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authorJelmer Vernooij <jelmer@samba.org>2008-10-21 14:51:13 +0200
committerJelmer Vernooij <jelmer@samba.org>2008-10-21 14:51:13 +0200
commit5209a846a9157e649fcdcb561f7eaf19c8c0e465 (patch)
treeb0a7e52b5646c8eec182dbc391e7934b6804488c /source4/kdc/hdb-samba4.c
parent625359b2e266105022309df8985720108ecd6f67 (diff)
parent2ee8d29d22bcb1c350ab59d71b0aee548489bc9c (diff)
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Merge branch 'master' of ssh://git.samba.org/data/git/samba into regsrv
Conflicts: source4/lib/registry/ldb.c source4/rpc_server/winreg/rpc_winreg.c
Diffstat (limited to 'source4/kdc/hdb-samba4.c')
-rw-r--r--source4/kdc/hdb-samba4.c1558
1 files changed, 1558 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/source4/kdc/hdb-samba4.c b/source4/kdc/hdb-samba4.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b6a48e79d0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/source4/kdc/hdb-samba4.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1558 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2001, 2003, PADL Software Pty Ltd.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004, Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004, Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. Neither the name of PADL Software nor the names of its contributors
+ * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ * without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY PADL SOFTWARE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL PADL SOFTWARE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include "system/time.h"
+#include "dsdb/common/flags.h"
+#include "lib/ldb/include/ldb.h"
+#include "lib/ldb/include/ldb_errors.h"
+#include "librpc/gen_ndr/netlogon.h"
+#include "auth/auth.h"
+#include "auth/credentials/credentials.h"
+#include "auth/auth_sam.h"
+#include "../lib/util/util_ldb.h"
+#include "dsdb/samdb/samdb.h"
+#include "librpc/ndr/libndr.h"
+#include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_drsblobs.h"
+#include "librpc/gen_ndr/lsa.h"
+#include "libcli/auth/libcli_auth.h"
+#include "param/param.h"
+#include "events/events.h"
+#include "kdc/kdc.h"
+#include "../lib/crypto/md4.h"
+
+enum hdb_ldb_ent_type
+{ HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT, HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_SERVER,
+ HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT, HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_TRUST, HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_ANY };
+
+enum trust_direction {
+ UNKNOWN = 0,
+ INBOUND = LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_INBOUND,
+ OUTBOUND = LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_OUTBOUND
+};
+
+static const char *realm_ref_attrs[] = {
+ "nCName",
+ "dnsRoot",
+ NULL
+};
+
+static const char *trust_attrs[] = {
+ "trustPartner",
+ "trustAuthIncoming",
+ "trustAuthOutgoing",
+ "whenCreated",
+ "msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes",
+ "trustAttributes",
+ "trustDirection",
+ "trustType",
+ NULL
+};
+
+static KerberosTime ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(struct ldb_message *msg, const char *attr, KerberosTime default_val)
+{
+ const char *tmp;
+ const char *gentime;
+ struct tm tm;
+
+ gentime = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, attr, NULL);
+ if (!gentime)
+ return default_val;
+
+ tmp = strptime(gentime, "%Y%m%d%H%M%SZ", &tm);
+ if (tmp == NULL) {
+ return default_val;
+ }
+
+ return timegm(&tm);
+}
+
+static HDBFlags uf2HDBFlags(krb5_context context, int userAccountControl, enum hdb_ldb_ent_type ent_type)
+{
+ HDBFlags flags = int2HDBFlags(0);
+
+ /* we don't allow kadmin deletes */
+ flags.immutable = 1;
+
+ /* mark the principal as invalid to start with */
+ flags.invalid = 1;
+
+ flags.renewable = 1;
+
+ /* All accounts are servers, but this may be disabled again in the caller */
+ flags.server = 1;
+
+ /* Account types - clear the invalid bit if it turns out to be valid */
+ if (userAccountControl & UF_NORMAL_ACCOUNT) {
+ if (ent_type == HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
+ flags.client = 1;
+ }
+ flags.invalid = 0;
+ }
+
+ if (userAccountControl & UF_INTERDOMAIN_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
+ if (ent_type == HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
+ flags.client = 1;
+ }
+ flags.invalid = 0;
+ }
+ if (userAccountControl & UF_WORKSTATION_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
+ if (ent_type == HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
+ flags.client = 1;
+ }
+ flags.invalid = 0;
+ }
+ if (userAccountControl & UF_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
+ if (ent_type == HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
+ flags.client = 1;
+ }
+ flags.invalid = 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Not permitted to act as a client if disabled */
+ if (userAccountControl & UF_ACCOUNTDISABLE) {
+ flags.client = 0;
+ }
+ if (userAccountControl & UF_LOCKOUT) {
+ flags.invalid = 1;
+ }
+/*
+ if (userAccountControl & UF_PASSWORD_NOTREQD) {
+ flags.invalid = 1;
+ }
+*/
+/*
+ UF_PASSWORD_CANT_CHANGE and UF_ENCRYPTED_TEXT_PASSWORD_ALLOWED are irrelevent
+*/
+ if (userAccountControl & UF_TEMP_DUPLICATE_ACCOUNT) {
+ flags.invalid = 1;
+ }
+
+/* UF_DONT_EXPIRE_PASSWD and UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY handled in LDB_message2entry() */
+
+/*
+ if (userAccountControl & UF_MNS_LOGON_ACCOUNT) {
+ flags.invalid = 1;
+ }
+*/
+ if (userAccountControl & UF_SMARTCARD_REQUIRED) {
+ flags.require_hwauth = 1;
+ }
+ if (userAccountControl & UF_TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION) {
+ flags.ok_as_delegate = 1;
+ }
+ if (!(userAccountControl & UF_NOT_DELEGATED)) {
+ flags.forwardable = 1;
+ flags.proxiable = 1;
+ }
+
+ if (userAccountControl & UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH) {
+ flags.require_preauth = 0;
+ } else {
+ flags.require_preauth = 1;
+
+ }
+ return flags;
+}
+
+static int hdb_ldb_destructor(struct hdb_ldb_private *private)
+{
+ hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex = private->entry_ex;
+ free_hdb_entry(&entry_ex->entry);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void hdb_ldb_free_entry(krb5_context context, hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
+{
+ talloc_free(entry_ex->ctx);
+}
+
