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authorAndrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>2006-11-07 06:59:56 +0000
committerGerald (Jerry) Carter <jerry@samba.org>2007-10-10 14:25:03 -0500
commit3c1e780ec7e16dc6667402bbc65708bf9a5c062f (patch)
tree2102bb577ea9f00751b8c869b0a5c756fc2ae8e5 /source4/heimdal/lib/gssapi/krb5/accept_sec_context.c
parent8b91594e0936bbaedf5430406fcf8df3ea406c10 (diff)
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r19604: This is a massive commit, and I appologise in advance for it's size.
This merges Samba4 with lorikeet-heimdal, which itself has been tracking Heimdal CVS for the past couple of weeks. This is such a big change because Heimdal reorganised it's internal structures, with the mechglue merge, and because many of our 'wishes' have been granted: we now have DCE_STYLE GSSAPI, send_to_kdc hooks and many other features merged into the mainline code. We have adapted to upstream's choice of API in these cases. In gensec_gssapi and gensec_krb5, we either expect a valid PAC, or NO PAC. This matches windows behavour. We also have an option to require the PAC to be present (which allows us to automate the testing of this code). This also includes a restructure of how the kerberos dependencies are handled, due to the fallout of the merge. Andrew Bartlett (This used to be commit 4826f1735197c2a471d771495e6d4c1051b4c471)
Diffstat (limited to 'source4/heimdal/lib/gssapi/krb5/accept_sec_context.c')
-rw-r--r--source4/heimdal/lib/gssapi/krb5/accept_sec_context.c774
1 files changed, 774 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/source4/heimdal/lib/gssapi/krb5/accept_sec_context.c b/source4/heimdal/lib/gssapi/krb5/accept_sec_context.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e42bb11b85
--- /dev/null
+++ b/source4/heimdal/lib/gssapi/krb5/accept_sec_context.c
@@ -0,0 +1,774 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2006 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan
+ * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden).
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors
+ * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ * without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "krb5/gsskrb5_locl.h"
+
+RCSID("$Id: accept_sec_context.c,v 1.64 2006/10/25 04:19:45 lha Exp $");
+
+HEIMDAL_MUTEX gssapi_keytab_mutex = HEIMDAL_MUTEX_INITIALIZER;
+krb5_keytab _gsskrb5_keytab;
+
+OM_uint32
+_gsskrb5_register_acceptor_identity (const char *identity)
+{
+ krb5_error_code ret;
+
+ ret = _gsskrb5_init();
+ if(ret)
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+ HEIMDAL_MUTEX_lock(&gssapi_keytab_mutex);
+
+ if(_gsskrb5_keytab != NULL) {
+ krb5_kt_close(_gsskrb5_context, _gsskrb5_keytab);
+ _gsskrb5_keytab = NULL;
+ }
+ if (identity == NULL) {
+ ret = krb5_kt_default(_gsskrb5_context, &_gsskrb5_keytab);
+ } else {
+ char *p;
+
+ asprintf(&p, "FILE:%s", identity);
+ if(p == NULL) {
+ HEIMDAL_MUTEX_unlock(&gssapi_keytab_mutex);
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ }
+ ret = krb5_kt_resolve(_gsskrb5_context, p, &_gsskrb5_keytab);
+ free(p);
+ }
+ HEIMDAL_MUTEX_unlock(&gssapi_keytab_mutex);
+ if(ret)
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+}
+
+void
+_gsskrb5i_is_cfx(gsskrb5_ctx ctx, int *is_cfx)
+{
+ krb5_keyblock *key;
+ int acceptor = (ctx->more_flags & LOCAL) == 0;
+
+ *is_cfx = 0;
+
+ if (acceptor) {
+ if (ctx->auth_context->local_subkey)
+ key = ctx->auth_context->local_subkey;
+ else
+ key = ctx->auth_context->remote_subkey;
+ } else {
+ if (ctx->auth_context->remote_subkey)
+ key = ctx->auth_context->remote_subkey;
+ else
+ key = ctx->auth_context->local_subkey;
+ }
