summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/source4/heimdal/lib/gssapi/krb5/cfx.c
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorAndrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>2006-11-07 06:59:56 +0000
committerGerald (Jerry) Carter <jerry@samba.org>2007-10-10 14:25:03 -0500
commit3c1e780ec7e16dc6667402bbc65708bf9a5c062f (patch)
tree2102bb577ea9f00751b8c869b0a5c756fc2ae8e5 /source4/heimdal/lib/gssapi/krb5/cfx.c
parent8b91594e0936bbaedf5430406fcf8df3ea406c10 (diff)
downloadsamba-3c1e780ec7e16dc6667402bbc65708bf9a5c062f.tar.gz
samba-3c1e780ec7e16dc6667402bbc65708bf9a5c062f.tar.bz2
samba-3c1e780ec7e16dc6667402bbc65708bf9a5c062f.zip
r19604: This is a massive commit, and I appologise in advance for it's size.
This merges Samba4 with lorikeet-heimdal, which itself has been tracking Heimdal CVS for the past couple of weeks. This is such a big change because Heimdal reorganised it's internal structures, with the mechglue merge, and because many of our 'wishes' have been granted: we now have DCE_STYLE GSSAPI, send_to_kdc hooks and many other features merged into the mainline code. We have adapted to upstream's choice of API in these cases. In gensec_gssapi and gensec_krb5, we either expect a valid PAC, or NO PAC. This matches windows behavour. We also have an option to require the PAC to be present (which allows us to automate the testing of this code). This also includes a restructure of how the kerberos dependencies are handled, due to the fallout of the merge. Andrew Bartlett (This used to be commit 4826f1735197c2a471d771495e6d4c1051b4c471)
Diffstat (limited to 'source4/heimdal/lib/gssapi/krb5/cfx.c')
-rwxr-xr-xsource4/heimdal/lib/gssapi/krb5/cfx.c887
1 files changed, 887 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/source4/heimdal/lib/gssapi/krb5/cfx.c b/source4/heimdal/lib/gssapi/krb5/cfx.c
new file mode 100755
index 0000000000..cb3f9ee5d3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/source4/heimdal/lib/gssapi/krb5/cfx.c
@@ -0,0 +1,887 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2003, PADL Software Pty Ltd.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. Neither the name of PADL Software nor the names of its contributors
+ * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ * without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY PADL SOFTWARE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL PADL SOFTWARE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "krb5/gsskrb5_locl.h"
+
+RCSID("$Id: cfx.c,v 1.24 2006/10/24 21:13:22 lha Exp $");
+
+/*
+ * Implementation of draft-ietf-krb-wg-gssapi-cfx-06.txt
+ */
+
+#define CFXSentByAcceptor (1 << 0)
+#define CFXSealed (1 << 1)
+#define CFXAcceptorSubkey (1 << 2)
+
+krb5_error_code
+_gsskrb5cfx_wrap_length_cfx(krb5_crypto crypto,
+ int conf_req_flag,
+ size_t input_length,
+ size_t *output_length,
+ size_t *cksumsize,
+ uint16_t *padlength)
+{
+ krb5_error_code ret;
+ krb5_cksumtype type;
+
+ /* 16-byte header is always first */
+ *output_length = sizeof(gss_cfx_wrap_token_desc);
+ *padlength = 0;
+
+ ret = krb5_crypto_get_checksum_type(_gsskrb5_context, crypto, &type);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ ret = krb5_checksumsize(_gsskrb5_context, type, cksumsize);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ if (conf_req_flag) {
+ size_t padsize;
+
+ /* Header is concatenated with data before encryption */
+ input_length += sizeof(gss_cfx_wrap_token_desc);
+
+ ret = krb5_crypto_getpadsize(_gsskrb5_context, crypto, &padsize);
+ if (ret) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ if (padsize > 1) {
+ /* XXX check this */
+ *padlength = padsize - (input_length % padsize);
+
+ /* We add the pad ourselves (noted here for completeness only) */
+ input_length += *padlength;
+ }
+
+ *output_length += krb5_get_wrapped_length(_gsskrb5_context,
+ crypto, input_length);
+ } else {
+ /* Checksum is concatenated with data */
+ *output_length += input_length + *cksumsize;
+ }
+
+ assert(*output_length > input_length);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+krb5_error_code
+_gsskrb5cfx_max_wrap_length_cfx(krb5_crypto crypto,
+ int conf_req_flag,
+ size_t input_length,
+ OM_uint32 *output_length)
+{
+ krb5_error_code ret;
+
+ *output_length = 0;
+
+ /* 16-byte header is always first */
+ if (input_length < 16)
+ return 0;
+ input_length -= 16;
+
+ if (conf_req_flag) {
+ size_t wrapped_size, sz;
+
+ wrapped_size = input_length + 1;
+ do {
+ wrapped_size--;
+ sz = krb5_get_wrapped_length(_gsskrb5_context,
+ crypto, wrapped_size);
+ } while (wrapped_size && sz > input_length);
