Merge branch 'v4-0-test' of ssh://git.samba.org/data/git/samba into v4-0-test

(This used to be commit f008c3b6ee324056fd9b63f6151ad6849640c959)

3 files changed, 318 insertions, 68 deletions

diff --git a/source4/kdc/hdb-ldb.c b/source4/kdc/hdb-ldb.c
index 8f8ce3074b..ef3a0bcb8a 100644
--- a/source4/kdc/hdb-ldb.c
+++ b/source4/kdc/hdb-ldb.c
@@ -45,14 +45,22 @@
 #include "dsdb/samdb/samdb.h"
 #include "librpc/ndr/libndr.h"
 #include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_drsblobs.h"
+#include "librpc/gen_ndr/lsa.h"
 #include "libcli/auth/libcli_auth.h"
 #include "param/param.h"
 #include "events/events.h"
 #include "kdc/kdc.h"
+#include "lib/crypto/md4.h"
 
 enum hdb_ldb_ent_type 
 { HDB_LDB_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT, HDB_LDB_ENT_TYPE_SERVER, 
-  HDB_LDB_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT, HDB_LDB_ENT_TYPE_ANY };
+  HDB_LDB_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT, HDB_LDB_ENT_TYPE_TRUST, HDB_LDB_ENT_TYPE_ANY };
+
+enum trust_direction {
+	UNKNOWN = 0,
+	INBOUND = LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_INBOUND, 
+	OUTBOUND = LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_OUTBOUND
+};
 
 static const char *realm_ref_attrs[] = {
 	"nCName", 
@@ -60,6 +68,18 @@ static const char *realm_ref_attrs[] = {
 	NULL
 };
 
