r11543: A major upgrade to our KDC and PAC handling.

We now put the PAC in the AS-REP, so that the client has it in the
TGT.  We then validate it (and re-sign it) on a TGS-REQ, ie when the
client wants a ticket.

This should also allow us to interop with windows KDCs.

If we get an invalid PAC at the TGS stage, we just drop it.

I'm slowly trying to move the application logic out of hdb-ldb.c, and
back in with the rest of Samba's auth system, for consistancy.  This
continues that trend.

Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit 36973b1eef7db5983cce76ba241e54d5f925c69c)

3 files changed, 390 insertions, 110 deletions

diff --git a/source4/kdc/hdb-ldb.c b/source4/kdc/hdb-ldb.c
index 87e8273898..8b61914dae 100644
--- a/source4/kdc/hdb-ldb.c
+++ b/source4/kdc/hdb-ldb.c
@@ -73,12 +73,6 @@ static const char *realm_ref_attrs[] = {
 	NULL
 };
 
-struct hdb_ldb_private {
-	struct ldb_context *samdb;
-	struct ldb_message **msg;
-	struct ldb_message **realm_ref_msg;
-};
-
 static KerberosTime ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(struct ldb_message *msg, const char *attr, KerberosTime default_val)
 {
     const char *tmp;
@@ -177,13 +171,10 @@ static HDBFlags uf2HDBFlags(krb5_context context, int userAccountControl, enum h
 	if (userAccountControl & UF_SMARTCARD_REQUIRED) {
 		flags.require_hwauth = 1;
 	}
-	if (flags.server && (userAccountControl & UF_TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION)) {
-		flags.forwardable = 1;
-		flags.proxiable = 1;
-	} else if (flags.client && (userAccountControl & UF_NOT_DELEGATED)) {
-		flags.forwardable = 0;
-		flags.proxiable = 0;
-	} else {
+	if (userAccountControl & UF_TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION) {
+		flags.ok_as_delegate = 1;
+	}	
+	if (!(userAccountControl & UF_NOT_DELEGATED)) {
 		flags.forwardable = 1;
 		flags.proxiable = 1;
 	}
@@ -205,6 +196,12 @@ static HDBFlags uf2HDBFlags(krb5_context context, int userAccountControl, enum h
 	return flags;
 }
 
+static krb5_error_code hdb_ldb_free_private(krb5_context context, hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
+{
+	talloc_free(entry_ex->private);
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /*
  * Construct an hdb_entry from a directory entry.
  */
@@ -213,15 +210,17 @@ static krb5_error_code LDB_message2entry(krb5_context context, HDB *db,
 					 enum hdb_ldb_ent_type ent_type, 
 					 struct ldb_message *msg,
 					 struct ldb_message *realm_ref_msg,
-					 hdb_entry *ent)
+					 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
 {
 	const char *unicodePwd;
-	int userAccountControl;
+	unsigned int userAccountControl;
 	int i;
 	krb5_error_code ret = 0;
 	const char *dnsdomain = ldb_msg_find_string(realm_ref_msg, "dnsRoot", NULL);
 	char *realm = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, dnsdomain);
 
+	struct hdb_ldb_private *private;
+	hdb_entry *ent = &entry_ex->entry;
 
 	memset(ent, 0, sizeof(*ent));
 
@@ -233,7 +232,7 @@ static krb5_error_code LDB_message2entry(krb5_context context, HDB *db,
 		goto out;
 	}
 			
-	userAccountControl = ldb_msg_find_int(msg, "userAccountControl", 0);
+	userAccountControl = ldb_msg_find_uint(msg, "userAccountControl", 0);
 	
 	ent->principal = malloc(sizeof(*(ent->principal)));
 	if (ent_type == HDB_LDB_ENT_TYPE_ANY && principal == NULL) {
@@ -279,6 +278,7 @@ static krb5_error_code LDB_message2entry(krb5_context context, HDB *db,
 	if (ent_type == HDB_LDB_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT) {
 		ent->flags.invalid = 0;
 		ent->flags.server = 1;
+		ent->flags.forwardable = 1;
 	}
 