+ if (wrapped_size == 0) {
+ *output_length = 0;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* inner header */
+ if (wrapped_size < 16) {
+ *output_length = 0;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ wrapped_size -= 16;
+
+ *output_length = wrapped_size;
+ } else {
+ krb5_cksumtype type;
+ size_t cksumsize;
+
+ ret = krb5_crypto_get_checksum_type(_gsskrb5_context, crypto, &type);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ ret = krb5_checksumsize(_gsskrb5_context, type, &cksumsize);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ if (input_length < cksumsize)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Checksum is concatenated with data */
+ *output_length = input_length - cksumsize;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+OM_uint32 _gssapi_wrap_size_cfx(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
+ const gsskrb5_ctx context_handle,
+ int conf_req_flag,
+ gss_qop_t qop_req,
+ OM_uint32 req_output_size,
+ OM_uint32 *max_input_size,
+ krb5_keyblock *key)
+{
+ krb5_error_code ret;
+ krb5_crypto crypto;
+
+ ret = krb5_crypto_init(_gsskrb5_context, key, 0, &crypto);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ _gsskrb5_set_error_string();
+ *minor_status = ret;
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ }
+
+ ret = _gsskrb5cfx_max_wrap_length_cfx(crypto, conf_req_flag,
+ req_output_size, max_input_size);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ _gsskrb5_set_error_string();
+ *minor_status = ret;
+ krb5_crypto_destroy(_gsskrb5_context, crypto);
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ }
+
+ krb5_crypto_destroy(_gsskrb5_context, crypto);
+
+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Rotate "rrc" bytes to the front or back
+ */
+
+static krb5_error_code
+rrc_rotate(void *data, size_t len, uint16_t rrc, krb5_boolean unrotate)
+{
+ u_char *tmp, buf[256];
+ size_t left;
+
+ if (len == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ rrc %= len;
+
+ if (rrc == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ left = len - rrc;
+
+ if (rrc <= sizeof(buf)) {
+ tmp = buf;
+ } else {
+ tmp = malloc(rrc);
+ if (tmp == NULL)
+ return ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ if (unrotate) {
+ memcpy(tmp, data, rrc);
+ memmove(data, (u_char *)data + rrc, left);
+ memcpy((u_char *)data + left, tmp, rrc);
+ } else {
+ memcpy(tmp, (u_char *)data + left, rrc);
+ memmove((u_char *)data + rrc, data, left);
+ memcpy(data, tmp, rrc);
+ }
+
+ if (rrc > sizeof(buf))
+ free(tmp);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+OM_uint32 _gssapi_wrap_cfx(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
+ const gsskrb5_ctx context_handle,
+ int conf_req_flag,
+ gss_qop_t qop_req,
+ const gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer,
+ int *conf_state,
+ gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer,
+ krb5_keyblock *key)
+{
+ krb5_crypto crypto;
+ gss_cfx_wrap_token token;
+ krb5_error_code ret;
+ unsigned usage;
+ krb5_data cipher;
+ size_t wrapped_len, cksumsize;
+ uint16_t padlength, rrc = 0;
+ int32_t seq_number;
+ u_char *p;
+
+ ret = krb5_crypto_init(_gsskrb5_context, key, 0, &crypto);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ _gsskrb5_set_error_string();
+ *minor_status = ret;
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ }
+
+ ret = _gsskrb5cfx_wrap_length_cfx(crypto, conf_req_flag,
+ input_message_buffer->length,
+ &wrapped_len, &cksumsize, &padlength);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ _gsskrb5_set_error_string();
+ *minor_status = ret;
+ krb5_crypto_destroy(_gsskrb5_context, crypto);
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ }
+
+ /* Always rotate encrypted token (if any) and checksum to header */
+ rrc = (conf_req_flag ? sizeof(*token) : 0) + (uint16_t)cksumsize;
+
+ output_message_buffer->length = wrapped_len;
+ output_message_buffer->value = malloc(output_message_buffer->length);
+ if (output_message_buffer->value == NULL) {
+ *minor_status = ENOMEM;
+ krb5_crypto_destroy(_gsskrb5_context, crypto);
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ }
+
+ p = output_message_buffer->value;
+ token = (gss_cfx_wrap_token)p;
+ token->TOK_ID[0] = 0x05;
+ token->TOK_ID[1] = 0x04;
+ token->Flags = 0;
+ token->Filler = 0xFF;
+ if ((context_handle->more_flags & LOCAL) == 0)
+ token->Flags |= CFXSentByAcceptor;
+ if (context_handle->more_flags & ACCEPTOR_SUBKEY)
+ token->Flags |= CFXAcceptorSubkey;
+ if (conf_req_flag) {
+ /*
+ * In Wrap tokens with confidentiality, the EC field is
+ * used to encode the size (in bytes) of the random filler.