+static krb5_error_code LDB_message2entry_keys(krb5_context context,
+ struct smb_iconv_convenience *iconv_convenience,
+ TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ struct ldb_message *msg,
+ unsigned int userAccountControl,
+ hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
+{
+ krb5_error_code ret = 0;
+ enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
+ struct samr_Password *hash;
+ const struct ldb_val *sc_val;
+ struct supplementalCredentialsBlob scb;
+ struct supplementalCredentialsPackage *scpk = NULL;
+ bool newer_keys = false;
+ struct package_PrimaryKerberosBlob _pkb;
+ struct package_PrimaryKerberosCtr3 *pkb3 = NULL;
+ struct package_PrimaryKerberosCtr4 *pkb4 = NULL;
+ uint32_t i;
+ uint32_t allocated_keys = 0;
+
+ entry_ex->entry.keys.val = NULL;
+ entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
+
+ entry_ex->entry.kvno = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "msDS-KeyVersionNumber", 0);
+
+ /* Get keys from the db */
+
+ hash = samdb_result_hash(mem_ctx, msg, "unicodePwd");
+ sc_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "supplementalCredentials");
+
+ /* unicodePwd for enctype 0x17 (23) if present */
+ if (hash) {
+ allocated_keys++;
+ }
+
+ /* supplementalCredentials if present */
+ if (sc_val) {
+ ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob_all(sc_val, mem_ctx, iconv_convenience, &scb,
+ (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_supplementalCredentialsBlob);
+ if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
+ dump_data(0, sc_val->data, sc_val->length);
+ ret = EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (scb.sub.signature != SUPPLEMENTAL_CREDENTIALS_SIGNATURE) {
+ NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(supplementalCredentialsBlob, &scb);
+ ret = EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ for (i=0; i < scb.sub.num_packages; i++) {
+ if (strcmp("Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys", scb.sub.packages[i].name) == 0) {
+ scpk = &scb.sub.packages[i];
+ if (!scpk->data || !scpk->data[0]) {
+ scpk = NULL;
+ continue;
+ }
+ newer_keys = true;
+ break;
+ } else if (strcmp("Primary:Kerberos", scb.sub.packages[i].name) == 0) {
+ scpk = &scb.sub.packages[i];
+ if (!scpk->data || !scpk->data[0]) {
+ scpk = NULL;
+ }
+ /*
+ * we don't break here in hope to find
+ * a Kerberos-Newer-Keys package
+ */
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ /*
+ * Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys or Primary:Kerberos element
+ * of supplementalCredentials
+ */
+ if (scpk) {
+ DATA_BLOB blob;
+
+ blob = strhex_to_data_blob(mem_ctx, scpk->data);
+ if (!blob.data) {
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* we cannot use ndr_pull_struct_blob_all() here, as w2k and w2k3 add padding bytes */
+ ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&blob, mem_ctx, iconv_convenience, &_pkb,
+ (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_package_PrimaryKerberosBlob);
+ if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
+ krb5_set_error_string(context, "LDB_message2entry_keys: could not parse package_PrimaryKerberosBlob");
+ krb5_warnx(context, "LDB_message2entry_keys: could not parse package_PrimaryKerberosBlob");
+ ret = EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (newer_keys && _pkb.version != 4) {
+ krb5_set_error_string(context, "LDB_message2entry_keys: Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys not version 4");
+ krb5_warnx(context, "LDB_message2entry_keys: Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys not version 4");
+ ret = EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (!newer_keys && _pkb.version != 3) {
+ krb5_set_error_string(context, "LDB_message2entry_keys: could not parse Primary:Kerberos not version 3");
+ krb5_warnx(context, "LDB_message2entry_keys: could not parse Primary:Kerberos not version 3");
+ ret = EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (_pkb.version == 4) {
+ pkb4 = &_pkb.ctr.ctr4;
+ allocated_keys += pkb4->num_keys;
+ } else if (_pkb.version == 3) {
+ pkb3 = &_pkb.ctr.ctr3;
+ allocated_keys += pkb3->num_keys;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (allocated_keys == 0) {
+ /* oh, no password. Apparently (comment in
+ * hdb-ldap.c) this violates the ASN.1, but this
+ * allows an entry with no keys (yet). */
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* allocate space to decode into */
+ entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
+ entry_ex->entry.keys.val = calloc(allocated_keys, sizeof(Key));
+ if (entry_ex->entry.keys.val == NULL) {
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (hash && !(userAccountControl & UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY)) {
+ Key key;
+
+ key.mkvno = 0;
+ key.salt = NULL; /* No salt for this enc type */
+
+ ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
+ ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5,
+ hash->hash, sizeof(hash->hash),
+ &key.key);
+ if (ret) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
+ entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
+ }
+
+ if (pkb4) {
+ for (i=0; i < pkb4->num_keys; i++) {
+ bool use = true;
+ Key key;
+
+ if (!pkb4->keys[i].value) continue;
+
+ if (userAccountControl & UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY) {
+ switch (pkb4->keys[i].keytype) {
+ case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_CRC:
+ case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD5:
+ break;
+ default:
+ use = false;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!use) continue;
+
+ key.mkvno = 0;
+ key.salt = NULL;
+
+ if (pkb4->salt.string) {
+ DATA_BLOB salt;
+
+ salt = data_blob_string_const(pkb4->salt.string);
+
+ key.salt = calloc(1, sizeof(*key.salt));
+ if (key.salt == NULL) {
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ key.salt->type = hdb_pw_salt;
+
+ ret = krb5_data_copy(&key.salt->salt, salt.data, salt.length);
+ if (ret) {
+ free(key.salt);
+ key.salt = NULL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* TODO: maybe pass the iteration_count somehow... */
+
+ ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
+ pkb4->keys[i].keytype,
+ pkb4->keys[i].value->data,
+ pkb4->keys[i].value->length,
+ &key.key);
+ if (ret) {
+ if (key.salt) {
+ free_Salt(key.salt);
+ free(key.salt);
+ key.salt = NULL;
+ }
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
+ entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
+ }
+ } else if (pkb3) {
+ for (i=0; i < pkb3->num_keys; i++) {
+ bool use = true;
+ Key key;
+
+ if (!pkb3->keys[i].value) continue;
+
+ if (userAccountControl & UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY) {
+ switch (pkb3->keys[i].keytype) {
+ case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_CRC:
+ case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD5:
+ break;
+ default:
+ use = false;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!use) continue;
+
+ key.mkvno = 0;
+ key.salt = NULL;
+
+ if (pkb3->salt.string) {
+ DATA_BLOB salt;
+
+ salt = data_blob_string_const(pkb3->salt.string);
+
+ key.salt = calloc(1, sizeof(*key.salt));
+ if (key.salt == NULL) {
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ key.salt->type = hdb_pw_salt;
+
+ ret = krb5_data_copy(&key.salt->salt, salt.data, salt.length);
+ if (ret) {
+ free(key.salt);
+ key.salt = NULL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
+ pkb3->keys[i].keytype,
+ pkb3->keys[i].value->data,
+ pkb3->keys[i].value->length,
+ &key.key);
+ if (ret) {
+ if (key.salt) {
+ free_Salt(key.salt);
+ free(key.salt);
+ key.salt = NULL;
+ }
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
+ entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
+ }
+ }
+
+out:
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
+ }
+ if (entry_ex->entry.keys.len == 0 && entry_ex->entry.keys.val) {
+ free(entry_ex->entry.keys.val);
+ entry_ex->entry.keys.val = NULL;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Construct an hdb_entry from a directory entry.
+ */
+static krb5_error_code LDB_message2entry(krb5_context context, HDB *db,
+ TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, krb5_const_principal principal,
+ enum hdb_ldb_ent_type ent_type,
+ struct ldb_message *msg,
+ struct ldb_message *realm_ref_msg,
+ hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
+{
+ unsigned int userAccountControl;
+ int i;
+ krb5_error_code ret = 0;
+ krb5_boolean is_computer = FALSE;
+ const char *dnsdomain = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(realm_ref_msg, "dnsRoot", NULL);
+ char *realm = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, dnsdomain);
+ struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = ldb_get_opaque((struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db, "loadparm");
+ struct ldb_dn *domain_dn = samdb_result_dn((struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db,
+ mem_ctx,
+ realm_ref_msg,
+ "nCName",
+ ldb_dn_new(mem_ctx, (struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db, NULL));
+
+ struct hdb_ldb_private *private;
+ NTTIME acct_expiry;
+
+ struct ldb_message_element *objectclasses;
+ struct ldb_val computer_val;
+ computer_val.data = discard_const_p(uint8_t,"computer");
+ computer_val.length = strlen((const char *)computer_val.data);
+
+ objectclasses = ldb_msg_find_element(msg, "objectClass");
+
+ if (objectclasses && ldb_msg_find_val(objectclasses, &computer_val)) {
+ is_computer = TRUE;
+ }
+
+ memset(entry_ex, 0, sizeof(*entry_ex));
+
+ if (!realm) {
+ krb5_set_error_string(context, "talloc_strdup: out of memory");
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ private = talloc(mem_ctx, struct hdb_ldb_private);
+ if (!private) {
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ private->entry_ex = entry_ex;
+ private->iconv_convenience = lp_iconv_convenience(lp_ctx);
+ private->netbios_name = lp_netbios_name(lp_ctx);
+
+ talloc_set_destructor(private, hdb_ldb_destructor);
+
+ entry_ex->ctx = private;
+ entry_ex->free_entry = hdb_ldb_free_entry;
+
+ userAccountControl = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg, "userAccountControl", 0);
+
+
+ entry_ex->entry.principal = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.principal)));
+ if (ent_type == HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_ANY && principal == NULL) {
+ const char *samAccountName = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "samAccountName", NULL);
+ if (!samAccountName) {
+ krb5_set_error_string(context, "LDB_message2entry: no samAccountName present");
+ ret = ENOENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ samAccountName = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "samAccountName", NULL);
+ krb5_make_principal(context, &entry_ex->entry.principal, realm, samAccountName, NULL);
+ } else {
+ char *strdup_realm;
+ ret = copy_Principal(principal, entry_ex->entry.principal);
+ if (ret) {
+ krb5_clear_error_string(context);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* While we have copied the client principal, tests
+ * show that Win2k3 returns the 'corrected' realm, not
+ * the client-specified realm. This code attempts to
+ * replace the client principal's realm with the one
+ * we determine from our records */
+
+ /* this has to be with malloc() */
+ strdup_realm = strdup(realm);
+ if (!strdup_realm) {
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ krb5_clear_error_string(context);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ free(*krb5_princ_realm(context, entry_ex->entry.principal));
+ krb5_princ_set_realm(context, entry_ex->entry.principal, &strdup_realm);
+ }
+
+ entry_ex->entry.flags = uf2HDBFlags(context, userAccountControl, ent_type);
+
+ if (ent_type == HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT) {
+ entry_ex->entry.flags.invalid = 0;
+ entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 1;
+ entry_ex->entry.flags.forwardable = 1;
+ entry_ex->entry.flags.ok_as_delegate = 1;
+ }
+
+ if (lp_parm_bool(lp_ctx, NULL, "kdc", "require spn for service", true)) {
+ if (!is_computer && !ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "servicePrincipalName", NULL)) {
+ entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* use 'whenCreated' */
+ entry_ex->entry.created_by.time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenCreated", 0);
+ /* use '???' */
+ entry_ex->entry.created_by.principal = NULL;
+
+ entry_ex->entry.modified_by = (Event *) malloc(sizeof(Event));
+ if (entry_ex->entry.modified_by == NULL) {
+ krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory");
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* use 'whenChanged' */
+ entry_ex->entry.modified_by->time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenChanged", 0);
+ /* use '???' */
+ entry_ex->entry.modified_by->principal = NULL;
+
