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author | Andrew Tridgell <tridge@samba.org> | 2003-08-13 01:53:07 +0000 |
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committer | Andrew Tridgell <tridge@samba.org> | 2003-08-13 01:53:07 +0000 |
commit | ef2e26c91b80556af033d3335e55f5dfa6fff31d (patch) | |
tree | faa21bfd7e7b5247250b47c7891dc1a5ebee6be9 /source4/rpc_server/srv_lsa_hnd.c | |
download | samba-ef2e26c91b80556af033d3335e55f5dfa6fff31d.tar.gz samba-ef2e26c91b80556af033d3335e55f5dfa6fff31d.tar.bz2 samba-ef2e26c91b80556af033d3335e55f5dfa6fff31d.zip |
first public release of samba4 code
(This used to be commit b0510b5428b3461aeb9bbe3cc95f62fc73e2b97f)
Diffstat (limited to 'source4/rpc_server/srv_lsa_hnd.c')
-rw-r--r-- | source4/rpc_server/srv_lsa_hnd.c | 265 |
1 files changed, 265 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/source4/rpc_server/srv_lsa_hnd.c b/source4/rpc_server/srv_lsa_hnd.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..814fa60aab --- /dev/null +++ b/source4/rpc_server/srv_lsa_hnd.c @@ -0,0 +1,265 @@ +/* + * Unix SMB/CIFS implementation. + * RPC Pipe client / server routines + * Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 1992-1997, + * Copyright (C) Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton 1996-1997, + * Copyright (C) Jeremy Allison 2001. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or + * (at your option) any later version. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software + * Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#undef DBGC_CLASS +#define DBGC_CLASS DBGC_RPC_SRV + +/* This is the max handles across all instances of a pipe name. */ +#ifndef MAX_OPEN_POLS +#define MAX_OPEN_POLS 1024 +#endif + +/**************************************************************************** + Hack as handles need to be persisant over lsa pipe closes so long as a samr + pipe is open. JRA. +****************************************************************************/ + +static BOOL is_samr_lsa_pipe(const char *pipe_name) +{ + return (strstr(pipe_name, "samr") || strstr(pipe_name, "lsa")); +} + +/**************************************************************************** + Initialise a policy handle list on a pipe. Handle list is shared between all + pipes of the same name. +****************************************************************************/ + +BOOL init_pipe_handle_list(pipes_struct *p, char *pipe_name) +{ + pipes_struct *plist = get_first_internal_pipe(); + struct handle_list *hl = NULL; + + for (plist = get_first_internal_pipe(); plist; plist = get_next_internal_pipe(plist)) { + if (strequal( plist->name, pipe_name) || + (is_samr_lsa_pipe(plist->name) && is_samr_lsa_pipe(pipe_name))) { + if (!plist->pipe_handles) { + pstring msg; + slprintf(msg, sizeof(msg)-1, "init_pipe_handles: NULL pipe_handle pointer in pipe %s", + pipe_name ); + smb_panic(msg); + } + hl = plist->pipe_handles; + break; + } + } + + if (!hl) { + /* + * No handle list for this pipe (first open of pipe). + * Create list. + */ + + if ((hl = (struct handle_list *)malloc(sizeof(struct handle_list))) == NULL) + return False; + ZERO_STRUCTP(hl); + + DEBUG(10,("init_pipe_handles: created handle list for pipe %s\n", pipe_name )); + } + + /* + * One more pipe is using this list. + */ + + hl->pipe_ref_count++; + + /* + * Point this pipe at this list. + */ + + p->pipe_handles = hl; + + DEBUG(10,("init_pipe_handles: pipe_handles ref count = %u for pipe %s\n", + p->pipe_handles->pipe_ref_count, pipe_name )); + + return True; +} + +/**************************************************************************** + find first available policy slot. creates a policy handle for you. +****************************************************************************/ + +BOOL create_policy_hnd(pipes_struct *p, POLICY_HND *hnd, void (*free_fn)(void *), void *data_ptr) +{ + static uint32 pol_hnd_low = 0; + static uint32 pol_hnd_high = 0; + + struct policy *pol; + + if (p->pipe_handles->count > MAX_OPEN_POLS) { + DEBUG(0,("create_policy_hnd: ERROR: too many handles (%d) on this pipe.\n", + (int)p->pipe_handles->count)); + return False; + } + + pol = (struct policy *)malloc(sizeof(*p)); + if (!pol) { + DEBUG(0,("create_policy_hnd: ERROR: out of memory!