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-rw-r--r-- | source3/smbd/sec_ctx.c | 295 |
1 files changed, 295 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/source3/smbd/sec_ctx.c b/source3/smbd/sec_ctx.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e3aac77d8e --- /dev/null +++ b/source3/smbd/sec_ctx.c @@ -0,0 +1,295 @@ +/* + Unix SMB/Netbios implementation. + Version 1.9. + uid/user handling + Copyright (C) Tim Potter 2000 + + This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or + (at your option) any later version. + + This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + GNU General Public License for more details. + + You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software + Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA. +*/ + +#include "includes.h" + +extern int DEBUGLEVEL; +extern struct current_user current_user; + +struct sec_ctx { + uid_t uid; + uid_t gid; + int ngroups; + gid_t *groups; +}; + +/* A stack of security contexts. We include the current context as being + the first one, so there is room for another MAX_SEC_CTX_DEPTH more. */ + +static struct sec_ctx sec_ctx_stack[MAX_SEC_CTX_DEPTH + 1]; +static int sec_ctx_stack_ndx; + +/* Become the specified uid */ + +static BOOL become_uid(uid_t uid) +{ + /* Check for dodgy uid values */ + + if (uid == (uid_t)-1 || + ((sizeof(uid_t) == 2) && (uid == (uid_t)65535))) { + static int done; + + if (!done) { + DEBUG(1,("WARNING: using uid %d is a security risk\n", + (int)uid)); + done = 1; + } + } + + /* Set effective user id */ + + set_effective_uid(uid); + current_user.uid = uid; + +#ifdef WITH_PROFILE + profile_p->uid_changes++; +#endif + + return True; +} + +/* Become the specified gid */ + +static BOOL become_gid(gid_t gid) +{ + /* Check for dodgy gid values */ + + if (gid == (gid_t)-1 || ((sizeof(gid_t) == 2) && + (gid == (gid_t)65535))) { + static int done; + + if (!done) { + DEBUG(1,("WARNING: using gid %d is a security risk\n", + (int)gid)); + done = 1; + } + } + + /* Set effective group id */ + + set_effective_gid(gid); + current_user.gid = gid; + + return True; +} + +/* Become the specified uid and gid */ + +static BOOL become_id(uid_t uid, gid_t gid) +{ + return become_gid(gid) && become_uid(uid); +} + +/* Drop back to root privileges in order to change to another user */ + +static void gain_root(void) +{ + if (geteuid() != 0) { + set_effective_uid(0); + + if (geteuid() != 0) { + DEBUG(0, + ("Warning: You appear to have a trapdoor " + "uid system\n")); + } + } + + if (getegid() != 0) { + set_effective_gid(0); + + if (getegid() != 0) { + DEBUG(0, + ("Warning: You appear to have a trapdoor " + "gid system\n")); + } + } +} + +/* Get the list of current groups */ + +static void get_current_groups(int *ngroups, gid_t **groups) +{ + *ngroups = getgroups(0, NULL); + *groups = (gid_t *)malloc(*ngroups * sizeof(gid_t)); + + if (!groups) { + DEBUG(0, ("Out of memory in get_current_groups\n")); + return; + } + + getgroups(*ngroups, *groups); +} + +/* Create a new security context on the stack. It is the same as the old + one. User changes are done using the set_sec_ctx() function. */ + +BOOL push_sec_ctx(void) +{ + /* Check we don't overflow our stack */ + + if (sec_ctx_stack_ndx == (MAX_SEC_CTX_DEPTH)) { + DEBUG(0, ("Security context stack overflow!\n")); + return False; + } + + /* Store previous user context */ + + sec_ctx_stack_ndx++; + + sec_ctx_stack[sec_ctx_stack_ndx].uid = geteuid(); + sec_ctx_stack[sec_ctx_stack_ndx].gid = getegid(); + + sec_ctx_stack[sec_ctx_stack_ndx].ngroups = sys_getgroups(0, NULL); + + if (!