+ if (key == NULL)
+ key = ctx->auth_context->keyblock;
+
+ if (key == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ switch (key->keytype) {
+ case ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC:
+ case ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4:
+ case ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5:
+ case ETYPE_DES3_CBC_MD5:
+ case ETYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1:
+ case ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5:
+ case ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5_56:
+ break;
+ default :
+ *is_cfx = 1;
+ if ((acceptor && ctx->auth_context->local_subkey) ||
+ (!acceptor && ctx->auth_context->remote_subkey))
+ ctx->more_flags |= ACCEPTOR_SUBKEY;
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
+
+static OM_uint32
+gsskrb5_accept_delegated_token
+(OM_uint32 * minor_status,
+ gsskrb5_ctx ctx,
+ gss_cred_id_t * delegated_cred_handle
+ )
+{
+ krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
+ krb5_error_code kret;
+ int32_t ac_flags, ret = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+
+ *minor_status = 0;
+
+ /* XXX Create a new delegated_cred_handle? */
+ if (delegated_cred_handle == NULL) {
+ kret = krb5_cc_default (_gsskrb5_context, &ccache);
+ } else {
+ *delegated_cred_handle = NULL;
+ kret = krb5_cc_gen_new (_gsskrb5_context, &krb5_mcc_ops, &ccache);
+ }
+ if (kret) {
+ ctx->flags &= ~GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ kret = krb5_cc_initialize(_gsskrb5_context, ccache, ctx->source);
+ if (kret) {
+ ctx->flags &= ~GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ krb5_auth_con_removeflags(_gsskrb5_context,
+ ctx->auth_context,
+ KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_DO_TIME,
+ &ac_flags);
+ kret = krb5_rd_cred2(_gsskrb5_context,
+ ctx->auth_context,
+ ccache,
+ &ctx->fwd_data);
+ if (kret)
+ _gsskrb5_set_error_string();
+ krb5_auth_con_setflags(_gsskrb5_context,
+ ctx->auth_context,
+ ac_flags);
+ if (kret) {
+ ctx->flags &= ~GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG;
+ ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ *minor_status = kret;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (delegated_cred_handle) {
+ gsskrb5_cred handle;
+
+ ret = _gsskrb5_import_cred(minor_status,
+ ccache,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ delegated_cred_handle);
+ if (ret != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+ goto out;
+
+ handle = (gsskrb5_cred) *delegated_cred_handle;
+
+ handle->cred_flags |= GSS_CF_DESTROY_CRED_ON_RELEASE;
+ krb5_cc_close(_gsskrb5_context, ccache);
+ ccache = NULL;
+ }
+
+out:
+ if (ccache) {
+ if (delegated_cred_handle == NULL)
+ krb5_cc_close(_gsskrb5_context, ccache);
+ else
+ krb5_cc_destroy(_gsskrb5_context, ccache);
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static OM_uint32
+gsskrb5_acceptor_ready(OM_uint32 * minor_status,
+ gsskrb5_ctx ctx,
+ gss_cred_id_t *delegated_cred_handle)
+{
+ OM_uint32 ret;
+ int32_t seq_number;
+ int is_cfx = 0;
+
+ krb5_auth_getremoteseqnumber (_gsskrb5_context,
+ ctx->auth_context,
+ &seq_number);
+
+ _gsskrb5i_is_cfx(ctx, &is_cfx);
+
+ ret = _gssapi_msg_order_create(minor_status,
+ &ctx->order,
+ _gssapi_msg_order_f(ctx->flags),
+ seq_number, 0, is_cfx);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ /*
+ * If requested, set local sequence num to remote sequence if this
+ * isn't a mutual authentication context
+ */
+ if (!(ctx->flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG) && _gssapi_msg_order_f(ctx->flags)) {
+ krb5_auth_con_setlocalseqnumber(_gsskrb5_context,
+ ctx->auth_context,
+ seq_number);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We should handle the delegation ticket, in case it's there
