r20640: Commit part 2/2

Update Heimdal to match current lorikeet-heimdal.  This includes
integrated PAC hooks, so Samba doesn't have to handle this any more.

This also brings in the PKINIT code, hence so many new files.

Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit 351f7040f7bb73b9a60b22b564686f7c2f98a729)

1 files changed, 661 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/source4/heimdal/lib/des/rsa-imath.c b/source4/heimdal/lib/des/rsa-imath.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..298affadfe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/source4/heimdal/lib/des/rsa-imath.c
@@ -0,0 +1,661 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2006 - 2007 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan
+ * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). 
+ * All rights reserved. 
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 
+ * are met: 
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 
+ *
+ * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors 
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software 
+ *    without specific prior written permission. 
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND 
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 
+ * SUCH DAMAGE. 
+ */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
+#include <config.h>
+#endif
+
+RCSID("$Id: rsa-imath.c,v 1.23 2007/01/06 13:45:25 lha Exp $");
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <krb5-types.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+
+#include <rsa.h>
+
+#include <roken.h>
+
+#include "imath/imath.h"
+#include "imath/iprime.h"
+
+static void
+BN2mpz(mpz_t *s, const BIGNUM *bn)
+{
+    size_t len;
+    void *p;
+
+    mp_int_init(s);
+
+    len = BN_num_bytes(bn);
+    p = malloc(len);
+    BN_bn2bin(bn, p);
+    mp_int_read_unsigned(s, p, len);
+    free(p);
+}
+
+static BIGNUM *
+mpz2BN(mpz_t *s)
+{
+    size_t size;
+    BIGNUM *bn;
+    void *p;
+
+    size = mp_int_unsigned_len(s);
+    p = malloc(size);
+    if (p == NULL && size != 0)
+	return NULL;
+    mp_int_to_unsigned(s, p, size);
+
+    bn = BN_bin2bn(p, size, NULL);
+    free(p);
+    return bn;
+}
+
+static int random_num(mp_int, size_t);
+
+static void
+setup_blind(mp_int n, mp_int b, mp_int bi)
+{
+    mp_int_init(b);
+    mp_int_init(bi);
+    random_num(b, mp_int_count_bits(n));
+    mp_int_mod(b, n, b);
+    mp_int_invmod(b, n, bi);
+}
+
+static void
+blind(mp_int in, mp_int b, mp_int e, mp_int n)
+{
+    mpz_t t1;
+    mp_int_init(&t1);
+    /* in' = (in * b^e) mod n */
+    mp_int_exptmod(b, e, n, &t1);
+    mp_int_mul(&t1, in, in);
+    mp_int_mod(in, n, in);
+    mp_int_clear(&t1);
+}
+
+static void
+unblind(mp_int out, mp_int bi, mp_int n)
+{
+    /* out' = (out * 1/b) mod n */
+    mp_int_mul(out, bi, out);
+    mp_int_mod(out, n, out);
+}
+
+static mp_result
+rsa_private_calculate(mp_int in, mp_int p,  mp_int q,
