summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/source4/torture/smb2/acls.c
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorZack Kirsch <zack.kirsch@isilon.com>2009-07-04 16:16:23 -0700
committerTim Prouty <tprouty@samba.org>2009-12-07 16:54:16 -0800
commitd252d23ff15577e2c7049181b5b30692c4bcd6bc (patch)
tree0fa17dedd67aa45046abc8639958537d27b6bdb3 /source4/torture/smb2/acls.c
parent8ceb428c5568bd690cb6811a0618f7866633705b (diff)
downloadsamba-d252d23ff15577e2c7049181b5b30692c4bcd6bc.tar.gz
samba-d252d23ff15577e2c7049181b5b30692c4bcd6bc.tar.bz2
samba-d252d23ff15577e2c7049181b5b30692c4bcd6bc.zip
s4 torture: Port RAW-ACLS tests to SMB2
- The smblsa calls had to be commented out for now and should be fixed later, but they aren't crucial to the test. - The first two tests from RAW-ACLS were already ported to torture_smb2_setinfo() and test_create_acl(). Modifications were made similar to the RAW-ACLS changes. - test_sd_get_set() was ported, but does not pass against XP or Vista; it is not added to the SMB2-ACLS test suite. - printf -> torture_comment / torture_warning / torture_result
Diffstat (limited to 'source4/torture/smb2/acls.c')
-rw-r--r--source4/torture/smb2/acls.c1874
1 files changed, 1874 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/source4/torture/smb2/acls.c b/source4/torture/smb2/acls.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b565a5bce9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/source4/torture/smb2/acls.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1874 @@
+/*
+ Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
+
+ test security descriptor operations for SMB2
+
+ Copyright (C) Zack Kirsch 2009
+
+ This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+ (at your option) any later version.
+
+ This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+ You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+*/
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include "libcli/smb2/smb2.h"
+#include "libcli/smb2/smb2_calls.h"
+#include "torture/torture.h"
+#include "torture/util.h"
+#include "torture/smb2/proto.h"
+#include "libcli/security/security.h"
+#include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_security.h"
+
+#define CHECK_STATUS(status, correct) do { \
+ if (!NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, correct)) { \
+ torture_result(tctx, TORTURE_FAIL, "(%s) Incorrect status %s - should be %s\n", \
+ __location__, nt_errstr(status), nt_errstr(correct)); \
+ ret = false; \
+ goto done; \
+ }} while (0)
+
+#define BASEDIR "smb2-testsd"
+
+#define CHECK_ACCESS_IGNORE SEC_STD_SYNCHRONIZE
+
+#define CHECK_ACCESS_FLAGS(_fh, flags) do { \
+ union smb_fileinfo _q; \
+ _q.access_information.level = RAW_FILEINFO_ACCESS_INFORMATION; \
+ _q.access_information.in.file.handle = (_fh); \
+ status = smb2_getinfo_file(tree, tctx, &_q); \
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); \
+ /* Handle a Vista bug where SEC_STD_SYNCHRONIZE doesn't come back. */ \
+ if (((flags & CHECK_ACCESS_IGNORE) == CHECK_ACCESS_IGNORE) && \
+ ((_q.access_information.out.access_flags & CHECK_ACCESS_IGNORE) != CHECK_ACCESS_IGNORE)) { \
+ torture_comment(tctx, "SKIPPING (Vista bug): (%s) Incorrect access_flags 0x%08x - should be 0x%08x\n", \
+ __location__, _q.access_information.out.access_flags, (flags)); \
+ } \
+ if ((_q.access_information.out.access_flags & ~CHECK_ACCESS_IGNORE) != \
+ ((flags & ~CHECK_ACCESS_IGNORE))) { \
+ torture_result(tctx, TORTURE_FAIL, "(%s) Incorrect access_flags 0x%08x - should be 0x%08x\n", \
+ __location__, _q.access_information.out.access_flags, (flags)); \
+ ret = false; \
+ goto done; \
+ } \
+} while (0)
+
+#define FAIL_UNLESS(__cond) \
+ do { \
+ if (__cond) {} else { \
+ torture_result(tctx, TORTURE_FAIL, "%s) condition violated: %s\n", \
+ __location__, #__cond); \
+ ret = false; goto done; \
+ } \
+ } while(0)
+
+#define CHECK_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR(_sd1, _sd2) do { \
+ if (!security_descriptor_equal(_sd1, _sd2)) { \
+ torture_warning(tctx, "%s: security descriptors don't match!\n", __location__); \
+ torture_warning(tctx, "got:\n"); \
+ NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(security_descriptor, _sd1); \
+ torture_warning(tctx, "expected:\n"); \
+ NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(security_descriptor, _sd2); \
+ ret = false; \
+ } \
+} while (0)
+
+/*
+ test the behaviour of the well known SID_CREATOR_OWNER sid, and some generic
+ mapping bits
+ Note: This test was copied from raw/acls.c.
+*/
+static bool test_creator_sid(struct torture_context *tctx, struct smb2_tree *tree)
+{
+ NTSTATUS status;
+ struct smb2_create io;
+ const char *fname = BASEDIR "\\creator.txt";
+ bool ret = true;
+ struct smb2_handle handle;
+ union smb_fileinfo q;
+ union smb_setfileinfo set;
+ struct security_descriptor *sd, *sd_orig, *sd2;
+ const char *owner_sid;
+
+ if (!smb2_util_setup_dir(tctx, tree, BASEDIR))
+ return false;
+
+ torture_comment(tctx, "TESTING SID_CREATOR_OWNER\n");
+
+ ZERO_STRUCT(io);
+ io.level = RAW_OPEN_SMB2;
+ io.in.create_flags = 0;
+ io.in.desired_access = SEC_STD_READ_CONTROL | SEC_STD_WRITE_DAC | SEC_STD_WRITE_OWNER;
+ io.in.create_options = 0;
+ io.in.file_attributes = FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL;
+ io.in.share_access = NTCREATEX_SHARE_ACCESS_DELETE |
+ NTCREATEX_SHARE_ACCESS_READ |
+ NTCREATEX_SHARE_ACCESS_WRITE;
+ io.in.alloc_size = 0;
+ io.in.create_disposition = NTCREATEX_DISP_OPEN_IF;
+ io.in.impersonation_level = NTCREATEX_IMPERSONATION_ANONYMOUS;
+ io.in.security_flags = 0;
+ io.in.fname = fname;
+
+ status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io);
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK);
+ handle = io.out.file.handle;
+
+ torture_comment(tctx, "get the original sd\n");
+ q.query_secdesc.level = RAW_FILEINFO_SEC_DESC;
+ q.query_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle;
+ q.query_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL | SECINFO_OWNER;
+ status = smb2_getinfo_file(tree, tctx, &q);
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK);
+ sd_orig = q.query_secdesc.out.sd;
+
+ owner_sid = dom_sid_string(tctx, sd_orig->owner_sid);
+
+ torture_comment(tctx, "set a sec desc allowing no write by CREATOR_OWNER\n");
+ sd = security_descriptor_dacl_create(tctx,
+ 0, NULL, NULL,
+ SID_CREATOR_OWNER,
+ SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED,
+ SEC_RIGHTS_FILE_READ | SEC_STD_ALL,
+ 0,
+ NULL);
+
+ set.set_secdesc.level = RAW_SFILEINFO_SEC_DESC;
+ set.set_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle;
+ set.set_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL;
+ set.set_secdesc.in.sd = sd;
+
+ status = smb2_setinfo_file(tree, &set);
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK);
+
+ torture_comment(tctx, "try open for write\n");
+ io.in.desired_access = SEC_FILE_WRITE_DATA;
+ status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io);
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED);
+
+ torture_comment(tctx, "try open for read\n");
+ io.in.desired_access = SEC_FILE_READ_DATA;
+ status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io);
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED);
+
+ torture_comment(tctx, "try open for generic write\n");
+ io.in.desired_access = SEC_GENERIC_WRITE;
+ status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io);
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED);
+
+ torture_comment(tctx, "try open for generic read\n");
+ io.in.desired_access = SEC_GENERIC_READ;
+ status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io);
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED);
+
+ torture_comment(tctx, "set a sec desc allowing no write by owner\n");
+ sd = security_descriptor_dacl_create(tctx,
+ 0, owner_sid, NULL,
+ owner_sid,
+ SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED,
+ SEC_RIGHTS_FILE_READ | SEC_STD_ALL,
+ 0,
+ NULL);
+
+ set.set_secdesc.level = RAW_SFILEINFO_SEC_DESC;
+ set.set_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle;
+ set.set_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL;
+ set.set_secdesc.in.sd = sd;
+ status = smb2_setinfo_file(tree, &set);
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK);
+
+ torture_comment(tctx, "check that sd has been mapped correctly\n");
+ status = smb2_getinfo_file(tree, tctx, &q);
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK);
+ CHECK_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR(q.query_secdesc.out.sd, sd);
+
+ torture_comment(tctx, "try open for write\n");
+ io.in.desired_access = SEC_FILE_WRITE_DATA;
+ status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io);
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED);
+
+ torture_comment(tctx, "try open for read\n");
+ io.in.desired_access = SEC_FILE_READ_DATA;
+ status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io);
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK);
+ CHECK_ACCESS_FLAGS(io.out.file.handle,
+ SEC_FILE_READ_DATA);
+ smb2_util_close(tree, io.out.file.handle);
+
+ torture_comment(tctx, "try open for generic write\n");
+ io.in.desired_access = SEC_GENERIC_WRITE;
+ status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io);
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED);
+
+ torture_comment(tctx, "try open for generic read\n");
+ io.in.desired_access = SEC_GENERIC_READ;
+ status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io);
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK);
+ CHECK_ACCESS_FLAGS(io.out.file.handle,
+ SEC_RIGHTS_FILE_READ);
+ smb2_util_close(tree, io.out.file.handle);
+
+ torture_comment(tctx, "set a sec desc allowing generic read by owner\n");
+ sd = security_descriptor_dacl_create(tctx,
+ 0, NULL, NULL,
+ owner_sid,
+ SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED,
+ SEC_GENERIC_READ | SEC_STD_ALL,
+ 0,
+ NULL);
+
+ set.set_secdesc.in.sd = sd;
+ status = smb2_setinfo_file(tree, &set);
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK);
+
+ torture_comment(tctx, "check that generic read has been mapped correctly\n");
+ sd2 = security_descriptor_dacl_create(tctx,
+ 0, owner_sid, NULL,
+ owner_sid,
+ SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED,
+ SEC_RIGHTS_FILE_READ | SEC_STD_ALL,
+ 0,
+ NULL);
+
+ status = smb2_getinfo_file(tree, tctx, &q);
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK);
+ CHECK_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR(q.query_secdesc.out.sd, sd2);
+
+ torture_comment(tctx, "try open for write\n");
+ io.in.desired_access = SEC_FILE_WRITE_DATA;
+ status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io);
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED);
+
+ torture_comment(tctx, "try open for read\n");
+ io.in.desired_access = SEC_FILE_READ_DATA;
+ status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io);
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK);
+ CHECK_ACCESS_FLAGS(io.out.file.handle,
+ SEC_FILE_READ_DATA);
+ smb2_util_close(tree, io.out.file.handle);
+
+ torture_comment(tctx, "try open for generic write\n");
+ io.in.desired_access = SEC_GENERIC_WRITE;
+ status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io);
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED);
+
+ torture_comment(tctx, "try open for generic read\n");
+ io.in.desired_access = SEC_GENERIC_READ;
+ status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io);
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK);
+ CHECK_ACCESS_FLAGS(io.out.file.handle, SEC_RIGHTS_FILE_READ);
+ smb2_util_close(tree, io.out.file.handle);
+
+
+ torture_comment(tctx, "put back original sd\n");
+ set.set_secdesc.in.sd = sd_orig;
+ status = smb2_setinfo_file(tree, &set);
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK);
+
+
+done:
+ smb2_util_close(tree, handle);
+ smb2_deltree(tree, BASEDIR);
+ smb2_tdis(tree);
+ smb2_logoff(tree->session);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ test the mapping of the SEC_GENERIC_xx bits to SEC_STD_xx and
+ SEC_FILE_xx bits
+ Note: This test was copied from raw/acls.c.