+ */
+ if (ctx->fwd_data.length > 0 && (ctx->flags & GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG)) {
+ ret = gsskrb5_accept_delegated_token(minor_status,
+ ctx,
+ delegated_cred_handle);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ } else {
+ /* Well, looks like it wasn't there after all */
+ ctx->flags &= ~GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG;
+ }
+
+ ctx->state = ACCEPTOR_READY;
+ ctx->more_flags |= OPEN;
+
+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+}
+
+static OM_uint32
+gsskrb5_acceptor_start(OM_uint32 * minor_status,
+ gsskrb5_ctx ctx,
+ const gss_cred_id_t acceptor_cred_handle,
+ const gss_buffer_t input_token_buffer,
+ const gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings,
+ gss_name_t * src_name,
+ gss_OID * mech_type,
+ gss_buffer_t output_token,
+ OM_uint32 * ret_flags,
+ OM_uint32 * time_rec,
+ gss_cred_id_t * delegated_cred_handle)
+{
+ krb5_error_code kret;
+ OM_uint32 ret = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+ krb5_data indata;
+ krb5_flags ap_options;
+ krb5_ticket *ticket = NULL;
+ krb5_keytab keytab = NULL;
+ krb5_keyblock *keyblock = NULL;
+ int is_cfx = 0;
+ const gsskrb5_cred acceptor_cred = (gsskrb5_cred)acceptor_cred_handle;
+
+ /*
+ * We may, or may not, have an escapsulation.
+ */
+ ret = _gsskrb5_decapsulate (minor_status,
+ input_token_buffer,
+ &indata,
+ "\x01\x00",
+ GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM);
+
+ if (ret) {
+ /* Assume that there is no OID wrapping. */
+ indata.length = input_token_buffer->length;
+ indata.data = input_token_buffer->value;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We need to get our keytab
+ */
+ if (acceptor_cred == NULL) {
+ if (_gsskrb5_keytab != NULL)
+ keytab = _gsskrb5_keytab;
+ } else if (acceptor_cred->keytab != NULL) {
+ keytab = acceptor_cred->keytab;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We need to check the ticket and create the AP-REP packet
+ */
+ kret = krb5_rd_req_return_keyblock(_gsskrb5_context,
+ &ctx->auth_context,
+ &indata,
+ (acceptor_cred == NULL) ? NULL : acceptor_cred->principal,
+ keytab,
+ &ap_options,
+ &ticket,
+ &keyblock);
+ if (kret) {
+ ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ *minor_status = kret;
+ _gsskrb5_set_error_string ();
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We need to remember some data on the context_handle.
+ */
+ ctx->ticket = ticket;
+ ctx->service_keyblock = keyblock;
+ ctx->lifetime = ticket->ticket.endtime;
+
+ /*
+ * We need to copy the principal names to the context and the
+ * calling layer.
+ */
+ kret = krb5_copy_principal(_gsskrb5_context,
+ ticket->client,
+ &ctx->source);
+ if (kret) {
+ ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ *minor_status = kret;
+ _gsskrb5_set_error_string ();
+ }
+
+ kret = krb5_copy_principal(_gsskrb5_context, ticket->server, &ctx->target);
+ if (kret) {
+ ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ *minor_status = kret;
+ _gsskrb5_set_error_string ();
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We need to setup some compat stuff, this assumes that
+ * context_handle->target is already set.
+ */
+ ret = _gss_DES3_get_mic_compat(minor_status, ctx);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ if (src_name != NULL) {
+ kret = krb5_copy_principal (_gsskrb5_context,
+ ticket->client,
+ (gsskrb5_name*)src_name);
+ if (kret) {
+ ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ *minor_status = kret;
+ _gsskrb5_set_error_string ();
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We need to get the flags out of the 8003 checksum.