+ entry_ex->entry.valid_start = NULL;
+
+ acct_expiry = samdb_result_account_expires(msg);
+ if (acct_expiry == 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) {
+ entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
+ } else {
+ entry_ex->entry.valid_end = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.valid_end));
+ if (entry_ex->entry.valid_end == NULL) {
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ *entry_ex->entry.valid_end = nt_time_to_unix(acct_expiry);
+ }
+
+ if (ent_type != HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT) {
+ NTTIME must_change_time
+ = samdb_result_force_password_change((struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db, mem_ctx,
+ domain_dn, msg);
+ if (must_change_time == 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) {
+ entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
+ } else {
+ entry_ex->entry.pw_end = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.pw_end));
+ if (entry_ex->entry.pw_end == NULL) {
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ *entry_ex->entry.pw_end = nt_time_to_unix(must_change_time);
+ }
+ } else {
+ entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
+ }
+
+ entry_ex->entry.max_life = NULL;
+
+ entry_ex->entry.max_renew = NULL;
+
+ entry_ex->entry.generation = NULL;
+
+ /* Get keys from the db */
+ ret = LDB_message2entry_keys(context, private->iconv_convenience, private, msg, userAccountControl, entry_ex);
+ if (ret) {
+ /* Could be bougus data in the entry, or out of memory */
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ entry_ex->entry.etypes = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.etypes)));
+ if (entry_ex->entry.etypes == NULL) {
+ krb5_clear_error_string(context);
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ entry_ex->entry.etypes->len = entry_ex->entry.keys.len;
+ entry_ex->entry.etypes->val = calloc(entry_ex->entry.etypes->len, sizeof(int));
+ if (entry_ex->entry.etypes->val == NULL) {
+ krb5_clear_error_string(context);
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ for (i=0; i < entry_ex->entry.etypes->len; i++) {
+ entry_ex->entry.etypes->val[i] = entry_ex->entry.keys.val[i].key.keytype;
+ }
+
+
+ private->msg = talloc_steal(private, msg);
+ private->realm_ref_msg = talloc_steal(private, realm_ref_msg);
+ private->samdb = (struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db;
+
+out:
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ /* This doesn't free ent itself, that is for the eventual caller to do */
+ hdb_free_entry(context, entry_ex);
+ } else {
+ talloc_steal(db, entry_ex->ctx);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Construct an hdb_entry from a directory entry.
+ */
+static krb5_error_code LDB_trust_message2entry(krb5_context context, HDB *db,
+ struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
+ TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, krb5_const_principal principal,
+ enum trust_direction direction,
+ struct ldb_message *msg,
+ hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
+{
+
+ const char *dnsdomain;
+ char *realm;
+ char *strdup_realm;
+ DATA_BLOB password_utf16;
+ struct samr_Password password_hash;
+ const struct ldb_val *password_val;
+ struct trustAuthInOutBlob password_blob;
+ struct hdb_ldb_private *private;
+
+ enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
+ int i, ret, trust_direction_flags;
+
+ private = talloc(mem_ctx, struct hdb_ldb_private);
+ if (!private) {
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ private->entry_ex = entry_ex;
+ private->iconv_convenience = lp_iconv_convenience(lp_ctx);
+ private->netbios_name = lp_netbios_name(lp_ctx);
+
+ talloc_set_destructor(private, hdb_ldb_destructor);
+
+ entry_ex->ctx = private;
+ entry_ex->free_entry = hdb_ldb_free_entry;
+
+ /* use 'whenCreated' */
+ entry_ex->entry.created_by.time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenCreated", 0);
+ /* use '???' */
+ entry_ex->entry.created_by.principal = NULL;
+
+ entry_ex->entry.valid_start = NULL;
+
+ trust_direction_flags = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "trustDirection", 0);
+
+ if (direction == INBOUND) {
+ realm = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, lp_realm(lp_ctx));
+ password_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "trustAuthIncoming");
+
+ } else { /* OUTBOUND */
+ dnsdomain = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "trustPartner", NULL);
+ realm = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, dnsdomain);
+ password_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "trustAuthOutgoing");
+ }
+
+ if (!password_val || !(trust_direction_flags & direction)) {
+ ret = ENOENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(password_val, mem_ctx, private->iconv_convenience, &password_blob,
+ (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_trustAuthInOutBlob);
+ if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
+ ret = EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ entry_ex->entry.kvno = -1;
+ for (i=0; i < password_blob.count; i++) {
+ if (password_blob.current->array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_VERSION) {
+ entry_ex->entry.kvno = password_blob.current->array[i].AuthInfo.version.version;
+ }
+ }
+
+ for (i=0; i < password_blob.count; i++) {
+ if (password_blob.current->array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_CLEAR) {
+ password_utf16 = data_blob_const(password_blob.current->array[i].AuthInfo.clear.password,
+ password_blob.current->array[i].AuthInfo.clear.size);
+ /* In the future, generate all sorts of
+ * hashes, but for now we can't safely convert
+ * the random strings windows uses into
+ * utf8 */
+
+ /* but as it is utf16 already, we can get the NT password/arcfour-hmac-md5 key */
+ mdfour(password_hash.hash, password_utf16.data, password_utf16.length);
+ break;
+ } else if (password_blob.current->array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_NT4OWF) {
+ password_hash = password_blob.current->array[i].AuthInfo.nt4owf.password;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
+ entry_ex->entry.keys.val = NULL;
+
+ if (i < password_blob.count) {
+ Key key;
+ /* Must have found a cleartext or MD4 password */
+ entry_ex->entry.keys.val = calloc(1, sizeof(Key));
+
+ key.mkvno = 0;
+ key.salt = NULL; /* No salt for this enc type */
+
+ if (entry_ex->entry.keys.val == NULL) {
