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+TITLE INFORMATION: Joining an NT Domain with Samba 2.0 
+AUTHOR INFORMATION: Jeremy Allison, Samba Team 
+DATE INFORMATION: 11th November 1998 
+
+Contents 
+
+Joining an NT Domain with Samba 2.0 
+----------------------------------- 
+
+In order for a Samba-2 server to join an NT domain, you must first add
+the NetBIOS name of the Samba server to the NT domain on the PDC using
+Server Manager for Domains.  This creates the machine account in the
+domain (PDC) SAM.
+
+Assume you have a Samba-2 server with a NetBIOS name of SERV1 and are
+joining an NT domain called DOM, which has a PDC with a NetBIOS name
+of DOMPDC and two backup domain controllers with NetBIOS names DOMBDC1
+and DOMBDC2.
+
+In order to join the domain, first stop all Samba daemons and run the
+command
+
+smbpasswd -j DOM -r DOMPDC
+
+as we are joining the domain DOM and the PDC for that domain (the only
+machine that has write access to the domain SAM database). If this is
+successful you will see the message:
+
+smbpasswd: Joined domain DOM.
+
+in your terminal window. See the smbpasswd
+man page for more details.
+
+This command goes through the machine account password change
+protocol, then writes the new (random) machine account password for
+this Samba server into the a file in the same directory in which an
+smbpasswd file would be stored (normally :
+
+/usr/local/samba/private
+
+The filename looks like this:
+
+<NT DOMAIN NAME>.<Samba Server Name>.mac
+
+The .mac suffix stands for machine account password file. So in
+our example above, the file would be called:
+
+DOM.SERV1.mac
+
+This file is created and owned by root and is not readable by any
+other user. It is the key to the domain-level security for your
+system, and should be treated as carefully as a shadow password file.
+
+Now, before restarting the Samba daemons you must edit your
+smb.conf file to tell Samba it should now
+use domain security.
+
+Change (or add) your 
+
+"security ="
+
+line in the [global] section of your
+smb.conf to read:
+
+security = domain
+
+Next change the 
+
+"workgroup ="
+
+line in the [global] section to read: 
+
+workgroup = DOM
+
+as this is the name of the domain we are joining. 
+
+Finally, add (or modify) a:
+
+"password server ="
+
+line in the [global] section to read: 
+
+password server = DOMPDC DOMBDC1 DOMBDC2
+
+These are the primary and backup domain controllers Samba will attempt
+to contact in order to authenticate users. Samba will try to contact
+each of these servers in order, so you may want to rearrange this list
+in order to spread out the authentication load among domain
+controllers.
+
+Currently, Samba requires that a defined list of domain controllers be
+listed in this parameter in order to authenticate with domain-level
+security. NT does not use this method, and will either broadcast or
+use a WINS database in order to find domain controllers to
+authenticate against.
+
+Originally, I considered this idea for Samba, but dropped it because
+it seemed so insecure.  However several Samba-2 alpha users have
+requested that this feature be added to make Samba more NT-like, so
+I'll probably add a special name of '*' (which means: act like NT
+when looking for domain controllers) in a future release of the
+code. At present, however, you need to know where your domain
+controllers are.
+
+Finally, restart your Samba daemons and get ready for clients to begin
+using domain security!
+
+Why is this better than security = server? 
+------------------------------------------ 
+
+Currently, domain security in Samba doesn't free you from having to
+create local Unix users to represent the users attaching to your
+server. This means that if domain user DOM\fred attaches to your
+domain security Samba server, there needs to be a local Unix user fred
+to represent that user in the Unix filesystem. This is very similar to
+the older Samba security mode "security=server", where Samba would pass
+through the authentication request to a Windows NT server in the same
+way as a Windows 95 or Windows 98 server would.
+
+The advantage to domain-level security is that the authentication in
+domain-level security is passed down the authenticated RPC channel in
+exactly the same way that an NT server would do it. This means Samba
+servers now participate in domain trust relationships in exactly the
+same way NT servers do (i.e., you can add Samba servers into a
+resource domain and have the authentication passed on from a resource
+domain PDC to an account domain PDC.
+
+In addition, with "security=server" every Samba daemon on a
+server has to keep a connection open to the authenticating server for
+as long as that daemon lasts. This can drain the connection resources
+on a Microsoft NT server and cause it to run out of available
+connections. With "security =domain", however, the Samba
+daemons connect to the PDC/BDC only for as long as is necessary to
+authenticate the user, and then drop the connection, thus conserving
+PDC connection resources.
+
+And finally, acting in the same manner as an NT server authenticating
+to a PDC means that as part of the authentication reply, the Samba
+server gets the user identification information such as the user SID,
+the list of NT groups the user belongs to, etc. All this information
+will allow Samba to be extended in the future into a mode the
+developers currently call appliance mode. In this mode, no local Unix
+users will be necessary, and Samba will generate Unix uids and gids
+from the information passed back from the PDC when a user is
+authenticated, making a Samba server truly plug and play in an NT
+domain environment. Watch for this code soon.
+
+NOTE: Much of the text of this document was first published in the
+Web magazine "LinuxWorld" as the article "Doing the NIS/NT Samba".