+ */
+ {
+ krb5_authenticator authenticator;
+
+ kret = krb5_auth_con_getauthenticator(_gsskrb5_context,
+ ctx->auth_context,
+ &authenticator);
+ if(kret) {
+ ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ *minor_status = kret;
+ _gsskrb5_set_error_string ();
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if (authenticator->cksum->cksumtype == CKSUMTYPE_GSSAPI) {
+ ret = _gsskrb5_verify_8003_checksum(minor_status,
+ input_chan_bindings,
+ authenticator->cksum,
+ &ctx->flags,
+ &ctx->fwd_data);
+
+ krb5_free_authenticator(_gsskrb5_context, &authenticator);
+ if (ret) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ } else {
+ krb5_crypto crypto;
+
+ kret = krb5_crypto_init(_gsskrb5_context,
+ ctx->auth_context->keyblock,
+ 0, &crypto);
+ if(kret) {
+ krb5_free_authenticator(_gsskrb5_context, &authenticator);
+
+ ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ *minor_status = kret;
+ _gsskrb5_set_error_string ();
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Windows accepts Samba3's use of a kerberos, rather than
+ * GSSAPI checksum here
+ */
+
+ kret = krb5_verify_checksum(_gsskrb5_context,
+ crypto, KRB5_KU_AP_REQ_AUTH_CKSUM, NULL, 0,
+ authenticator->cksum);
+ krb5_free_authenticator(_gsskrb5_context, &authenticator);
+ krb5_crypto_destroy(_gsskrb5_context, crypto);
+
+ if(kret) {
+ ret = GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
+ *minor_status = kret;
+ _gsskrb5_set_error_string ();
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Samba style get some flags (but not DCE-STYLE)
+ */
+ ctx->flags =
+ GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG | GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if(ctx->flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG) {
+ krb5_data outbuf;
+
+ _gsskrb5i_is_cfx(ctx, &is_cfx);
+
+ if (is_cfx != 0
+ || (ap_options & AP_OPTS_USE_SUBKEY)) {
+ kret = krb5_auth_con_addflags(_gsskrb5_context,
+ ctx->auth_context,
+ KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_USE_SUBKEY,
+ NULL);
+ ctx->more_flags |= ACCEPTOR_SUBKEY;
+ }
+
+ kret = krb5_mk_rep(_gsskrb5_context,
+ ctx->auth_context,
+ &outbuf);
+ if (kret) {
+ *minor_status = kret;
+ _gsskrb5_set_error_string ();
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->flags & GSS_C_DCE_STYLE) {
+ output_token->length = outbuf.length;
+ output_token->value = outbuf.data;
+ } else {
+ ret = _gsskrb5_encapsulate(minor_status,
+ &outbuf,
+ output_token,
+ "\x02\x00",
+ GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM);
+ krb5_data_free (&outbuf);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ctx->flags |= GSS_C_TRANS_FLAG;
+
+ /* Remember the flags */
+
+ ctx->lifetime = ticket->ticket.endtime;
+ ctx->more_flags |= OPEN;
+
+ if (mech_type)
+ *mech_type = GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM;
+
+ if (time_rec) {
+ ret = _gsskrb5_lifetime_left(minor_status,
+ ctx->lifetime,
+ time_rec);
+ if (ret) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * When GSS_C_DCE_STYLE is in use, we need ask for a AP-REP from
+ * the client.