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
+ ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5,
+ password_hash.hash, sizeof(password_hash.hash),
+ &key.key);
+
+ entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
+ entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
+ }
+
+ entry_ex->entry.principal = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.principal)));
+
+ ret = copy_Principal(principal, entry_ex->entry.principal);
+ if (ret) {
+ krb5_clear_error_string(context);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* While we have copied the client principal, tests
+ * show that Win2k3 returns the 'corrected' realm, not
+ * the client-specified realm. This code attempts to
+ * replace the client principal's realm with the one
+ * we determine from our records */
+
+ /* this has to be with malloc() */
+ strdup_realm = strdup(realm);
+ if (!strdup_realm) {
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ krb5_clear_error_string(context);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ free(*krb5_princ_realm(context, entry_ex->entry.principal));
+ krb5_princ_set_realm(context, entry_ex->entry.principal, &strdup_realm);
+
+ entry_ex->entry.flags = int2HDBFlags(0);
+ entry_ex->entry.flags.immutable = 1;
+ entry_ex->entry.flags.invalid = 0;
+ entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 1;
+ entry_ex->entry.flags.require_preauth = 1;
+
+ entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
+
+ entry_ex->entry.max_life = NULL;
+
+ entry_ex->entry.max_renew = NULL;
+
+ entry_ex->entry.generation = NULL;
+
+ entry_ex->entry.etypes = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.etypes)));
+ if (entry_ex->entry.etypes == NULL) {
+ krb5_clear_error_string(context);
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ entry_ex->entry.etypes->len = entry_ex->entry.keys.len;
+ entry_ex->entry.etypes->val = calloc(entry_ex->entry.etypes->len, sizeof(int));
+ if (entry_ex->entry.etypes->val == NULL) {
+ krb5_clear_error_string(context);
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ for (i=0; i < entry_ex->entry.etypes->len; i++) {
+ entry_ex->entry.etypes->val[i] = entry_ex->entry.keys.val[i].key.keytype;
+ }
+
+
+ private->msg = talloc_steal(private, msg);
+ private->realm_ref_msg = NULL;
+ private->samdb = (struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db;
+
+out:
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ /* This doesn't free ent itself, that is for the eventual caller to do */
+ hdb_free_entry(context, entry_ex);
+ } else {
+ talloc_steal(db, entry_ex->ctx);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+
+}
+
+static krb5_error_code LDB_lookup_principal(krb5_context context, struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx,
+ TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ krb5_const_principal principal,
+ enum hdb_ldb_ent_type ent_type,
+ struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
+ struct ldb_message ***pmsg)
+{
+ krb5_error_code ret;
+ int lret;
+ char *filter = NULL;
+ const char * const *princ_attrs = user_attrs;
+
+ char *short_princ;
+ char *short_princ_talloc;
+
+ struct ldb_result *res = NULL;
+
+ ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, principal, KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM, &short_princ);
+
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ krb5_set_error_string(context, "LDB_lookup_principal: could not parse principal");
+ krb5_warnx(context, "LDB_lookup_principal: could not parse principal");
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ short_princ_talloc = talloc_strdup(mem_ctx, short_princ);
+ free(short_princ);
+ if (!short_princ_talloc) {
+ krb5_set_error_string(context, "LDB_lookup_principal: talloc_strdup() failed!");
+ return ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ switch (ent_type) {
+ case HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT:
+ case HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_TRUST:
+ case HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_ANY:
+ /* Can't happen */
+ return EINVAL;
+ case HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT:
+ filter = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "(&(objectClass=user)(samAccountName=%s))",
+ KRB5_TGS_NAME);
+ break;
+ case HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_SERVER:
+ filter = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "(&(objectClass=user)(samAccountName=%s))",
+ short_princ_talloc);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (!filter) {
+ krb5_set_error_string(context, "talloc_asprintf: out of memory");
+ return ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ lret = ldb_search(ldb_ctx, mem_ctx, &res, realm_dn,
+ LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE, princ_attrs, "%s", filter);
+ if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
+ DEBUG(3, ("Failed to search for %s: %s\n", filter, ldb_errstring(ldb_ctx)));
+ return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
+ } else if (res->count == 0 || res->count > 1) {
+ DEBUG(3, ("Failed find a single entry for %s: got %d\n", filter, res->count));
+ talloc_free(res);
+ return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
+ }
+ talloc_steal(mem_ctx, res->msgs);
+ *pmsg = res->msgs;
+ talloc_free(res);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static krb5_error_code LDB_lookup_trust(krb5_context context, struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx,
+ TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ const char *realm,
+ struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
+ struct ldb_message ***pmsg)
+{
+ int lret;
+ char *filter = NULL;
+ const char * const *attrs = trust_attrs;
+
+ struct ldb_result *res = NULL;
+ filter = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "(&(objectClass=trustedDomain)(|(flatname=%s)(trustPartner=%s)))", realm, realm);
+
+ if (!filter) {
+ krb5_set_error_string(context, "talloc_asprintf: out of memory");
+ return ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ lret = ldb_search(ldb_ctx, mem_ctx, &res,
+ ldb_get_default_basedn(ldb_ctx),
+ LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE, attrs, "%s", filter);
+ if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
+ DEBUG(3, ("Failed to search for %s: %s\n", filter, ldb_errstring(ldb_ctx)));
+ return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
