT_ACL(
+ fsp, fsp->fh->fd, sec_info_sent, sd);
+
+ fsp->access_mask = saved_access_mask;
+
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((ea_list != NULL) && (info == FILE_WAS_CREATED)) {
+ status = set_ea(conn, fsp, fname, ea_list);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!fsp->is_directory && S_ISDIR(sbuf.st_mode)) {
+ status = NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ /* Save the requested allocation size. */
+ if ((info == FILE_WAS_CREATED) || (info == FILE_WAS_OVERWRITTEN)) {
+ if (allocation_size
+ && (allocation_size > sbuf.st_size)) {
+ fsp->initial_allocation_size = smb_roundup(
+ fsp->conn, allocation_size);
+ if (fsp->is_directory) {
+ /* Can't set allocation size on a directory. */
+ status = NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ if (vfs_allocate_file_space(
+ fsp, fsp->initial_allocation_size) == -1) {
+ status = NT_STATUS_DISK_FULL;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ } else {
+ fsp->initial_allocation_size = smb_roundup(
+ fsp->conn, (SMB_BIG_UINT)sbuf.st_size);
+ }
+ }
+
+ DEBUG(10, ("create_file: info=%d\n", info));
+
+ *result = fsp;
+ if (pinfo != NULL) {
+ *pinfo = info;
+ }
+ if (psbuf != NULL) {
+ *psbuf = sbuf;
+ }
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+
+ fail:
+ DEBUG(10, ("create_file: %s\n", nt_errstr(status)));
+
+ if (fsp != NULL) {
+ close_file(fsp, ERROR_CLOSE);
+ fsp = NULL;
+ }
+ return status;
+}
+
NTSTATUS create_file(connection_struct *conn,
struct smb_request *req,
uint16_t root_dir_fid,
@@ -2651,182 +2888,16 @@ NTSTATUS create_file(connection_struct *conn,
goto fail;
}
- if (create_options & FILE_OPEN_BY_FILE_ID) {
- status = NT_STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED;
- goto fail;
- }
-
- if (req == NULL) {
- oplock_request |= INTERNAL_OPEN_ONLY;
- }
-
- /* This is the correct thing to do (check every time) but can_delete
- * is expensive (it may have to read the parent directory
- * permissions). So for now we're not doing it unless we have a strong
- * hint the client is really going to delete this file. If the client
- * is forcing FILE_CREATE let the filesystem take care of the
- * permissions. */
-
- /* Setting FILE_SHARE_DELETE is the hint. */
-
- if (lp_acl_check_permissions(SNUM(conn))
- && (create_disposition != FILE_CREATE)
- && (share_access & FILE_SHARE_DELETE)
- && (access_mask & DELETE_ACCESS)
- && (((dos_mode(conn, fname, &sbuf) & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_READONLY)
- && !lp_delete_readonly(SNUM(conn)))
- || !can_delete_file_in_directory(conn, fname))) {
- status = NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
- goto fail;
- }
-
-#if 0
- /* We need to support SeSecurityPrivilege for this. */
- if ((access_mask & SEC_RIGHT_SYSTEM_SECURITY) &&
- !user_has_privileges(current_user.nt_user_token,
- &se_security)) {
- status = NT_STATUS_PRIVILEGE_NOT_HELD;
- goto fail;
- }
-#endif
-
- /*
- * If it's a request for a directory open, deal with it separately.
- */
-
- if (create_options & FILE_DIRECTORY_FILE) {
-
- /* Can't open a temp directory. IFS kit test. */
- if (file_attributes & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_TEMPORARY) {
- status = NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
- goto fail;
- }
-
- /*
- * We will get a create directory here if the Win32
- * app specified a security descriptor in the
- * CreateDirectory() call.
- */
-
- oplock_request = 0;
- status = open_directory(
- conn, req, fname, &sbuf, access_mask, share_access,
- create_disposition, create_options, file_attributes,
- &info, &fsp);
- } else {
-
- /*
- * Ordinary file case.
- */
-
- status = open_file_ntcreate(
- conn, req, fname, &sbuf, access_mask, share_access,
- create_disposition, create_options, file_attributes,
- oplock_request, &info, &fsp);
-
- if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_FILE_IS_A_DIRECTORY)) {
-
- /*
- * Fail the open if it was explicitly a non-directory
- * file.
- */
-
- if (create_options & FILE_NON_DIRECTORY_FILE) {
- status = NT_STATUS_FILE_IS_A_DIRECTORY;
- goto fail;
- }
-
- oplock_request = 0;
- status = open_directory(
- conn, req, fname, &sbuf, access_mask,
- share_access, create_disposition,
- create_options, file_attributes,
- &info, &fsp);
- }
- }
-
- TALLOC_FREE(case_state);
+ status = create_file_unixpath(
+ conn, req, fname, access_mask, share_access,
+ create_disposition, create_options, file_attributes,
+ oplock_request, allocation_size, sd, ea_list,
+ &fsp, &info, &sbuf);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
goto fail;
}
- /*
- * According to the MS documentation, the only time the security
- * descriptor is applied to the opened file is iff we *created* the
- * file; an existing file stays the same.
- *
- * Also, it seems (from observation) that you can open the file with
- * any access mask but you can still write the sd. We need to override
- * the granted access before we call set_sd
- * Patch for bug #2242 from Tom Lackemann <cessnatomny@yahoo.com>.
- */
-
- if ((sd != NULL) && (info == FILE_WAS_CREATED)
- && lp_nt_acl_support(SNUM(conn))) {
-
- uint32_t sec_info_sent = ALL_SECURITY_INFORMATION;
- uint32_t saved_access_mask = fsp->access_mask;
-
- if (sd->owner_sid==0) {
- sec_info_sent &= ~OWNER_SECURITY_INFORMATION;
- }
- if (sd->group_sid==0) {
- sec_info_sent &= ~GROUP_SECURITY_INFORMATION;
- }
- if (sd->sacl==0) {
- sec_info_sent &= ~SACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION;
- }
- if (sd->dacl==0) {
- sec_info_sent &= ~DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION;
- }
-
- fsp->access_mask = FILE_GENERIC_ALL;
-
- status = SMB_VFS_FSET_NT_ACL(
- fsp, fsp->fh->fd, sec_info_sent, sd);
-
- fsp->access_mask = saved_access_mask;
-
- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
- goto fail;
- }
- }
-
- if ((ea_list != NULL) && (info == FILE_WAS_CREATED)) {
- status = set_ea(conn, fsp, fname, ea_list);
- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
- goto fail;
- }
- }
-
- if (!fsp->is_directory && S_ISDIR(sbuf.st_mode)) {
- status = NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
- goto fail;
- }
-
- /* Save the requested allocation size. */
- if ((info == FILE_WAS_CREATED) || (info == FILE_WAS_OVERWRITTEN)) {
- if (allocation_size
- && (allocation_size > sbuf.st_size)) {
- fsp->initial_allocation_size = smb_roundup(
- fsp->conn, allocation_size);
- if (fsp->is_directory) {
- /* Can't set allocation size on a directory. */
- status = NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
- goto fail;
- }
- if (vfs_allocate_file_space(
- fsp, fsp->initial_allocation_size) == -1) {
- status = NT_STATUS_DISK_FULL;
- goto fail;
- }
- } else {
- fsp->initial_allocation_size = smb_roundup(
- fsp->conn, (SMB_BIG_UINT)sbuf.st_size);
- }
- }
-
done:
DEBUG(10, ("create_file: info=%d\n", info));