(sec_ctx_stack[sec_ctx_stack_ndx].groups = + malloc(sec_ctx_stack[sec_ctx_stack_ndx].ngroups * + sizeof(gid_t)))) { + DEBUG(0, ("Out of memory in push_sec_ctx()\n")); + return False; + } + + sys_getgroups(sec_ctx_stack[sec_ctx_stack_ndx].ngroups, + sec_ctx_stack[sec_ctx_stack_ndx].groups); + + return True; +} + +/* Set the current security context to a given user */ + +void set_sec_ctx(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, int ngroups, gid_t *groups) +{ + /* Set the security context */ + + DEBUG(3, ("setting sec ctx (%d, %d)\n", uid, gid)); + + gain_root(); + +#ifdef HAVE_SETGROUPS + sys_setgroups(ngroups, groups); + + sec_ctx_stack[sec_ctx_stack_ndx].ngroups = ngroups; + sec_ctx_stack[sec_ctx_stack_ndx].groups = + memdup(groups, sizeof(gid_t) * ngroups); +#endif + + become_id(uid, gid); + + sec_ctx_stack[sec_ctx_stack_ndx].uid = uid; + sec_ctx_stack[sec_ctx_stack_ndx].gid = gid; + + /* Update current_user stuff */ + + current_user.uid = uid; + current_user.gid = gid; + current_user.ngroups = ngroups; + current_user.groups = groups; +} + +/* Become root context */ + +void set_root_sec_ctx(void) +{ + /* May need to worry about supplementary groups at some stage */ + + set_sec_ctx(0, 0, 0, NULL); +} + +/* Pop a security context from the stack */ + +BOOL pop_sec_ctx(void) +{ + /* Check for stack underflow */ + + if (sec_ctx_stack_ndx == 0) { + DEBUG(0, ("Security context stack underflow!\n")); + return False; + } + + /* Clear previous user info */ + + sec_ctx_stack[sec_ctx_stack_ndx].uid = (uid_t)-1; + sec_ctx_stack[sec_ctx_stack_ndx].gid = (gid_t)-1; + + safe_free(sec_ctx_stack[sec_ctx_stack_ndx].groups); + sec_ctx_stack[sec_ctx_stack_ndx].ngroups = 0; + + /* Pop back previous user */ + + sec_ctx_stack_ndx--; + + gain_root(); + +#ifdef HAVE_SETGROUPS + sys_setgroups(sec_ctx_stack[sec_ctx_stack_ndx].ngroups, + sec_ctx_stack[sec_ctx_stack_ndx].groups); +#endif + + become_id(sec_ctx_stack[sec_ctx_stack_ndx].uid, + sec_ctx_stack[sec_ctx_stack_ndx].gid); + + /* Update current_user stuff */ + + current_user.uid = sec_ctx_stack[sec_ctx_stack_ndx].uid; + current_user.gid = sec_ctx_stack[sec_ctx_stack_ndx].gid; + current_user.ngroups = sec_ctx_stack[sec_ctx_stack_ndx].ngroups; + current_user.groups = sec_ctx_stack[sec_ctx_stack_ndx].groups; + + DEBUG(3, ("popped off to sec ctx (%d, %d)\n", geteuid(), getegid())); + + return True; +} + +/* Initialise the security context system */ + +void init_sec_ctx(void) +{ + int i; + + /* Initialise security context stack */ + + memset(sec_ctx_stack, 0, sizeof(struct sec_ctx) * MAX_SEC_CTX_DEPTH); + + for (i = 0; i < MAX_SEC_CTX_DEPTH; i++) { + sec_ctx_stack[i].uid = (uid_t)-1; + sec_ctx_stack[i].gid = (gid_t)-1; + } + + /* Initialise first level of stack. It is the current context */ + + sec_ctx_stack[0].uid = geteuid(); + sec_ctx_stack[0].gid = getegid(); + + get_current_groups(&sec_ctx_stack[0].ngroups, + &sec_ctx_stack[0].groups); + + /* Initialise current_user global */ + + current_user.uid = sec_ctx_stack[sec_ctx_stack_ndx].uid; + current_user.gid = sec_ctx_stack[sec_ctx_stack_ndx].gid; + current_user.ngroups = sec_ctx_stack[sec_ctx_stack_ndx].ngroups; + current_user.groups = sec_ctx_stack[sec_ctx_stack_ndx].groups; + + /* The conn and vuid are usually taken care of by other modules. + We initialise them here. */ + + current_user.conn = NULL; + current_user.vuid = UID_FIELD_INVALID; +} |