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-rw-r--r--source3/auth/auth_sam.c452
1 files changed, 452 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/source3/auth/auth_sam.c b/source3/auth/auth_sam.c
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+++ b/source3/auth/auth_sam.c
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+/*
+ Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
+ Password and authentication handling
+ Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 1992-2000
+ Copyright (C) Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton 1996-2000
+ Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett 2001
+
+ This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ (at your option) any later version.
+
+ This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+ You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
+*/
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+/****************************************************************************
+core of smb password checking routine.
+****************************************************************************/
+static BOOL smb_pwd_check_ntlmv1(DATA_BLOB nt_response,
+ const uchar *part_passwd,
+ DATA_BLOB sec_blob,
+ uint8 user_sess_key[16])
+{
+ /* Finish the encryption of part_passwd. */
+ uchar p24[24];
+
+ if (part_passwd == NULL) {
+ DEBUG(10,("No password set - DISALLOWING access\n"));
+ /* No password set - always false ! */
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ if (sec_blob.length != 8) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("smb_pwd_check_ntlmv1: incorrect challenge size (%d)\n", sec_blob.length));
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ if (nt_response.length != 24) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("smb_pwd_check_ntlmv1: incorrect password length (%d)\n", nt_response.length));
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ SMBOWFencrypt(part_passwd, sec_blob.data, p24);
+ if (user_sess_key != NULL)
+ {
+ SMBsesskeygen_ntv1(part_passwd, NULL, user_sess_key);
+ }
+
+
+
+#if DEBUG_PASSWORD
+ DEBUG(100,("Part password (P16) was |"));
+ dump_data(100, part_passwd, 16);
+ DEBUG(100,("Password from client was |"));
+ dump_data(100, nt_response.data, nt_response.length);
+ DEBUG(100,("Given challenge was |"));
+ dump_data(100, sec_blob.data, sec_blob.length);
+ DEBUG(100,("Value from encryption was |"));
+ dump_data(100, p24, 24);
+#endif
+ return (memcmp(p24, nt_response.data, 24) == 0);
+}
+
+/****************************************************************************
+core of smb password checking routine.
+****************************************************************************/
+static BOOL smb_pwd_check_ntlmv2(const DATA_BLOB ntv2_response,
+ const uchar *part_passwd,
+ const DATA_BLOB sec_blob,
+ const char *user, const char *domain,
+ uint8 user_sess_key[16])
+{
+ /* Finish the encryption of part_passwd. */
+ uchar kr[16];
+ uchar value_from_encryption[16];
+ uchar client_response[16];
+ DATA_BLOB client_key_data;
+
+ if (part_passwd == NULL)
+ {
+ DEBUG(10,("No password set - DISALLOWING access\n"));
+ /* No password set - always False */
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ if (ntv2_response.length < 16) {
+ /* We MUST have more than 16 bytes, or the stuff below will go
+ crazy... */
+ DEBUG(0, ("smb_pwd_check_ntlmv2: incorrect password length (%d)\n",
+ ntv2_response.length));
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ client_key_data = data_blob(ntv2_response.data+16, ntv2_response.length-16);
+ memcpy(client_response, ntv2_response.data, sizeof(client_response));
+
+ ntv2_owf_gen(part_passwd, user, domain, kr);
+ SMBOWFencrypt_ntv2(kr, sec_blob, client_key_data, (char *)value_from_encryption);
+ if (user_sess_key != NULL)
+ {
+ SMBsesskeygen_ntv2(kr, value_from_encryption, user_sess_key);
+ }
+
+#if DEBUG_PASSWORD
+ DEBUG(100,("Part password (P16) was |"));
+ dump_data(100, part_passwd, 16);
+ DEBUG(100,("Password from client was |"));
+ dump_data(100, ntv2_response.data, ntv2_response.length);
+ DEBUG(100,("Variable data from client was |"));
+ dump_data(100, client_key_data.data, client_key_data.length);
+ DEBUG(100,("Given challenge was |"));
+ dump_data(100, sec_blob.data, sec_blob.length);
+ DEBUG(100,("Value from encryption was |"));
+ dump_data(100, value_from_encryption, 16);
+#endif
+ data_blob_clear_free(&client_key_data);
+ return (memcmp(value_from_encryption, client_response, 16) == 0);
+}
+
+
+/****************************************************************************
+ Do a specific test for an smb password being correct, given a smb_password and
+ the lanman and NT responses.