+static const char *trust_attrs[] = {
+	"trustPartner",
+	"trustAuthIncoming",
+	"trustAuthOutgoing",
+	"whenCreated",
+	"msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes",
+	"trustAttributes",
+	"trustDirection",
+	"trustType",
+	NULL
+};
+
 static KerberosTime ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(struct ldb_message *msg, const char *attr, KerberosTime default_val)
 {
     const char *tmp;
@@ -675,6 +695,187 @@ out:
 	return ret;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Construct an hdb_entry from a directory entry.
+ */
+static krb5_error_code LDB_trust_message2entry(krb5_context context, HDB *db, 
+					       struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
+					       TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, krb5_const_principal principal,
+					       enum trust_direction direction,
+					       struct ldb_message *msg,
+					       hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
+{
+	
+	const char *dnsdomain;
+	char *realm;
+	char *strdup_realm;
+	DATA_BLOB password_utf16;
+	struct samr_Password password_hash;
+	const struct ldb_val *password_val;
+	struct trustAuthInOutBlob password_blob;
+	struct hdb_ldb_private *private;
+
+	enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
+	int i, ret, trust_direction_flags;
+
+	private = talloc(mem_ctx, struct hdb_ldb_private);
+	if (!private) {
+		ret = ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	private->entry_ex = entry_ex;
+	private->iconv_convenience = lp_iconv_convenience(lp_ctx);
+	private->netbios_name = lp_netbios_name(lp_ctx);
+
+	talloc_set_destructor(private, hdb_ldb_destrutor);
+
+	entry_ex->ctx = private;
+	entry_ex->free_entry = hdb_ldb_free_entry;
+
+	/* use 'whenCreated' */
+	entry_ex->entry.created_by.time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenCreated", 0);
+	/* use '???' */
+	entry_ex->entry.created_by.principal = NULL;
+
+	entry_ex->entry.valid_start = NULL;
+
+	trust_direction_flags = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "trustDirection", 0);
+
+	if (direction == INBOUND) {
+		realm = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, lp_realm(lp_ctx));
+		password_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "trustAuthIncoming");
+
+	} else { /* OUTBOUND */
+		dnsdomain = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "trustPartner", NULL);
+		realm = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, dnsdomain);
+		password_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "trustAuthOutgoing");
+	}
+
+	if (!password_val || !(trust_direction_flags & direction)) {
+		ret = ENOENT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob_all(password_val, mem_ctx, private->iconv_convenience, &password_blob,
+					   (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_trustAuthInOutBlob);
+	if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
+		ret = EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	for (i=0; i < password_blob.count; i++) {
+		if (password_blob.current->array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_CLEAR) {
+			password_utf16 = data_blob_const(password_blob.current->array[i].AuthInfo.clear.password,
+							 password_blob.current->array[i].AuthInfo.clear.size);
+			/* In the future, generate all sorts of
+			 * hashes, but for now we can't safely convert
+			 * the random strings windows uses into
+			 * utf8 */
+
+			/* but as it is utf16 already, we can get the NT password/arcfour-hmac-md5 key */
+			mdfour(password_hash.hash, password_utf16.data, password_utf16.length);
+			break;
+		} else if (password_blob.current->array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_NT4OWF) {
+			password_hash = password_blob.current->array[i].AuthInfo.nt4owf.password;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
+	entry_ex->entry.keys.val = NULL;
+
+	if (i < password_blob.count) {
+		Key key;
+		/* Must have found a cleartext or MD4 password */
+		entry_ex->entry.keys.val = calloc(1, sizeof(Key));
+
+		key.mkvno = 0;
+		key.salt = NULL; /* No salt for this enc type */
+
+		if (entry_ex->entry.keys.val == NULL) {
+			ret = ENOMEM;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		
+		ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
+					 ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5,
+					 password_hash.hash, sizeof(password_hash.hash), 
+					 &key.key);
+		
+		entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
+		entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
+	}
+		
+	ret = copy_Principal(principal, entry_ex->entry.principal);
+	if (ret) {
+		krb5_clear_error_string(context);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	
+	/* While we have copied the client principal, tests
+	 * show that Win2k3 returns the 'corrected' realm, not
+	 * the client-specified realm.  This code attempts to
+	 * replace the client principal's realm with the one
+	 * we determine from our records */
+	
+	/* this has to be with malloc() */
+	strdup_realm = strdup(realm);
+	if (!strdup_realm) {
+		ret = ENOMEM;
+		krb5_clear_error_string(context);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	free(*krb5_princ_realm(context, entry_ex->entry.principal));
+	krb5_princ_set_realm(context, entry_ex->entry.principal, &strdup_realm);
+	
+	entry_ex->entry.flags = int2HDBFlags(0);
+	entry_ex->entry.flags.immutable = 1;
+	entry_ex->entry.flags.invalid = 0;
+	entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 1;
+	entry_ex->entry.flags.require_preauth = 1;
+
+	entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
+			
+	entry_ex->entry.max_life = NULL;
+
+	entry_ex->entry.max_renew = NULL;
+
+	entry_ex->entry.generation = NULL;
+
+	entry_ex->entry.etypes = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.etypes)));
+	if (entry_ex->entry.etypes == NULL) {
+		krb5_clear_error_string(context);
+		ret = ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	entry_ex->entry.etypes->len = entry_ex->entry.keys.len;
+	entry_ex->entry.etypes->val = calloc(entry_ex->entry.etypes->len, sizeof(int));
+	if (entry_ex->entry.etypes->val == NULL) {
+		krb5_clear_error_string(context);
+		ret = ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	for (i=0; i < entry_ex->entry.etypes->len; i++) {
+		entry_ex->entry.etypes->val[i] = entry_ex->entry.keys.val[i].key.keytype;
+	}
+
+
+	private->msg = talloc_steal(private, msg);
+	private->realm_ref_msg = NULL;
+	private->samdb = (struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db;
+	
+out:
+	if (ret != 0) {
+		/* This doesn't free ent itself, that is for the eventual caller to do */
+		hdb_free_entry(context, entry_ex);
+	} else {
+		talloc_steal(db, entry_ex->ctx);
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+
+}
+
 static krb5_error_code LDB_lookup_principal(krb5_context context, struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx, 					
 					    TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
 					    krb5_const_principal principal,
@@ -709,8 +910,7 @@ static krb5_error_code LDB_lookup_principal(krb5_context context, struct ldb_con
 
