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authorAndrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>2005-08-20 06:08:52 +0000
committerGerald (Jerry) Carter <jerry@samba.org>2007-10-10 13:33:36 -0500
commit40f56f63bec5a609229033dc4c0854bb4fb16f06 (patch)
tree0bce454b79bfa8f387e9f2ca94c1bccbec51f6fc /source4/auth
parent479be53c0a894df441db9a02d0b75b222b374ae9 (diff)
downloadsamba-40f56f63bec5a609229033dc4c0854bb4fb16f06.tar.gz
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r9415: Remove old kerberos code (including salt guessing code) that has only
caused me pain (and covourty warnings). Simply gensec_gssapi to assume the properties of lorikeet-heimdal, rather than having #ifdef around critical features. This simplifies the code rather a lot. Andrew Bartlett (This used to be commit 11156f556db678c3d325fe5ced5e41a76ed6a3f1)
Diffstat (limited to 'source4/auth')
-rw-r--r--source4/auth/gensec/gensec_gssapi.c24
-rw-r--r--source4/auth/kerberos/clikrb5.c25
-rw-r--r--source4/auth/kerberos/kerberos.c672
3 files changed, 8 insertions, 713 deletions
diff --git a/source4/auth/gensec/gensec_gssapi.c b/source4/auth/gensec/gensec_gssapi.c
index 183e3f201b..b68bfbdb36 100644
--- a/source4/auth/gensec/gensec_gssapi.c
+++ b/source4/auth/gensec/gensec_gssapi.c
@@ -128,14 +128,6 @@ static NTSTATUS gensec_gssapi_start(struct gensec_security *gensec_security)
talloc_set_destructor(gensec_gssapi_state, gensec_gssapi_destory);
- if (gensec_security->want_features & GENSEC_FEATURE_SESSION_KEY) {
-#ifndef HAVE_GSSKRB5_GET_INITIATOR_SUBKEY
- /* GSSAPI won't give us the session keys, without the
- * right hooks. This is critical when requested, so
- * fail outright. */
- return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
-#endif
- }
if (gensec_security->want_features & GENSEC_FEATURE_SIGN) {
gensec_gssapi_state->want_flags |= GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG;
}
@@ -143,13 +135,7 @@ static NTSTATUS gensec_gssapi_start(struct gensec_security *gensec_security)
gensec_gssapi_state->want_flags |= GSS_C_CONF_FLAG;
}
if (gensec_security->want_features & GENSEC_FEATURE_DCE_STYLE) {
-#ifndef GSS_C_DCE_STYLE
- /* GSSAPI DCE_STYLE is critical when requested, so
- * fail outright */
- return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
-#else
gensec_gssapi_state->want_flags |= GSS_C_DCE_STYLE;
-#endif
}
gensec_gssapi_state->gss_oid = gss_mech_krb5;
@@ -678,12 +664,16 @@ static BOOL gensec_gssapi_have_feature(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
return gensec_gssapi_state->got_flags & GSS_C_CONF_FLAG;
}
if (feature & GENSEC_FEATURE_SESSION_KEY) {
-#ifdef HAVE_GSSKRB5_GET_INITIATOR_SUBKEY
if ((gensec_gssapi_state->gss_oid->length == gss_mech_krb5->length)
&& (memcmp(gensec_gssapi_state->gss_oid->elements, gss_mech_krb5->elements, gensec_gssapi_state->gss_oid->length) == 0)) {
return True;
}
-#endif
+ }
+ if (feature & GENSEC_FEATURE_DCE_STYLE) {
+ return True;
+ }
+ if (feature & GENSEC_FEATURE_ASYNC_REPLIES) {
+ return True;
}
return False;
}
@@ -698,7 +688,6 @@ static NTSTATUS gensec_gssapi_session_key(struct gensec_security *gensec_securit
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
