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| -rw-r--r-- | docs/textdocs/cifsntdomain.txt | 287 |
1 files changed, 231 insertions, 56 deletions
diff --git a/docs/textdocs/cifsntdomain.txt b/docs/textdocs/cifsntdomain.txt index 622c286636..f4e9566c2f 100644 --- a/docs/textdocs/cifsntdomain.txt +++ b/docs/textdocs/cifsntdomain.txt @@ -1,91 +1,110 @@ -!== -!== cifsntdomain.txt for Samba release 1.9.18alpha4 25 Oct 1997 -!== NT Domain Authentication ------------------------ Authors: - Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton (lkcl@switchboard.net) - Copyright (C) 1997 Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton +-------- Copyright (C) 1997 Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton - Paul Ashton (paul@argo.demon.co.uk) - Copyright (C) 1997 Paul Ashton + Copyright (C) 1997 Paul Ashton -Version: 0.017 (20oct97) +Version: 0.019 (25oct97) +-------- Distribution: Unlimited and encouraged, for the purposes of implementation - and comments. Feedback welcomed by the authors. +------------- and comments. Feedback welcomed by the authors. Liability: Absolutely none accepted implicitly or explicitly, direct - or consequentially, for use, abuse, misuse, lack of use, +---------- or consequentially, for use, abuse, misuse, lack of use, misunderstandings, mistakes, omissions, mis-information for anything in or not in, related to or pertaining to this document or anything else that a lawyer can think of or not think of. Warning: Please bear in mind that an incorrect implementation of this - protocol can cause NT workstation to fail irrevocably, for +-------- protocol can cause NT workstation to fail irrevocably, for which the authors accept no liability (see above). Please contact your vendor if you have any problems. Sources: - Packet Traces from Netmonitor (Service Pack 1 and above) - - Paul Ashton and Luke Leighton's other "NT Domain" doc. +-------- - Paul Ashton and Luke Leighton's other "NT Domain" doc. - CIFS documentation - cifs6.txt - CIFS documentation - cifsrap2.txt Original: http://mailhost.cb1.com/~lkcl/cifsntdomain.txt. - (Controlled copy maintained by lkcl@switchboard.net) +--------- (Controlled copy maintained by lkcl@switchboard.net) Credits: - Paul Ashton: loads of work with Net Monitor; - understanding the NT authentication system; +-------- understanding the NT authentication system; reference implementation of the NT domain support on which this document is originally based. - Linus Nordberg: producing c-code from Paul's crypto spec. - Windows Sourcer development team + Contents: +--------- -1) Introduction + 1) Introduction -2) Structures and notes + 2) Structures and notes - 2.1) Notes - 2.2) Structures + 2.1) Notes + 2.2) Structures -3) Transact Named Pipe Header/Tail + 3) Transact Named Pipe Header/Tail - 3.1) Header - 3.2) Tail + 3.1) Header + 3.2) Tail -4) NTLSA Transact Named Pipe + 4) NTLSA Transact Named Pipe - 4.1) LSA Open Policy - 4.2) LSA Query Info Policy - 4.3) LSA Enumerate Trusted Domains - 4.4) LSA Open Secret - 4.5) LSA Close - 4.6) LSA Lookup SIDS - 4.7) LSA Lookup Names + 4.1) LSA Open Policy + 4.2) LSA Query Info Policy + 4.3) LSA Enumerate Trusted Domains + 4.4) LSA Open Secret + 4.5) LSA Close + 4.6) LSA Lookup SIDS + 4.7) LSA Lookup Names -5) NETLOGON rpc Transact Named Pipe + 5) NETLOGON rpc Transact Named Pipe - 5.1) LSA Request Challenge - 5.2) LSA Authenticate 2 - 5.3) LSA Server Password Set - 5.4) LSA SAM Logon - 5.5) LSA SAM Logoff + 5.1) LSA Request Challenge + 5.2) LSA Authenticate 2 + 5.3) LSA Server Password Set + 5.4) LSA SAM Logon + 5.5) LSA SAM Logoff -6) \\MAILSLOT\NET\NTLOGON + 6) \\MAILSLOT\NET\NTLOGON - 6.1) Query for PDC - 6.2) SAM Logon + 6.1) Query for PDC + 6.2) SAM Logon -7) SRVSVC Transact Named Pipe + 7) SRVSVC Transact Named Pipe + + 7.1) Net Share Enum + 7.2) Net Server Get Info - 7.1) Net Share Enum - 7.2) Net Server Get Info Appendix: +--------- -A1) Cryptographic