+		      mp_int dmp1, mp_int dmq1, mp_int iqmp,
+		      mp_int out)
+{
+    mpz_t vp, vq, u;
+    mp_int_init(&vp); mp_int_init(&vq); mp_int_init(&u);
+    
+    /* vq = c ^ (d mod (q - 1)) mod q */
+    /* vp = c ^ (d mod (p - 1)) mod p */
+    mp_int_mod(in, p, &u);
+    mp_int_exptmod(&u, dmp1, p, &vp);
+    mp_int_mod(in, q, &u);
+    mp_int_exptmod(&u, dmq1, q, &vq);
+    
+    /* C2 = 1/q mod p  (iqmp) */
+    /* u = (vp - vq)C2 mod p. */
+    mp_int_sub(&vp, &vq, &u);
+    if (mp_int_compare_zero(&u) < 0)
+	mp_int_add(&u, p, &u);
+    mp_int_mul(&u, iqmp, &u);
+    mp_int_mod(&u, p, &u);
+    
+    /* c ^ d mod n = vq + u q */
+    mp_int_mul(&u, q, &u);
+    mp_int_add(&u, &vq, out);
+    
+    mp_int_clear(&vp);
+    mp_int_clear(&vq);
+    mp_int_clear(&u);
+
+    return MP_OK;
+}
+
+/*
+ *
+ */
+
+static int
+imath_rsa_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char* from, 
+			unsigned char* to, RSA* rsa, int padding)
+{
+    unsigned char *p, *p0;
+    mp_result res;
+    size_t size, padlen;
+    mpz_t enc, dec, n, e;
+
+    if (padding != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)
+	return -1;
+
+    size = RSA_size(rsa);
+
+    if (size < RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE || size - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE < flen)
+	return -2;
+
+    BN2mpz(&n, rsa->n);
+    BN2mpz(&e, rsa->e);
+
+    p = p0 = malloc(size - 1);
+    if (p0 == NULL) {
+	mp_int_clear(&e);
+	mp_int_clear(&n);
+	return -3;
+    }
+
+    padlen = size - flen - 3;
+    assert(padlen >= 8);
+
+    *p++ = 2;
+    if (RAND_bytes(p, padlen) != 1) {
+	mp_int_clear(&e);
+	mp_int_clear(&n);
+	free(p0);
+	return -4;
+    }
+    while(padlen) {
+	if (*p == 0)
+	    *p = 1;
+	padlen--;
+	p++;
+    }
+    *p++ = 0;
+    memcpy(p, from, flen);
+    p += flen;
+    assert((p - p0) == size - 1);
+
+    mp_int_init(&enc);
+    mp_int_init(&dec);
+    mp_int_read_unsigned(&dec, p0, size - 1);
+    free(p0);
+
+    res = mp_int_exptmod(&dec, &e, &n, &enc);
+
+    mp_int_clear(&dec);
+    mp_int_clear(&e);
+    mp_int_clear(&n);
+    {
+	size_t ssize;
+	ssize = mp_int_unsigned_len(&enc);
+	assert(size >= ssize);
+	mp_int_to_unsigned(&enc, to, ssize);
+	size = ssize;
+    }
+    mp_int_clear(&enc);
+
+    return size;
+}
+
+static int
+imath_rsa_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char* from, 
+			 unsigned char* to, RSA* rsa, int padding)
+{
+    unsigned char *p;
+    mp_result res;
+    size_t size;
+    mpz_t s, us, n, e;
+
+    if (padding != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)
+	return -1;
+
+    if (flen > RSA_size(rsa))
+	return -2;
+
+    BN2mpz(&n, rsa->n);
+    BN2mpz(&e, rsa->e);
+
+#if 0
+    /* Check that the exponent is larger then 3 */
+    if (mp_int_compare_value(&e, 3) <= 0) {
+	mp_int_clear(&n);
+	mp_int_clear(&e);
+	return -3;
+    }
+#endif
+
+    mp_int_init(&s);
+    mp_int_init(&us);
+    mp_int_read_unsigned(&s, rk_UNCONST(from), flen);