 	if (lp_parm_bool(-1, "kdc", "require spn for service", True)) {
@@ -399,7 +399,7 @@ static krb5_error_code LDB_message2entry(krb5_context context, HDB *db,
 		} else {
 			ret = krb5_data_alloc (&keyvalue, 16);
 			if (ret) {
-				krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory");
+				krb5_clear_error_string(context);
 				ret = ENOMEM;
 				goto out;
 			}
@@ -409,7 +409,7 @@ static krb5_error_code LDB_message2entry(krb5_context context, HDB *db,
 			ent->keys.val = malloc(sizeof(ent->keys.val[0]));
 			if (ent->keys.val == NULL) {
 				krb5_data_free(&keyvalue);
-				krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory");
+				krb5_clear_error_string(context);
 				ret = ENOMEM;
 				goto out;
 			}
@@ -425,14 +425,14 @@ static krb5_error_code LDB_message2entry(krb5_context context, HDB *db,
 
 	ent->etypes = malloc(sizeof(*(ent->etypes)));
 	if (ent->etypes == NULL) {
-		krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory");
+		krb5_clear_error_string(context);
 		ret = ENOMEM;
 		goto out;
 	}
 	ent->etypes->len = ent->keys.len;
 	ent->etypes->val = calloc(ent->etypes->len, sizeof(int));
 	if (ent->etypes->val == NULL) {
-		krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory");
+		krb5_clear_error_string(context);
 		ret = ENOMEM;
 		goto out;
 	}
@@ -440,10 +440,27 @@ static krb5_error_code LDB_message2entry(krb5_context context, HDB *db,
 		ent->etypes->val[i] = ent->keys.val[i].key.keytype;
 	}
 
+
+	private = talloc(db, struct hdb_ldb_private);
+	if (!private) {
+		ret = ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	private->msg = talloc_steal(private, msg);
+	private->realm_ref_msg = talloc_steal(private, realm_ref_msg);
+	private->samdb = (struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db;
+	
+	entry_ex->private = private;
+	entry_ex->free_private = hdb_ldb_free_private;
+	entry_ex->check_client_access = hdb_ldb_check_client_access;
+	entry_ex->authz_data_tgs_req = hdb_ldb_authz_data_tgs_req;
+	entry_ex->authz_data_as_req = hdb_ldb_authz_data_as_req;
+
 out:
 	if (ret != 0) {
-		/* I don't think this frees ent itself. */
-		hdb_free_entry(context, ent);
+		/* This doesn't free ent itself, that is for the eventual caller to do */
+		hdb_free_entry(context, &entry_ex->entry);
 	}
 
 	return ret;
@@ -618,44 +635,6 @@ static krb5_error_code LDB_rename(krb5_context context, HDB *db, const char *new
 	return HDB_ERR_DB_INUSE;
 }
 
-static krb5_error_code hdb_ldb_free_private(krb5_context context, hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
-{
-	talloc_free(entry_ex->private);
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static krb5_error_code hdb_ldb_check_client_access(krb5_context context, hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex, 
-						   HostAddresses *addresses)
-{
-	krb5_error_code ret;
-	NTSTATUS nt_status;
-	TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx = talloc_new(entry_ex->private);
-	struct hdb_ldb_private *private = entry_ex->private;
-	char *name, *workstation = NULL;
-	if (!tmp_ctx) {
-		return ENOMEM;
-	}
-	
-	ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, entry_ex->entry.principal, &name);
-	if (ret != 0) {
-		talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
-	}
-	nt_status = authsam_account_ok(tmp_ctx, 
-				       private->samdb, 
-				       MSV1_0_ALLOW_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT | MSV1_0_ALLOW_WORKSTATION_TRUST_ACCOUNT,
-				       private->msg,
-				       private->realm_ref_msg,
-				       workstation,
-				       name);
-	free(name);
-	
-	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
-		return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
-	}
-	return 0;
-}
-
-
 static krb5_error_code LDB_fetch_ex(krb5_context context, HDB *db, unsigned flags,
 				    krb5_const_principal principal,
 				    enum hdb_ent_type ent_type,
@@ -703,22 +682,7 @@ static krb5_error_code LDB_fetch_ex(krb5_context context, HDB *db, unsigned flag
 
