first public release of samba4 code

(This used to be commit b0510b5428b3461aeb9bbe3cc95f62fc73e2b97f)

1 files changed, 612 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/source4/passdb/secrets.c b/source4/passdb/secrets.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..01eb82f414
--- /dev/null
+++ b/source4/passdb/secrets.c
@@ -0,0 +1,612 @@
+/* 
+   Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
+   Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 1992-2001
+   Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett      2002
+   Copyright (C) Rafal Szczesniak     2002
+   
+   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+   the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+   (at your option) any later version.
+   
+   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+   GNU General Public License for more details.
+   
+   You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+   along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+   Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
+*/
+
+/* the Samba secrets database stores any generated, private information
+   such as the local SID and machine trust password */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#undef DBGC_CLASS
+#define DBGC_CLASS DBGC_PASSDB
+
+static TDB_CONTEXT *tdb;
+
+/* open up the secrets database */
+BOOL secrets_init(void)
+{
+	pstring fname;
+
+	if (tdb)
+		return True;
+
+	pstrcpy(fname, lp_private_dir());
+	pstrcat(fname,"/secrets.tdb");
+
+	tdb = tdb_open_log(fname, 0, TDB_DEFAULT, O_RDWR|O_CREAT, 0600);
+
+	if (!tdb) {
+		DEBUG(0,("Failed to open %s\n", fname));
+		return False;
+	}
+	return True;
+}
+
+/* read a entry from the secrets database - the caller must free the result
+   if size is non-null then the size of the entry is put in there
+ */
+void *secrets_fetch(const char *key, size_t *size)
+{
+	TDB_DATA kbuf, dbuf;
+	secrets_init();
+	if (!tdb)
+		return NULL;
+	kbuf.dptr = strdup(key);
+	kbuf.dsize = strlen(key);
+	dbuf = tdb_fetch(tdb, kbuf);
+	if (size)
+		*size = dbuf.dsize;
+	free(kbuf.dptr);
+	return dbuf.dptr;
+}
+
+/* store a secrets entry 
+ */
+BOOL secrets_store(const char *key, const void *data, size_t size)
+{
+	TDB_DATA kbuf, dbuf;
+	int ret;
+
+	secrets_init();
+	if (!tdb)
+		return False;
+	kbuf.dptr = strdup(key);
+	kbuf.dsize = strlen(key);
+	dbuf.dptr = memdup(data, size);
+	dbuf.dsize = size;
+
+	ret = tdb_store(tdb, kbuf, dbuf, TDB_REPLACE) == 0;
+
+	free(kbuf.dptr);
+	free(dbuf.dptr);
+
+	return ret == 0;
+}
+
+
+/* delete a secets database entry
+ */
+BOOL secrets_delete(const char *key)
+{
+	TDB_DATA kbuf;
+	int ret;
+
+	secrets_init();
+	if (!tdb)
+		return False;
+	kbuf.dptr = strdup(key);
+	kbuf.dsize = strlen(key);
+	ret = tdb_delete(tdb, kbuf);
+	free(kbuf.dptr);
+	return ret == 0;
+}
+
+BOOL secrets_store_domain_sid(const char *domain, const DOM_SID *sid)
+{
+	fstring key;
+
+	slprintf(key, sizeof(key)-1, "%s/%s", SECRETS_DOMAIN_SID, domain);
+	strupper(key);
+	return secrets_store(key, sid, sizeof(DOM_SID));
+}
+
+BOOL secrets_fetch_domain_sid(const char *domain, DOM_SID *sid)
+{
+	DOM_SID *dyn_sid;
+	fstring key;
+	size_t size;
+
+	slprintf(key, sizeof(key)-1, "%s/%s", SECRETS_DOMAIN_SID, domain);
+	strupper(key);
+	dyn_sid = (DOM_SID *)secrets_fetch(key, &size);
+
+	if (dyn_sid == NULL)
+		return False;
+
+	if (size != sizeof(DOM_SID))
+	{ 
+		SAFE_FREE(dyn_sid);
+		return False;
+	}
+
+	*sid = *dyn_sid;
+	SAFE_FREE(dyn_sid);
+	return True;
+}
+
+BOOL secrets_store_domain_guid(const char *domain, GUID *guid)
+{
+	fstring key;
+
+	slprintf(key, sizeof(key)-1, "%s/%s", SECRETS_DOMAIN_GUID, domain);
+	strupper(key);
+	return secrets_store(key, guid, sizeof(GUID));
+}
+
+BOOL secrets_fetch_domain_guid(const char *domain, GUID *guid)
+{
+	GUID *dyn_guid;
+	fstring key;
+	size_t size;
+	GUID new_guid;
+
+	slprintf(key, sizeof(key)-1, "%s/%s", SECRETS_DOMAIN_GUID, domain);
+	strupper(key);
+	dyn_guid = (GUID *)secrets_fetch(key, &size);