 	switch (ent_type) {
 	case HDB_LDB_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT:
-		/* Can't happen */
-		return EINVAL;
+	case HDB_LDB_ENT_TYPE_TRUST:
 	case HDB_LDB_ENT_TYPE_ANY:
 		/* Can't happen */
 		return EINVAL;
@@ -745,6 +945,40 @@ static krb5_error_code LDB_lookup_principal(krb5_context context, struct ldb_con
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static krb5_error_code LDB_lookup_trust(krb5_context context, struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx, 					
+					TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+					const char *realm,
+					struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
+					struct ldb_message ***pmsg)
+{
+	int lret;
+	char *filter = NULL;
+	const char * const *attrs = trust_attrs;
+
+	struct ldb_result *res = NULL;
+	filter = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "(&(objectClass=trustedDomain)(|(flatname=%s)(trustPartner=%s)))", realm, realm);
+
+	if (!filter) {
+		krb5_set_error_string(context, "talloc_asprintf: out of memory");
+		return ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	lret = ldb_search(ldb_ctx, ldb_get_default_basedn(ldb_ctx), LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE, filter, attrs, &res);
+
+	if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
+		DEBUG(3, ("Failed to search for %s: %s\n", filter, ldb_errstring(ldb_ctx)));
+		return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
+	} else if (res->count == 0 || res->count > 1) {
+		DEBUG(3, ("Failed find a single entry for %s: got %d\n", filter, res->count));
+		talloc_free(res);
+		return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
+	}
+	talloc_steal(mem_ctx, res->msgs);
+	*pmsg = res->msgs;
+	talloc_free(res);
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static krb5_error_code LDB_lookup_realm(krb5_context context, struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx, 
 					TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
 					const char *realm,
@@ -853,8 +1087,10 @@ static krb5_error_code LDB_fetch_krbtgt(krb5_context context, HDB *db,
 {
 	krb5_error_code ret;
 	struct ldb_message **msg = NULL;
-	struct ldb_message **realm_ref_msg = NULL;
+	struct ldb_message **realm_ref_msg_1 = NULL;
+	struct ldb_message **realm_ref_msg_2 = NULL;
 	struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
+	const char *realm;
 
 	krb5_principal alloc_principal = NULL;
 	if (principal->name.name_string.len != 2
@@ -864,14 +1100,18 @@ static krb5_error_code LDB_fetch_krbtgt(krb5_context context, HDB *db,
 	}
 
 	/* krbtgt case.  Either us or a trusted realm */
+
 	if ((LDB_lookup_realm(context, (struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db,
-			      mem_ctx, principal->name.name_string.val[1], &realm_ref_msg) == 0)) {
+			      mem_ctx, principal->realm, &realm_ref_msg_1) == 0)
+	    && (LDB_lookup_realm(context, (struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db,
+				 mem_ctx, principal->name.name_string.val[1], &realm_ref_msg_2) == 0)
+	    && (ldb_dn_compare(realm_ref_msg_1[0]->dn, realm_ref_msg_1[0]->dn) == 0)) {
 		/* us */		
  		/* Cludge, cludge cludge.  If the realm part of krbtgt/realm,
  		 * is in our db, then direct the caller at our primary
- 		 * krgtgt */
+ 		 * krbtgt */
  		