-#ifdef HAVE_GSSKRB5_GET_INITIATOR_SUBKEY
/* Ensure we only call this for GSSAPI/krb5, otherwise things could get very ugly */
if ((gensec_gssapi_state->gss_oid->length == gss_mech_krb5->length)
&& (memcmp(gensec_gssapi_state->gss_oid->elements, gss_mech_krb5->elements,
@@ -723,7 +712,6 @@ static NTSTATUS gensec_gssapi_session_key(struct gensec_security *gensec_securit
}
return NT_STATUS_NO_USER_SESSION_KEY;
}
-#endif
DEBUG(1, ("NO session key for this mech\n"));
return NT_STATUS_NO_USER_SESSION_KEY;
diff --git a/source4/auth/kerberos/clikrb5.c b/source4/auth/kerberos/clikrb5.c
index 51638af2c9..7a43498773 100644
--- a/source4/auth/kerberos/clikrb5.c
+++ b/source4/auth/kerberos/clikrb5.c
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@
#endif
#if defined(HAVE_KRB5_PRINCIPAL2SALT) && defined(HAVE_KRB5_USE_ENCTYPE) && defined(HAVE_KRB5_STRING_TO_KEY) && defined(HAVE_KRB5_ENCRYPT_BLOCK)
- int create_kerberos_key_from_string_direct(krb5_context context,
+ int create_kerberos_key_from_string(krb5_context context,
krb5_principal host_princ,
krb5_data *password,
krb5_keyblock *key,
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@
return ret;
}
#elif defined(HAVE_KRB5_GET_PW_SALT) && defined(HAVE_KRB5_STRING_TO_KEY_SALT)
- int create_kerberos_key_from_string_direct(krb5_context context,
+ int create_kerberos_key_from_string(krb5_context context,
krb5_principal host_princ,
krb5_data *password,
krb5_keyblock *key,
@@ -118,27 +118,6 @@
#error UNKNOWN_CREATE_KEY_FUNCTIONS
#endif
- int create_kerberos_key_from_string(krb5_context context,
- krb5_principal host_princ,
- krb5_data *password,
- krb5_keyblock *key,
- krb5_enctype enctype)
-{
- krb5_principal salt_princ = NULL;
- int ret;
- /*
- * Check if we've determined that the KDC is salting keys for this
- * principal/enctype in a non-obvious way. If it is, try to match
- * its behavior.
- */
- salt_princ = kerberos_fetch_salt_princ_for_host_princ(context, host_princ, enctype);
- ret = create_kerberos_key_from_string_direct(context, salt_princ ? salt_princ : host_princ, password, key, enctype);
- if (salt_princ) {
- krb5_free_principal(context, salt_princ);
- }
- return ret;
-}
-
#if defined(HAVE_KRB5_GET_PERMITTED_ENCTYPES)
krb5_error_code get_kerberos_allowed_etypes(krb5_context context,
krb5_enctype **enctypes)
diff --git a/source4/auth/kerberos/kerberos.c b/source4/auth/kerberos/kerberos.c
index 8c82ae780e..31e0c71c55 100644
--- a/source4/auth/kerberos/kerberos.c
+++ b/source4/auth/kerberos/kerberos.c
@@ -167,677 +167,5 @@ kerb_prompter(krb5_context ctx, void *data,
return 0;
}
-/*
- simulate a kinit, putting the tgt in the given credentials cache.
- If cache_name == NULL place in default cache location.
-
- Orignally by remus@snapserver.com
-*/
-int kerberos_kinit_password(const char *principal,
- const char *password,
- int time_offset,
- time_t *expire_time,
- const char *cache_name,
- time_t *kdc_time)
-{
- int code;
- krb5_context ctx = NULL;
- krb5_ccache cc = NULL;
-
- if ((code = krb5_init_context(&ctx)))
- return code;
-
- if (time_offset != 0) {
- krb5_set_real_time(ctx, time(NULL) + time_offset, 0);
- }
-
- if ((code = krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, cache_name ?