+ */
+ if (ctx->flags & GSS_C_DCE_STYLE) {
+ /*
+ * Return flags to caller, but we haven't processed
+ * delgations yet
+ */
+ if (ret_flags)
+ *ret_flags = (ctx->flags & ~GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG);
+
+ ctx->state = ACCEPTOR_WAIT_FOR_DCESTYLE;
+ return GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
+ }
+
+ ret = gsskrb5_acceptor_ready(minor_status, ctx, delegated_cred_handle);
+
+ if (ret_flags)
+ *ret_flags = ctx->flags;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static OM_uint32
+acceptor_wait_for_dcestyle(OM_uint32 * minor_status,
+ gsskrb5_ctx ctx,
+ const gss_cred_id_t acceptor_cred_handle,
+ const gss_buffer_t input_token_buffer,
+ const gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings,
+ gss_name_t * src_name,
+ gss_OID * mech_type,
+ gss_buffer_t output_token,
+ OM_uint32 * ret_flags,
+ OM_uint32 * time_rec,
+ gss_cred_id_t * delegated_cred_handle)
+{
+ OM_uint32 ret;
+ krb5_error_code kret;
+ krb5_data inbuf;
+ int32_t r_seq_number, l_seq_number;
+
+ /*
+ * We know it's GSS_C_DCE_STYLE so we don't need to decapsulate the AP_REP
+ */
+
+ inbuf.length = input_token_buffer->length;
+ inbuf.data = input_token_buffer->value;
+
+ /*
+ * We need to remeber the old remote seq_number, then check if the
+ * client has replied with our local seq_number, and then reset
+ * the remote seq_number to the old value
+ */
+ {
+ kret = krb5_auth_con_getlocalseqnumber(_gsskrb5_context,
+ ctx->auth_context,
+ &l_seq_number);
+ if (kret) {
+ _gsskrb5_set_error_string ();
+ *minor_status = kret;
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ }
+
+ kret = krb5_auth_getremoteseqnumber(_gsskrb5_context,
+ ctx->auth_context,
+ &r_seq_number);
+ if (kret) {
+ _gsskrb5_set_error_string ();
+ *minor_status = kret;
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ }
+
+ kret = krb5_auth_con_setremoteseqnumber(_gsskrb5_context,
+ ctx->auth_context,
+ l_seq_number);
+ if (kret) {
+ _gsskrb5_set_error_string ();
+ *minor_status = kret;
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We need to verify the AP_REP, but we need to flag that this is
+ * DCE_STYLE, so don't check the timestamps this time, but put the
+ * flag DO_TIME back afterward.
+ */
+ {
+ krb5_ap_rep_enc_part *repl;
+ int32_t auth_flags;
+
+ krb5_auth_con_removeflags(_gsskrb5_context,
+ ctx->auth_context,
+ KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_DO_TIME,
+ &auth_flags);
+
+ kret = krb5_rd_rep(_gsskrb5_context, ctx->auth_context, &inbuf, &repl);
+ if (kret) {
+ _gsskrb5_set_error_string ();
+ *minor_status = kret;
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ }
+ krb5_free_ap_rep_enc_part(_gsskrb5_context, repl);
+ krb5_auth_con_setflags(_gsskrb5_context, ctx->auth_context, auth_flags);
+ }
+
+ /* We need to check the liftime */
+ {
+ OM_uint32 lifetime_rec;
+
+ ret = _gsskrb5_lifetime_left(minor_status,
+ ctx->lifetime,
+ &lifetime_rec);
+ if (ret) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ if (lifetime_rec == 0) {
+ return GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED;
+ }
+
+ if (time_rec) *time_rec = lifetime_rec;
+ }
+
+ /* We need to give the caller the flags which are in use */
+ if (ret_flags) *ret_flags = ctx->flags;
+
+ if (src_name) {
+ kret = krb5_copy_principal(_gsskrb5_context,
+ ctx->source,
+ (gsskrb5_name*)src_name);
+ if (kret) {
+ *minor_status = kret;
+ _gsskrb5_set_error_string ();
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * After the krb5_rd_rep() the remote and local seq_number should