+ */
+ token->Flags |= CFXSealed;
+ token->EC[0] = (padlength >> 8) & 0xFF;
+ token->EC[1] = (padlength >> 0) & 0xFF;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * In Wrap tokens without confidentiality, the EC field is
+ * used to encode the size (in bytes) of the trailing
+ * checksum.
+ *
+ * This is not used in the checksum calcuation itself,
+ * because the checksum length could potentially vary
+ * depending on the data length.
+ */
+ token->EC[0] = 0;
+ token->EC[1] = 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * In Wrap tokens that provide for confidentiality, the RRC
+ * field in the header contains the hex value 00 00 before
+ * encryption.
+ *
+ * In Wrap tokens that do not provide for confidentiality,
+ * both the EC and RRC fields in the appended checksum
+ * contain the hex value 00 00 for the purpose of calculating
+ * the checksum.
+ */
+ token->RRC[0] = 0;
+ token->RRC[1] = 0;
+
+ HEIMDAL_MUTEX_lock(&context_handle->ctx_id_mutex);
+ krb5_auth_con_getlocalseqnumber(_gsskrb5_context,
+ context_handle->auth_context,
+ &seq_number);
+ _gsskrb5_encode_be_om_uint32(0, &token->SND_SEQ[0]);
+ _gsskrb5_encode_be_om_uint32(seq_number, &token->SND_SEQ[4]);
+ krb5_auth_con_setlocalseqnumber(_gsskrb5_context,
+ context_handle->auth_context,
+ ++seq_number);
+ HEIMDAL_MUTEX_unlock(&context_handle->ctx_id_mutex);
+
+ /*
+ * If confidentiality is requested, the token header is
+ * appended to the plaintext before encryption; the resulting
+ * token is {"header" | encrypt(plaintext | pad | "header")}.
+ *
+ * If no confidentiality is requested, the checksum is
+ * calculated over the plaintext concatenated with the
+ * token header.
+ */
+ if (context_handle->more_flags & LOCAL) {
+ usage = KRB5_KU_USAGE_INITIATOR_SEAL;
+ } else {
+ usage = KRB5_KU_USAGE_ACCEPTOR_SEAL;
+ }
+
+ if (conf_req_flag) {
+ /*
+ * Any necessary padding is added here to ensure that the
+ * encrypted token header is always at the end of the
+ * ciphertext.
+ *
+ * The specification does not require that the padding
+ * bytes are initialized.