- cache_name : krb5_cc_default_name(ctx), &cc))) {
- krb5_free_context(ctx);
- return code;
- }
-
- code = kerberos_kinit_password_cc(ctx, cc, principal, password, expire_time, kdc_time);
-
- krb5_cc_close(ctx, cc);
- krb5_free_context(ctx);
-
- return code;
-}
-
-/* run kinit to setup our ccache */
-int ads_kinit_password(struct ads_struct *ads)
-{
- char *s;
- int ret;
-
- if (asprintf(&s, "%s@%s", ads->auth.user_name, ads->auth.realm) == -1) {
- return KRB5_CC_NOMEM;
- }
-
- if (!ads->auth.password) {
- return KRB5_LIBOS_CANTREADPWD;
- }
-
- ret = kerberos_kinit_password(s, ads->auth.password, ads->auth.time_offset,
- &ads->auth.expire, NULL, NULL);
-
- if (ret) {
- DEBUG(0,("kerberos_kinit_password %s failed: %s\n",
- s, error_message(ret)));
- }
- free(s);
- return ret;
-}
-
-int ads_kdestroy(const char *cc_name)
-{
- krb5_error_code code;
- krb5_context ctx = NULL;
- krb5_ccache cc = NULL;
-
- if ((code = krb5_init_context (&ctx))) {
- DEBUG(3, ("ads_kdestroy: kdb5_init_context failed: %s\n",
- error_message(code)));
- return code;
- }
-
- if (!cc_name) {
- if ((code = krb5_cc_default(ctx, &cc))) {
- krb5_free_context(ctx);
- return code;
- }
- } else {
- if ((code = krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, cc_name, &cc))) {
- DEBUG(3, ("ads_kdestroy: krb5_cc_resolve failed: %s\n",
- error_message(code)));
- krb5_free_context(ctx);
- return code;
- }
- }
-
- if ((code = krb5_cc_destroy (ctx, cc))) {
- DEBUG(3, ("ads_kdestroy: krb5_cc_destroy failed: %s\n",
- error_message(code)));
- }
-
- krb5_free_context (ctx);
- return code;
-}
-
-/************************************************************************
- Routine to fetch the salting principal for a service. Active
- Directory may use a non-obvious principal name to generate the salt
- when it determines the key to use for encrypting tickets for a service,
- and hopefully we detected that when we joined the domain.
- ************************************************************************/
-
-static char *kerberos_secrets_fetch_salting_principal(const char *service, int enctype)
-{
- char *ret = NULL;
-
-#if 0
- asprintf(&key, "%s/%s/enctype=%d", SECRETS_SALTING_PRINCIPAL, service, enctype);
- if (!key) {
- return NULL;
- }
- ret = (char *)secrets_fetch(key, NULL);
- SAFE_FREE(key);
-#endif
- return ret;
-}
-
-/************************************************************************
- Routine to get the salting principal for this service. Active
- Directory may use a non-obvious principal name to generate the salt
- when it determines the key to use for encrypting tickets for a service,
- and hopefully we detected that when we joined the domain.
- Caller must free if return is not null.
- ************************************************************************/
-
-krb5_principal kerberos_fetch_salt_princ_for_host_princ(krb5_context context,
- krb5_principal host_princ,
- int enctype)
-{
- char *unparsed_name = NULL, *salt_princ_s = NULL;
- krb5_principal ret_princ = NULL;
-
- if (krb5_unparse_name(context, host_princ, &unparsed_name) != 0) {
- return (krb5_principal)NULL;
- }
-
- if ((salt_princ_s = kerberos_secrets_fetch_salting_principal(unparsed_name, enctype)) == NULL) {
- krb5_free_unparsed_name(context, unparsed_name);
- return (krb5_principal)NULL;
- }
-
- if (krb5_parse_name(context, salt_princ_s, &ret_princ) != 0) {
- krb5_free_unparsed_name(context, unparsed_name);
- SAFE_FREE(salt_princ_s);
- return (krb5_principal)NULL;
- }
- krb5_free_unparsed_name(context, unparsed_name);
- SAFE_FREE(salt_princ_s);
- return ret_princ;
-}
-
-/************************************************************************
- Routine to set the salting principal for this service. Active
- Directory may use a non-obvious principal name to generate the salt
- when it determines the key to use for encrypting tickets for a service,
- and hopefully we detected that when we joined the domain.
- Setting principal to NULL deletes this entry.