+
+    if (mp_int_compare(&s, &n) >= 0) {
+	mp_int_clear(&n);
+	mp_int_clear(&e);
+	return -4;
+    }
+
+    res = mp_int_exptmod(&s, &e, &n, &us);
+
+    mp_int_clear(&s);
+    mp_int_clear(&n);
+    mp_int_clear(&e);
+
+    if (res != MP_OK)
+	return -5;
+    p = to;
+
+
+    size = mp_int_unsigned_len(&us);
+    assert(size <= RSA_size(rsa));
+    mp_int_to_unsigned(&us, p, size);
+
+    mp_int_clear(&us);
+
+    /* head zero was skipped by mp_int_to_unsigned */
+    if (*p == 0)
+	return -6;
+    if (*p != 1)
+	return -7;
+    size--; p++;
+    while (size && *p == 0xff) {
+	size--; p++;
+    }
+    if (size == 0 || *p != 0)
+	return -8;
+    size--; p++;
+
+    memmove(to, p, size);
+
+    return size;
+}
+
+static int
+imath_rsa_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char* from, 
+			  unsigned char* to, RSA* rsa, int padding)
+{
+    unsigned char *p, *p0;
+    mp_result res;
+    size_t size;
+    mpz_t in, out, n, e, b, bi;
+    int blinding = (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING) == 0;
+
+    if (padding != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)
+	return -1;
+
+    size = RSA_size(rsa);
+
+    if (size < RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE || size - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE < flen)
+	return -2;
+
+    p0 = p = malloc(size);
+    *p++ = 0;
+    *p++ = 1;
+    memset(p, 0xff, size - flen - 3);
+    p += size - flen - 3;
+    *p++ = 0;
+    memcpy(p, from, flen);
+    p += flen;
+    assert((p - p0) == size);
+
+    BN2mpz(&n, rsa->n);
+    BN2mpz(&e, rsa->e);
+
+    mp_int_init(&in);
+    mp_int_init(&out);
+    mp_int_read_unsigned(&in, p0, size);
+    free(p0);
+
+    if(mp_int_compare_zero(&in) < 0 ||
+       mp_int_compare(&in, &n) >= 0) {
+	size = 0;
+	goto out;
+    }
+
+    if (blinding) {
+	setup_blind(&n, &b, &bi);
+	blind(&in, &b, &e, &n);
+    }
+
+    if (rsa->p && rsa->q && rsa->dmp1 && rsa->dmq1 && rsa->iqmp) {
+	mpz_t p, q, dmp1, dmq1, iqmp;
+
+	BN2mpz(&p, rsa->p);
+	BN2mpz(&q, rsa->q);
+	BN2mpz(&dmp1, rsa->dmp1);
+	BN2mpz(&dmq1, rsa->dmq1);
+	BN2mpz(&iqmp, rsa->iqmp);
+
+	res = rsa_private_calculate(&in, &p, &q, &dmp1, &dmq1, &iqmp, &out);
+
+	mp_int_clear(&p);
+	mp_int_clear(&q);
+	mp_int_clear(&dmp1);
+	mp_int_clear(&dmq1);
+	mp_int_clear(&iqmp);
+    } else {
+	mpz_t d;
+
+	BN2mpz(&d, rsa->d);
+	res = mp_int_exptmod(&in, &d, &n, &out);
+	mp_int_clear(&d);
+	if (res != MP_OK) {
+	    size = 0;
+	    goto out;
+	}
+    }
+
+    if (blinding) {
+	unblind(&out, &bi, &n);
+	mp_int_clear(&b);
+	mp_int_clear(&bi);
+    }
+
+    {
+	size_t ssize;
+	ssize = mp_int_unsigned_len(&out);
+	assert(size >= ssize);
+	mp_int_to_unsigned(&out, to, size);
+	size = ssize;
+    }
+    
+out:
+    mp_int_clear(&e);
+    mp_int_clear(&n);
+    mp_int_clear(&in);
+    mp_int_clear(&out);
+
+    return size;
+}
+
+static int
+imath_rsa_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char* from, 