+*/
+static bool test_generic_bits(struct torture_context *tctx, struct smb2_tree *tree)
+{
+ NTSTATUS status;
+ struct smb2_create io;
+ const char *fname = BASEDIR "\\generic.txt";
+ bool ret = true;
+ struct smb2_handle handle;
+ int i;
+ union smb_fileinfo q;
+ union smb_setfileinfo set;
+ struct security_descriptor *sd, *sd_orig, *sd2;
+ const char *owner_sid;
+ const struct {
+ uint32_t gen_bits;
+ uint32_t specific_bits;
+ } file_mappings[] = {
+ { 0, 0 },
+ { SEC_GENERIC_READ, SEC_RIGHTS_FILE_READ },
+ { SEC_GENERIC_WRITE, SEC_RIGHTS_FILE_WRITE },
+ { SEC_GENERIC_EXECUTE, SEC_RIGHTS_FILE_EXECUTE },
+ { SEC_GENERIC_ALL, SEC_RIGHTS_FILE_ALL },
+ { SEC_FILE_READ_DATA, SEC_FILE_READ_DATA },
+ { SEC_FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTE, SEC_FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTE }
+ };
+ const struct {
+ uint32_t gen_bits;
+ uint32_t specific_bits;
+ } dir_mappings[] = {
+ { 0, 0 },
+ { SEC_GENERIC_READ, SEC_RIGHTS_DIR_READ },
+ { SEC_GENERIC_WRITE, SEC_RIGHTS_DIR_WRITE },
+ { SEC_GENERIC_EXECUTE, SEC_RIGHTS_DIR_EXECUTE },
+ { SEC_GENERIC_ALL, SEC_RIGHTS_DIR_ALL }
+ };
+ bool has_restore_privilege = false;
+ bool has_take_ownership_privilege = false;
+
+ if (!smb2_util_setup_dir(tctx, tree, BASEDIR))
+ return false;
+
+ torture_comment(tctx, "TESTING FILE GENERIC BITS\n");
+
+ ZERO_STRUCT(io);
+ io.level = RAW_OPEN_SMB2;
+ io.in.create_flags = 0;
+ io.in.desired_access =
+ SEC_STD_READ_CONTROL |
+ SEC_STD_WRITE_DAC |
+ SEC_STD_WRITE_OWNER;
+ io.in.create_options = 0;
+ io.in.file_attributes = FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL;
+ io.in.share_access =
+ NTCREATEX_SHARE_ACCESS_READ |
+ NTCREATEX_SHARE_ACCESS_WRITE;
+ io.in.alloc_size = 0;
+ io.in.create_disposition = NTCREATEX_DISP_OPEN_IF;
+ io.in.impersonation_level = NTCREATEX_IMPERSONATION_ANONYMOUS;
+ io.in.security_flags = 0;
+ io.in.fname = fname;
+ status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io);
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK);
+ handle = io.out.file.handle;
+
+ torture_comment(tctx, "get the original sd\n");
+ q.query_secdesc.level = RAW_FILEINFO_SEC_DESC;
+ q.query_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle;
+ q.query_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL | SECINFO_OWNER;
+ status = smb2_getinfo_file(tree, tctx, &q);
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK);
+ sd_orig = q.query_secdesc.out.sd;
+
+ owner_sid = dom_sid_string(tctx, sd_orig->owner_sid);
+
+/*
+ * XXX: The smblsa calls use SMB as their transport - need to get rid of
+ * dependency.
+ */
+/*
+ status = smblsa_sid_check_privilege(cli,
+ owner_sid,
+ sec_privilege_name(SEC_PRIV_RESTORE));
+ has_restore_privilege = NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ torture_warning(tctx, "smblsa_sid_check_privilege - %s\n", nt_errstr(status));
+ }
+ torture_comment(tctx, "SEC_PRIV_RESTORE - %s\n", has_restore_privilege?"Yes":"No");
+
+ status = smblsa_sid_check_privilege(cli,
+ owner_sid,
+ sec_privilege_name(SEC_PRIV_TAKE_OWNERSHIP));
+ has_take_ownership_privilege = NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ torture_warning(tctx, "smblsa_sid_check_privilege - %s\n", nt_errstr(status));
+ }
+ torture_comment(tctx, "SEC_PRIV_TAKE_OWNERSHIP - %s\n", has_take_ownership_privilege?"Yes":"No");
+*/
+
+ for (i=0;i<ARRAY_SIZE(file_mappings);i++) {
+ uint32_t expected_mask =
+ SEC_STD_WRITE_DAC |
+ SEC_STD_READ_CONTROL |
+ SEC_FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTE |
+ SEC_STD_DELETE;
+ uint32_t expected_mask_anon = SEC_FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTE;
+
+ if (has_restore_privilege) {
+ expected_mask_anon |= SEC_STD_DELETE;
+ }
+
+ torture_comment(tctx, "testing generic bits 0x%08x\n",
+ file_mappings[i].gen_bits);
+ sd = security_descriptor_dacl_create(tctx,
+ 0, owner_sid, NULL,
+ owner_sid,
+ SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED,
+ file_mappings[i].gen_bits,
+ 0,
+ NULL);
+
+ set.set_secdesc.level = RAW_SFILEINFO_SEC_DESC;
+ set.set_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle;
+ set.set_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL | SECINFO_OWNER;
+ set.set_secdesc.in.sd = sd;
+
+ status = smb2_setinfo_file(tree, &set);
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK);
+
+ sd2 = security_descriptor_dacl_create(tctx,
+ 0, owner_sid, NULL,
+ owner_sid,
+ SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED,
+ file_mappings[i].specific_bits,
+ 0,
+ NULL);
+
+ status = smb2_getinfo_file(tree, tctx, &q);
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK);
+ CHECK_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR(q.query_secdesc.out.sd, sd2);
+
+ io.in.desired_access = SEC_FLAG_MAXIMUM_ALLOWED;
+ status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io);
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK);
+ CHECK_ACCESS_FLAGS(io.out.file.handle,
+ expected_mask | file_mappings[i].specific_bits);
+ smb2_util_close(tree, io.out.file.handle);
+
+ if (!has_take_ownership_privilege) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ torture_comment(tctx, "testing generic bits 0x%08x (anonymous)\n",
+ file_mappings[i].gen_bits);
+ sd = security_descriptor_dacl_create(tctx,
+ 0, SID_NT_ANONYMOUS, NULL,
+ owner_sid,
+ SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED,
+ file_mappings[i].gen_bits,
+ 0,
+ NULL);
+
+ set.set_secdesc.level = RAW_SFILEINFO_SEC_DESC;
+ set.set_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle;
+ set.set_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL | SECINFO_OWNER;
+ set.set_secdesc.in.sd = sd;
+
+ status = smb2_setinfo_file(tree, &set);
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK);
+
+ sd2 = security_descriptor_dacl_create(tctx,
+ 0, SID_NT_ANONYMOUS, NULL,
+ owner_sid,
+ SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED,
+ file_mappings[i].specific_bits,
+ 0,
+ NULL);
+
+ status = smb2_getinfo_file(tree, tctx, &q);
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK);
+ CHECK_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR(q.query_secdesc.out.sd, sd2);
+
+ io.in.desired_access = SEC_FLAG_MAXIMUM_ALLOWED;
+ status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io);
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK);
+ CHECK_ACCESS_FLAGS(io.out.file.handle,
+ expected_mask_anon | file_mappings[i].specific_bits);
+ smb2_util_close(tree, io.out.file.handle);
+ }
+
+ torture_comment(tctx, "put back original sd\n");
+ set.set_secdesc.in.sd = sd_orig;
+ status = smb2_setinfo_file(tree, &set);
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK);
+
+ smb2_util_close(tree, handle);
+ smb2_util_unlink(tree, fname);
+
+
+ torture_comment(tctx, "TESTING DIR GENERIC BITS\n");
+
+ ZERO_STRUCT(io);
+ io.level = RAW_OPEN_SMB2;
+ io.in.create_flags = 0;
+ io.in.desired_access =
+ SEC_STD_READ_CONTROL |
+ SEC_STD_WRITE_DAC |
+ SEC_STD_WRITE_OWNER;
+ io.in.create_options = NTCREATEX_OPTIONS_DIRECTORY;
+ io.in.file_attributes = FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY;
+ io.in.share_access =
+ NTCREATEX_SHARE_ACCESS_READ |
+ NTCREATEX_SHARE_ACCESS_WRITE;
+ io.in.alloc_size = 0;
+ io.in.create_disposition = NTCREATEX_DISP_OPEN_IF;
+ io.in.impersonation_level = NTCREATEX_IMPERSONATION_ANONYMOUS;
+ io.in.security_flags = 0;
+ io.in.fname = fname;
+ status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io);
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK);
+ handle = io.out.file.handle;
+
+ torture_comment(tctx, "get the original sd\n");
+ q.query_secdesc.level = RAW_FILEINFO_SEC_DESC;
+ q.query_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle;
+ q.query_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL | SECINFO_OWNER;
+ status = smb2_getinfo_file(tree, tctx, &q);
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK);
+ sd_orig = q.query_secdesc.out.sd;
+
+ owner_sid = dom_sid_string(tctx, sd_orig->owner_sid);
+
+/*
+ * XXX: The smblsa calls use SMB as their transport - need to get rid of
+ * dependency.