+ } else if (res->count == 0 || res->count > 1) {
+ DEBUG(3, ("Failed find a single entry for %s: got %d\n", filter, res->count));
+ talloc_free(res);
+ return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
+ }
+ talloc_steal(mem_ctx, res->msgs);
+ *pmsg = res->msgs;
+ talloc_free(res);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static krb5_error_code LDB_lookup_realm(krb5_context context, struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx,
+ TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ const char *realm,
+ struct ldb_message ***pmsg)
+{
+ int ret;
+ struct ldb_result *cross_ref_res;
+ struct ldb_dn *partitions_basedn = samdb_partitions_dn(ldb_ctx, mem_ctx);
+
+ ret = ldb_search(ldb_ctx, mem_ctx, &cross_ref_res,
+ partitions_basedn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE, realm_ref_attrs,
+ "(&(&(|(&(dnsRoot=%s)(nETBIOSName=*))(nETBIOSName=%s))(objectclass=crossRef))(ncName=*))",
+ realm, realm);
+
+ if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
+ DEBUG(3, ("Failed to search to lookup realm(%s): %s\n", realm, ldb_errstring(ldb_ctx)));
+ talloc_free(cross_ref_res);
+ return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
+ } else if (cross_ref_res->count == 0 || cross_ref_res->count > 1) {
+ DEBUG(3, ("Failed find a single entry for realm %s: got %d\n", realm, cross_ref_res->count));
+ talloc_free(cross_ref_res);
+ return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
+ }
+
+ if (pmsg) {
+ *pmsg = cross_ref_res->msgs;
+ talloc_steal(mem_ctx, cross_ref_res->msgs);
+ }
+ talloc_free(cross_ref_res);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+static krb5_error_code LDB_open(krb5_context context, HDB *db, int flags, mode_t mode)
+{
+ if (db->hdb_master_key_set) {
+ krb5_warnx(context, "LDB_open: use of a master key incompatible with LDB\n");
+ krb5_set_error_string(context, "LDB_open: use of a master key incompatible with LDB\n");
+ return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static krb5_error_code LDB_close(krb5_context context, HDB *db)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static krb5_error_code LDB_lock(krb5_context context, HDB *db, int operation)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static krb5_error_code LDB_unlock(krb5_context context, HDB *db)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static krb5_error_code LDB_rename(krb5_context context, HDB *db, const char *new_name)
+{
+ return HDB_ERR_DB_INUSE;
+}
+
+static krb5_error_code LDB_fetch_client(krb5_context context, HDB *db,
+ TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ krb5_const_principal principal,
+ unsigned flags,
+ hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex) {
+ NTSTATUS nt_status;
+ char *principal_string;
+ krb5_error_code ret;
+ struct ldb_message **msg = NULL;
+ struct ldb_message **realm_ref_msg = NULL;
+
+ ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, principal, &principal_string);
+
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ nt_status = sam_get_results_principal((struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db,
+ mem_ctx, principal_string,
+ &msg, &realm_ref_msg);
+ free(principal_string);
+ if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER)) {
+ return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
+ } else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY)) {
+ return ENOMEM;
+ } else if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+ return EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ ret = LDB_message2entry(context, db, mem_ctx,
+ principal, HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT,
+ msg[0], realm_ref_msg[0], entry_ex);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static krb5_error_code LDB_fetch_krbtgt(krb5_context context, HDB *db,
+ TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ krb5_const_principal principal,
+ unsigned flags,
+ hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
+{
+ krb5_error_code ret;
+ struct ldb_message **msg = NULL;
+ struct ldb_message **realm_ref_msg_1 = NULL;
+ struct ldb_message **realm_ref_msg_2 = NULL;
+ struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
+ const char *realm;
+
+ krb5_principal alloc_principal = NULL;
+ if (principal->name.name_string.len != 2
+ || (strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[0], KRB5_TGS_NAME) != 0)) {
+ /* Not a krbtgt */
+ return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
+ }
+
+ /* krbtgt case. Either us or a trusted realm */
+
+ if ((LDB_lookup_realm(context, (struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db,
+ mem_ctx, principal->realm, &realm_ref_msg_1) == 0)
+ && (LDB_lookup_realm(context, (struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db,
+ mem_ctx, principal->name.name_string.val[1], &realm_ref_msg_2) == 0)
+ && (ldb_dn_compare(realm_ref_msg_1[0]->dn, realm_ref_msg_1[0]->dn) == 0)) {
+ /* us */
+ /* Cludge, cludge cludge. If the realm part of krbtgt/realm,
+ * is in our db, then direct the caller at our primary
+ * krbtgt */
+
+ const char *dnsdomain = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(realm_ref_msg_1[0], "dnsRoot", NULL);
+ char *realm_fixed = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, dnsdomain);
+ if (!realm_fixed) {
+ krb5_set_error_string(context, "strupper_talloc: out of memory");
+ return ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ ret = krb5_copy_principal(context, principal, &alloc_principal);
+ if (ret) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ free(alloc_principal->name.name_string.val[1]);
+ alloc_principal->name.name_string.val[1] = strdup(realm_fixed);
+ talloc_free(realm_fixed);
+ if (!alloc_principal->name.name_string.val[1]) {
+ krb5_set_error_string(context, "LDB_fetch: strdup() failed!");
+ return ENOMEM;
+ }
+ principal = alloc_principal;
+ realm_dn = samdb_result_dn((struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db, mem_ctx, realm_ref_msg_1[0], "nCName", NULL);
+
+ ret = LDB_lookup_principal(context, (struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db,
+ mem_ctx,
+ principal, HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT, realm_dn, &msg);
+
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ krb5_warnx(context, "LDB_fetch: could not find principal in DB");
+ krb5_set_error_string(context, "LDB_fetch: could not find principal in DB");