 		ret = LDB_message2entry(context, db, mem_ctx, 
 					principal, ldb_ent_type, 
-					msg[0], realm_ref_msg[0], &entry_ex->entry);
-
-		if (ret == 0) {
-			struct hdb_ldb_private *private = talloc(db, struct hdb_ldb_private);
-			if (!private) {
-				hdb_free_entry(context, &entry_ex->entry);
-				ret = ENOMEM;
-			}
-			private->msg = talloc_steal(private, msg);
-			private->realm_ref_msg = talloc_steal(private, realm_ref_msg);
-			private->samdb = (struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db;
-			
-			entry_ex->private = private;
-			entry_ex->free_private = hdb_ldb_free_private;
-			entry_ex->check_client_access = hdb_ldb_check_client_access;
-		}
+					msg[0], realm_ref_msg[0], entry_ex);
 
 		talloc_free(mem_ctx);
 		return ret;
@@ -802,7 +766,7 @@ static krb5_error_code LDB_fetch_ex(krb5_context context, HDB *db, unsigned flag
 
 			ret = LDB_message2entry(context, db, mem_ctx, 
 						principal, ldb_ent_type, 
-						msg[0], realm_ref_msg[0], &entry_ex->entry);
+						msg[0], realm_ref_msg[0], entry_ex);
 			talloc_free(mem_ctx);
 			return ret;
 			
@@ -845,7 +809,7 @@ static krb5_error_code LDB_fetch_ex(krb5_context context, HDB *db, unsigned flag
 	} else {
 		ret = LDB_message2entry(context, db, mem_ctx, 
 					principal, ldb_ent_type, 
-					msg[0], realm_ref_msg[0], &entry_ex->entry);
+					msg[0], realm_ref_msg[0], entry_ex);
 		if (ret != 0) {
 			krb5_warnx(context, "LDB_fetch: message2entry failed\n");	
 		}
@@ -898,6 +862,9 @@ static krb5_error_code LDB_seq(krb5_context context, HDB *db, unsigned flags, hd
 	krb5_error_code ret;
 	struct hdb_ldb_seq *priv = (struct hdb_ldb_seq *)db->hdb_openp;
 	TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
+	hdb_entry_ex entry_ex;
+	memset(&entry_ex, '\0', sizeof(entry_ex));
+
 	if (!priv) {
 		return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
 	}
@@ -913,7 +880,13 @@ static krb5_error_code LDB_seq(krb5_context context, HDB *db, unsigned flags, hd
 		ret = LDB_message2entry(context, db, mem_ctx, 
 					NULL, HDB_LDB_ENT_TYPE_ANY, 
 					priv->msgs[priv->index++], 
-					priv->realm_ref_msgs[0], entry);
+					priv->realm_ref_msgs[0], &entry_ex);
+		if (ret == 0) {
+			if (entry_ex.free_private) {
+				entry_ex.free_private(context, &entry_ex);
+			}
+			*entry = entry_ex.entry;
+		}
 	} else {
 		ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
 	}
diff --git a/source4/kdc/pac-glue.c b/source4/kdc/pac-glue.c
index ae306b4062..03b53fa3af 100644
--- a/source4/kdc/pac-glue.c
+++ b/source4/kdc/pac-glue.c
@@ -23,42 +23,41 @@
 