+ */
+/*
+ status = smblsa_sid_check_privilege(cli,
+ owner_sid,
+ sec_privilege_name(SEC_PRIV_RESTORE));
+ has_restore_privilege = NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ torture_warning(tctx, "smblsa_sid_check_privilege - %s\n", nt_errstr(status));
+ }
+ torture_comment(tctx, "SEC_PRIV_RESTORE - %s\n", has_restore_privilege?"Yes":"No");
+
+ status = smblsa_sid_check_privilege(cli,
+ owner_sid,
+ sec_privilege_name(SEC_PRIV_TAKE_OWNERSHIP));
+ has_take_ownership_privilege = NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ torture_warning(tctx, "smblsa_sid_check_privilege - %s\n", nt_errstr(status));
+ }
+ torture_comment(tctx, "SEC_PRIV_TAKE_OWNERSHIP - %s\n", has_take_ownership_privilege?"Yes":"No");
+
+*/
+ for (i=0;i<ARRAY_SIZE(dir_mappings);i++) {
+ uint32_t expected_mask =
+ SEC_STD_WRITE_DAC |
+ SEC_STD_READ_CONTROL |
+ SEC_FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTE |
+ SEC_STD_DELETE;
+ uint32_t expected_mask_anon = SEC_FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTE;
+
+ if (has_restore_privilege) {
+ expected_mask_anon |= SEC_STD_DELETE;
+ }
+
+ torture_comment(tctx, "testing generic bits 0x%08x\n",
+ file_mappings[i].gen_bits);
+ sd = security_descriptor_dacl_create(tctx,
+ 0, owner_sid, NULL,
+ owner_sid,
+ SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED,
+ dir_mappings[i].gen_bits,
+ 0,
+ NULL);
+
+ set.set_secdesc.level = RAW_SFILEINFO_SEC_DESC;
+ set.set_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle;
+ set.set_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL | SECINFO_OWNER;
+ set.set_secdesc.in.sd = sd;
+
+ status = smb2_setinfo_file(tree, &set);
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK);
+
+ sd2 = security_descriptor_dacl_create(tctx,
+ 0, owner_sid, NULL,
+ owner_sid,
+ SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED,
+ dir_mappings[i].specific_bits,
+ 0,
+ NULL);
+
+ status = smb2_getinfo_file(tree, tctx, &q);
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK);
+ CHECK_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR(q.query_secdesc.out.sd, sd2);
+
+ io.in.desired_access = SEC_FLAG_MAXIMUM_ALLOWED;
+ status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io);
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK);
+ CHECK_ACCESS_FLAGS(io.out.file.handle,
+ expected_mask | dir_mappings[i].specific_bits);
+ smb2_util_close(tree, io.out.file.handle);
+
+ if (!has_take_ownership_privilege) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ torture_comment(tctx, "testing generic bits 0x%08x (anonymous)\n",
+ file_mappings[i].gen_bits);
+ sd = security_descriptor_dacl_create(tctx,
+ 0, SID_NT_ANONYMOUS, NULL,
+ owner_sid,
+ SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED,
+ file_mappings[i].gen_bits,
+ 0,
+ NULL);
+
+ set.set_secdesc.level = RAW_SFILEINFO_SEC_DESC;
+ set.set_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle;
+ set.set_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL | SECINFO_OWNER;
+ set.set_secdesc.in.sd = sd;
+
+ status = smb2_setinfo_file(tree, &set);
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK);
+
+ sd2 = security_descriptor_dacl_create(tctx,
+ 0, SID_NT_ANONYMOUS, NULL,
+ owner_sid,
+ SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED,
+ file_mappings[i].specific_bits,
+ 0,
+ NULL);
+
+ status = smb2_getinfo_file(tree, tctx, &q);
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK);
+ CHECK_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR(q.query_secdesc.out.sd, sd2);
+
+ io.in.desired_access = SEC_FLAG_MAXIMUM_ALLOWED;
+ status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io);
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK);
+ CHECK_ACCESS_FLAGS(io.out.file.handle,
+ expected_mask_anon | dir_mappings[i].specific_bits);
+ smb2_util_close(tree, io.out.file.handle);
+ }
+
+ torture_comment(tctx, "put back original sd\n");
+ set.set_secdesc.in.sd = sd_orig;
+ status = smb2_setinfo_file(tree, &set);
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK);
+
+ smb2_util_close(tree, handle);
+ smb2_util_unlink(tree, fname);
+
+done:
+ smb2_util_close(tree, handle);
+ smb2_deltree(tree, BASEDIR);
+ smb2_tdis(tree);
+ smb2_logoff(tree->session);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ see what access bits the owner of a file always gets
+ Note: This test was copied from raw/acls.c.
+*/
+static bool test_owner_bits(struct torture_context *tctx, struct smb2_tree *tree)
+{
+ NTSTATUS status;
+ struct smb2_create io;
+ const char *fname = BASEDIR "\\test_owner_bits.txt";
+ bool ret = true;
+ struct smb2_handle handle;
+ int i;
+ union smb_fileinfo q;
+ union smb_setfileinfo set;
+ struct security_descriptor *sd, *sd_orig;
+ const char *owner_sid;
+ bool has_restore_privilege = false;
+ bool has_take_ownership_privilege = false;
+ uint32_t expected_bits;
+
+ if (!smb2_util_setup_dir(tctx, tree, BASEDIR))
+ return false;
+
+ torture_comment(tctx, "TESTING FILE OWNER BITS\n");
+
+ ZERO_STRUCT(io);
+ io.level = RAW_OPEN_SMB2;
+ io.in.create_flags = 0;
+ io.in.desired_access =
+ SEC_STD_READ_CONTROL |
+ SEC_STD_WRITE_DAC |
+ SEC_STD_WRITE_OWNER;
+ io.in.create_options = 0;
+ io.in.file_attributes = FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL;
+ io.in.share_access =
+ NTCREATEX_SHARE_ACCESS_READ |
+ NTCREATEX_SHARE_ACCESS_WRITE;
+ io.in.alloc_size = 0;
+ io.in.create_disposition = NTCREATEX_DISP_OPEN_IF;
+ io.in.impersonation_level = NTCREATEX_IMPERSONATION_ANONYMOUS;
+ io.in.security_flags = 0;
+ io.in.fname = fname;
+ status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io);
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK);
+ handle = io.out.file.handle;
+
+ torture_comment(tctx, "get the original sd\n");
+ q.query_secdesc.level = RAW_FILEINFO_SEC_DESC;
+ q.query_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle;
+ q.query_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL | SECINFO_OWNER;
+ status = smb2_getinfo_file(tree, tctx, &q);
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK);
+ sd_orig = q.query_secdesc.out.sd;
+
+ owner_sid = dom_sid_string(tctx, sd_orig->owner_sid);
+
+/*
+ * XXX: The smblsa calls use SMB as their transport - need to get rid of
+ * dependency.
