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author | Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> | 2005-09-07 21:52:50 +0000 |
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committer | Gerald (Jerry) Carter <jerry@samba.org> | 2007-10-10 13:36:33 -0500 |
commit | 1f2f470889d63a2a81ee3f2d8bdff782ac8d0e28 (patch) | |
tree | 8766af7915448b3e015ca6a0796e3020f11d8456 /source4/heimdal/kdc | |
parent | db400b4a58d834cca165f1fc6ad84e9f5ace280f (diff) | |
download | samba-1f2f470889d63a2a81ee3f2d8bdff782ac8d0e28.tar.gz samba-1f2f470889d63a2a81ee3f2d8bdff782ac8d0e28.tar.bz2 samba-1f2f470889d63a2a81ee3f2d8bdff782ac8d0e28.zip |
r10066: This is the second in my patches to work on Samba4's kerberos support,
with an aim to make the code simpiler and more correct.
Gone is the old (since the very early Samba 3.0 krb5 days) 'iterate over
all keytypes)' code in gensec_krb5, we now follow the approach used in
gensec_gssapi, and use a keytab.
I have also done a lot of work in the GSSAPI code, to try and reduce
the diff between us and upstream heimdal. It was becoming hard to
track patches in this code, and I also want this patch (the DCE_STYLE
support) to be in a 'manageable' state for when lha considers it for
merging. (metze assures me it still has memory leak problems, but
I've started to address some of that).
This patch also includes a simple update of other code to current
heimdal, as well as changes we need for better PAC verification.
On the PAC side of things we now match windows member servers by
checking the name and authtime on an incoming PAC. Not generating these
right was the cause of the PAC pain, and so now both the main code and
torture test validate this behaviour.
One thing doesn't work with this patch:
- the sealing of RPC pipes with kerberos, Samba -> Samba seems
broken. I'm pretty sure this is related to AES, and the need to break
apart the gss_wrap interface.
Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit a3aba57c00a9c5318f4706db55d03f64e8bea60c)
Diffstat (limited to 'source4/heimdal/kdc')
-rw-r--r-- | source4/heimdal/kdc/kerberos5.c | 31 |
1 files changed, 27 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/source4/heimdal/kdc/kerberos5.c b/source4/heimdal/kdc/kerberos5.c index 453263774b..38444f4a13 100644 --- a/source4/heimdal/kdc/kerberos5.c +++ b/source4/heimdal/kdc/kerberos5.c @@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ log_timestamp(krb5_context context, strlcpy(renewtime_str, "unset", sizeof(renewtime_str)); kdc_log(context, config, 5, - "%s authtime: %s starttime: %s endtype: %s renew till: %s", + "%s authtime: %s starttime: %s endtime: %s renew till: %s", type, authtime_str, starttime_str, endtime_str, renewtime_str); } @@ -329,8 +329,9 @@ make_etype_info_entry(krb5_context context, ETYPE_INFO_ENTRY *ent, Key *key) { ent->etype = key->key.keytype; if(key->salt){ - ALLOC(ent->salttype); #if 0 + ALLOC(ent->salttype); + if(key->salt->type == hdb_pw_salt) *ent->salttype = 0; /* or 1? or NULL? */ else if(key->salt->type == hdb_afs3_salt) @@ -345,8 +346,17 @@ make_etype_info_entry(krb5_context context, ETYPE_INFO_ENTRY *ent, Key *key) *know* what cell you are using (e.g by assuming that the cell is the same as the realm in lower case) */ -#else +#elif 0 + ALLOC(ent->salttype); *ent->salttype = key->salt->type; +#else + /* + * We shouldn't sent salttype since its incompatible with the + * specification and its break windows clients. The afs + * salting problem is solved by using KRB5-PADATA-AFS3-SALT + * implemented in Heimdal 0.7 and later. + */ + ent->salttype = NULL; #endif krb5_copy_data(context, &key->salt->salt, &ent->salt); @@ -1508,7 +1518,20 @@ fix_transited_encoding(krb5_context context, int num_realms; int i; - if(tr->tr_type != DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS) { + switch (tr->tr_type) { + case DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS: + break; + case 0: + /* + * Allow empty content of type 0 because that is was Microsoft + * generates in their TGT. + */ + if (tr->contents.length == 0) + break; + kdc_log(context, config, 0, + "Transited type 0 with non empty content"); + return KRB5KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP; + default: kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Unknown transited type: %u", tr->tr_type); return KRB5KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP; |