- 		const char *dnsdomain = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(realm_ref_msg[0], "dnsRoot", NULL);
+ 		const char *dnsdomain = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(realm_ref_msg_1[0], "dnsRoot", NULL);
  		char *realm_fixed = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, dnsdomain);
  		if (!realm_fixed) {
  			krb5_set_error_string(context, "strupper_talloc: out of memory");
@@ -891,31 +1131,69 @@ static krb5_error_code LDB_fetch_krbtgt(krb5_context context, HDB *db,
  			return ENOMEM;
  		}
  		principal = alloc_principal;
-		realm_dn = samdb_result_dn((struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db, mem_ctx, realm_ref_msg[0], "nCName", NULL);
+		realm_dn = samdb_result_dn((struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db, mem_ctx, realm_ref_msg_1[0], "nCName", NULL);
+		
+		ret = LDB_lookup_principal(context, (struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db, 
+					   mem_ctx, 
+					   principal, HDB_LDB_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT, realm_dn, &msg);
+		
+		if (ret != 0) {
+			krb5_warnx(context, "LDB_fetch: could not find principal in DB");
+			krb5_set_error_string(context, "LDB_fetch: could not find principal in DB");
+			return ret;
+		}
+		
+		ret = LDB_message2entry(context, db, mem_ctx, 
+					principal, HDB_LDB_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT, 
+					msg[0], realm_ref_msg_1[0], entry_ex);
+		if (ret != 0) {
+			krb5_warnx(context, "LDB_fetch: message2entry failed");	
+		}
+		return ret;
+
 	} else {
-		/* we should lookup trusted domains */
-		return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
-	}
+		enum trust_direction direction = UNKNOWN;
 
-	realm_dn = samdb_result_dn((struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db, mem_ctx, realm_ref_msg[0], "nCName", NULL);
-	
-	ret = LDB_lookup_principal(context, (struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db, 
-				   mem_ctx, 
-				   principal, HDB_LDB_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT, realm_dn, &msg);
-	
-	if (ret != 0) {
-		krb5_warnx(context, "LDB_fetch: could not find principal in DB");
-		krb5_set_error_string(context, "LDB_fetch: could not find principal in DB");
+		struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = talloc_get_type(ldb_get_opaque(db->hdb_db, "loadparm"), struct loadparm_context);
+		/* Either an inbound or outbound trust */
+
+		if (strcasecmp(lp_realm(lp_ctx), principal->realm) == 0) {
+			/* look for inbound trust */
+			direction = INBOUND;
+			realm = principal->name.name_string.val[1];
+		}
+
+		if (strcasecmp(lp_realm(lp_ctx), principal->name.name_string.val[1]) == 0) {
+			/* look for outbound trust */
+			direction = OUTBOUND;
+			realm = principal->realm;
+		}
+
+		/* Trusted domains are under CN=system */
+		
+		ret = LDB_lookup_trust(context, (struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db, 
+				       mem_ctx, 
+				       realm, realm_dn, &msg);
+		
+		if (ret != 0) {
+			krb5_warnx(context, "LDB_fetch: could not find principal in DB");
+			krb5_set_error_string(context, "LDB_fetch: could not find principal in DB");
+			return ret;
+		}
+		
+		ret = LDB_trust_message2entry(context, db, lp_ctx, mem_ctx, 
+					      principal, direction, 
+					      msg[0], entry_ex);
+		if (ret != 0) {
+			krb5_warnx(context, "LDB_fetch: message2entry failed");	
+		}
 		return ret;
-	}
 
-	ret = LDB_message2entry(context, db, mem_ctx, 
-				principal, HDB_LDB_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT, 
-				msg[0], realm_ref_msg[0], entry_ex);
-	if (ret != 0) {
-		krb5_warnx(context, "LDB_fetch: message2entry failed");	
+		
+		/* we should lookup trusted domains */
+		return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
 	}
-	return ret;
+
 }
 
 static krb5_error_code LDB_fetch_server(krb5_context context, HDB *db, 
@@ -1022,10 +1300,13 @@ static krb5_error_code LDB_fetch(krb5_context context, HDB *db,
 		if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
 	}
 	if (flags & HDB_F_GET_SERVER) {
-		ret = LDB_fetch_server(context, db, mem_ctx, principal, flags, entry_ex);
-		if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
+		/* krbtgt fits into this situation for trusted realms, and for resolving different versions of our own realm name */
 		ret = LDB_fetch_krbtgt(context, db, mem_ctx, principal, flags, entry_ex);
 		if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
+
+		/* We return 'no entry' if it does not start with krbtgt/, so move to the common case quickly */
+		ret = LDB_fetch_server(context, db, mem_ctx, principal, flags, entry_ex);
+		if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
 	}
 	if (flags & HDB_F_GET_KRBTGT) {
 		ret = LDB_fetch_krbtgt(context, db, mem_ctx, principal, flags, entry_ex);
diff --git a/source4/kdc/kpasswdd.c b/source4/kdc/kpasswdd.c
index 065777fc66..603332e69e 100644
--- a/source4/kdc/kpasswdd.c
+++ b/source4/kdc/kpasswdd.c
@@ -40,8 +40,7 @@
 