+ */
+/*
+ status = smblsa_sid_check_privilege(cli,
+ owner_sid,
+ sec_privilege_name(SEC_PRIV_RESTORE));
+ has_restore_privilege = NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ torture_warning(tctx, "smblsa_sid_check_privilege - %s\n", nt_errstr(status));
+ }
+ torture_comment(tctx, "SEC_PRIV_RESTORE - %s\n", has_restore_privilege?"Yes":"No");
+
+ status = smblsa_sid_check_privilege(cli,
+ owner_sid,
+ sec_privilege_name(SEC_PRIV_TAKE_OWNERSHIP));
+ has_take_ownership_privilege = NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ torture_warning(tctx, "smblsa_sid_check_privilege - %s\n", nt_errstr(status));
+ }
+ torture_comment(tctx, "SEC_PRIV_TAKE_OWNERSHIP - %s\n", has_take_ownership_privilege?"Yes":"No");
+*/
+
+ sd = security_descriptor_dacl_create(tctx,
+ 0, NULL, NULL,
+ owner_sid,
+ SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED,
+ SEC_FILE_WRITE_DATA,
+ 0,
+ NULL);
+
+ set.set_secdesc.level = RAW_SFILEINFO_SEC_DESC;
+ set.set_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle;
+ set.set_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL;
+ set.set_secdesc.in.sd = sd;
+
+ status = smb2_setinfo_file(tree, &set);
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK);
+
+ expected_bits = SEC_FILE_WRITE_DATA | SEC_FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTE;
+
+ for (i=0;i<16;i++) {
+ uint32_t bit = (1<<i);
+ io.in.desired_access = bit;
+ status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io);
+ if (expected_bits & bit) {
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ torture_warning(tctx, "failed with access mask 0x%08x of expected 0x%08x\n",
+ bit, expected_bits);
+ }
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK);
+ CHECK_ACCESS_FLAGS(io.out.file.handle, bit);
+ smb2_util_close(tree, io.out.file.handle);
+ } else {
+ if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ torture_warning(tctx, "open succeeded with access mask 0x%08x of "
+ "expected 0x%08x - should fail\n",
+ bit, expected_bits);
+ }
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED);
+ }
+ }
+
+ torture_comment(tctx, "put back original sd\n");
+ set.set_secdesc.in.sd = sd_orig;
+ status = smb2_setinfo_file(tree, &set);
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK);
+
+done:
+ smb2_util_close(tree, handle);
+ smb2_util_unlink(tree, fname);
+ smb2_deltree(tree, BASEDIR);
+ smb2_tdis(tree);
+ smb2_logoff(tree->session);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+
+
+/*
+ test the inheritance of ACL flags onto new files and directories
+ Note: This test was copied from raw/acls.c.
+*/
+static bool test_inheritance(struct torture_context *tctx, struct smb2_tree *tree)
+{
+ NTSTATUS status;
+ struct smb2_create io;
+ const char *dname = BASEDIR "\\inheritance";
+ const char *fname1 = BASEDIR "\\inheritance\\testfile";
+ const char *fname2 = BASEDIR "\\inheritance\\testdir";
+ bool ret = true;
+ struct smb2_handle handle, handle2;
+ int i;
+ union smb_fileinfo q;
+ union smb_setfileinfo set;
+ struct security_descriptor *sd, *sd2, *sd_orig=NULL, *sd_def1, *sd_def2;
+ const char *owner_sid;
+ const struct dom_sid *creator_owner;
+ const struct {
+ uint32_t parent_flags;
+ uint32_t file_flags;
+ uint32_t dir_flags;
+ } test_flags[] = {
+ {
+ 0,
+ 0,
+ 0
+ },
+ {
+ SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT,
+ 0,
+ SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT |
+ SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERIT_ONLY,
+ },
+ {
+ SEC_ACE_FLAG_CONTAINER_INHERIT,
+ 0,
+ SEC_ACE_FLAG_CONTAINER_INHERIT,
+ },
+ {
+ SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT |
+ SEC_ACE_FLAG_CONTAINER_INHERIT,
+ 0,
+ SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT |
+ SEC_ACE_FLAG_CONTAINER_INHERIT,
+ },
+ {
+ SEC_ACE_FLAG_NO_PROPAGATE_INHERIT,
+ 0,
+ 0,
+ },
+ {
+ SEC_ACE_FLAG_NO_PROPAGATE_INHERIT |
+ SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT,
+ 0,
+ 0,
+ },
+ {
+ SEC_ACE_FLAG_NO_PROPAGATE_INHERIT |
+ SEC_ACE_FLAG_CONTAINER_INHERIT,
+ 0,
+ 0,
+ },
+ {
+ SEC_ACE_FLAG_NO_PROPAGATE_INHERIT |
+ SEC_ACE_FLAG_CONTAINER_INHERIT |
+ SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT,
+ 0,
+ 0,
+ },
+ {
+ SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERIT_ONLY,
+ 0,
+ 0,
+ },
+ {
+ SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERIT_ONLY |
+ SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT,
+ 0,
+ SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT |
+ SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERIT_ONLY,
+ },
+ {
+ SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERIT_ONLY |
+ SEC_ACE_FLAG_CONTAINER_INHERIT,
+ 0,
+ SEC_ACE_FLAG_CONTAINER_INHERIT,
+ },
+ {
+ SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERIT_ONLY |
+ SEC_ACE_FLAG_CONTAINER_INHERIT |
+ SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT,
+ 0,
+ SEC_ACE_FLAG_CONTAINER_INHERIT |
+ SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT,
+ },
+ {
+ SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERIT_ONLY |
+ SEC_ACE_FLAG_NO_PROPAGATE_INHERIT,
+ 0,
+ 0,
+ },
+ {
+ SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERIT_ONLY |
+ SEC_ACE_FLAG_NO_PROPAGATE_INHERIT |
+ SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT,
+ 0,
+ 0,
+ },
+ {
+ SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERIT_ONLY |
+ SEC_ACE_FLAG_NO_PROPAGATE_INHERIT |
+ SEC_ACE_FLAG_CONTAINER_INHERIT,
+ 0,
+ 0,
+ },
+ {
+ SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERIT_ONLY |
+ SEC_ACE_FLAG_NO_PROPAGATE_INHERIT |
+ SEC_ACE_FLAG_CONTAINER_INHERIT |
+ SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT,
+ 0,
+ 0,
+ }
+ };
+
+ if (!smb2_util_setup_dir(tctx, tree, BASEDIR))
+ return false;
+
+ torture_comment(tctx, "TESTING ACL INHERITANCE\n");
+
+ ZERO_STRUCT(io);
+ io.level = RAW_OPEN_SMB2;
+ io.in.create_flags = 0;
+ io.in.desired_access = SEC_RIGHTS_FILE_ALL;
+ io.in.create_options = NTCREATEX_OPTIONS_DIRECTORY;
+ io.in.file_attributes = FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY;
+ io.in.share_access = 0;
+ io.in.alloc_size = 0;
+ io.in.create_disposition = NTCREATEX_DISP_CREATE;
+ io.in.impersonation_level = NTCREATEX_IMPERSONATION_ANONYMOUS;
+ io.in.security_flags = 0;
+ io.in.fname = dname;
+
+ status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io);
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK);
+ handle = io.out.file.handle;
+
+ torture_comment(tctx, "get the original sd\n");
+ q.query_secdesc.level = RAW_FILEINFO_SEC_DESC;
+ q.query_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle;
+ q.query_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL | SECINFO_OWNER;
+ status = smb2_getinfo_file(tree, tctx, &q);
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK);
+ sd_orig = q.query_secdesc.out.sd;
+
+ owner_sid = dom_sid_string(tctx, sd_orig->owner_sid);
+
+ torture_comment(tctx, "owner_sid is %s\n", owner_sid);
+
+ /*
+ * The Windows Default ACL for a new file, when there is no ACL to be
+ * inherited: FullControl for the owner and SYSTEM.
+ */
+ sd_def1 = security_descriptor_dacl_create(tctx,
+ 0, owner_sid, NULL,
+ owner_sid,
+ SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED,
+ SEC_RIGHTS_FILE_ALL,
+ 0,
+ SID_NT_SYSTEM,
+ SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED,
+ SEC_RIGHTS_FILE_ALL,
+ 0,
+ NULL);
+
+ /*
+ * Use this in the case the system being tested does not add an ACE for
+ * the SYSTEM SID.