+ */
+ p += sizeof(*token);
+ memcpy(p, input_message_buffer->value, input_message_buffer->length);
+ memset(p + input_message_buffer->length, 0xFF, padlength);
+ memcpy(p + input_message_buffer->length + padlength,
+ token, sizeof(*token));
+
+ ret = krb5_encrypt(_gsskrb5_context, crypto,
+ usage, p,
+ input_message_buffer->length + padlength +
+ sizeof(*token),
+ &cipher);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ _gsskrb5_set_error_string();
+ *minor_status = ret;
+ krb5_crypto_destroy(_gsskrb5_context, crypto);
+ _gsskrb5_release_buffer(minor_status, output_message_buffer);
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ }
+ assert(sizeof(*token) + cipher.length == wrapped_len);
+ token->RRC[0] = (rrc >> 8) & 0xFF;
+ token->RRC[1] = (rrc >> 0) & 0xFF;
+
+ ret = rrc_rotate(cipher.data, cipher.length, rrc, FALSE);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ _gsskrb5_set_error_string();
+ *minor_status = ret;
+ krb5_crypto_destroy(_gsskrb5_context, crypto);
+ _gsskrb5_release_buffer(minor_status, output_message_buffer);
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ }
+ memcpy(p, cipher.data, cipher.length);
+ krb5_data_free(&cipher);
+ } else {
+ char *buf;
+ Checksum cksum;
+
+ buf = malloc(input_message_buffer->length + sizeof(*token));
+ if (buf == NULL) {
+ *minor_status = ENOMEM;
+ krb5_crypto_destroy(_gsskrb5_context, crypto);
+ _gsskrb5_release_buffer(minor_status, output_message_buffer);
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ }
+ memcpy(buf, input_message_buffer->value, input_message_buffer->length);
+ memcpy(buf + input_message_buffer->length, token, sizeof(*token));
+
+ ret = krb5_create_checksum(_gsskrb5_context, crypto,
+ usage, 0, buf,
+ input_message_buffer->length +
+ sizeof(*token),
+ &cksum);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ _gsskrb5_set_error_string();
+ *minor_status = ret;
+ krb5_crypto_destroy(_gsskrb5_context, crypto);
+ _gsskrb5_release_buffer(minor_status, output_message_buffer);
+ free(buf);
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ }
+
+ free(buf);
+
+ assert(cksum.checksum.length == cksumsize);
+ token->EC[0] = (cksum.checksum.length >> 8) & 0xFF;
+ token->EC[1] = (cksum.checksum.length >> 0) & 0xFF;
+ token->RRC[0] = (rrc >> 8) & 0xFF;
+ token->RRC[1] = (rrc >> 0) & 0xFF;
+
+ p += sizeof(*token);
+ memcpy(p, input_message_buffer->value, input_message_buffer->length);
+ memcpy(p + input_message_buffer->length,
+ cksum.checksum.data, cksum.checksum.length);
+
+ ret = rrc_rotate(p,
+ input_message_buffer->length + cksum.checksum.length, rrc, FALSE);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ _gsskrb5_set_error_string();
+ *minor_status = ret;
+ krb5_crypto_destroy(_gsskrb5_context, crypto);
+ _gsskrb5_release_buffer(minor_status, output_message_buffer);
+ free_Checksum(&cksum);
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ }
+ free_Checksum(&cksum);
+ }
+
+ krb5_crypto_destroy(_gsskrb5_context, crypto);
+
+ if (conf_state != NULL) {
+ *conf_state = conf_req_flag;
+ }
+
+ *minor_status = 0;
+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+}
+
+OM_uint32 _gssapi_unwrap_cfx(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
+ const gsskrb5_ctx context_handle,
+ const gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer,
+ gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer,
+ int *conf_state,
+ gss_qop_t *qop_state,
+ krb5_keyblock *key)
+{
+ krb5_crypto crypto;
+ gss_cfx_wrap_token token;
+ u_char token_flags;
+ krb5_error_code ret;
+ unsigned usage;
+ krb5_data data;
+ uint16_t ec, rrc;
+ OM_uint32 seq_number_lo, seq_number_hi;
+ size_t len;
+ u_char *p;
+
+ *minor_status = 0;
+
+ if (input_message_buffer->length < sizeof(*token)) {
+ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+ }
+
+ p = input_message_buffer->value;
+
+ token = (gss_cfx_wrap_token)p;
+
+ if (token->TOK_ID[0] != 0x05 || token->TOK_ID[1] != 0x04) {
+ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+ }
+
+ /* Ignore unknown flags */
+ token_flags = token->Flags &
+ (CFXSentByAcceptor | CFXSealed | CFXAcceptorSubkey);
+
+ if (token_flags & CFXSentByAcceptor) {
+ if ((context_handle->more_flags & LOCAL) == 0)
+ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+ }
+
+ if (context_handle->more_flags & ACCEPTOR_SUBKEY) {
+ if ((token_flags & CFXAcceptorSubkey) == 0)
+ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+ } else {
+ if (token_flags & CFXAcceptorSubkey)
+ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+ }
+
+ if (token->Filler != 0xFF) {
+ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+ }
+
+ if (conf_state != NULL) {
+ *conf_state = (token_flags & CFXSealed) ? 1 : 0;
+ }
+
+ ec = (token->EC[0] << 8) | token->EC[1];
+ rrc = (token->RRC[0] << 8) | token->RRC[1];
+
+ /*
+ * Check sequence number
+ */
+ _gsskrb5_decode_be_om_uint32(&token->SND_SEQ[0], &seq_number_hi);
+ _gsskrb5_decode_be_om_uint32(&token->SND_SEQ[4], &seq_number_lo);
+ if (seq_number_hi) {
+ /* no support for 64-bit sequence numbers */
+ *minor_status = ERANGE;
+ return GSS_S_UNSEQ_TOKEN;
+ }
+
+ HEIMDAL_MUTEX_lock(&context_handle->ctx_id_mutex);
+ ret = _gssapi_msg_order_check(context_handle->order, seq_number_lo);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ *minor_status = 0;
+ HEIMDAL_MUTEX_unlock(&context_handle->ctx_id_mutex);
+ _gsskrb5_release_buffer(minor_status, output_message_buffer);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ HEIMDAL_MUTEX_unlock(&context_handle->ctx_id_mutex);
+
+ /*
+ * Decrypt and/or verify checksum
+ */
+ ret = krb5_crypto_init(_gsskrb5_context, key, 0, &crypto);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ _gsskrb5_set_error_string();
+ *minor_status = ret;
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ }
+
+ if (context_handle->more_flags & LOCAL) {
+ usage = KRB5_KU_USAGE_ACCEPTOR_SEAL;
+ } else {
+ usage = KRB5_KU_USAGE_INITIATOR_SEAL;
+ }
+
+ p += sizeof(*token);
+ len = input_message_buffer->length;
+ len -= (p - (u_char *)input_message_buffer->value);
+
+ /* Rotate by RRC; bogus to do this in-place XXX */
+ *minor_status = rrc_rotate(p, len, rrc, TRUE);
+ if (*minor_status != 0) {
+ krb5_crypto_destroy(_gsskrb5_context, crypto);
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ }
+
+ if (token_flags & CFXSealed) {
+ ret = krb5_decrypt(_gsskrb5_context, crypto, usage,
+ p, len, &data);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ _gsskrb5_set_error_string();
+ *minor_status = ret;
+ krb5_crypto_destroy(_gsskrb5_context, crypto);
+ return GSS_S_BAD_MIC;
+ }
+
+ /* Check that there is room for the pad and token header */
+ if (data.length < ec + sizeof(*token)) {
+ krb5_crypto_destroy(_gsskrb5_context, crypto);
+ krb5_data_free(&data);
+ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+ }
+ p = data.data;
+ p += data.length - sizeof(*token);
+
+ /* RRC is unprotected; don't modify input buffer */
+ ((gss_cfx_wrap_token)p)->RRC[0] = token->RRC[0];
+ ((gss_cfx_wrap_token)p)->RRC[1] = token->RRC[1];
+
+ /* Check the integrity of the header */
+ if (memcmp(p, token, sizeof(*token)) != 0) {
+ krb5_crypto_destroy(_gsskrb5_context, crypto);
+ krb5_data_free(&data);
+ return GSS_S_BAD_MIC;
+ }
+
+ output_message_buffer->value = data.data;
+ output_message_buffer->length = data.length - ec - sizeof(*token);
+ } else {
+ Checksum cksum;
+
+ /* Determine checksum type */
+ ret = krb5_crypto_get_checksum_type(_gsskrb5_context,
+ crypto, &cksum.cksumtype);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ _gsskrb5_set_error_string();
+ *minor_status = ret;
+ krb5_crypto_destroy(_gsskrb5_context, crypto);
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ }
+
+ cksum.checksum.length = ec;
+
+ /* Check we have at least as much data as the checksum */
+ if (len < cksum.checksum.length) {
+ *minor_status = ERANGE;
+ krb5_crypto_destroy(_gsskrb5_context, crypto);
+ return GSS_S_BAD_MIC;
+ }
+
