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diff --git a/docs/docbook/projdoc/security_level.xml b/docs/docbook/projdoc/security_level.xml deleted file mode 100644 index 528c87c52c..0000000000 --- a/docs/docbook/projdoc/security_level.xml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,340 +0,0 @@ -<chapter id="securitylevels"> -<chapterinfo> - &author.tridge; - &author.jelmer; -</chapterinfo> -<title>Samba as Stand-Alone Server</title> - -<para> -In this section the function and purpose of Samba's <emphasis>security</emphasis> -modes are described. -</para> - -<sect1> -<title>User and Share security level</title> - -<para> -A SMB server tells the client at startup what "security level" it is -running. There are two options "share level" and "user level". Which -of these two the client receives affects the way the client then tries -to authenticate itself. It does not directly affect (to any great -extent) the way the Samba server does security. I know this is -strange, but it fits in with the client/server approach of SMB. In SMB -everything is initiated and controlled by the client, and the server -can only tell the client what is available and whether an action is -allowed. -</para> - -<sect2> -<title>User Level Security</title> - -<para> -I'll describe user level security first, as its simpler. In user level -security the client will send a "session setup" command directly after -the protocol negotiation. This contains a username and password. The -server can either accept or reject that username/password -combination. Note that at this stage the server has no idea what -share the client will eventually try to connect to, so it can't base -the "accept/reject" on anything other than: -</para> - -<orderedlist> -<listitem><para>the username/password</para></listitem> -<listitem><para>the machine that the client is coming from</para></listitem> -</orderedlist> - -<para> -If the server accepts the username/password then the client expects to -be able to mount any share (using a "tree connection") without -specifying a password. It expects that all access rights will be as -the username/password specified in the "session setup". -</para> - -<para> -It is also possible for a client to send multiple "session setup" -requests. When the server responds it gives the client a "uid" to use -as an authentication tag for that username/password. The client can -maintain multiple authentication contexts in this way (WinDD is an -example of an application that does this) -</para> - -</sect2> - -<sect2> -<title>Share Level Security</title> - -<para> -Ok, now for share level security. In share level security the client -authenticates itself separately for each share. It will send a -password along with each "tree connection" (share mount). It does not -explicitly send a username with this operation. The client is -expecting a password to be associated with each share, independent of -the user. This means that samba has to work out what username the -client probably wants to use. It is never explicitly sent the -username. Some commercial SMB servers such as NT actually associate -passwords directly with shares in share level security, but samba -always uses the unix authentication scheme where it is a -username/password that is authenticated, not a "share/password". -</para> - -<para> -Many clients send a "session setup" even if the server is in share -level security. They normally send a valid username but no -password. Samba records this username in a list of "possible -usernames". When the client then does a "tree connection" it also adds -to this list the name of the share they try to connect to (useful for -home directories) and any users listed in the <command>user =</command> &smb.conf; -line. The password is then checked in turn against these "possible -usernames". If a match is found then the client is authenticated as -that user. -</para> - -</sect2> - -<sect2> -<title>Server Level Security</title> - -<para> -Finally "server level" security. In server level security the samba -server reports to the client that it is in user level security. The -client then does a "session setup" as described earlier. The samba -server takes the username/password that the client sends and attempts -to login to the "password server" by sending exactly the same -username/password that it got from the client. If that server is in -user level security and accepts the password then samba accepts the -clients connection. This allows the samba server to use another SMB -server as the "password server". -</para> - -<para> -You should also note that at the very start of all this, where the -server tells the client what security level it is in, it also tells -the client if it supports encryption. If it does then it supplies the -client with a random "cryptkey". The client will then send all -passwords in encrypted form. You have to compile samba with encryption -enabled to support this feature, and you have to maintain a separate -smbpasswd file with SMB style encrypted passwords. It is -cryptographically impossible to translate from unix style encryption -to SMB style encryption, although there are some fairly simple management -schemes by which the two could be kept in sync. -</para> - -<para> -"security = server" means that Samba reports to clients that -it is running in "user mode" but actually passes off all authentication -requests to another "user mode" server. This requires an additional -parameter "password server =" that points to the real authentication server. -That real authentication server can be another Samba server or can be a -Windows NT server, the later natively capable of encrypted password support. -</para> - -<note><para> -<emphasis>Server</emphasis> level security is incompatible with what is known -as <emphasis>schannel</emphasis> or "sign and seal" protocols. This means that -if you want to use <emphasis>server</emphasis> level security you must disable -the use of "sign and seal" on all machines on your network. -</para></note> - -<sect3> -<title>Configuring Samba for Seemless Windows Network Integration</title> - -<para> -MS Windows clients may use encrypted passwords as part of a challenege/response -authentication model (a.k.a. NTLMv1) or alone, or clear text strings for simple -password based authentication. It should be realized that with the SMB protocol -the password is passed over the network either in plain text or encrypted, but -not both in the same authentication request. -</para> - -<para> -When encrypted passwords are used a password that has been entered by the user -is encrypted in two ways: -</para> - -<itemizedlist> - <listitem><para>An MD4 hash of the UNICODE of the