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authorAndrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>2007-07-19 07:48:26 +0000
committerGerald (Jerry) Carter <jerry@samba.org>2007-10-10 15:01:13 -0500
commit3a1b90ec755d89d9d7a358c0f477e51b217218ea (patch)
treedfc3c9e1d42ef68d30bfd67a1b6dda11fa9953b7 /source4/scripting/ejs
parentbb681188407055a7ea77cdaa76600dac37ae3096 (diff)
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r23966: It isn't great, but at least now we have some access control in SWAT
This patch prevents non-root and non-administrator users from running the provision, upgrade and vampire pages. *I think* the rest of SWAT is LDB operations, or otherwise authenticated, so we should now be secure. I wish I had a better way to 'prove' we got this right, but this is better than nothing, and moves us closer to an alpha. Andrew Bartlett (This used to be commit d61061052dc4711f886199e49bc303002c8f9b11)
Diffstat (limited to 'source4/scripting/ejs')
-rw-r--r--source4/scripting/ejs/smbcalls_auth.c45
1 files changed, 45 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/source4/scripting/ejs/smbcalls_auth.c b/source4/scripting/ejs/smbcalls_auth.c
index 94a74e8e2a..33d7f2cf0e 100644
--- a/source4/scripting/ejs/smbcalls_auth.c
+++ b/source4/scripting/ejs/smbcalls_auth.c
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
#include "scripting/ejs/smbcalls.h"
#include "lib/events/events.h"
#include "lib/messaging/irpc.h"
+#include "libcli/security/security.h"
static int ejs_doauth(MprVarHandle eid,
TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx, struct MprVar *auth, const char *username,
@@ -39,6 +40,7 @@ static int ejs_doauth(MprVarHandle eid,
struct auth_context *auth_context;
struct MprVar *session_info_obj;
NTSTATUS nt_status;
+ bool set;
struct smbcalls_context *c;
struct event_context *ev;
@@ -111,6 +113,32 @@ static int ejs_doauth(MprVarHandle eid,
goto done;
}
+ if (security_token_has_nt_authenticated_users(session_info->security_token)) {
+ mprSetPropertyValue(auth, "user_class", mprString("USER"));
+ set = true;
+ }
+
+ if (security_token_has_builtin_administrators(session_info->security_token)) {
+ mprSetPropertyValue(auth, "user_class", mprString("ADMINISTRATOR"));
+ set = true;
+ }
+
+ if (security_token_is_system(session_info->security_token)) {
+ mprSetPropertyValue(auth, "user_class", mprString("SYSTEM"));
+ set = true;
+ }
+
+ if (security_token_is_anonymous(session_info->security_token)) {
+ mprSetPropertyValue(auth, "report", mprString("Anonymous login not permitted"));
+ mprSetPropertyValue(auth, "result", mprCreateBoolVar(False));
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if (!set) {
+ mprSetPropertyValue(auth, "report", mprString("Session Info generation failed"));
+ mprSetPropertyValue(auth, "result", mprCreateBoolVar(False));
+ }
+
session_info_obj = mprInitObject(eid, "session_info", 0, NULL);
mprSetPtrChild(session_info_obj, "session_info", session_info);
@@ -121,6 +149,23 @@ static int ejs_doauth(MprVarHandle eid,
mprSetPropertyValue(auth, "username", mprString(server_info->account_name));
mprSetPropertyValue(auth, "domain", mprString(server_info->domain_name));
+ if (security_token_is_system(session_info->security_token)) {
+ mprSetPropertyValue(auth, "report", mprString("SYSTEM"));
+ }
+
+ if (security_token_is_anonymous(session_info->security_token)) {
+ mprSetPropertyValue(auth, "report", mprString("ANONYMOUS"));
+ }
+
+ if (security_token_has_builtin_administrators(session_info->security_token)) {
+ mprSetPropertyValue(auth, "report", mprString("ADMINISTRATOR"));
+ }
+
+ if (security_token_has_nt_authenticated_users(session_info->security_token)) {
+ mprSetPropertyValue(auth, "report", mprString("USER"));
+ }
+
+
done:
return 0;
}