+			  unsigned char* to, RSA* rsa, int padding)
+{
+    unsigned char *ptr;
+    mp_result res;
+    size_t size;
+    mpz_t in, out, n, e, b, bi;
+    int blinding = (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING) == 0;
+
+    if (padding != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)
+	return -1;
+
+    size = RSA_size(rsa);
+    if (flen > size)
+	return -2;
+
+    mp_int_init(&in);
+    mp_int_init(&out);
+
+    BN2mpz(&n, rsa->n);
+    BN2mpz(&e, rsa->e);
+
+    res = mp_int_read_unsigned(&in, rk_UNCONST(from), flen);
+    if (res != MP_OK) {
+	size = -1;
+	goto out;
+    }
+
+    if(mp_int_compare_zero(&in) < 0 ||
+       mp_int_compare(&in, &n) >= 0) {
+	size = 0;
+	goto out;
+    }
+
+    if (blinding) {
+	setup_blind(&n, &b, &bi);
+	blind(&in, &b, &e, &n);
+    }
+
+    if (rsa->p && rsa->q && rsa->dmp1 && rsa->dmq1 && rsa->iqmp) {
+	mpz_t p, q, dmp1, dmq1, iqmp;
+
+	BN2mpz(&p, rsa->p);
+	BN2mpz(&q, rsa->q);
+	BN2mpz(&dmp1, rsa->dmp1);
+	BN2mpz(&dmq1, rsa->dmq1);
+	BN2mpz(&iqmp, rsa->iqmp);
+
+	res = rsa_private_calculate(&in, &p, &q, &dmp1, &dmq1, &iqmp, &out);
+
+	mp_int_clear(&p);
+	mp_int_clear(&q);
+	mp_int_clear(&dmp1);
+	mp_int_clear(&dmq1);
+	mp_int_clear(&iqmp);
+    } else {
+	mpz_t d;
+
+	if(mp_int_compare_zero(&in) < 0 ||
+	   mp_int_compare(&in, &n) >= 0)
+	    return MP_RANGE;
+
+	BN2mpz(&d, rsa->d);
+	res = mp_int_exptmod(&in, &d, &n, &out);
+	mp_int_clear(&d);
+	if (res != MP_OK) {
+	    size = 0;
+	    goto out;
+	}
+    }
+
+    if (blinding) {
+	unblind(&out, &bi, &n);
+	mp_int_clear(&b);
+	mp_int_clear(&bi);
+    }
+
+    ptr = to;
+    {
+	size_t ssize;
+	ssize = mp_int_unsigned_len(&out);
+	assert(size >= ssize);
+	mp_int_to_unsigned(&out, ptr, ssize);
+	size = ssize;
+    }
+
+    /* head zero was skipped by mp_int_to_unsigned */
+    if (*ptr != 2)
+	return -3;
+    size--; ptr++;
+    while (size && *ptr != 0) {
+	size--; ptr++;
+    }
+    if (size == 0)
+	return -4;
+    size--; ptr++;
+
+    memmove(to, ptr, size);
+
+out:
+    mp_int_clear(&e);
+    mp_int_clear(&n);
+    mp_int_clear(&in);
+    mp_int_clear(&out);
+
+    return size;
+}
+
+static int
+random_num(mp_int num, size_t len)
+{
+    unsigned char *p;
+    mp_result res;
+ 
+    len = (len + 7) / 8;
+    p = malloc(len);
+    if (p == NULL)
+	return 1;
+    if (RAND_bytes(p, len) != 1) {
+	free(p);
+	return 1;
+    }
+    res = mp_int_read_unsigned(num, p, len);
+    free(p);
+    if (res != MP_OK)
+	return 1;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+#define CHECK(f, v) if ((f) != (v)) { goto out; }
+
+static int
+imath_rsa_generate_key(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e, BN_GENCB *cb)
+{
+    mpz_t el, p, q, n, d, dmp1, dmq1, iqmp, t1, t2, t3;
+    int counter, ret;
+
+    if (bits < 789)
+	return -1;
+
+    ret = -1;
+
+    mp_int_init(&el);
+    mp_int_init(&p);
+    mp_int_init(&q);
+    mp_int_init(&n);
+    mp_int_init(&d);