+
+	DEBUG(6,("key is %s, size is %d\n", key, (int)size));
+
+	if ((NULL == dyn_guid) && (ROLE_DOMAIN_PDC == lp_server_role())) {
+		uuid_generate_random(&new_guid);
+		if (!secrets_store_domain_guid(domain, &new_guid))
+			return False;
+		dyn_guid = (GUID *)secrets_fetch(key, &size);
+		if (dyn_guid == NULL)
+			return False;
+	}
+
+	if (size != sizeof(GUID))
+	{ 
+		SAFE_FREE(dyn_guid);
+		return False;
+	}
+
+	*guid = *dyn_guid;
+	SAFE_FREE(dyn_guid);
+	return True;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Form a key for fetching the machine trust account password
+ *
+ * @param domain domain name
+ *
+ * @return stored password's key
+ **/
+const char *trust_keystr(const char *domain)
+{
+	static fstring keystr;
+
+	slprintf(keystr,sizeof(keystr)-1,"%s/%s", 
+		 SECRETS_MACHINE_ACCT_PASS, domain);
+	strupper(keystr);
+
+	return keystr;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Form a key for fetching a trusted domain password
+ *
+ * @param domain trusted domain name
+ *
+ * @return stored password's key
+ **/
+char *trustdom_keystr(const char *domain)
+{
+	static char* keystr;
+
+	asprintf(&keystr, "%s/%s", SECRETS_DOMTRUST_ACCT_PASS, domain);
+	strupper(keystr);
+		
+	return keystr;
+}
+
+/************************************************************************
+ Lock the trust password entry.
+************************************************************************/
+
+BOOL secrets_lock_trust_account_password(const char *domain, BOOL dolock)
+{
+	if (!tdb)
+		return False;
+
+	if (dolock)
+		return (tdb_lock_bystring(tdb, trust_keystr(domain),0) == 0);
+	else
+		tdb_unlock_bystring(tdb, trust_keystr(domain));
+	return True;
+}
+
+/************************************************************************
+ Routine to get the trust account password for a domain.
+ The user of this function must have locked the trust password file using
+ the above call.
+************************************************************************/
+
+BOOL secrets_fetch_trust_account_password(const char *domain, uint8 ret_pwd[16],
+					  time_t *pass_last_set_time)
+{
+	struct machine_acct_pass *pass;
+	char *plaintext;
+	size_t size;
+
+	plaintext = secrets_fetch_machine_password();
+	if (plaintext) {
+		/* we have an ADS password - use that */
+		DEBUG(4,("Using ADS machine password\n"));
+		E_md4hash(plaintext, ret_pwd);
+		SAFE_FREE(plaintext);
+		pass_last_set_time = 0;
+		return True;
+	}
+
+	if (!(pass = secrets_fetch(trust_keystr(domain), &size))) {
+		DEBUG(5, ("secrets_fetch failed!\n"));
+		return False;
+	}
+	
+	if (size != sizeof(*pass)) {
+		DEBUG(0, ("secrets were of incorrect size!\n"));
+		return False;
+	}
+
+	if (pass_last_set_time) *pass_last_set_time = pass->mod_time;
+	memcpy(ret_pwd, pass->hash, 16);
+	SAFE_FREE(pass);
+	return True;
+}
+
+/************************************************************************
+ Routine to get account password to trusted domain
+************************************************************************/
+
+BOOL secrets_fetch_trusted_domain_password(const char *domain, char** pwd,
+					   DOM_SID *sid, time_t *pass_last_set_time)
+{
+	struct trusted_dom_pass *pass;
+	size_t size;
+
+	/* fetching trusted domain password structure */
+	if (!(pass = secrets_fetch(trustdom_keystr(domain), &size))) {
+		DEBUG(5, ("secrets_fetch failed!\n"));
+		return False;
+	}
+
+	if (size != sizeof(*pass)) {
+		DEBUG(0, ("secrets were of incorrect size!\n"));
+		return False;
+	}
+
+	/* the trust's password */	
+	if (pwd) {
+		*pwd = strdup(pass->pass);
+		if (!*pwd) {
+			return False;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* last change time */
+	if (pass_last_set_time) *pass_last_set_time = pass->mod_time;
+
+	/* domain sid */
+	memcpy(&sid, &(pass->domain_sid), sizeof(sid));
+	
+	SAFE_FREE(pass);
+	
+	return True;
+}
+
+/************************************************************************
+ Routine to set the trust account password for a domain.