password - string. This is known as the NT hash. - </para></listitem> - - <listitem><para>The password is converted to upper case, - and then padded or trucated to 14 bytes. This string is - then appended with 5 bytes of NULL characters and split to - form two 56 bit DES keys to encrypt a "magic" 8 byte value. - The resulting 16 bytes for the LanMan hash. - </para></listitem> -</itemizedlist> - -<para> -MS Windows 95 pre-service pack 1, MS Windows NT versions 3.x and version 4.0 -pre-service pack 3 will use either mode of password authentication. All -versions of MS Windows that follow these versions no longer support plain -text passwords by default. -</para> - -<para> -MS Windows clients have a habit of dropping network mappings that have been idle -for 10 minutes or longer. When the user attempts to use the mapped drive -connection that has been dropped, the client re-establishes the connection using -a cached copy of the password. -</para> - -<para> -When Microsoft changed the default password mode, support was dropped for caching -of the plain text password. This means that when the registry parameter is changed -to re-enable use of plain text passwords it appears to work, but when a dropped -service connection mapping attempts to revalidate it will fail if the remote -authentication server does not support encrypted passwords. This means that it -is definitely not a good idea to re-enable plain text password support in such clients. -</para> - -<para> -The following parameters can be used to work around the issue of Windows 9x client -upper casing usernames and password before transmitting them to the SMB server -when using clear text authentication. -</para> - -<para><programlisting> - <ulink url="smb.conf.5.html#PASSWORDLEVEL">passsword level</ulink> = <replaceable>integer</replaceable> - <ulink url="smb.conf.5.html#USERNAMELEVEL">username level</ulink> = <replaceable>integer</replaceable> -</programlisting></para> - -<para> -By default Samba will lower case the username before attempting to lookup the user -in the database of local system accounts. Because UNIX usernames conventionally -only contain lower case character, the <parameter>username level</parameter> parameter -is rarely needed. -</para> - -<para> -However, passwords on UNIX systems often make use of mixed case characters. -This means that in order for a user on a Windows 9x client to connect to a Samba -server using clear text authentication, the <parameter>password level</parameter> -must be set to the maximum number of upper case letter which <emphasis>could</emphasis> -appear is a password. Note that the server OS uses the traditional DES version -of crypt(), a <parameter>password level</parameter> of 8 will result in case -insensitive passwords as seen from Windows users. This will also result in longer -login times as Samba has to compute the permutations of the password string and -try them one by one until a match is located (or all combinations fail). -</para> - -<para> -The best option to adopt is to enable support for encrypted passwords -where ever Samba is used. There are three configuration possibilities -for support of encrypted passwords: -</para> - -</sect3> -<sect3> -<title>Use MS Windows NT as an authentication server</title> - -<para> -This method involves the additions of the following parameters in the &smb.conf; file: -</para> - -<para><programlisting> - encrypt passwords = Yes - security = server - password server = "NetBIOS_name_of_PDC" -</programlisting></para> - - -<para> -There are two ways of identifying whether or not a username and -password pair was valid or not. One uses the reply information provided -as part of the authentication messaging process, the other uses -just an error code. -</para> - -<para> -The down-side of this mode of configuration is the fact that -for security reasons Samba will send the password server a bogus -username and a bogus password and if the remote server fails to -reject the username and password pair then an alternative mode -of identification of validation is used. Where a site uses password -lock out after a certain number of failed authentication attempts -this will result in user lockouts. -</para> - -<para> -Use of this mode of authentication does require there to be -a standard Unix account for the user, this account can be blocked -to prevent logons by other than MS Windows clients. -</para> - -</sect3> -</sect2> - -<sect2> -<title>Domain Level Security</title> - -<para> -When samba is operating in <emphasis>security = domain</emphasis> mode this means that -the Samba server has a domain security trust account (a machine account) and will cause -all authentication requests to be passed through to the domain controllers. -</para> - -<sect3> -<title>Samba as a member of an MS Windows NT security domain</title> - -<para> -This method involves addition of the following parameters in the &smb.conf; file: -</para> - -<para><programlisting> - encrypt passwords = Yes - security = domain - workgroup = "name of NT domain" - password server = * -</programlisting></para> - -<para> -The use of the "*" argument to <command>password server</command> will cause samba to locate the -domain controller in a way analogous to the way this is done within MS Windows NT. -This is the default behaviour. -</para> - -<para> -In order for this method to work the Samba server needs to join the -MS Windows NT security domain. This is done as follows: -</para> - -<itemizedlist> - <listitem><para>On the MS Windows NT domain controller using - the Server Manager add a machine account for the Samba server. - </para></listitem> - - <listitem><para>Next, on the Linux system execute: - <command>smbpasswd -r PDC_NAME -j DOMAIN_NAME</command> (samba 2.x) - - <command>net join -U administrator%password</command> (samba-3) - </para></listitem> -</itemizedlist> - -<para> -Use of this mode of authentication does require there to be a standard Unix account -for the user in order to assign a uid once the account has been authenticated by -the remote Windows DC. This account can be blocked to prevent logons by clients other than -MS Windows through things such as setting an invalid shell in the -<filename>/etc/passwd</filename> entry. -</para> - -<para> -An alternative to assigning UIDs to Windows users on a Samba member server is -presented in the <link linkend="winbind">Winbind Overview</link> chapter -in this HOWTO collection. -</para> - -</sect3> -</sect2> - -<sect2> -<title>ADS Level Security</title> - -<para> -For information about the configuration option please refer to the entire section entitled -<emphasis>Samba as an ADS Domain Member.</emphasis> -</para> - -</sect2> -</sect1> -</chapter> |