+    mp_int_init(&dmp1);
+    mp_int_init(&dmq1);
+    mp_int_init(&iqmp);
+    mp_int_init(&t1);
+    mp_int_init(&t2);
+    mp_int_init(&t3);
+
+    BN2mpz(&el, e);
+
+    /* generate p and q so that p != q and bits(pq) ~ bits */
+    counter = 0;
+    do {
+	BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, counter++);
+	CHECK(random_num(&p, bits / 2 + 1), 0);
+	CHECK(mp_int_find_prime(&p), MP_TRUE);
+
+	CHECK(mp_int_sub_value(&p, 1, &t1), MP_OK);
+	CHECK(mp_int_gcd(&t1, &el, &t2), MP_OK);
+    } while(mp_int_compare_value(&t2, 1) != 0);
+
+    BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 0);
+
+    counter = 0;
+    do {
+	BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, counter++);
+	CHECK(random_num(&q, bits / 2 + 1), 0);
+	CHECK(mp_int_find_prime(&q), MP_TRUE);
+
+	if (mp_int_compare(&p, &q) == 0) /* don't let p and q be the same */
+	    continue;
+
+	CHECK(mp_int_sub_value(&q, 1, &t1), MP_OK);
+	CHECK(mp_int_gcd(&t1, &el, &t2), MP_OK);
+    } while(mp_int_compare_value(&t2, 1) != 0);
+
+    /* make p > q */
+    if (mp_int_compare(&p, &q) < 0)
+	mp_int_swap(&p, &q);
+
+    BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 1);
+
+    /* calculate n,  		n = p * q */
+    CHECK(mp_int_mul(&p, &q, &n), MP_OK);
+
+    /* calculate d, 		d = 1/e mod (p - 1)(q - 1) */
+    CHECK(mp_int_sub_value(&p, 1, &t1), MP_OK);
+    CHECK(mp_int_sub_value(&q, 1, &t2), MP_OK);
+    CHECK(mp_int_mul(&t1, &t2, &t3), MP_OK);
+    CHECK(mp_int_invmod(&el, &t3, &d), MP_OK);
+
+    /* calculate dmp1		dmp1 = d mod (p-1) */
+    CHECK(mp_int_mod(&d, &t1, &dmp1), MP_OK);
+    /* calculate dmq1		dmq1 = d mod (q-1) */
+    CHECK(mp_int_mod(&d, &t2, &dmq1), MP_OK);
+    /* calculate iqmp 		iqmp = 1/q mod p */
+    CHECK(mp_int_invmod(&q, &p, &iqmp), MP_OK);
+
+    /* fill in RSA key */
+
+    rsa->e = mpz2BN(&el);
+    rsa->p = mpz2BN(&p);
+    rsa->q = mpz2BN(&q);
+    rsa->n = mpz2BN(&n);
+    rsa->d = mpz2BN(&d);
+    rsa->dmp1 = mpz2BN(&dmp1);
+    rsa->dmq1 = mpz2BN(&dmq1);
+    rsa->iqmp = mpz2BN(&iqmp);
+
+    ret = 1;
+out:
+    mp_int_clear(&el);
+    mp_int_clear(&p);
+    mp_int_clear(&q);
+    mp_int_clear(&n);
+    mp_int_clear(&d);
+    mp_int_clear(&dmp1);
+    mp_int_clear(&dmq1);
+    mp_int_clear(&iqmp);
+    mp_int_clear(&t1);
+    mp_int_clear(&t2);
+    mp_int_clear(&t3);
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int 
+imath_rsa_init(RSA *rsa)
+{
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+imath_rsa_finish(RSA *rsa)
+{
+    return 1;
+}
+
+const RSA_METHOD hc_rsa_imath_method = {
+    "hcrypto imath RSA",
+    imath_rsa_public_encrypt,
+    imath_rsa_public_decrypt,
+    imath_rsa_private_encrypt,
+    imath_rsa_private_decrypt,
+    NULL,
+    NULL,
+    imath_rsa_init,
+    imath_rsa_finish,
+    0,
+    NULL,
+    NULL,
+    NULL,
+    imath_rsa_generate_key
+};
+
+const RSA_METHOD *
+RSA_imath_method(void)
+{
+    return &hc_rsa_imath_method;
+}