+ */
+ sd_def2 = security_descriptor_dacl_create(tctx,
+ 0, owner_sid, NULL,
+ owner_sid,
+ SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED,
+ SEC_RIGHTS_FILE_ALL,
+ 0,
+ NULL);
+
+ creator_owner = dom_sid_parse_talloc(tctx, SID_CREATOR_OWNER);
+
+ for (i=0;i<ARRAY_SIZE(test_flags);i++) {
+ sd = security_descriptor_dacl_create(tctx,
+ 0, NULL, NULL,
+ SID_CREATOR_OWNER,
+ SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED,
+ SEC_FILE_WRITE_DATA,
+ test_flags[i].parent_flags,
+ SID_WORLD,
+ SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED,
+ SEC_FILE_ALL | SEC_STD_ALL,
+ 0,
+ NULL);
+ set.set_secdesc.level = RAW_SFILEINFO_SEC_DESC;
+ set.set_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle;
+ set.set_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL;
+ set.set_secdesc.in.sd = sd;
+ status = smb2_setinfo_file(tree, &set);
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK);
+
+ io.in.fname = fname1;
+ io.in.create_options = 0;
+ status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io);
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK);
+ handle2 = io.out.file.handle;
+
+ q.query_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle2;
+ status = smb2_getinfo_file(tree, tctx, &q);
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK);
+
+ smb2_util_close(tree, handle2);
+ smb2_util_unlink(tree, fname1);
+
+ if (!(test_flags[i].parent_flags & SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT)) {
+ if (!security_descriptor_equal(q.query_secdesc.out.sd, sd_def1) &&
+ !security_descriptor_equal(q.query_secdesc.out.sd, sd_def2)) {
+ torture_warning(tctx, "Expected default sd:\n");
+ NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(security_descriptor, sd_def1);
+ torture_warning(tctx, "at %d - got:\n", i);
+ NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(security_descriptor, q.query_secdesc.out.sd);
+ }
+ goto check_dir;
+ }
+
+ if (q.query_secdesc.out.sd->dacl == NULL ||
+ q.query_secdesc.out.sd->dacl->num_aces != 1 ||
+ q.query_secdesc.out.sd->dacl->aces[0].access_mask != SEC_FILE_WRITE_DATA ||
+ !dom_sid_equal(&q.query_secdesc.out.sd->dacl->aces[0].trustee,
+ sd_orig->owner_sid)) {
+ torture_warning(tctx, "Bad sd in child file at %d\n", i);
+ NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(security_descriptor, q.query_secdesc.out.sd);
+ ret = false;
+ goto check_dir;
+ }
+
+ if (q.query_secdesc.out.sd->dacl->aces[0].flags !=
+ test_flags[i].file_flags) {
+ torture_warning(tctx, "incorrect file_flags 0x%x - expected 0x%x for parent 0x%x with (i=%d)\n",
+ q.query_secdesc.out.sd->dacl->aces[0].flags,
+ test_flags[i].file_flags,
+ test_flags[i].parent_flags,
+ i);
+ ret = false;
+ }
+
+ check_dir:
+ io.in.fname = fname2;
+ io.in.create_options = NTCREATEX_OPTIONS_DIRECTORY;
+ status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io);
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK);
+ handle2 = io.out.file.handle;
+
+ q.query_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle2;
+ status = smb2_getinfo_file(tree, tctx, &q);
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK);
+
+ smb2_util_close(tree, handle2);
+ smb2_util_rmdir(tree, fname2);
+
+ if (!(test_flags[i].parent_flags & SEC_ACE_FLAG_CONTAINER_INHERIT) &&
+ (!(test_flags[i].parent_flags & SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT) ||
+ (test_flags[i].parent_flags & SEC_ACE_FLAG_NO_PROPAGATE_INHERIT))) {
+ if (!security_descriptor_equal(q.query_secdesc.out.sd, sd_def1) &&
+ !security_descriptor_equal(q.query_secdesc.out.sd, sd_def2)) {
+ torture_warning(tctx, "Expected default sd for dir at %d:\n", i);
+ NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(security_descriptor, sd_def1);
+ torture_warning(tctx, "got:\n");
+ NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(security_descriptor, q.query_secdesc.out.sd);
+ }
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if ((test_flags[i].parent_flags & SEC_ACE_FLAG_CONTAINER_INHERIT) &&
+ (test_flags[i].parent_flags & SEC_ACE_FLAG_NO_PROPAGATE_INHERIT)) {
+ if (q.query_secdesc.out.sd->dacl == NULL ||
+ q.query_secdesc.out.sd->dacl->num_aces != 1 ||
+ q.query_secdesc.out.sd->dacl->aces[0].access_mask != SEC_FILE_WRITE_DATA ||
+ !dom_sid_equal(&q.query_secdesc.out.sd->dacl->aces[0].trustee,
+ sd_orig->owner_sid) ||
+ q.query_secdesc.out.sd->dacl->aces[0].flags != test_flags[i].dir_flags) {
+ torture_warning(tctx, "(CI & NP) Bad sd in child dir - expected 0x%x for parent 0x%x (i=%d)\n",
+ test_flags[i].dir_flags,
+ test_flags[i].parent_flags, i);
+ NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(security_descriptor, q.query_secdesc.out.sd);
+ torture_warning(tctx, "FYI, here is the parent sd:\n");
+ NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(security_descriptor, sd);
+ ret = false;
+ continue;
+ }
+ } else if (test_flags[i].parent_flags & SEC_ACE_FLAG_CONTAINER_INHERIT) {
+ if (q.query_secdesc.out.sd->dacl == NULL ||
+ q.query_secdesc.out.sd->dacl->num_aces != 2 ||
+ q.query_secdesc.out.sd->dacl->aces[0].access_mask != SEC_FILE_WRITE_DATA ||
+ !dom_sid_equal(&q.query_secdesc.out.sd->dacl->aces[0].trustee,
+ sd_orig->owner_sid) ||
+ q.query_secdesc.out.sd->dacl->aces[1].access_mask != SEC_FILE_WRITE_DATA ||
+ !dom_sid_equal(&q.query_secdesc.out.sd->dacl->aces[1].trustee,
+ creator_owner) ||
+ q.query_secdesc.out.sd->dacl->aces[0].flags != 0 ||
+ q.query_secdesc.out.sd->dacl->aces[1].flags !=
+ (test_flags[i].dir_flags | SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERIT_ONLY)) {
+ torture_warning(tctx, "(CI) Bad sd in child dir - expected 0x%x for parent 0x%x (i=%d)\n",
+ test_flags[i].dir_flags,
+ test_flags[i].parent_flags, i);
+ NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(security_descriptor, q.query_secdesc.out.sd);
+ torture_warning(tctx, "FYI, here is the parent sd:\n");
+ NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(security_descriptor, sd);
+ ret = false;
+ continue;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (q.query_secdesc.out.sd->dacl == NULL ||
+ q.query_secdesc.out.sd->dacl->num_aces != 1 ||
+ q.query_secdesc.out.sd->dacl->aces[0].access_mask != SEC_FILE_WRITE_DATA ||
+ !dom_sid_equal(&q.query_secdesc.out.sd->dacl->aces[0].trustee,
+ creator_owner) ||
+ q.query_secdesc.out.sd->dacl->aces[0].flags != test_flags[i].dir_flags) {
+ torture_warning(tctx, "(0) Bad sd in child dir - expected 0x%x for parent 0x%x (i=%d)\n",
+ test_flags[i].dir_flags,
+ test_flags[i].parent_flags, i);
+ NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(security_descriptor, q.query_secdesc.out.sd);
+ torture_warning(tctx, "FYI, here is the parent sd:\n");
+ NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(security_descriptor, sd);
+ ret = false;
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ torture_comment(tctx, "testing access checks on inherited create with %s\n", fname1);
+ sd = security_descriptor_dacl_create(tctx,
+ 0, NULL, NULL,
+ owner_sid,
+ SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED,
+ SEC_FILE_WRITE_DATA | SEC_STD_WRITE_DAC,
+ SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT,
+ SID_WORLD,
+ SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED,
+ SEC_FILE_ALL | SEC_STD_ALL,
+ 0,
+ NULL);
+ set.set_secdesc.level = RAW_SFILEINFO_SEC_DESC;
+ set.set_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle;
+ set.set_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL;
+ set.set_secdesc.in.sd = sd;
+ status = smb2_setinfo_file(tree, &set);
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK);
+
+ /* Check DACL we just set. */
+ torture_comment(tctx, "checking new sd\n");
+ q.query_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle;
+ q.query_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL;
+ status = smb2_getinfo_file(tree, tctx, &q);
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK);
+ CHECK_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR(q.query_secdesc.out.sd, sd);
+
+ io.in.fname = fname1;
+ io.in.create_options = 0;
+ io.in.desired_access = SEC_RIGHTS_FILE_ALL;
+ io.in.create_disposition = NTCREATEX_DISP_CREATE;
+ status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io);
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK);
+ handle2 = io.out.file.handle;
+ CHECK_ACCESS_FLAGS(handle2, SEC_RIGHTS_FILE_ALL);
+
+ q.query_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle2;
+ q.query_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL | SECINFO_OWNER;
+ status = smb2_getinfo_file(tree, tctx, &q);
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK);
+ smb2_util_close(tree, handle2);
+
+ sd2 = security_descriptor_dacl_create(tctx,
+ 0, owner_sid, NULL,
+ owner_sid,
+ SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED,
+ SEC_FILE_WRITE_DATA | SEC_STD_WRITE_DAC,
+ 0,
+ NULL);
+ CHECK_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR(q.query_secdesc.out.sd, sd2);
+
+ io.in.create_disposition = NTCREATEX_DISP_OPEN;
+ io.in.desired_access = SEC_RIGHTS_FILE_ALL;
+ status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io);
+ if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ torture_warning(tctx, "failed: w2k3 ACL bug (allowed open when ACL should deny)\n");
+ ret = false;
+ handle2 = io.out.file.handle;
+ CHECK_ACCESS_FLAGS(handle2, SEC_RIGHTS_FILE_ALL);
+ smb2_util_close(tree, handle2);
+ } else {
+ if (TARGET_IS_WIN7(tctx)) {