side of NT Domain Authentication + A1) Cryptographic side of NT Domain Authentication + + A1.1) Definitions + A1.2) Protocol + A1.3) Comments + + A2) SIDs and RIDs + + A2.1) Well-known SIDs + + A2.1.1) Universal well-known SIDs + A2.1.2) NT well-known SIDs + + A2.2) Well-known RIDS + + A2.2.1) Well-known RID users + A2.2.2) Well-known RID groups + A2.2.3) Well-known RID aliases @@ -346,10 +365,13 @@ include, but are not limited to: char[16] rc4 NT OWF Password UNISTR2 domain name unicode string UNISTR2 user name unicode string - UNISTR2 workgroup name unicode string + UNISTR2 workstation name unicode string - SAM_INFO (sam logon/logoff id info structure) : + Note: presumably, the return credentials is supposedly for the server to + verify that the credential chain hasn't been compromised. + CLNT_INFO2 client identification/authentication info VOID* pointer to return credentials. CRED return credentials - ignored. @@ -393,6 +415,8 @@ include, but are not limited to: - USER_INFO (user logon info) : + Note: it would be nice to know what the 16 byte user session key is for. + NTTIME logon time NTTIME logoff time NTTIME kickoff time @@ -416,7 +440,7 @@ include, but are not limited to: VOID* undocumented buffer pointer to groups. UINT32 user flags - char[16] unused user session key + char[16] user session key UNIHDR logon server unicode string header UNIHDR logon domain unicode string header @@ -554,7 +578,7 @@ The start of each of the NTLSA and NETLOGON named pipes begins with: 10 UINT32 allocation hint - data size (bytes) minus header and tail. 14 UINT16 0 - presentation context identifier 16 UINT8 0 - cancel count -17 UINT8 0 - reserved +17 UINT8 in replies: 0 - reserved; in requests: opnum - see #defines. 18 ...... start of data (goes on for allocation_hint bytes) @@ -1033,11 +1057,12 @@ Appendix A1) Cryptographic side of NT Domain Authentication -------------------------------------------------- -Definitions ------------ -Add(A1,A2): Intel byte ordered addition of corresponding 4 byte - words in arrays A1 and A2 +A1.1) Definitions +----------------- + +Add(A1,A2): Intel byte ordered addition of corresponding 4 byte words +in arrays A1 and A2 E(K,D): DES ECB encryption of 8 byte data D using 7 byte key K @@ -1045,20 +1070,170 @@ lmowf(): Lan man hash ntowf(): NT hash -PW: md4(machine_password) =3D=3D md4(lsadump $machine.acc) - =3D=3D pwdump(machine$) - (initially) =3D=3D md4(lmowf(unicode(machine))) +PW: md4(machine_password) == md4(lsadump $machine.acc) == +pwdump(machine$) (initially) == md4(lmowf(unicode(machine))) -RC4(K,Lk,D,Ld): RC4 encryption of data D of length Ld with key K - of length Lk +RC4(K,Lk,D,Ld): RC4 encryption of data D of length Ld with key K of +length Lk -v[m..n(,l)]: subset of v from bytes m to n, optionally padded - with zeroes to length l +v[m..n(,l)]: subset of v from bytes m to n, optionally padded with +zeroes to length l Cred(K,D): E(K[7..7,7],E(K[0..6],D)) computes a credential Time(): 4 byte current time -Cc,Cs: 8 byte client and server challenges -Rc,Rs: 8 byte client and server credentials +Cc,Cs: 8 byte client and server challenges Rc,Rs: 8 byte client and +server credentials + + +A1.2) Protocol +-------------- + +C->S ReqChal,Cc S->C Cs + +C & S compute session key Ks = E(PW[9..15],E(PW[0..6],Add(Cc,Cs))) + +C: Rc = Cred(Ks,Cc) C->S Authenticate,Rc S: Rs = Cred(Ks,Cs), +assert(Rc == Cred(Ks,Cc)) S->C Rs C: assert(Rs == Cred(Ks,Cs)) + +On joining the domain the client will optionally attempt to change its +password and the domain controller may refuse to update it depending +on registry settings. This will also occur weekly afterwards. + +C: Tc = Time(), Rc' = Cred(Ks,Rc+Tc) C->S ServerPasswordSet,Rc',Tc, +rc4(Ks[0..7,16],lmowf(randompassword()) C: Rc = Cred(Ks,Rc+Tc+1) S: +assert(Rc' == Cred(Ks,Rc+Tc)), Ts = Time() S: Rs' = Cred(Ks,Rs+Tc+1) +S->C Rs',Ts C: assert(Rs' == Cred(Ks,Rs+Tc+1)) S: Rs = Rs' + +User: U with password P wishes to