\n")); + return False; + } + + ZERO_STRUCTP(pol); + + pol->data_ptr = data_ptr; + pol->free_fn = free_fn; + + pol_hnd_low++; + if (pol_hnd_low == 0) + (pol_hnd_high)++; + + SIVAL(&pol->pol_hnd.data1, 0 , 0); /* first bit must be null */ + SIVAL(&pol->pol_hnd.data2, 0 , pol_hnd_low ); /* second bit is incrementing */ + SSVAL(&pol->pol_hnd.data3, 0 , pol_hnd_high); /* second bit is incrementing */ + SSVAL(&pol->pol_hnd.data4, 0 , (pol_hnd_high>>16)); /* second bit is incrementing */ + SIVAL(pol->pol_hnd.data5, 0, time(NULL)); /* something random */ + SIVAL(pol->pol_hnd.data5, 4, sys_getpid()); /* something more random */ + + DLIST_ADD(p->pipe_handles->Policy, pol); + p->pipe_handles->count++; + + *hnd = pol->pol_hnd; + + DEBUG(4,("Opened policy hnd[%d] ", (int)p->pipe_handles->count)); + dump_data(4, (char *)hnd, sizeof(*hnd)); + + return True; +} + +/**************************************************************************** + find policy by handle - internal version. +****************************************************************************/ + +static struct policy *find_policy_by_hnd_internal(pipes_struct *p, POLICY_HND *hnd, void **data_p) +{ + struct policy *pol; + size_t i; + + if (data_p) + *data_p = NULL; + + for (i = 0, pol=p->pipe_handles->Policy;pol;pol=pol->next, i++) { + if (memcmp(&pol->pol_hnd, hnd, sizeof(*hnd)) == 0) { + DEBUG(4,("Found policy hnd[%d] ", (int)i)); + dump_data(4, (char *)hnd, sizeof(*hnd)); + if (data_p) + *data_p = pol->data_ptr; + return pol; + } + } + + DEBUG(4,("Policy not found: ")); + dump_data(4, (char *)hnd, sizeof(*hnd)); + + p->bad_handle_fault_state = True; + + return NULL; +} + +/**************************************************************************** + find policy by handle +****************************************************************************/ + +BOOL find_policy_by_hnd(pipes_struct *p, POLICY_HND *hnd, void **data_p) +{ + return find_policy_by_hnd_internal(p, hnd, data_p) == NULL ? False : True; +} + +/**************************************************************************** + Close a policy. +****************************************************************************/ + +BOOL close_policy_hnd(pipes_struct *p, POLICY_HND *hnd) +{ + struct policy *pol = find_policy_by_hnd_internal(p, hnd, NULL); + + if (!pol) { + DEBUG(3,("Error closing policy\n")); + return False; + } + + DEBUG(3,("Closed policy\n")); + + if (pol->free_fn && pol->data_ptr) + (*pol->free_fn)(pol->data_ptr); + + p->pipe_handles->count--; + + DLIST_REMOVE(p->pipe_handles->Policy, pol); + + ZERO_STRUCTP(pol); + + SAFE_FREE(pol); + + return True; +} + +/**************************************************************************** + Close a pipe - free the handle list if it was the last pipe reference. +****************************************************************************/ + +void close_policy_by_pipe(pipes_struct *p) +{ + p->pipe_handles->pipe_ref_count--; + + if (p->pipe_handles->pipe_ref_count == 0) { + /* + * Last pipe open on this list - free the list. + */ + while (p->pipe_handles->Policy) + close_policy_hnd(p, &p->pipe_handles->Policy->pol_hnd); + + p->pipe_handles->Policy = NULL; + p->pipe_handles->count = 0; + + SAFE_FREE(p->pipe_handles); + DEBUG(10,("close_policy_by_pipe: deleted handle list for pipe %s\n", p->name )); + } +} + +/******************************************************************* +Shall we allow access to this rpc? Currently this function +implements the 'restrict anonymous' setting by denying access to +anonymous users if the restrict anonymous level is > 0. Further work +will be checking a security descriptor to determine whether a user +token has enough access to access the pipe. +********************************************************************/ + +BOOL pipe_access_check(pipes_struct *p) +{ + /* Don't let anonymous users access this RPC if restrict + anonymous > 0 */ + + if (lp_restrict_anonymous() > 0) { + user_struct *user = get_valid_user_struct(p->vuid); + + if (!user) { + DEBUG(3, ("invalid vuid %d\n", p->vuid)); + return False; + } + + if (user->guest) + return False; + } + + return True; +} |