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND);
+ } else {
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED);
+ }
+ }
+
+ torture_comment(tctx, "trying without execute\n");
+ io.in.create_disposition = NTCREATEX_DISP_OPEN;
+ io.in.desired_access = SEC_RIGHTS_FILE_ALL & ~SEC_FILE_EXECUTE;
+ status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io);
+ if (TARGET_IS_WIN7(tctx)) {
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND);
+ } else {
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED);
+ }
+
+ torture_comment(tctx, "and with full permissions again\n");
+ io.in.create_disposition = NTCREATEX_DISP_OPEN;
+ io.in.desired_access = SEC_RIGHTS_FILE_ALL;
+ status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io);
+ if (TARGET_IS_WIN7(tctx)) {
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND);
+ } else {
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED);
+ }
+
+ io.in.desired_access = SEC_FILE_WRITE_DATA;
+ status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io);
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK);
+ handle2 = io.out.file.handle;
+ CHECK_ACCESS_FLAGS(handle2, SEC_FILE_WRITE_DATA);
+ smb2_util_close(tree, handle2);
+
+ torture_comment(tctx, "put back original sd\n");
+ set.set_secdesc.level = RAW_SFILEINFO_SEC_DESC;
+ set.set_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle;
+ set.set_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL;
+ set.set_secdesc.in.sd = sd_orig;
+ status = smb2_setinfo_file(tree, &set);
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK);
+
+ smb2_util_close(tree, handle);
+
+ io.in.desired_access = SEC_RIGHTS_FILE_ALL;
+ status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io);
+ if (TARGET_IS_WIN7(tctx)) {
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND);
+ } else {
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED);
+ }
+
+ io.in.desired_access = SEC_FILE_WRITE_DATA;
+ status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io);
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK);
+ handle2 = io.out.file.handle;
+ CHECK_ACCESS_FLAGS(handle2, SEC_FILE_WRITE_DATA);
+ smb2_util_close(tree, handle2);
+
+ smb2_util_unlink(tree, fname1);
+ smb2_util_rmdir(tree, dname);
+
+done:
+ if (sd_orig != NULL) {
+ set.set_secdesc.level = RAW_SFILEINFO_SEC_DESC;
+ set.set_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle;
+ set.set_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL;
+ set.set_secdesc.in.sd = sd_orig;
+ status = smb2_setinfo_file(tree, &set);
+ }
+
+ smb2_util_close(tree, handle);
+ smb2_deltree(tree, BASEDIR);
+ smb2_tdis(tree);
+ smb2_logoff(tree->session);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static bool test_inheritance_flags(struct torture_context *tctx,
+ struct smb2_tree *tree)
+{
+ NTSTATUS status;
+ struct smb2_create io;
+ const char *dname = BASEDIR "\\inheritance";
+ const char *fname1 = BASEDIR "\\inheritance\\testfile";
+ bool ret = true;
+ struct smb2_handle handle, handle2;
+ int i, j;
+ union smb_fileinfo q;
+ union smb_setfileinfo set;
+ struct security_descriptor *sd, *sd2, *sd_orig=NULL;
+ const char *owner_sid;
+ struct {
+ uint32_t parent_set_sd_type; /* 3 options */
+ uint32_t parent_set_ace_inherit; /* 1 option */
+ uint32_t parent_get_sd_type;
+ uint32_t parent_get_ace_inherit;
+ uint32_t child_get_sd_type;
+ uint32_t child_get_ace_inherit;
+ } tflags[16] = {0}; /* 2^4 */
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 15; i++) {
+ torture_comment(tctx, "i=%d:", i);
+
+ if (i & 1) {
+ tflags[i].parent_set_sd_type |=
+ SEC_DESC_DACL_AUTO_INHERITED;
+ torture_comment(tctx, "AUTO_INHERITED, ");
+ }
+ if (i & 2) {
+ tflags[i].parent_set_sd_type |=
+ SEC_DESC_DACL_AUTO_INHERIT_REQ;
+ torture_comment(tctx, "AUTO_INHERIT_REQ, ");
+ }
+ if (i & 4) {
+ tflags[i].parent_set_sd_type |=
+ SEC_DESC_DACL_PROTECTED;
+ torture_comment(tctx, "PROTECTED, ");
+ tflags[i].parent_get_sd_type |=
+ SEC_DESC_DACL_PROTECTED;
+ }
+ if (i & 8) {
+ tflags[i].parent_set_ace_inherit |=
+ SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERITED_ACE;
+ torture_comment(tctx, "INHERITED, ");
+ tflags[i].parent_get_ace_inherit |=
+ SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERITED_ACE;
+ }
+
+ if ((tflags[i].parent_set_sd_type &
+ (SEC_DESC_DACL_AUTO_INHERITED | SEC_DESC_DACL_AUTO_INHERIT_REQ)) ==
+ (SEC_DESC_DACL_AUTO_INHERITED | SEC_DESC_DACL_AUTO_INHERIT_REQ)) {
+ tflags[i].parent_get_sd_type |=
+ SEC_DESC_DACL_AUTO_INHERITED;
+ tflags[i].child_get_sd_type |=
+ SEC_DESC_DACL_AUTO_INHERITED;
+ tflags[i].child_get_ace_inherit |=
+ SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERITED_ACE;
+ torture_comment(tctx, " ... parent is AUTO INHERITED");
+ }
+
+ if (tflags[i].parent_set_ace_inherit &
+ SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERITED_ACE) {
+ tflags[i].parent_get_ace_inherit =
+ SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERITED_ACE;
+ torture_comment(tctx, " ... parent ACE is INHERITED");
+ }
+
+ torture_comment(tctx, "\n");
+ }
+
+ if (!smb2_util_setup_dir(tctx, tree, BASEDIR))
+ return false;
+
+ torture_comment(tctx, "TESTING ACL INHERITANCE FLAGS\n");
+
+ ZERO_STRUCT(io);
+ io.level = RAW_OPEN_SMB2;
+ io.in.create_flags = 0;
+ io.in.desired_access = SEC_RIGHTS_FILE_ALL;
+ io.in.create_options = NTCREATEX_OPTIONS_DIRECTORY;
+ io.in.file_attributes = FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY;
+ io.in.share_access = NTCREATEX_SHARE_ACCESS_MASK;
+ io.in.alloc_size = 0;
+ io.in.create_disposition = NTCREATEX_DISP_CREATE;
+ io.in.impersonation_level = NTCREATEX_IMPERSONATION_ANONYMOUS;
+ io.in.security_flags = 0;
+ io.in.fname = dname;
+
+ torture_comment(tctx, "creating initial directory %s\n", dname);
+ status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io);
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK);
+ handle = io.out.file.handle;
+
+ torture_comment(tctx, "getting original sd\n");
+ q.query_secdesc.level = RAW_FILEINFO_SEC_DESC;
+ q.query_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle;
+ q.query_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL | SECINFO_OWNER;
+ status = smb2_getinfo_file(tree, tctx, &q);
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK);
+ sd_orig = q.query_secdesc.out.sd;
+
+ owner_sid = dom_sid_string(tctx, sd_orig->owner_sid);
+ torture_comment(tctx, "owner_sid is %s\n", owner_sid);
+
+ for (i=0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tflags); i++) {
+ torture_comment(tctx, "setting a new sd on directory, pass #%d\n", i);
+
+ sd = security_descriptor_dacl_create(tctx,
+ tflags[i].parent_set_sd_type,
+ NULL, NULL,
+ owner_sid,
+ SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED,
+ SEC_FILE_WRITE_DATA | SEC_STD_WRITE_DAC,
+ SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT |
+ SEC_ACE_FLAG_CONTAINER_INHERIT |
+ tflags[i].parent_set_ace_inherit,
+ SID_WORLD,
+ SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED,
+ SEC_FILE_ALL | SEC_STD_ALL,
+ 0,
+ NULL);
+ set.set_secdesc.level = RAW_SFILEINFO_SEC_DESC;
+ set.set_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle;
+ set.set_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL;
+ set.set_secdesc.in.sd = sd;
+ status = smb2_setinfo_file(tree, &set);
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK);
+
+ /*
+ * Check DACL we just set, except change the bits to what they
+ * should be.
+ */
+ torture_comment(tctx, " checking new sd\n");
+
+ /* REQ bit should always be false. */
+ sd->type &= ~SEC_DESC_DACL_AUTO_INHERIT_REQ;
+
+ if ((tflags[i].parent_get_sd_type & SEC_DESC_DACL_AUTO_INHERITED) == 0)
+ sd->type &= ~SEC_DESC_DACL_AUTO_INHERITED;
+
+ q.query_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle;
+ q.query_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL;
+ status = smb2_getinfo_file(tree, tctx, &q);
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK);
+ CHECK_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR(q.query_secdesc.out.sd, sd);
+
+ /* Create file. */
+ torture_comment(tctx, " creating file %s\n", fname1);
+ io.in.fname = fname1;
+ io.in.create_options = 0;
+ io.in.file_attributes = FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL;
+ io.in.desired_access = SEC_RIGHTS_FILE_ALL;
+ io.in.create_disposition = NTCREATEX_DISP_CREATE;
+ status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io);
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK);
+ handle2 = io.out.file.handle;
+ CHECK_ACCESS_FLAGS(handle2, SEC_RIGHTS_FILE_ALL);
+
+ q.query_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle2;
+ q.query_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL | SECINFO_OWNER;
+ status = smb2_getinfo_file(tree, tctx, &q);
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK);
+
+ torture_comment(tctx, " checking sd on file %s\n", fname1);
+ sd2 = security_descriptor_dacl_create(tctx,
+ tflags[i].child_get_sd_type,
+ owner_sid, NULL,
+ owner_sid,
+ SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED,
+ SEC_FILE_WRITE_DATA | SEC_STD_WRITE_DAC,
+ tflags[i].child_get_ace_inherit,
+ NULL);
+ CHECK_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR(q.query_secdesc.out.sd, sd2);
+
+ /*
+ * Set new sd on file ... prove that the bits have nothing to
+ * do with the parents bits when manually setting an ACL. The
+ * _AUTO_INHERITED bit comes directly from the ACL set.