 #include "includes.h"
 #include "kdc/kdc.h"
-#include "kdc/pac-glue.h" /* Ensure we don't get this prototype wrong, as that could be painful */
-
- krb5_error_code samba_get_pac(krb5_context context, 
-			       struct krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
-			       krb5_principal client, 
-			       krb5_keyblock *krbtgt_keyblock, 
-			       krb5_keyblock *server_keyblock, 
-			       time_t tgs_authtime,
-			       krb5_data *pac)
+#include "include/ads.h"
+#include "lib/ldb/include/ldb.h"
+#include "heimdal/lib/krb5/krb5_locl.h"
+#include "librpc/gen_ndr/krb5pac.h"
+#include "auth/auth.h"
+
+/* Given the right private pointer from hdb_ldb, get a PAC from the attached ldb messages */
+static krb5_error_code samba_get_pac(krb5_context context, 
+				     struct hdb_ldb_private *private,
+				     krb5_principal client, 
+				     krb5_keyblock *krbtgt_keyblock, 
+				     krb5_keyblock *server_keyblock, 
+				     time_t tgs_authtime,
+				     krb5_data *pac)
 {
 	krb5_error_code ret;
 	NTSTATUS nt_status;
 	struct auth_serversupplied_info *server_info;
 	DATA_BLOB tmp_blob;
-	char *principal_string;
-	TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(config, 0, "samba_get_pac context");
+	TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(private, 0, "samba_get_pac context");
+
 	if (!mem_ctx) {
 		return ENOMEM;
 	}
 
-	ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, client, &principal_string);
-
-	if (ret != 0) {
-		krb5_set_error_string(context, "get pac: could not unparse principal");
-		krb5_warnx(context, "get pac: could not unparse principal");
-		talloc_free(mem_ctx);
-		return ret;
-	}
-
-	nt_status = sam_get_server_info_principal(mem_ctx, principal_string,
-						  &server_info);
-	free(principal_string);
+	nt_status = authsam_make_server_info(mem_ctx, private->samdb, 
+					     private->msg, 
+					     private->realm_ref_msg,
+					     data_blob(NULL, 0),
+					     data_blob(NULL, 0),
+					     &server_info);
 	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
 		DEBUG(0, ("Getting user info for PAC failed: %s\n",
 			  nt_errstr(nt_status)));
-		return EINVAL;
+		return ENOMEM;
 	}
 