- ************************************************************************/
-
- BOOL kerberos_secrets_store_salting_principal(const char *service,
- int enctype,
- const char *principal)
-{
- char *key = NULL;
- BOOL ret = False;
- krb5_context context = NULL;
- krb5_principal princ = NULL;
- char *princ_s = NULL;
- char *unparsed_name = NULL;
-
- krb5_init_context(&context);
- if (!context) {
- return False;
- }
- if (strchr_m(service, '@')) {
- asprintf(&princ_s, "%s", service);
- } else {
- asprintf(&princ_s, "%s@%s", service, lp_realm());
- }
-
- if (krb5_parse_name(context, princ_s, &princ) != 0) {
- goto out;
-
- }
- if (krb5_unparse_name(context, princ, &unparsed_name) != 0) {
- goto out;
- }
-
- asprintf(&key, "%s/%s/enctype=%d", SECRETS_SALTING_PRINCIPAL, unparsed_name, enctype);
- if (!key) {
- goto out;
- }
-
-#if 0
- if ((principal != NULL) && (strlen(principal) > 0)) {
- ret = secrets_store(key, principal, strlen(principal) + 1);
- } else {
- ret = secrets_delete(key);
- }
-#endif
-
- out:
-
- SAFE_FREE(key);
- SAFE_FREE(princ_s);
-
- if (unparsed_name) {
- krb5_free_unparsed_name(context, unparsed_name);
- }
- if (context) {
- krb5_free_context(context);
- }
-
- return ret;
-}
-
-/************************************************************************
- Routine to get initial credentials as a service ticket for the local machine.
- Returns a buffer initialized with krb5_mk_req_extended.
- ************************************************************************/
-
-static krb5_error_code get_service_ticket(krb5_context ctx,
- krb5_ccache ccache,
- const char *service_principal,
- int enctype,
- krb5_data *p_outbuf)
-{
- krb5_creds creds, *new_creds = NULL;
- char *service_s = NULL;
- char *machine_account = NULL, *password = NULL;
- krb5_data in_data;
- krb5_auth_context auth_context = NULL;
- krb5_error_code err = 0;
-
- ZERO_STRUCT(creds);
-
- asprintf(&machine_account, "%s$@%s", lp_netbios_name(), lp_realm());
- if (machine_account == NULL) {
- goto out;
- }
- password = secrets_fetch_machine_password(lp_workgroup());
- if (password == NULL) {
- goto out;
- }
- if ((err = kerberos_kinit_password(machine_account, password, 0, NULL, LIBADS_CCACHE_NAME, NULL)) != 0) {
- DEBUG(0,("get_service_ticket: kerberos_kinit_password %s@%s failed: %s\n",
- machine_account,
- lp_realm(),
- error_message(err)));
- goto out;
- }
-
- /* Ok - the above call has gotten a TGT. Now we need to get a service
- ticket to ourselves. */
-
- /* Set up the enctype and client and server principal fields for krb5_get_credentials. */
- kerberos_set_creds_enctype(&creds, enctype);
-
- if ((err = krb5_cc_get_principal(ctx, ccache, &creds.client))) {
- DEBUG(3, ("get_service_ticket: krb5_cc_get_principal failed: %s\n",
- error_message(err)));
- goto out;
- }
-
- if (strchr_m(service_principal, '@')) {
- asprintf(&service_s, "%s", service_principal);
- } else {
- asprintf(&service_s, "%s@%s", service_principal, lp_realm());
- }
-
- if ((err = krb5_parse_name(ctx, service_s, &creds.server))) {
- DEBUG(0,("get_service_ticket: krb5_parse_name %s failed: %s\n",
- service_s, error_message(err)));
- goto out;
- }
-
- if ((err = krb5_get_credentials(ctx, 0, ccache, &creds, &new_creds))) {
- DEBUG(5,("get_service_ticket: krb5_get_credentials for %s enctype %d failed: %s\n",
- service_s, enctype, error_message(err)));
- goto out;
- }
-
- memset(&in_data, '\0', sizeof(in_data));
- if ((err = krb5_mk_req_extended(ctx, &auth_context, 0, &in_data,
- new_creds, p_outbuf)) != 0) {
- DEBUG(0,("get_service_ticket: krb5_mk_req_extended failed: %s\n",
- error_message(err)));
- goto out;
- }
-
- out:
-
- if (auth_context) {
- krb5_auth_con_free(ctx, auth_context);
- }
- if (new_creds) {
- krb5_free_creds(ctx, new_creds);
- }
- if (creds.server) {
- krb5_free_principal(ctx, creds.server);
- }
- if (creds.client) {
- krb5_free_principal(ctx, creds.client);
- }
-
- SAFE_FREE(service_s);
- SAFE_FREE(password);
- SAFE_FREE(machine_account);
- return err;
-}
-
-/************************************************************************
- Check if the machine password can be used in conjunction with the salting_principal
- to generate a key which will successfully decrypt the AP_REQ already
- gotten as a message to the local machine.