+ */
+ for (j = 0; j < ARRAY_SIZE(tflags); j++) {
+ torture_comment(tctx, " setting new file sd, pass #%d\n", j);
+
+ /* Change sd type. */
+ sd2->type &= ~(SEC_DESC_DACL_AUTO_INHERITED |
+ SEC_DESC_DACL_AUTO_INHERIT_REQ |
+ SEC_DESC_DACL_PROTECTED);
+ sd2->type |= tflags[j].parent_set_sd_type;
+
+ sd2->dacl->aces[0].flags &=
+ ~SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERITED_ACE;
+ sd2->dacl->aces[0].flags |=
+ tflags[j].parent_set_ace_inherit;
+
+ set.set_secdesc.level = RAW_SFILEINFO_SEC_DESC;
+ set.set_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle2;
+ set.set_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL;
+ set.set_secdesc.in.sd = sd2;
+ status = smb2_setinfo_file(tree, &set);
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK);
+
+ /* Check DACL we just set. */
+ sd2->type &= ~SEC_DESC_DACL_AUTO_INHERIT_REQ;
+ if ((tflags[j].parent_get_sd_type & SEC_DESC_DACL_AUTO_INHERITED) == 0)
+ sd2->type &= ~SEC_DESC_DACL_AUTO_INHERITED;
+
+ q.query_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle2;
+ q.query_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL | SECINFO_OWNER;
+ status = smb2_getinfo_file(tree, tctx, &q);
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK);
+
+ CHECK_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR(q.query_secdesc.out.sd, sd2);
+ }
+
+ smb2_util_close(tree, handle2);
+ smb2_util_unlink(tree, fname1);
+ }
+
+done:
+ smb2_util_close(tree, handle);
+ smb2_deltree(tree, BASEDIR);
+ smb2_tdis(tree);
+ smb2_logoff(tree->session);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ test dynamic acl inheritance
+ Note: This test was copied from raw/acls.c.
+*/
+static bool test_inheritance_dynamic(struct torture_context *tctx,
+ struct smb2_tree *tree)
+{
+ NTSTATUS status;
+ struct smb2_create io;
+ const char *dname = BASEDIR "\\inheritance";
+ const char *fname1 = BASEDIR "\\inheritance\\testfile";
+ bool ret = true;
+ struct smb2_handle handle, handle2;
+ union smb_fileinfo q;
+ union smb_setfileinfo set;
+ struct security_descriptor *sd, *sd_orig=NULL;
+ const char *owner_sid;
+
+ torture_comment(tctx, "TESTING DYNAMIC ACL INHERITANCE\n");
+
+ if (!smb2_util_setup_dir(tctx, tree, BASEDIR))
+ return false;
+
+ ZERO_STRUCT(io);
+ io.level = RAW_OPEN_SMB2;
+ io.in.create_flags = 0;
+ io.in.desired_access = SEC_RIGHTS_FILE_ALL;
+ io.in.create_options = NTCREATEX_OPTIONS_DIRECTORY;
+ io.in.file_attributes = FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY;
+ io.in.share_access = 0;
+ io.in.alloc_size = 0;
+ io.in.create_disposition = NTCREATEX_DISP_CREATE;
+ io.in.impersonation_level = NTCREATEX_IMPERSONATION_ANONYMOUS;
+ io.in.security_flags = 0;
+ io.in.fname = dname;
+
+ status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io);
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK);
+ handle = io.out.file.handle;
+
+ torture_comment(tctx, "get the original sd\n");
+ q.query_secdesc.level = RAW_FILEINFO_SEC_DESC;
+ q.query_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle;
+ q.query_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL | SECINFO_OWNER;
+ status = smb2_getinfo_file(tree, tctx, &q);
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK);
+ sd_orig = q.query_secdesc.out.sd;
+
+ owner_sid = dom_sid_string(tctx, sd_orig->owner_sid);
+
+ torture_comment(tctx, "owner_sid is %s\n", owner_sid);
+
+ sd = security_descriptor_dacl_create(tctx,
+ 0, NULL, NULL,
+ owner_sid,
+ SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED,
+ SEC_FILE_WRITE_DATA | SEC_STD_DELETE | SEC_FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTE,
+ SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT,
+ NULL);
+ sd->type |= SEC_DESC_DACL_AUTO_INHERITED | SEC_DESC_DACL_AUTO_INHERIT_REQ;
+
+ set.set_secdesc.level = RAW_SFILEINFO_SEC_DESC;
+ set.set_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle;
+ set.set_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL;
+ set.set_secdesc.in.sd = sd;
+ status = smb2_setinfo_file(tree, &set);
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK);
+
+ torture_comment(tctx, "create a file with an inherited acl\n");
+ io.in.fname = fname1;
+ io.in.create_options = 0;
+ io.in.desired_access = SEC_FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTE;
+ io.in.create_disposition = NTCREATEX_DISP_CREATE;
+ status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io);
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK);
+ handle2 = io.out.file.handle;
+ smb2_util_close(tree, handle2);
+
+ torture_comment(tctx, "try and access file with base rights - should be OK\n");
+ io.in.desired_access = SEC_FILE_WRITE_DATA;
+ io.in.create_disposition = NTCREATEX_DISP_OPEN;
+ status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io);
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK);
+ handle2 = io.out.file.handle;
+ smb2_util_close(tree, handle2);
+
+ torture_comment(tctx, "try and access file with extra rights - should be denied\n");
+ io.in.desired_access = SEC_FILE_WRITE_DATA | SEC_FILE_EXECUTE;
+ status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io);
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED);
+
+ torture_comment(tctx, "update parent sd\n");
+ sd = security_descriptor_dacl_create(tctx,
+ 0, NULL, NULL,
+ owner_sid,
+ SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED,
+ SEC_FILE_WRITE_DATA | SEC_STD_DELETE | SEC_FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTE | SEC_FILE_EXECUTE,
+ SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT,
+ NULL);
+ sd->type |= SEC_DESC_DACL_AUTO_INHERITED | SEC_DESC_DACL_AUTO_INHERIT_REQ;
+
+ set.set_secdesc.in.sd = sd;
+ status = smb2_setinfo_file(tree, &set);
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK);
+
+ torture_comment(tctx, "try and access file with base rights - should be OK\n");
+ io.in.desired_access = SEC_FILE_WRITE_DATA;
+ status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io);
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK);
+ handle2 = io.out.file.handle;
+ smb2_util_close(tree, handle2);
+
+
+ torture_comment(tctx, "try and access now - should be OK if dynamic inheritance works\n");
+ io.in.desired_access = SEC_FILE_WRITE_DATA | SEC_FILE_EXECUTE;
+ status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io);
+ if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED)) {
+ torture_comment(tctx, "Server does not have dynamic inheritance\n");
+ }
+ if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_OK)) {
+ torture_comment(tctx, "Server does have dynamic inheritance\n");
+ }
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED);
+
+ smb2_util_unlink(tree, fname1);
+
+done:
+ torture_comment(tctx, "put back original sd\n");
+ set.set_secdesc.level = RAW_SFILEINFO_SEC_DESC;
+ set.set_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle;
+ set.set_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL;
+ set.set_secdesc.in.sd = sd_orig;
+ status = smb2_setinfo_file(tree, &set);
+
+ smb2_util_close(tree, handle);
+ smb2_util_rmdir(tree, dname);
+ smb2_deltree(tree, BASEDIR);
+ smb2_tdis(tree);
+ smb2_logoff(tree->session);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#define CHECK_STATUS_FOR_BIT_ACTION(status, bits, action) do { \
+ if (!(bits & desired_64)) {\
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED); \
+ action; \
+ } else { \
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); \
+ } \
+} while (0)
+
+#define CHECK_STATUS_FOR_BIT(status, bits, access) do { \
+ if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { \
+ if (!(granted & access)) {\
+ ret = false; \
+ torture_result(tctx, TORTURE_FAIL, "(%s) %s but flags 0x%08X are not granted! granted[0x%08X] desired[0x%08X]\n", \
+ __location__, nt_errstr(status), access, granted, desired); \
+ goto done; \
+ } \
+ } else { \
+ if (granted & access) {\
+ ret = false; \
+ torture_result(tctx, TORTURE_FAIL, "(%s) %s but flags 0x%08X are granted! granted[0x%08X] desired[0x%08X]\n", \
+ __location__, nt_errstr(status), access, granted, desired); \
+ goto done; \
+ } \
+ } \
+ CHECK_STATUS_FOR_BIT_ACTION(status, bits, do {} while (0)); \