 	ret = kerberos_create_pac(mem_ctx, server_info, 
@@ -80,3 +79,273 @@
 	talloc_free(mem_ctx);
 	return ret;
 }
+
+/* Wrap the PAC in the right ASN.1.  Will always free 'pac', on success or failure */
+krb5_error_code wrap_pac(krb5_context context, krb5_data *pac, AuthorizationData **out) 
+{
+	krb5_error_code ret;
+
+	unsigned char *buf;
+	size_t buf_size;
+	size_t len;
+	
+	AD_IF_RELEVANT if_relevant;
+	AuthorizationData *auth_data;
+
+	if_relevant.len = 1;
+	if_relevant.val = malloc(sizeof(*if_relevant.val));
+	if (!if_relevant.val) {
+		krb5_data_free(pac);
+		*out = NULL;
+		return ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	if_relevant.val[0].ad_type = KRB5_AUTHDATA_WIN2K_PAC;
+	if_relevant.val[0].ad_data.data = NULL;
+	if_relevant.val[0].ad_data.length = 0;
+	
+	/* pac.data will be freed with this */
+	if_relevant.val[0].ad_data.data = pac->data;
+	if_relevant.val[0].ad_data.length = pac->length;
+	
+	ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(AuthorizationData, buf, buf_size, &if_relevant, &len, ret);
+	free_AuthorizationData(&if_relevant);
+	if (ret) {
+		*out = NULL;
+		return ret;
+	}		
+	
+	auth_data = malloc(sizeof(*auth_data));
+	if (!auth_data) {
+		free(buf);
+		*out = NULL;
+		return ret;
+	}		
+	auth_data->len = 1;
+	auth_data->val = malloc(sizeof(*auth_data->val));
+	if (!auth_data->val) {
+		free(buf);
+		free(auth_data);
+		*out = NULL;
+		return ret;
+	}
+	auth_data->val[0].ad_type = KRB5_AUTHDATA_IF_RELEVANT;
+	auth_data->val[0].ad_data.length = len;
+	auth_data->val[0].ad_data.data = buf;
+
+	*out = auth_data;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+
+/* Given a hdb_entry, create a PAC out of the private data 
+
+   Don't create it if the client has the UF_NO_AUTH_DATA_REQUIRED bit
+   set, or if they specificaly asked not to get it.
+*/
+
+ krb5_error_code hdb_ldb_authz_data_as_req(krb5_context context, struct hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex, 
+					   METHOD_DATA* pa_data_seq,
+					   time_t authtime,
+					   EncryptionKey *tgtkey,
+					   EncryptionKey *sessionkey,
+					   AuthorizationData **out)
+{
+	krb5_error_code ret;
+	int i;
+	krb5_data pac;
+	krb5_boolean pac_wanted = TRUE;
+	unsigned int userAccountControl;
+	struct PA_PAC_REQUEST pac_request;
+	struct hdb_ldb_private *private = talloc_get_type(entry_ex->private, struct hdb_ldb_private);
+	
+	/* The user account may be set not to want the PAC */
+	userAccountControl = ldb_msg_find_uint(private->msg, "userAccountControl", 0);
+	if (userAccountControl & UF_NO_AUTH_DATA_REQUIRED) {
+		*out = NULL;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* The user may not want a PAC */
+	for (i=0; i<pa_data_seq->len; i++) {
+		if (pa_data_seq->val[i].padata_type == KRB5_PADATA_PA_PAC_REQUEST) {
+			ret = decode_PA_PAC_REQUEST(pa_data_seq->val[i].padata_value.data, 
+						    pa_data_seq->val[i].padata_value.length, 
+						    &pac_request, NULL);
+			if (ret == 0) {
+				pac_wanted = !!pac_request.include_pac;
+			}
+			free_PA_PAC_REQUEST(&pac_request);
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (!pac_wanted) {
+		*out = NULL;
+		return 0;
+	}	
+
+	/* Get PAC from Samba */
+	ret = samba_get_pac(context,
+			    private,
+			    entry_ex->entry.principal,
+			    tgtkey,
+			    tgtkey,
+			    authtime,
+			    &pac);
+
+	if (ret) {
+		*out = NULL;
+		return ret;
+	}
+	
+	return wrap_pac(context, &pac, out);
+}
+
+/* Resign (and reform, including possibly new groups) a PAC */
+
+ krb5_error_code hdb_ldb_authz_data_tgs_req(krb5_context context, struct hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex, 
+					    krb5_principal client, 
+					    AuthorizationData *in, 
+					    time_t authtime,
+					    EncryptionKey *tgtkey,
+					    EncryptionKey *servicekey,
+					    EncryptionKey *sessionkey,
+					    AuthorizationData **out)
+{
+	NTSTATUS nt_status;
+	krb5_error_code ret;
+
+	unsigned int userAccountControl;
+
+	struct hdb_ldb_private *private = talloc_get_type(entry_ex->private, struct hdb_ldb_private);
+	krb5_data k5pac_in, k5pac_out;
+	DATA_BLOB pac_in, pac_out;
+
+	struct PAC_LOGON_INFO *logon_info;
+	union netr_Validation validation;
+	struct auth_serversupplied_info *server_info_out;
+
+	krb5_boolean found = FALSE;
+	TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
+	
+	/* The service account may be set not to want the PAC */
+	userAccountControl = ldb_msg_find_uint(private->msg, "userAccountControl", 0);
+	if (userAccountControl & UF_NO_AUTH_DATA_REQUIRED) {
+		*out = NULL;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	ret = _krb5_find_type_in_ad(context, KRB5_AUTHDATA_WIN2K_PAC,
+				    &k5pac_in, &found, sessionkey, in);
+	if (ret || !found) {
+		*out = NULL;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	mem_ctx = talloc_new(private);
+	if (!mem_ctx) {
+		krb5_data_free(&k5pac_in);
+		*out = NULL;
+		return ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	pac_in = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, k5pac_in.data, k5pac_in.length);
+	krb5_data_free(&k5pac_in);
+	if (!pac_in.data) {
+		talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+		*out = NULL;
+		return ENOMEM;
+	}
+		
+	/* Parse the PAC again, for the logon info */
+	nt_status = kerberos_pac_logon_info(mem_ctx, &logon_info,
+					    pac_in,
+					    context,
+					    tgtkey, 
+					    tgtkey, 
+					    client, authtime, 
+					    &ret);
+
+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+		DEBUG(1, ("Failed to parse PAC in TGT: %s/%s\n", 
+			  nt_errstr(nt_status), error_message(ret)));
+		talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+		*out = NULL;
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	/* Pull this right into the normal auth sysstem structures */
+	validation.sam3 = &logon_info->info3;
+	nt_status = make_server_info_netlogon_validation(mem_ctx,
+							 "",
+							 3, &validation,
+							 &server_info_out); 
+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+		talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+		*out = NULL;
+		return ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	/* And make a new PAC, possibly containing new groups */
+	ret = kerberos_create_pac(mem_ctx, 
+				  server_info_out,
+				  context,
+				  tgtkey,
+				  servicekey,
+				  client,
+				  authtime,
+				  &pac_out);
+
+	if (ret != 0) {
+		talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+		*out = NULL;
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	ret = krb5_data_copy(&k5pac_out, pac_out.data, pac_out.length);
+	if (ret != 0) {
+		talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+		*out = NULL;
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	return wrap_pac(context, &k5pac_out, out);
+}
+
+/* Given an hdb entry (and in particular it's private member), consult
+ * the account_ok routine in auth/auth_sam.c for consistancy */
+
+ krb5_error_code hdb_ldb_check_client_access(krb5_context context, hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex, 
+					    HostAddresses *addresses)
+{
+	krb5_error_code ret;
+	NTSTATUS nt_status;
+	TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx = talloc_new(entry_ex->private);
+	struct hdb_ldb_private *private = talloc_get_type(entry_ex->private, struct hdb_ldb_private);
+	char *name, *workstation = NULL;
+	if (!tmp_ctx) {
+		return ENOMEM;
+	}
+	
+	ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, entry_ex->entry.principal, &name);
+	if (ret != 0) {
+		talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
+	}
+	nt_status = authsam_account_ok(tmp_ctx, 
+				       private->samdb, 
+				       MSV1_0_ALLOW_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT | MSV1_0_ALLOW_WORKSTATION_TRUST_ACCOUNT,
+				       private->msg,
+				       private->realm_ref_msg,
+				       workstation,
+				       name);
+	free(name);
+
+	/* TODO:  Need a more complete mapping of NTSTATUS to krb5kdc errors */
+
+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+		return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
diff --git a/source4/kdc/pac-glue.h b/source4/kdc/pac-glue.h
index 69490bb7f3..953ddae815 100644
--- a/source4/kdc/pac-glue.h
+++ b/source4/kdc/pac-glue.h
@@ -1,8 +1,46 @@
+/* 
+   Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
 