 /* TODO: remove all SAMBA4_INTERNAL_HEIMDAL stuff from this file */
 #ifdef SAMBA4_INTERNAL_HEIMDAL
-#include "heimdal/lib/hcrypto/aes.h"
-#include "heimdal/lib/krb5/krb5-private.h"
+#include "heimdal_build/kpasswdd-glue.h"
 #endif
 
 /* hold information about one kdc socket */
diff --git a/source4/kdc/pac-glue.c b/source4/kdc/pac-glue.c
index bee271eaa9..cbdbb86b1f 100644
--- a/source4/kdc/pac-glue.c
+++ b/source4/kdc/pac-glue.c
@@ -153,18 +153,12 @@ krb5_error_code samba_kdc_reget_pac(void *priv, krb5_context context,
 				struct hdb_entry_ex *client,  
 				struct hdb_entry_ex *server, krb5_pac *pac)
 {
-	NTSTATUS nt_status;
-	enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
 	krb5_error_code ret;
 
 	unsigned int userAccountControl;
 
 	struct hdb_ldb_private *private = talloc_get_type(server->ctx, struct hdb_ldb_private);
-	krb5_data k5pac_in;
-	DATA_BLOB pac_in;
 
-	union PAC_INFO info;
-	union netr_Validation validation;
 	struct auth_serversupplied_info *server_info_out;
 
 	TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(private, 0, "samba_get_pac context");
@@ -176,46 +170,22 @@ krb5_error_code samba_kdc_reget_pac(void *priv, krb5_context context,
 	/* The service account may be set not to want the PAC */
 	userAccountControl = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(private->msg, "userAccountControl", 0);
 	if (userAccountControl & UF_NO_AUTH_DATA_REQUIRED) {
+		talloc_free(mem_ctx);
 		*pac = NULL;
 		return 0;
 	}
 
-	ret = krb5_pac_get_buffer(context, *pac, PAC_TYPE_LOGON_INFO, &k5pac_in);
-	if (ret != 0) {
-		return ret;
-	}
+	ret = kerberos_pac_to_server_info(mem_ctx, private->iconv_convenience,
+					  *pac, context, &server_info_out);
 
-	pac_in = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, k5pac_in.data, k5pac_in.length);
-	krb5_data_free(&k5pac_in);
-	if (!pac_in.data) {
-		talloc_free(mem_ctx);
-		return ENOMEM;
-	}
-		
-	ndr_err = ndr_pull_union_blob(&pac_in, mem_ctx, private->iconv_convenience, &info,
-				      PAC_TYPE_LOGON_INFO,
-				      (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_PAC_INFO);
-	if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err) || !info.logon_info.info) {
-		nt_status = ndr_map_error2ntstatus(ndr_err);
-		DEBUG(0,("can't parse the PAC LOGON_INFO: %s\n", nt_errstr(nt_status)));
-		talloc_free(mem_ctx);
-		return EINVAL;
-	}
+	/* We will compleatly regenerate this pac */
+	krb5_pac_free(context, *pac);
 
-	/* Pull this right into the normal auth sysstem structures */
-	validation.sam3 = &info.logon_info.info->info3;
-	nt_status = make_server_info_netlogon_validation(mem_ctx,
-							 "",
-							 3, &validation,
-							 &server_info_out); 
-	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+	if (ret) {
 		talloc_free(mem_ctx);
-		return ENOMEM;
+		return ret;
 	}
 
-	/* We will compleatly regenerate this pac */
-	krb5_pac_free(context, *pac);
-
 	ret = make_pac(context, mem_ctx, private->iconv_convenience, server_info_out, pac);
 
 	talloc_free(mem_ctx);