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ ret = LDB_message2entry(context, db, mem_ctx,
+ principal, HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT,
+ msg[0], realm_ref_msg_1[0], entry_ex);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ krb5_warnx(context, "LDB_fetch: self krbtgt message2entry failed");
+ }
+ return ret;
+
+ } else {
+ enum trust_direction direction = UNKNOWN;
+
+ struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = talloc_get_type(ldb_get_opaque(db->hdb_db, "loadparm"), struct loadparm_context);
+ /* Either an inbound or outbound trust */
+
+ if (strcasecmp(lp_realm(lp_ctx), principal->realm) == 0) {
+ /* look for inbound trust */
+ direction = INBOUND;
+ realm = principal->name.name_string.val[1];
+ }
+
+ if (strcasecmp(lp_realm(lp_ctx), principal->name.name_string.val[1]) == 0) {
+ /* look for outbound trust */
+ direction = OUTBOUND;
+ realm = principal->realm;
+ }
+
+ /* Trusted domains are under CN=system */
+
+ ret = LDB_lookup_trust(context, (struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db,
+ mem_ctx,
+ realm, realm_dn, &msg);
+
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ krb5_warnx(context, "LDB_fetch: could not find principal in DB");
+ krb5_set_error_string(context, "LDB_fetch: could not find principal in DB");
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ ret = LDB_trust_message2entry(context, db, lp_ctx, mem_ctx,
+ principal, direction,
+ msg[0], entry_ex);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ krb5_warnx(context, "LDB_fetch: trust_message2entry failed");
+ }
+ return ret;
+
+
+ /* we should lookup trusted domains */
+ return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
+ }
+
+}
+
+static krb5_error_code LDB_fetch_server(krb5_context context, HDB *db,
+ TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ krb5_const_principal principal,
+ unsigned flags,
+ hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
+{
+ krb5_error_code ret;
+ const char *realm;
+ struct ldb_message **msg = NULL;
+ struct ldb_message **realm_ref_msg = NULL;
+ struct ldb_dn *partitions_basedn = samdb_partitions_dn(db->hdb_db, mem_ctx);
+ if (principal->name.name_string.len >= 2) {
+ /* 'normal server' case */
+ int ldb_ret;
+ NTSTATUS nt_status;
+ struct ldb_dn *user_dn, *domain_dn;
+ char *principal_string;
+
+ ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, principal,
+ KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM,
+ &principal_string);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /* At this point we may find the host is known to be
+ * in a different realm, so we should generate a
+ * referral instead */
+ nt_status = crack_service_principal_name((struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db,
+ mem_ctx, principal_string,
+ &user_dn, &domain_dn);
+ free(principal_string);
+
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+ return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
+ }
+
+ ldb_ret = gendb_search_dn((struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db,
+ mem_ctx, user_dn, &msg, user_attrs);
+
+ if (ldb_ret != 1) {
+ return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
+ }
+
+ ldb_ret = gendb_search((struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db,
+ mem_ctx, partitions_basedn, &realm_ref_msg, realm_ref_attrs,
+ "ncName=%s", ldb_dn_get_linearized(domain_dn));
+
+ if (ldb_ret != 1) {
+ return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
+ }
+
+ } else {
+ struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
+ /* server as client principal case, but we must not lookup userPrincipalNames */
+
+ realm = krb5_principal_get_realm(context, principal);
+
+ ret = LDB_lookup_realm(context, (struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db,
+ mem_ctx, realm, &realm_ref_msg);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
+ }
+
+ realm_dn = samdb_result_dn((struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db, mem_ctx, realm_ref_msg[0], "nCName", NULL);
+
+ ret = LDB_lookup_principal(context, (struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db,
+ mem_ctx,
+ principal, HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_SERVER, realm_dn, &msg);
+
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ret = LDB_message2entry(context, db, mem_ctx,
+ principal, HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_SERVER,
+ msg[0], realm_ref_msg[0], entry_ex);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ krb5_warnx(context, "LDB_fetch: message2entry failed");
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static krb5_error_code LDB_fetch(krb5_context context, HDB *db,
+ krb5_const_principal principal,
+ unsigned flags,
+ hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
+{
+ krb5_error_code ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
+
+ TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(db, 0, "LDB_fetch context");
+
+ if (!mem_ctx) {
+ krb5_set_error_string(context, "LDB_fetch: talloc_named() failed!");
+ return ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ if (flags & HDB_F_GET_CLIENT) {
+ ret = LDB_fetch_client(context, db, mem_ctx, principal, flags, entry_ex);
+ if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
+ }
+ if (flags & HDB_F_GET_SERVER) {
+ /* krbtgt fits into this situation for trusted realms, and for resolving different versions of our own realm name */
+ ret = LDB_fetch_krbtgt(context, db, mem_ctx, principal, flags, entry_ex);
+ if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
+
+ /* We return 'no entry' if it does not start with krbtgt/, so move to the common case quickly */
+ ret = LDB_fetch_server(context, db, mem_ctx, principal, flags, entry_ex);
+ if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
+ }
+ if (flags & HDB_F_GET_KRBTGT) {
+ ret = LDB_fetch_krbtgt(context, db, mem_ctx, principal, flags, entry_ex);
+ if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
+ }
+
+done:
+ talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static krb5_error_code LDB_store(krb5_context context, HDB *db, unsigned flags, hdb_entry_ex *entry)
+{
+ return HDB_ERR_DB_INUSE;
+}
+
+static krb5_error_code LDB_remove(krb5_context context, HDB *db, krb5_const_principal principal)
+{
+ return HDB_ERR_DB_INUSE;
+}
+
+struct hdb_ldb_seq {
+ struct ldb_context *ctx;
+ int index;
+ int count;
+ struct ldb_message **msgs;