- ************************************************************************/
-
-static BOOL verify_service_password(krb5_context ctx,
- int enctype,
- const char *salting_principal,
- krb5_data *in_data)
-{
- BOOL ret = False;
- krb5_principal salting_kprinc = NULL;
- krb5_ticket *ticket = NULL;
- krb5_keyblock key;
- krb5_data passdata;
- char *salting_s = NULL;
- char *password = NULL;
- krb5_auth_context auth_context = NULL;
- krb5_error_code err;
-
- memset(&passdata, '\0', sizeof(passdata));
- memset(&key, '\0', sizeof(key));
-
- password = secrets_fetch_machine_password(lp_workgroup());
- if (password == NULL) {
- goto out;
- }
-
- if (strchr_m(salting_principal, '@')) {
- asprintf(&salting_s, "%s", salting_principal);
- } else {
- asprintf(&salting_s, "%s@%s", salting_principal, lp_realm());
- }
-
- if ((err = krb5_parse_name(ctx, salting_s, &salting_kprinc))) {
- DEBUG(0,("verify_service_password: krb5_parse_name %s failed: %s\n",
- salting_s, error_message(err)));
- goto out;
- }
-
- passdata.length = strlen(password);
- passdata.data = (char*)password;
- if ((err = create_kerberos_key_from_string_direct(ctx, salting_kprinc, &passdata, &key, enctype))) {
- DEBUG(0,("verify_service_password: create_kerberos_key_from_string %d failed: %s\n",
- enctype, error_message(err)));
- goto out;
- }
-
- if ((err = krb5_auth_con_init(ctx, &auth_context)) != 0) {
- DEBUG(0,("verify_service_password: krb5_auth_con_init failed %s\n", error_message(err)));
- goto out;
- }
-
- if ((err = krb5_auth_con_setuseruserkey(ctx, auth_context, &key)) != 0) {
- DEBUG(0,("verify_service_password: krb5_auth_con_setuseruserkey failed %s\n", error_message(err)));
- goto out;
- }
-
- if (!(err = krb5_rd_req(ctx, &auth_context, in_data, NULL, NULL, NULL, &ticket))) {
- DEBUG(10,("verify_service_password: decrypted message with enctype %u salt %s!\n",
- (unsigned int)enctype, salting_s));
- ret = True;
- }
-
- out:
-
- memset(&passdata, 0, sizeof(passdata));
- krb5_free_keyblock_contents(ctx, &key);
- if (ticket != NULL) {
- krb5_free_ticket(ctx, ticket);
- }
- if (salting_kprinc) {
- krb5_free_principal(ctx, salting_kprinc);
- }
- SAFE_FREE(salting_s);
- SAFE_FREE(password);
- return ret;
-}
-/************************************************************************
- *
- * From the current draft of kerberos-clarifications:
- *
- * It is not possible to reliably generate a user's key given a pass
- * phrase without contacting the KDC, since it will not be known
- * whether alternate salt or parameter values are required.
- *
- * And because our server has a password, we have this exact problem. We
- * make multiple guesses as to which principal name provides the salt which
- * the KDC is using.