+ /* Length now is of the plaintext only, no checksum */
+ len -= cksum.checksum.length;
+ cksum.checksum.data = p + len;
+
+ output_message_buffer->length = len; /* for later */
+ output_message_buffer->value = malloc(len + sizeof(*token));
+ if (output_message_buffer->value == NULL) {
+ *minor_status = ENOMEM;
+ krb5_crypto_destroy(_gsskrb5_context, crypto);
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ }
+
+ /* Checksum is over (plaintext-data | "header") */
+ memcpy(output_message_buffer->value, p, len);
+ memcpy((u_char *)output_message_buffer->value + len,
+ token, sizeof(*token));
+
+ /* EC is not included in checksum calculation */
+ token = (gss_cfx_wrap_token)((u_char *)output_message_buffer->value +
+ len);
+ token->EC[0] = 0;
+ token->EC[1] = 0;
+ token->RRC[0] = 0;
+ token->RRC[1] = 0;
+
+ ret = krb5_verify_checksum(_gsskrb5_context, crypto,
+ usage,
+ output_message_buffer->value,
+ len + sizeof(*token),
+ &cksum);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ _gsskrb5_set_error_string();
+ *minor_status = ret;
+ krb5_crypto_destroy(_gsskrb5_context, crypto);
+ _gsskrb5_release_buffer(minor_status, output_message_buffer);
+ return GSS_S_BAD_MIC;
+ }
+ }
+
+ krb5_crypto_destroy(_gsskrb5_context, crypto);
+
+ if (qop_state != NULL) {
+ *qop_state = GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT;
+ }
+
+ *minor_status = 0;
+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+}
+
+OM_uint32 _gssapi_mic_cfx(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
+ const gsskrb5_ctx context_handle,
+ gss_qop_t qop_req,
+ const gss_buffer_t message_buffer,
+ gss_buffer_t message_token,
+ krb5_keyblock *key)
+{
+ krb5_crypto crypto;
+ gss_cfx_mic_token token;
+ krb5_error_code ret;
+ unsigned usage;
+ Checksum cksum;
+ u_char *buf;
+ size_t len;
+ int32_t seq_number;
+
+ ret = krb5_crypto_init(_gsskrb5_context, key, 0, &crypto);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ _gsskrb5_set_error_string();
+ *minor_status = ret;
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ }
+
+ len = message_buffer->length + sizeof(*token);
+ buf = malloc(len);
+ if (buf == NULL) {
+ *minor_status = ENOMEM;
+ krb5_crypto_destroy(_gsskrb5_context, crypto);
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(buf, message_buffer->value, message_buffer->length);
+
+ token = (gss_cfx_mic_token)(buf + message_buffer->length);
+ token->TOK_ID[0] = 0x04;
+ token->TOK_ID[1] = 0x04;
+ token->Flags = 0;
+ if ((context_handle->more_flags & LOCAL) == 0)
+ token->Flags |= CFXSentByAcceptor;
+ if (context_handle->more_flags & ACCEPTOR_SUBKEY)
+ token->Flags |= CFXAcceptorSubkey;
+ memset(token->Filler, 0xFF, 5);
+
+ HEIMDAL_MUTEX_lock(&context_handle->ctx_id_mutex);
+ krb5_auth_con_getlocalseqnumber(_gsskrb5_context,
+ context_handle->auth_context,
+ &seq_number);
+ _gsskrb5_encode_be_om_uint32(0, &token->SND_SEQ[0]);
+ _gsskrb5_encode_be_om_uint32(seq_number, &token->SND_SEQ[4]);
+ krb5_auth_con_setlocalseqnumber(_gsskrb5_context,
+ context_handle->auth_context,
+ ++seq_number);
+ HEIMDAL_MUTEX_unlock(&context_handle->ctx_id_mutex);
+
+ if (context_handle->more_flags & LOCAL) {
+ usage = KRB5_KU_USAGE_INITIATOR_SIGN;
+ } else {
+ usage = KRB5_KU_USAGE_ACCEPTOR_SIGN;
+ }
+
+ ret = krb5_create_checksum(_gsskrb5_context, crypto,
+ usage, 0, buf, len, &cksum);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ _gsskrb5_set_error_string();
+ *minor_status = ret;
+ krb5_crypto_destroy(_gsskrb5_context, crypto);
+ free(buf);
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ }
+ krb5_crypto_destroy(_gsskrb5_context, crypto);
+
+ /* Determine MIC length */
+ message_token->length = sizeof(*token) + cksum.checksum.length;
+ message_token->value = malloc(message_token->length);
+ if (message_token->value == NULL) {
+ *minor_status = ENOMEM;
+ free_Checksum(&cksum);
+ free(buf);
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ }
+
+ /* Token is { "header" | get_mic("header" | plaintext-data) } */