+************************************************************************/
+
+BOOL secrets_store_trust_account_password(const char *domain, uint8 new_pwd[16])
+{
+	struct machine_acct_pass pass;
+
+	pass.mod_time = time(NULL);
+	memcpy(pass.hash, new_pwd, 16);
+
+	return secrets_store(trust_keystr(domain), (void *)&pass, sizeof(pass));
+}
+
+/**
+ * Routine to set the password for trusted domain
+ *
+ * @param domain remote domain name
+ * @param pwd plain text password of trust relationship
+ * @param sid remote domain sid
+ *
+ * @return true if succeeded
+ **/
+
+BOOL secrets_store_trusted_domain_password(const char* domain, smb_ucs2_t *uni_dom_name,
+					   size_t uni_name_len, const char* pwd,
+					   DOM_SID sid)
+{
+	struct trusted_dom_pass pass;
+	ZERO_STRUCT(pass);
+
+	/* unicode domain name and its length */
+	if (!uni_dom_name)
+		return False;
+		
+	strncpy_w(pass.uni_name, uni_dom_name, sizeof(pass.uni_name) - 1);
+	pass.uni_name_len = uni_name_len;
+
+	/* last change time */
+	pass.mod_time = time(NULL);
+
+	/* password of the trust */
+	pass.pass_len = strlen(pwd);
+	fstrcpy(pass.pass, pwd);
+
+	/* domain sid */
+	memcpy(&(pass.domain_sid), &sid, sizeof(sid));
+
+	return secrets_store(trustdom_keystr(domain), (void *)&pass, sizeof(pass));
+}
+
+/************************************************************************
+ Routine to set the plaintext machine account password for a realm
+the password is assumed to be a null terminated ascii string
+************************************************************************/
+
+BOOL secrets_store_machine_password(const char *pass)
+{
+	char *key;
+	BOOL ret;
+	asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_MACHINE_PASSWORD, lp_workgroup());
+	strupper(key);
+	ret = secrets_store(key, pass, strlen(pass)+1);
+	free(key);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+
+/************************************************************************
+ Routine to fetch the plaintext machine account password for a realm
+the password is assumed to be a null terminated ascii string
+************************************************************************/
+char *secrets_fetch_machine_password(void)
+{
+	char *key;
+	char *ret;
+	asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_MACHINE_PASSWORD, lp_workgroup());
+	strupper(key);
+	ret = (char *)secrets_fetch(key, NULL);
+	free(key);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+
+
+/************************************************************************
+ Routine to delete the machine trust account password file for a domain.
+************************************************************************/
+
+BOOL trust_password_delete(const char *domain)
+{
+	return secrets_delete(trust_keystr(domain));
+}
+
+/************************************************************************
+ Routine to delete the password for trusted domain
+************************************************************************/
+
+BOOL trusted_domain_password_delete(const char *domain)
+{
+	return secrets_delete(trustdom_keystr(domain));
+}
+
+
+BOOL secrets_store_ldap_pw(const char* dn, char* pw)
+{
+	char *key = NULL;
+	BOOL ret;
+	
+	if (asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_LDAP_BIND_PW, dn) < 0) {
+		DEBUG(0, ("secrets_store_ldap_pw: asprintf failed!\n"));
+		return False;
+	}
+		
+	ret = secrets_store(key, pw, strlen(pw)+1);
+	
+	SAFE_FREE(key);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * Get trusted domains info from secrets.tdb.
+ *
+ * The linked list is allocated on the supplied talloc context, caller gets to destroy
+ * when done.
+ *
+ * @param ctx Allocation context
+ * @param enum_ctx Starting index, eg. we can start fetching at third
+ *        or sixth trusted domain entry. Zero is the first index.
+ *        Value it is set to is the enum context for the next enumeration.