- *
- ************************************************************************/
-
-static void kerberos_derive_salting_principal_for_enctype(const char *service_principal,
- krb5_context ctx,
- krb5_ccache ccache,
- krb5_enctype enctype,
- krb5_enctype *enctypes)
-{
- char *salting_principals[3] = {NULL, NULL, NULL}, *second_principal = NULL;
- krb5_error_code err = 0;
- krb5_data outbuf;
- int i, j;
-
- memset(&outbuf, '\0', sizeof(outbuf));
-
- /* Check that the service_principal is useful. */
- if ((service_principal == NULL) || (strlen(service_principal) == 0)) {
- return;
- }
-
- /* Generate our first guess -- the principal as-given. */
- asprintf(&salting_principals[0], "%s", service_principal);
- if ((salting_principals[0] == NULL) || (strlen(salting_principals[0]) == 0)) {
- return;
- }
-
- /* Generate our second guess -- the computer's principal, as Win2k3. */
- asprintf(&second_principal, "host/%s.%s", lp_netbios_name(), lp_realm());
- if (second_principal != NULL) {
- strlower_m(second_principal);
- asprintf(&salting_principals[1], "%s@%s", second_principal, lp_realm());
- SAFE_FREE(second_principal);
- }
- if ((salting_principals[1] == NULL) || (strlen(salting_principals[1]) == 0)) {
- goto out;
- }
-
- /* Generate our third guess -- the computer's principal, as Win2k. */
- asprintf(&second_principal, "HOST/%s", lp_netbios_name());
- if (second_principal != NULL) {
- strlower_m(second_principal + 5);
- asprintf(&salting_principals[2], "%s@%s",
- second_principal, lp_realm());
- SAFE_FREE(second_principal);
- }
- if ((salting_principals[2] == NULL) || (strlen(salting_principals[2]) == 0)) {
- goto out;
- }
-
- /* Get a service ticket for ourselves into our memory ccache. */
- /* This will commonly fail if there is no principal by that name (and we're trying
- many names). So don't print a debug 0 error. */
-
- if ((err = get_service_ticket(ctx, ccache, service_principal, enctype, &outbuf)) != 0) {
- DEBUG(3, ("verify_service_password: get_service_ticket failed: %s\n",
- error_message(err)));
- goto out;
- }
-
- /* At this point we have a message to ourselves, salted only the KDC knows how. We
- have to work out what that salting is. */
-
- /* Try and find the correct salting principal. */
- for (i = 0; i < sizeof(salting_principals) / sizeof(salting_principals[i]); i++) {
- if (verify_service_password(ctx, enctype, salting_principals[i], &outbuf)) {
- break;
- }
- }
-
- /* If we failed to get a match, return. */
- if (i >= sizeof(salting_principals) / sizeof(salting_principals[i])) {
- goto out;
- }
-
- /* If we succeeded, store the principal for use for all enctypes which
- * share the same cipher and string-to-key function. Doing this here
- * allows servers which just pass a keytab to krb5_rd_req() to work
- * correctly. */
- for (j = 0; enctypes[j] != 0; j++) {
- if (enctype != enctypes[j]) {
- /* If this enctype isn't compatible with the one which
- * we used, skip it. */
-
- if (!kerberos_compatible_enctypes(ctx, enctypes[j], enctype))
- continue;
- }
- /* If the principal which gives us the proper salt is the one
- * which we would normally guess, don't bother noting anything
- * in the secrets tdb. */
- if (strcmp(service_principal, salting_principals[i]) != 0) {
- kerberos_secrets_store_salting_principal(service_principal,
- enctypes[j],
- salting_principals[i]);
- }
- }
-
- out :
-
- kerberos_free_data_contents(ctx, &outbuf);
- SAFE_FREE(salting_principals[0]);
- SAFE_FREE(salting_principals[1]);
- SAFE_FREE(salting_principals[2]);
- SAFE_FREE(second_principal);
-}
-
-/************************************************************************
- Go through all the possible enctypes for this principal.
- ************************************************************************/
-
-static void kerberos_derive_salting_principal_direct(krb5_context context,
- krb5_ccache ccache,
- krb5_enctype *enctypes,
- char *service_principal)
-{
- int i;
-
- /* Try for each enctype separately, because the rules are
- * different for different enctypes. */
- for (i = 0; enctypes[i] != 0; i++) {
- /* Delete secrets entry first. */
- kerberos_secrets_store_salting_principal(service_principal, 0, NULL);
-#ifdef ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC
- if (enctypes[i] == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) {
- /* Of course this'll always work, so just save
- * ourselves the effort. */
- continue;
- }
-#endif
- /* Try to figure out what's going on with this
- * principal. */
- kerberos_derive_salting_principal_for_enctype(service_principal,
- context,
- ccache,
- enctypes[i],
- enctypes);
- }
-}
-
-/************************************************************************
- Wrapper function for the above.