+} while (0)
+
+/* test what access mask is needed for getting and setting security_descriptors */
+/* Note: This test was copied from raw/acls.c. */
+static bool test_sd_get_set(struct torture_context *tctx, struct smb2_tree *tree)
+{
+ NTSTATUS status;
+ bool ret = true;
+ struct smb2_create io;
+ union smb_fileinfo fi;
+ union smb_setfileinfo si;
+ struct security_descriptor *sd;
+ struct security_descriptor *sd_owner = NULL;
+ struct security_descriptor *sd_group = NULL;
+ struct security_descriptor *sd_dacl = NULL;
+ struct security_descriptor *sd_sacl = NULL;
+ struct smb2_handle handle;
+ const char *fname = BASEDIR "\\sd_get_set.txt";
+ uint64_t desired_64;
+ uint32_t desired = 0, granted;
+ int i = 0;
+#define NO_BITS_HACK (((uint64_t)1)<<32)
+ uint64_t open_bits =
+ SEC_MASK_GENERIC |
+ SEC_FLAG_SYSTEM_SECURITY |
+ SEC_FLAG_MAXIMUM_ALLOWED |
+ SEC_STD_ALL |
+ SEC_FILE_ALL |
+ NO_BITS_HACK;
+ uint64_t get_owner_bits = SEC_MASK_GENERIC | SEC_FLAG_MAXIMUM_ALLOWED | SEC_STD_READ_CONTROL;
+ uint64_t set_owner_bits = SEC_GENERIC_ALL | SEC_FLAG_MAXIMUM_ALLOWED | SEC_STD_WRITE_OWNER;
+ uint64_t get_group_bits = SEC_MASK_GENERIC | SEC_FLAG_MAXIMUM_ALLOWED | SEC_STD_READ_CONTROL;
+ uint64_t set_group_bits = SEC_GENERIC_ALL | SEC_FLAG_MAXIMUM_ALLOWED | SEC_STD_WRITE_OWNER;
+ uint64_t get_dacl_bits = SEC_MASK_GENERIC | SEC_FLAG_MAXIMUM_ALLOWED | SEC_STD_READ_CONTROL;
+ uint64_t set_dacl_bits = SEC_GENERIC_ALL | SEC_FLAG_MAXIMUM_ALLOWED | SEC_STD_WRITE_DAC;
+ uint64_t get_sacl_bits = SEC_FLAG_SYSTEM_SECURITY;
+ uint64_t set_sacl_bits = SEC_FLAG_SYSTEM_SECURITY;
+
+ if (!smb2_util_setup_dir(tctx, tree, BASEDIR))
+ return false;
+
+ torture_comment(tctx, "TESTING ACCESS MASKS FOR SD GET/SET\n");
+
+ /* first create a file with full access for everyone */
+ sd = security_descriptor_dacl_create(tctx,
+ 0, SID_NT_ANONYMOUS, SID_BUILTIN_USERS,
+ SID_WORLD,
+ SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED,
+ SEC_GENERIC_ALL,
+ 0,
+ NULL);
+ sd->type |= SEC_DESC_SACL_PRESENT;
+ sd->sacl = NULL;
+ ZERO_STRUCT(io);
+ io.level = RAW_OPEN_SMB2;
+ io.in.create_flags = 0;
+ io.in.desired_access = SEC_GENERIC_ALL;
+ io.in.create_options = 0;
+ io.in.file_attributes = FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL;
+ io.in.share_access = NTCREATEX_SHARE_ACCESS_READ | NTCREATEX_SHARE_ACCESS_WRITE;
+ io.in.alloc_size = 0;
+ io.in.create_disposition = NTCREATEX_DISP_OVERWRITE_IF;
+ io.in.impersonation_level = NTCREATEX_IMPERSONATION_ANONYMOUS;
+ io.in.security_flags = 0;
+ io.in.fname = fname;
+ io.in.sec_desc = sd;
+ status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io);
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK);
+ handle = io.out.file.handle;
+
+ status = smb2_util_close(tree, handle);
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK);
+
+ /*
+ * now try each access_mask bit and no bit at all in a loop
+ * and see what's allowed
+ * NOTE: if i == 32 it means access_mask = 0 (see NO_BITS_HACK above)
+ */
+ for (i=0; i <= 32; i++) {
+ desired_64 = ((uint64_t)1) << i;
+ desired = (uint32_t)desired_64;
+
+ /* first open the file with the desired access */
+ io.level = RAW_OPEN_SMB2;
+ io.in.desired_access = desired;
+ io.in.create_disposition = NTCREATEX_DISP_OPEN;
+ status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io);
+ CHECK_STATUS_FOR_BIT_ACTION(status, open_bits, goto next);
+ handle = io.out.file.handle;
+
+ /* then check what access was granted */
+ fi.access_information.level = RAW_FILEINFO_ACCESS_INFORMATION;
+ fi.access_information.in.file.handle = handle;
+ status = smb2_getinfo_file(tree, tctx, &fi);
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK);
+ granted = fi.access_information.out.access_flags;
+
+ /* test the owner */
+ ZERO_STRUCT(fi);
+ fi.query_secdesc.level = RAW_FILEINFO_SEC_DESC;
+ fi.query_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle;
+ fi.query_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_OWNER;
+ status = smb2_getinfo_file(tree, tctx, &fi);
+ CHECK_STATUS_FOR_BIT(status, get_owner_bits, SEC_STD_READ_CONTROL);
+ if (fi.query_secdesc.out.sd) {
+ sd_owner = fi.query_secdesc.out.sd;
+ } else if (!sd_owner) {
+ sd_owner = sd;
+ }
+ si.set_secdesc.level = RAW_SFILEINFO_SEC_DESC;
+ si.set_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle;
+ si.set_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_OWNER;
+ si.set_secdesc.in.sd = sd_owner;
+ status = smb2_setinfo_file(tree, &si);
+ CHECK_STATUS_FOR_BIT(status, set_owner_bits, SEC_STD_WRITE_OWNER);
+
+ /* test the group */
+ ZERO_STRUCT(fi);
+ fi.query_secdesc.level = RAW_FILEINFO_SEC_DESC;
+ fi.query_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle;
+ fi.query_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_GROUP;
+ status = smb2_getinfo_file(tree, tctx, &fi);
+ CHECK_STATUS_FOR_BIT(status, get_group_bits, SEC_STD_READ_CONTROL);
+ if (fi.query_secdesc.out.sd) {
+ sd_group = fi.query_secdesc.out.sd;
+ } else if (!sd_group) {
+ sd_group = sd;
+ }
+ si.set_secdesc.level = RAW_SFILEINFO_SEC_DESC;
+ si.set_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle;
+ si.set_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_GROUP;
+ si.set_secdesc.in.sd = sd_group;
+ status = smb2_setinfo_file(tree, &si);
+ CHECK_STATUS_FOR_BIT(status, set_group_bits, SEC_STD_WRITE_OWNER);
+
+ /* test the DACL */
+ ZERO_STRUCT(fi);
+ fi.query_secdesc.level = RAW_FILEINFO_SEC_DESC;
+ fi.query_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle;
+ fi.query_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL;
+ status = smb2_getinfo_file(tree, tctx, &fi);
+ CHECK_STATUS_FOR_BIT(status, get_dacl_bits, SEC_STD_READ_CONTROL);
+ if (fi.query_secdesc.out.sd) {
+ sd_dacl = fi.query_secdesc.out.sd;
+ } else if (!sd_dacl) {
+ sd_dacl = sd;
+ }
+ si.set_secdesc.level = RAW_SFILEINFO_SEC_DESC;
+ si.set_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle;
+ si.set_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL;
+ si.set_secdesc.in.sd = sd_dacl;
+ status = smb2_setinfo_file(tree, &si);
+ CHECK_STATUS_FOR_BIT(status, set_dacl_bits, SEC_STD_WRITE_DAC);
+
+ /* test the SACL */
+ ZERO_STRUCT(fi);
+ fi.query_secdesc.level = RAW_FILEINFO_SEC_DESC;
+ fi.query_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle;
+ fi.query_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_SACL;
+ status = smb2_getinfo_file(tree, tctx, &fi);
+ CHECK_STATUS_FOR_BIT(status, get_sacl_bits, SEC_FLAG_SYSTEM_SECURITY);
+ if (fi.query_secdesc.out.sd) {
+ sd_sacl = fi.query_secdesc.out.sd;
+ } else if (!sd_sacl) {
+ sd_sacl = sd;
+ }
+ si.set_secdesc.level = RAW_SFILEINFO_SEC_DESC;
+ si.set_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle;
+ si.set_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_SACL;
+ si.set_secdesc.in.sd = sd_sacl;
+ status = smb2_setinfo_file(tree, &si);
+ CHECK_STATUS_FOR_BIT(status, set_sacl_bits, SEC_FLAG_SYSTEM_SECURITY);
+
+ /* close the handle */
+ status = smb2_util_close(tree, handle);
+ CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK);
+next:
+ continue;
+ }
+
+done:
+ smb2_util_close(tree, handle);
+ smb2_util_unlink(tree, fname);
+ smb2_deltree(tree, BASEDIR);
+ smb2_tdis(tree);
+ smb2_logoff(tree->session);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ basic testing of SMB2 ACLs
+*/
+struct torture_suite *torture_smb2_acls_init(void)
+{
+ struct torture_suite *suite = torture_suite_create(talloc_autofree_context(), "ACLS");
+
+ torture_suite_add_1smb2_test(suite, "CREATOR", test_creator_sid);
+ torture_suite_add_1smb2_test(suite, "GENERIC", test_generic_bits);
+ torture_suite_add_1smb2_test(suite, "OWNER", test_owner_bits);
+ torture_suite_add_1smb2_test(suite, "INHERITANCE", test_inheritance);
+ torture_suite_add_1smb2_test(suite, "INHERITFLAGS", test_inheritance_flags);
+ torture_suite_add_1smb2_test(suite, "DYNAMIC", test_inheritance_dynamic);
+ /* XXX This test does not work against XP or Vista.
+ torture_suite_add_1smb2_test(suite, "GETSET", test_sd_get_set);
+ */
+
+ suite->description = talloc_strdup(suite, "SMB2-ACLS tests");
+
+ return suite;
+}