- krb5_error_code samba_get_pac(krb5_context context, 
-			       struct krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
-			       krb5_principal client, 
-			       krb5_keyblock *krbtgt_keyblock, 
-			       krb5_keyblock *server_keyblock, 
-			       time_t tgs_authtime,
-			       krb5_data *pac);
+   PAC Glue between Samba and the KDC
+   
+   Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2005
+
+   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+   the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+   (at your option) any later version.
+   
+   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+   GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+   
+   You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+   along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+   Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
+*/
+
+ struct hdb_ldb_private {
+	struct ldb_context *samdb;
+	struct ldb_message *msg;
+	struct ldb_message *realm_ref_msg;
+ };
+
+ krb5_error_code hdb_ldb_authz_data_as_req(krb5_context context, struct hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex, 
+					   METHOD_DATA* pa_data_seq,
+					   time_t authtime,
+					   EncryptionKey *tgtkey,
+					   EncryptionKey *sessionkey,
+					   AuthorizationData **out);
+
+ krb5_error_code hdb_ldb_authz_data_tgs_req(krb5_context context, struct hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex, 
+					    krb5_principal client, 
+					    AuthorizationData *in, 
+					    time_t authtime,
+					    EncryptionKey *tgtkey,
+					    EncryptionKey *servicekey,
+					    EncryptionKey *sessionkey,
+					    AuthorizationData **out);
+ krb5_error_code hdb_ldb_check_client_access(krb5_context context, hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex, 
+					     HostAddresses *addresses);