- ************************************************************************/
-
-BOOL kerberos_derive_salting_principal(char *service_principal)
-{
- krb5_context context = NULL;
- krb5_enctype *enctypes = NULL;
- krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
- krb5_error_code ret = 0;
-
- initialize_krb5_error_table();
- if ((ret = krb5_init_context(&context)) != 0) {
- DEBUG(1,("kerberos_derive_cifs_salting_principals: krb5_init_context failed. %s\n",
- error_message(ret)));
- return False;
- }
- if ((ret = get_kerberos_allowed_etypes(context, &enctypes)) != 0) {
- DEBUG(1,("kerberos_derive_cifs_salting_principals: get_kerberos_allowed_etypes failed. %s\n",
- error_message(ret)));
- goto out;
- }
-
- if ((ret = krb5_cc_resolve(context, LIBADS_CCACHE_NAME, &ccache)) != 0) {
- DEBUG(3, ("get_service_ticket: krb5_cc_resolve for %s failed: %s\n",
- LIBADS_CCACHE_NAME, error_message(ret)));
- goto out;
- }
-
- kerberos_derive_salting_principal_direct(context, ccache, enctypes, service_principal);
-
- out:
- if (enctypes) {
- free_kerberos_etypes(context, enctypes);
- }
- if (ccache) {
- krb5_cc_destroy(context, ccache);
- }
- if (context) {
- krb5_free_context(context);
- }
-
- return ret ? False : True;
-}
-
-/************************************************************************
- Core function to try and determine what salt is being used for any keytab
- keys.
- ************************************************************************/
-
-BOOL kerberos_derive_cifs_salting_principals(void)
-{
- fstring my_fqdn;
- char *service = NULL;
- krb5_context context = NULL;
- krb5_enctype *enctypes = NULL;
- krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
- krb5_error_code ret = 0;
- BOOL retval = False;
-
- initialize_krb5_error_table();
- if ((ret = krb5_init_context(&context)) != 0) {
- DEBUG(1,("kerberos_derive_cifs_salting_principals: krb5_init_context failed. %s\n",
- error_message(ret)));
- return False;
- }
- if ((ret = get_kerberos_allowed_etypes(context, &enctypes)) != 0) {
- DEBUG(1,("kerberos_derive_cifs_salting_principals: get_kerberos_allowed_etypes failed. %s\n",
- error_message(ret)));
- goto out;
- }
-
- if ((ret = krb5_cc_resolve(context, LIBADS_CCACHE_NAME, &ccache)) != 0) {
- DEBUG(3, ("get_service_ticket: krb5_cc_resolve for %s failed: %s\n",
- LIBADS_CCACHE_NAME, error_message(ret)));
- goto out;
- }
-
- if (asprintf(&service, "%s$", lp_netbios_name()) != -1) {
- strlower_m(service);
- kerberos_derive_salting_principal_direct(context, ccache, enctypes, service);
- SAFE_FREE(service);
- }
- if (asprintf(&service, "cifs/%s", lp_netbios_name()) != -1) {
- strlower_m(service);
- kerberos_derive_salting_principal_direct(context, ccache, enctypes, service);
- SAFE_FREE(service);
- }
- if (asprintf(&service, "host/%s", lp_netbios_name()) != -1) {
- strlower_m(service);
- kerberos_derive_salting_principal_direct(context, ccache, enctypes, service);
- SAFE_FREE(service);
- }
- if (asprintf(&service, "cifs/%s.%s", lp_netbios_name(), lp_realm()) != -1) {
- strlower_m(service);
- kerberos_derive_salting_principal_direct(context, ccache, enctypes, service);
- SAFE_FREE(service);
- }
- if (asprintf(&service, "host/%s.%s", lp_netbios_name(), lp_realm()) != -1) {
- strlower_m(service);
- kerberos_derive_salting_principal_direct(context, ccache, enctypes, service);
- SAFE_FREE(service);
- }
- name_to_fqdn(my_fqdn, lp_netbios_name());
- if (asprintf(&service, "cifs/%s", my_fqdn) != -1) {
- strlower_m(service);
- kerberos_derive_salting_principal_direct(context, ccache, enctypes, service);
- SAFE_FREE(service);
- }
- if (asprintf(&service, "host/%s", my_fqdn) != -1) {
- strlower_m(service);
- kerberos_derive_salting_principal_direct(context, ccache, enctypes, service);
- SAFE_FREE(service);
- }
-
- retval = True;
-
- out:
- if (enctypes) {
- free_kerberos_etypes(context, enctypes);
- }
- if (ccache) {
- krb5_cc_destroy(context, ccache);
- }
- if (context) {
- krb5_free_context(context);
- }
- return retval;
-}
#endif