diff options
author | Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> | 2008-09-22 14:23:22 -0700 |
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committer | Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> | 2008-09-22 14:23:22 -0700 |
commit | cebd9a9013a76073c3035b74175d228116fc7e48 (patch) | |
tree | 242265c7e48a3401be2d065aee453de2771d8e9e /source4 | |
parent | 1d92b2211cc507dd62526f564ec7f75a07110e00 (diff) | |
download | samba-cebd9a9013a76073c3035b74175d228116fc7e48.tar.gz samba-cebd9a9013a76073c3035b74175d228116fc7e48.tar.bz2 samba-cebd9a9013a76073c3035b74175d228116fc7e48.zip |
This torture test and skipping of the server-side check was bogus.
The IDL is declared to force the MessageType to 3 on output, so we
instead checked the same thing 255 times...
Andrew Bartlett
Diffstat (limited to 'source4')
-rw-r--r-- | source4/kdc/kdc.c | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | source4/torture/rpc/remote_pac.c | 49 |
2 files changed, 1 insertions, 52 deletions
diff --git a/source4/kdc/kdc.c b/source4/kdc/kdc.c index 307c39a43c..030eb23c10 100644 --- a/source4/kdc/kdc.c +++ b/source4/kdc/kdc.c @@ -584,13 +584,11 @@ static NTSTATUS kdc_check_generic_kerberos(struct irpc_message *msg, return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER; } -#if 0 - /* Windows does not check this */ if (pac_validate.MessageType != 3) { /* We don't implement any other message types - such as certificate validation - yet */ return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER; } -#endif + if (pac_validate.ChecksumAndSignature.length != (pac_validate.ChecksumLength + pac_validate.SignatureLength) || pac_validate.ChecksumAndSignature.length < pac_validate.ChecksumLength || pac_validate.ChecksumAndSignature.length < pac_validate.SignatureLength ) { diff --git a/source4/torture/rpc/remote_pac.c b/source4/torture/rpc/remote_pac.c index 6419e40014..b32881cc69 100644 --- a/source4/torture/rpc/remote_pac.c +++ b/source4/torture/rpc/remote_pac.c @@ -137,7 +137,6 @@ static bool test_PACVerify(struct torture_context *tctx, status = gensec_session_info(gensec_server_context, &session_info); torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx, status, "gensec_session_info failed"); - pac_wrapped_struct.MessageType = 0x3; pac_wrapped_struct.ChecksumLength = session_info->server_info->pac_srv_sig.signature.length; pac_wrapped_struct.SignatureType = session_info->server_info->pac_kdc_sig.type; pac_wrapped_struct.SignatureLength = session_info->server_info->pac_kdc_sig.signature.length; @@ -207,51 +206,6 @@ static bool test_PACVerify(struct torture_context *tctx, torture_assert(tctx, creds_client_check(creds, &r.out.return_authenticator->cred), "Credential chaining failed"); - /* This will break message type, check that however we still get NT_STATUS_OK */ - for (i=0; i < 256; i++) { - pac_wrapped_struct.MessageType = i; - pac_wrapped_struct.ChecksumLength = session_info->server_info->pac_srv_sig.signature.length; - pac_wrapped_struct.SignatureType = session_info->server_info->pac_kdc_sig.type; - pac_wrapped_struct.SignatureLength = session_info->server_info->pac_kdc_sig.signature.length; - pac_wrapped_struct.ChecksumAndSignature = payload - = data_blob_talloc(tmp_ctx, NULL, - pac_wrapped_struct.ChecksumLength - + pac_wrapped_struct.SignatureLength); - memcpy(&payload.data[0], - session_info->server_info->pac_srv_sig.signature.data, - pac_wrapped_struct.ChecksumLength); - memcpy(&payload.data[pac_wrapped_struct.ChecksumLength], - session_info->server_info->pac_kdc_sig.signature.data, - pac_wrapped_struct.SignatureLength); - - ndr_err = ndr_push_struct_blob(&pac_wrapped, tmp_ctx, lp_iconv_convenience(tctx->lp_ctx), &pac_wrapped_struct, - (ndr_push_flags_fn_t)ndr_push_PAC_Validate); - torture_assert(tctx, NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err), "ndr_push_struct_blob of PACValidate structure failed"); - - torture_assert(tctx, (creds->negotiate_flags & NETLOGON_NEG_ARCFOUR), "not willing to even try a PACValidate without RC4 encryption"); - creds_arcfour_crypt(creds, pac_wrapped.data, pac_wrapped.length); - - generic.length = pac_wrapped.length; - generic.data = pac_wrapped.data; - - ZERO_STRUCT(auth2); - creds_client_authenticator(creds, &auth); - r.in.credential = &auth; - r.in.return_authenticator = &auth2; - r.in.logon_level = NetlogonGenericInformation; - r.in.logon.generic = &generic; - r.in.server_name = talloc_asprintf(tctx, "\\\\%s", dcerpc_server_name(p)); - r.in.computer_name = cli_credentials_get_workstation(credentials); - r.in.validation_level = NetlogonValidationGenericInfo2; - - status = dcerpc_netr_LogonSamLogon(p, tctx, &r); - - torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx, status, "LogonSamLogon failed"); - - torture_assert(tctx, creds_client_check(creds, &r.out.return_authenticator->cred), - "Credential chaining failed"); - } - /* This will break the parsing nicely (even in the crypto wrapping), check we get INVALID_PARAMETER */ generic.length--; @@ -272,7 +226,6 @@ static bool test_PACVerify(struct torture_context *tctx, torture_assert(tctx, creds_client_check(creds, &r.out.return_authenticator->cred), "Credential chaining failed"); - pac_wrapped_struct.MessageType = 0x3; pac_wrapped_struct.ChecksumLength = session_info->server_info->pac_srv_sig.signature.length; pac_wrapped_struct.SignatureType = session_info->server_info->pac_kdc_sig.type; @@ -318,8 +271,6 @@ static bool test_PACVerify(struct torture_context *tctx, torture_assert(tctx, creds_client_check(creds, &r.out.return_authenticator->cred), "Credential chaining failed"); - - pac_wrapped_struct.MessageType = 0x3; pac_wrapped_struct.ChecksumLength = session_info->server_info->pac_srv_sig.signature.length; pac_wrapped_struct.SignatureType = session_info->server_info->pac_kdc_sig.type; pac_wrapped_struct.SignatureLength = session_info->server_info->pac_kdc_sig.signature.length; |