login to the domain (incidental data +such as workstation and domain omitted) + +C: Tc = Time(), Rc' = Cred(Ks,Rc+Tc) C->S NetLogonSamLogon,Rc',Tc,U, +rc4(Ks[0..7,16],16,ntowf(P),16), rc4(Ks[0..7,16],16,lmowf(P),16) S: +assert(Rc' == Cred(Ks,Rc+Tc)) assert(passwords match those in SAM) S: +Ts = Time() + +S->C Cred(Ks,Cred(Ks,Rc+Tc+1)),userinfo(logon script,UID,SIDs,etc) C: +assert(Rs == Cred(Ks,Cred(Rc+Tc+1)) C: Rc = Cred(Ks,Rc+Tc+1) + + +A1.3) Comments +-------------- + +On first joining the domain the session key could be computed by +anyone listening in on the network as the machine password has a well +known value. Until the machine is rebooted it will use this session +key to encrypt NT and LM one way functions of passwords which are +password equivalents. Any user who logs in before the machine has been +rebooted a second time will have their password equivalent exposed. Of +course the new machine password is exposed at this time anyway. + +None of the returned user info such as logon script, profile path and +SIDs *appear* to be protected by anything other than the TCP checksum. + +The server time stamps appear to be ignored. + +The client sends a ReturnAuthenticator in the SamLogon request which I +can't find a use for. However its time is used as the timestamp +returned by the server. + +The password OWFs should NOT be sent over the network reversibly +encrypted. They should be sent using RC4(Ks,md4(owf)) with the server +computing the same function using the owf values in the SAM. + + +A2) SIDs and RIDs +----------------- + +SIDs and RIDs are well documented elsewhere. + +A SID is an NT Security ID (see DOM_SID structure). They are of the form: + + S-revision-NN-SubAuth1-SubAuth2-SubAuth3... + S-revision-0xNNNNNNNNNNNN-SubAuth1-SubAuth2-SubAuth3... + +currently, the SID revision is 1. +The Sub-Authorities are known as Relative IDs (RIDs). + + +A2.1) Well-known SIDs +--------------------- + + +A2.1.1) Universal well-known SIDs +--------------------------------- + + Null SID S-1-0-0 + World S-1-1-0 + Local S-1-2-0 + Creator Owner ID S-1-3-0 + Creator Group ID S-1-3-1 + Creator Owner Server ID S-1-3-2 + Creator Group Server ID S-1-3-3 + + (Non-unique IDs) S-1-4 + + +A2.1.2) NT well-known SIDs +-------------------------- + + NT Authority S-1-5 + Dialup S-1-5-1 + + Network S-1-5-2 + Batch S-1-5-3 + Interactive S-1-5-4 + Service S-1-5-6 + AnonymousLogon S-1-5-7 (aka null logon session) + Proxy S-1-5-8 + ServerLogon S-1-5-8 (aka domain controller account) + + (Logon IDs) S-1-5-5-X-Y + + (NT non-unique IDs) S-1-5-0x15-... + + (Built-in domain) s-1-5-0x20 + + + +A2.2) Well-known RIDS +--------------------- + +A RID is a sub-authority value, as part of either a SID, or in the case +of Group RIDs, part of the DOM_GID structure, in the USER_INFO_1 +structure, in the LSA SAM Logon response. + + +A2.2.1) Well-known RID users +---------------------------- + + DOMAIN_USER_RID_ADMIN 0x0000 01F4 + DOMAIN_USER_RID_GUEST 0x0000 01F5 + + + +A2.2.2) Well-known RID groups +---------------------------- + + DOMAIN_GROUP_RID_ADMINS 0x0000 0200 + DOMAIN_GROUP_RID_USERS 0x0000 0201 + DOMAIN_GROUP_RID_GUESTS 0x0000 0202 + + + +A2.2.3) Well-known RID aliases +------------------------------ + + DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_ADMINS 0x0000 0220 + DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_USERS 0x0000 0221 + DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_GUESTS 0x0000 0222 + DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_POWER_USERS 0x0000 0223 + + DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_ACCOUNT_OPS 0x0000 0224 + DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_SYSTEM_OPS 0x0000 0225 + DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_PRINT_OPS 0x0000 0226 + DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_BACKUP_OPS 0x0000 0227 + + DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_REPLICATOR 0x0000 0228 |