+ struct ldb_message **realm_ref_msgs;
+};
+
+static krb5_error_code LDB_seq(krb5_context context, HDB *db, unsigned flags, hdb_entry_ex *entry)
+{
+ krb5_error_code ret;
+ struct hdb_ldb_seq *priv = (struct hdb_ldb_seq *)db->hdb_dbc;
+ TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
+ hdb_entry_ex entry_ex;
+ memset(&entry_ex, '\0', sizeof(entry_ex));
+
+ if (!priv) {
+ return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
+ }
+
+ mem_ctx = talloc_named(priv, 0, "LDB_seq context");
+
+ if (!mem_ctx) {
+ krb5_set_error_string(context, "LDB_seq: talloc_named() failed!");
+ return ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ if (priv->index < priv->count) {
+ ret = LDB_message2entry(context, db, mem_ctx,
+ NULL, HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_ANY,
+ priv->msgs[priv->index++],
+ priv->realm_ref_msgs[0], entry);
+ } else {
+ ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
+ }
+
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ talloc_free(priv);
+ db->hdb_dbc = NULL;
+ } else {
+ talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static krb5_error_code LDB_firstkey(krb5_context context, HDB *db, unsigned flags,
+ hdb_entry_ex *entry)
+{
+ struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx = (struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db;
+ struct hdb_ldb_seq *priv = (struct hdb_ldb_seq *)db->hdb_dbc;
+ char *realm;
+ struct ldb_dn *realm_dn = NULL;
+ struct ldb_result *res = NULL;
+ struct ldb_message **realm_ref_msgs = NULL;
+ krb5_error_code ret;
+ TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
+ int lret;
+
+ if (priv) {
+ talloc_free(priv);
+ db->hdb_dbc = NULL;
+ }
+
+ priv = (struct hdb_ldb_seq *) talloc(db, struct hdb_ldb_seq);
+ if (!priv) {
+ krb5_set_error_string(context, "talloc: out of memory");
+ return ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ priv->ctx = ldb_ctx;
+ priv->index = 0;
+ priv->msgs = NULL;
+ priv->realm_ref_msgs = NULL;
+ priv->count = 0;
+
+ mem_ctx = talloc_named(priv, 0, "LDB_firstkey context");
+
+ if (!mem_ctx) {
+ krb5_set_error_string(context, "LDB_firstkey: talloc_named() failed!");
+ return ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ ret = krb5_get_default_realm(context, &realm);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ talloc_free(priv);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ ret = LDB_lookup_realm(context, (struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db,
+ mem_ctx, realm, &realm_ref_msgs);
+
+ free(realm);
+
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ talloc_free(priv);
+ krb5_warnx(context, "LDB_firstkey: could not find realm\n");
+ return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
+ }
+
+ realm_dn = samdb_result_dn((struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db, mem_ctx, realm_ref_msgs[0], "nCName", NULL);
+
+ priv->realm_ref_msgs = talloc_steal(priv, realm_ref_msgs);
+
+ lret = ldb_search(ldb_ctx, priv, &res,
+ realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE, user_attrs,
+ "(objectClass=user)");
+
+ if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
+ talloc_free(priv);
+ return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
+ }
+
+ priv->count = res->count;
+ priv->msgs = talloc_steal(priv, res->msgs);
+ talloc_free(res);
+
+ db->hdb_dbc = priv;
+
+ ret = LDB_seq(context, db, flags, entry);
+
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ talloc_free(priv);
+ db->hdb_dbc = NULL;
+ } else {
+ talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static krb5_error_code LDB_nextkey(krb5_context context, HDB *db, unsigned flags,
+ hdb_entry_ex *entry)
+{
+ return LDB_seq(context, db, flags, entry);
+}
+
+static krb5_error_code LDB_destroy(krb5_context context, HDB *db)
+{
+ talloc_free(db);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* This interface is to be called by the KDC, which is expecting Samba
+ * calling conventions. It is also called by a wrapper
+ * (hdb_ldb_create) from the kpasswdd -> krb5 -> keytab_hdb -> hdb
+ * code */
+
+NTSTATUS kdc_hdb_samba4_create(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ struct event_context *ev_ctx,
+ struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
+ krb5_context context, struct HDB **db, const char *arg)
+{
+ NTSTATUS nt_status;
+ struct auth_session_info *session_info;
+ *db = talloc(mem_ctx, HDB);
+ if (!*db) {
+ krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory");
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+ (*db)->hdb_master_key_set = 0;
+ (*db)->hdb_db = NULL;
+
+ nt_status = auth_system_session_info(*db, lp_ctx, &session_info);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+ return nt_status;
+ }
+
+ /* The idea here is very simple. Using Kerberos to
+ * authenticate the KDC to the LDAP server is higly likely to
+ * be circular.
+ *
+ * In future we may set this up to use EXERNAL and SSL
+ * certificates, for now it will almost certainly be NTLMSSP
+ */
+
+ cli_credentials_set_kerberos_state(session_info->credentials,
+ CRED_DONT_USE_KERBEROS);
+
+ /* Setup the link to LDB */
+ (*db)->hdb_db = samdb_connect(*db, ev_ctx, lp_ctx, session_info);
+ if ((*db)->hdb_db == NULL) {
+ DEBUG(1, ("hdb_ldb_create: Cannot open samdb for KDC backend!"));
+ return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
+ }
+
+ (*db)->hdb_dbc = NULL;
+ (*db)->hdb_open = LDB_open;
+ (*db)->hdb_close = LDB_close;
+ (*db)->hdb_fetch = LDB_fetch;
+ (*db)->hdb_store = LDB_store;
+ (*db)->hdb_remove = LDB_remove;
+ (*db)->hdb_firstkey = LDB_firstkey;
+ (*db)->hdb_nextkey = LDB_nextkey;
+ (*db)->hdb_lock = LDB_lock;
+ (*db)->hdb_unlock = LDB_unlock;
+ (*db)->hdb_rename = LDB_rename;
+ /* we don't implement these, as we are not a lockable database */
+ (*db)->hdb__get = NULL;
+ (*db)->hdb__put = NULL;
+ /* kadmin should not be used for deletes - use other tools instead */
+ (*db)->hdb__del = NULL;
+ (*db)->hdb_destroy = LDB_destroy;
+
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+krb5_error_code hdb_samba4_create(krb5_context context, struct HDB **db, const char *arg)
+{
+ NTSTATUS nt_status;
+ /* The global kdc_mem_ctx and kdc_lp_ctx, Disgusting, ugly hack, but it means one less private hook */
+ nt_status = kdc_hdb_samba4_create(kdc_mem_ctx, event_context_find(kdc_mem_ctx), kdc_lp_ctx,
+ context, db, arg);
+
+ if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return EINVAL;
+}