+ * @param num_domains Number of domain entries to fetch at one call
+ * @param domains Pointer to array of trusted domain structs to be filled up
+ *
+ * @return nt status code of rpc response
+ **/ 
+
+NTSTATUS secrets_get_trusted_domains(TALLOC_CTX* ctx, int* enum_ctx, unsigned int max_num_domains, int *num_domains, TRUSTDOM ***domains)
+{
+	TDB_LIST_NODE *keys, *k;
+	TRUSTDOM *dom = NULL;
+	char *pattern;
+	unsigned int start_idx;
+	uint32 idx = 0;
+	size_t size;
+	fstring dom_name;
+	struct trusted_dom_pass *pass;
+	NTSTATUS status;
+
+	if (!secrets_init()) return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
+
+	*num_domains = 0;
+	start_idx = *enum_ctx;
+
+	/* generate searching pattern */
+	if (!(pattern = talloc_asprintf(ctx, "%s/*", SECRETS_DOMTRUST_ACCT_PASS))) {
+		DEBUG(0, ("secrets_get_trusted_domains: talloc_asprintf() failed!\n"));
+		return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+	}
+
+	DEBUG(5, ("secrets_get_trusted_domains: looking for %d domains, starting at index %d\n", 
+		  max_num_domains, *enum_ctx));
+
+	*domains = talloc_zero(ctx, sizeof(**domains)*max_num_domains);
+
+	/* fetching trusted domains' data and collecting them in a list */
+	keys = tdb_search_keys(tdb, pattern);
+
+	/* 
+	 * if there's no keys returned ie. no trusted domain,
+	 * return "no more entries" code
+	 */
+	status = NT_STATUS_NO_MORE_ENTRIES;
+
+	/* searching for keys in sectrets db -- way to go ... */
+	for (k = keys; k; k = k->next) {
+		char *secrets_key;
+		
+		/* important: ensure null-termination of the key string */
+		secrets_key = strndup(k->node_key.dptr, k->node_key.dsize);
+		if (!secrets_key) {
+			DEBUG(0, ("strndup failed!\n"));
+			return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+		}
+				
+		pass = secrets_fetch(secrets_key, &size);
+		
+		if (size != sizeof(*pass)) {
+			DEBUG(2, ("Secrets record %s is invalid!\n", secrets_key));
+			SAFE_FREE(pass);
+			continue;
+		}
+		
+		pull_ucs2_fstring(dom_name, pass->uni_name);
+		DEBUG(18, ("Fetched secret record num %d.\nDomain name: %s, SID: %s\n",
+			   idx, dom_name, sid_string_talloc(ctx, &pass->domain_sid)));
+
+		SAFE_FREE(secrets_key);
+
+		if (idx >= start_idx && idx < start_idx + max_num_domains) {
+			dom = talloc_zero(ctx, sizeof(*dom));
+			if (!dom) {
+				/* free returned tdb record */
+				SAFE_FREE(pass);
+				
+				return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+			}
+			
+			/* copy domain sid */
+			SMB_ASSERT(sizeof(dom->sid) == sizeof(pass->domain_sid));
+			memcpy(&(dom->sid), &(pass->domain_sid), sizeof(dom->sid));
+			
+			/* copy unicode domain name */
+			dom->name = talloc_strdup_w(ctx, pass->uni_name);
+			
+			(*domains)[idx - start_idx] = dom;
+			
+			DEBUG(18, ("Secret record is in required range.\n \
+				   start_idx = %d, max_num_domains = %d. Added to returned array.\n",
+				   start_idx, max_num_domains));
+
+			*enum_ctx = idx + 1;
+			(*num_domains)++;
+		
+			/* set proper status code to return */
+			if (k->next) {
+				/* there are yet some entries to enumerate */
+				status = STATUS_MORE_ENTRIES;
+			} else {
+				/* this is the last entry in the whole enumeration */
+				status = NT_STATUS_OK;
+			}
+		} else {
+			DEBUG(18, ("Secret is outside the required range.\n \
+				   start_idx = %d, max_num_domains = %d. Not added to returned array\n",
+				   start_idx, max_num_domains));
+		}
+		
+		idx++;
+		
+		/* free returned tdb record */
+		SAFE_FREE(pass);
+	}
+	
+	DEBUG(5, ("secrets_get_trusted_domains: got %d domains\n", *num_domains));
+
+	/* free the results of searching the keys */
+	tdb_search_list_free(keys);
+
+	return status;
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ Lock the secrets tdb based on a string - this is used as a primitive form of mutex
+ between smbd instances.
+*******************************************************************************/
+
+BOOL secrets_named_mutex(const char *name, unsigned int timeout, size_t *p_ref_count)
+{
+	size_t ref_count = *p_ref_count;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	if (!message_init())
+		return False;
+
+	if (ref_count == 0) {
+		ret = tdb_lock_bystring(tdb, name, timeout);
+		if (ret == 0)
+			DEBUG(10,("secrets_named_mutex: got mutex for %s\n", name ));
+	}
+
+	if (ret == 0) {
+		*p_ref_count = ++ref_count;
+		DEBUG(10,("secrets_named_mutex: ref_count for mutex %s = %u\n", name, (unsigned int)ref_count ));
+	}
+	return (ret == 0);
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ Unlock a named mutex.
+*******************************************************************************/
+
+void secrets_named_mutex_release(const char *name, size_t *p_ref_count)
+{
+	size_t ref_count = *p_ref_count;
+
+	SMB_ASSERT(ref_count != 0);
+
+	if (ref_count == 1) {
+		tdb_unlock_bystring(tdb, name);
+		DEBUG(10,("secrets_named_mutex: released mutex for %s\n", name ));
+	}
+
+	*p_ref_count = --ref_count;
+	DEBUG(10,("secrets_named_mutex_release: ref_count for mutex %s = %u\n", name, (unsigned int)ref_count ));
+}
+