+ * be the same, because the client just replies the seq_number
+ * from our AP-REP in its AP-REP, but then the client uses the
+ * seq_number from its AP-REQ for GSS_wrap()
+ */
+ {
+ int32_t tmp_r_seq_number, tmp_l_seq_number;
+
+ kret = krb5_auth_getremoteseqnumber(_gsskrb5_context,
+ ctx->auth_context,
+ &tmp_r_seq_number);
+ if (kret) {
+ _gsskrb5_set_error_string ();
+ *minor_status = kret;
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ }
+
+ kret = krb5_auth_con_getlocalseqnumber(_gsskrb5_context,
+ ctx->auth_context,
+ &tmp_l_seq_number);
+ if (kret) {
+ _gsskrb5_set_error_string ();
+ *minor_status = kret;
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Here we check if the client has responsed with our local seq_number,
+ */
+ if (tmp_r_seq_number != tmp_l_seq_number) {
+ return GSS_S_UNSEQ_TOKEN;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We need to reset the remote seq_number, because the client will use,
+ * the old one for the GSS_wrap() calls
+ */
+ {
+ kret = krb5_auth_con_setremoteseqnumber(_gsskrb5_context,
+ ctx->auth_context,
+ r_seq_number);
+ if (kret) {
+ _gsskrb5_set_error_string ();
+ *minor_status = kret;
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return gsskrb5_acceptor_ready(minor_status, ctx, delegated_cred_handle);
+}
+
+
+OM_uint32
+_gsskrb5_accept_sec_context(OM_uint32 * minor_status,
+ gss_ctx_id_t * context_handle,
+ const gss_cred_id_t acceptor_cred_handle,
+ const gss_buffer_t input_token_buffer,
+ const gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings,
+ gss_name_t * src_name,
+ gss_OID * mech_type,
+ gss_buffer_t output_token,
+ OM_uint32 * ret_flags,
+ OM_uint32 * time_rec,
+ gss_cred_id_t * delegated_cred_handle)
+{
+ OM_uint32 ret;
+ gsskrb5_ctx ctx;
+
+ GSSAPI_KRB5_INIT();
+
+ output_token->length = 0;
+ output_token->value = NULL;
+
+ if (src_name != NULL)
+ *src_name = NULL;
+ if (mech_type)
+ *mech_type = GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM;
+
+ if (*context_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) {
+ ret = _gsskrb5_create_ctx(minor_status,
+ context_handle,
+ input_chan_bindings,
+ ACCEPTOR_START);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ ctx = (gsskrb5_ctx)*context_handle;
+
+
+ /*
+ * TODO: check the channel_bindings
+ * (above just sets them to krb5 layer)
+ */
+
+ HEIMDAL_MUTEX_lock(&ctx->ctx_id_mutex);
+
+ switch (ctx->state) {
+ case ACCEPTOR_START:
+ ret = gsskrb5_acceptor_start(minor_status,
+ ctx,
+ acceptor_cred_handle,
+ input_token_buffer,
+ input_chan_bindings,
+ src_name,
+ mech_type,
+ output_token,
+ ret_flags,
+ time_rec,
+ delegated_cred_handle);
+ break;
+ case ACCEPTOR_WAIT_FOR_DCESTYLE:
+ ret = acceptor_wait_for_dcestyle(minor_status,
+ ctx,
+ acceptor_cred_handle,
+ input_token_buffer,
+ input_chan_bindings,
+ src_name,
+ mech_type,
+ output_token,
+ ret_flags,
+ time_rec,
+ delegated_cred_handle);
+ break;
+ case ACCEPTOR_READY:
+ /*
+ * If we get there, the caller have called
+ * gss_accept_sec_context() one time too many.
+ */
+ ret = GSS_S_BAD_STATUS;
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* TODO: is this correct here? --metze */
+ ret = GSS_S_BAD_STATUS;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ HEIMDAL_MUTEX_unlock(&ctx->ctx_id_mutex);
+
+ if (GSS_ERROR(ret)) {
+ OM_uint32 min2;
+ _gsskrb5_delete_sec_context(&min2, context_handle, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}