+ memcpy(message_token->value, token, sizeof(*token));
+ memcpy((u_char *)message_token->value + sizeof(*token),
+ cksum.checksum.data, cksum.checksum.length);
+
+ free_Checksum(&cksum);
+ free(buf);
+
+ *minor_status = 0;
+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+}
+
+OM_uint32 _gssapi_verify_mic_cfx(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
+ const gsskrb5_ctx context_handle,
+ const gss_buffer_t message_buffer,
+ const gss_buffer_t token_buffer,
+ gss_qop_t *qop_state,
+ krb5_keyblock *key)
+{
+ krb5_crypto crypto;
+ gss_cfx_mic_token token;
+ u_char token_flags;
+ krb5_error_code ret;
+ unsigned usage;
+ OM_uint32 seq_number_lo, seq_number_hi;
+ u_char *buf, *p;
+ Checksum cksum;
+
+ *minor_status = 0;
+
+ if (token_buffer->length < sizeof(*token)) {
+ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+ }
+
+ p = token_buffer->value;
+
+ token = (gss_cfx_mic_token)p;
+
+ if (token->TOK_ID[0] != 0x04 || token->TOK_ID[1] != 0x04) {
+ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+ }
+
+ /* Ignore unknown flags */
+ token_flags = token->Flags & (CFXSentByAcceptor | CFXAcceptorSubkey);
+
+ if (token_flags & CFXSentByAcceptor) {
+ if ((context_handle->more_flags & LOCAL) == 0)
+ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+ }
+ if (context_handle->more_flags & ACCEPTOR_SUBKEY) {
+ if ((token_flags & CFXAcceptorSubkey) == 0)
+ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+ } else {
+ if (token_flags & CFXAcceptorSubkey)
+ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+ }
+
+ if (memcmp(token->Filler, "\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff", 5) != 0) {
+ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Check sequence number
+ */
+ _gsskrb5_decode_be_om_uint32(&token->SND_SEQ[0], &seq_number_hi);
+ _gsskrb5_decode_be_om_uint32(&token->SND_SEQ[4], &seq_number_lo);
+ if (seq_number_hi) {
+ *minor_status = ERANGE;
+ return GSS_S_UNSEQ_TOKEN;
+ }
+
+ HEIMDAL_MUTEX_lock(&context_handle->ctx_id_mutex);
+ ret = _gssapi_msg_order_check(context_handle->order, seq_number_lo);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ *minor_status = 0;
+ HEIMDAL_MUTEX_unlock(&context_handle->ctx_id_mutex);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ HEIMDAL_MUTEX_unlock(&context_handle->ctx_id_mutex);
+
+ /*
+ * Verify checksum
+ */
+ ret = krb5_crypto_init(_gsskrb5_context, key, 0, &crypto);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ _gsskrb5_set_error_string();
+ *minor_status = ret;
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ }
+
+ ret = krb5_crypto_get_checksum_type(_gsskrb5_context, crypto,
+ &cksum.cksumtype);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ _gsskrb5_set_error_string();
+ *minor_status = ret;
+ krb5_crypto_destroy(_gsskrb5_context, crypto);
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ }
+
+ cksum.checksum.data = p + sizeof(*token);
+ cksum.checksum.length = token_buffer->length - sizeof(*token);
+
+ if (context_handle->more_flags & LOCAL) {
+ usage = KRB5_KU_USAGE_ACCEPTOR_SIGN;
+ } else {
+ usage = KRB5_KU_USAGE_INITIATOR_SIGN;
+ }
+
+ buf = malloc(message_buffer->length + sizeof(*token));
+ if (buf == NULL) {
+ *minor_status = ENOMEM;
+ krb5_crypto_destroy(_gsskrb5_context, crypto);
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ }
+ memcpy(buf, message_buffer->value, message_buffer->length);
+ memcpy(buf + message_buffer->length, token, sizeof(*token));
+
+ ret = krb5_verify_checksum(_gsskrb5_context, crypto,
+ usage,
+ buf,
+ sizeof(*token) + message_buffer->length,
+ &cksum);
+ krb5_crypto_destroy(_gsskrb5_context, crypto);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ _gsskrb5_set_error_string();
+ *minor_status = ret;
+ free(buf);
+ return GSS_S_BAD_MIC;
+ }
+
+ free(buf);
+
+ if (qop_state != NULL) {
+ *qop_state = GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT;
+ }
+
+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+}