+****************************************************************************/
+static NTSTATUS sam_password_ok(const struct auth_context *auth_context,
+ TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ SAM_ACCOUNT *sampass,
+ const auth_usersupplied_info *user_info,
+ uint8 user_sess_key[16])
+{
+ uint16 acct_ctrl;
+ const uint8 *nt_pw, *lm_pw;
+ uint32 auth_flags;
+
+ acct_ctrl = pdb_get_acct_ctrl(sampass);
+ if (acct_ctrl & ACB_PWNOTREQ)
+ {
+ if (lp_null_passwords())
+ {
+ DEBUG(3,("Account for user '%s' has no password and null passwords are allowed.\n", pdb_get_username(sampass)));
+ return(NT_STATUS_OK);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ DEBUG(3,("Account for user '%s' has no password and null passwords are NOT allowed.\n", pdb_get_username(sampass)));
+ return(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
+ }
+ }
+
+ nt_pw = pdb_get_nt_passwd(sampass);
+ lm_pw = pdb_get_lanman_passwd(sampass);
+
+ auth_flags = user_info->auth_flags;
+
+ if (nt_pw == NULL) {
+ DEBUG(3,("sam_password_ok: NO NT password stored for user %s.\n",
+ pdb_get_username(sampass)));
+ /* No return, we want to check the LM hash below in this case */
+ auth_flags &= (~(AUTH_FLAG_NTLMv2_RESP | AUTH_FLAG_NTLM_RESP));
+ }
+
+ if (auth_flags & AUTH_FLAG_NTLMv2_RESP) {
+ /* We have the NT MD4 hash challenge available - see if we can
+ use it (ie. does it exist in the smbpasswd file).
+ */
+ DEBUG(4,("sam_password_ok: Checking NTLMv2 password\n"));
+ if (smb_pwd_check_ntlmv2( user_info->nt_resp,
+ nt_pw, auth_context->challenge,
+ user_info->smb_name.str,
+ user_info->client_domain.str,
+ user_sess_key))
+ {
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+ } else {
+ DEBUG(3,("sam_password_ok: NTLMv2 password check failed\n"));
+ return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
+ }
+ } else if (auth_flags & AUTH_FLAG_NTLM_RESP) {
+ if (lp_ntlm_auth()) {
+ /* We have the NT MD4 hash challenge available - see if we can
+ use it (ie. does it exist in the smbpasswd file).
+ */
+ DEBUG(4,("sam_password_ok: Checking NT MD4 password\n"));
+ if (smb_pwd_check_ntlmv1(user_info->nt_resp,
+ nt_pw, auth_context->challenge,
+ user_sess_key))
+ {
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+ } else {
+ DEBUG(3,("sam_password_ok: NT MD4 password check failed for user %s\n",pdb_get_username(sampass)));
+ return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
+ }
+ } else {
+ DEBUG(2,("sam_password_ok: NTLMv1 passwords NOT PERMITTED for user %s\n",pdb_get_username(sampass)));
+ /* No return, we want to check the LM hash below in this case */
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (lm_pw == NULL) {
+ DEBUG(3,("sam_password_ok: NO LanMan password set for user %s (and no NT password supplied)\n",pdb_get_username(sampass)));
+ auth_flags &= (~AUTH_FLAG_LM_RESP);
+ }
+
+ if (auth_flags & AUTH_FLAG_LM_RESP) {
+
+ if (user_info->lm_resp.length != 24) {
+ DEBUG(2,("sam_password_ok: invalid LanMan password length (%d) for user %s\n",
+ user_info->nt_resp.length, pdb_get_username(sampass)));
+ }
+
+ if (!lp_lanman_auth()) {
+ DEBUG(3,("sam_password_ok: Lanman passwords NOT PERMITTED for user %s\n",pdb_get_username(sampass)));
+ return NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
+ }
+
+ DEBUG(4,("sam_password_ok: Checking LM password\n"));
+ if (smb_pwd_check_ntlmv1(user_info->lm_resp,
+ lm_pw, auth_context->challenge,
+ user_sess_key))
+ {
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+ } else {
+ DEBUG(4,("sam_password_ok: LM password check failed for user %s\n",pdb_get_username(sampass)));
+ return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Should not be reached, but if they send nothing... */
+ DEBUG(3,("sam_password_ok: NEITHER LanMan nor NT password supplied for user %s\n",pdb_get_username(sampass)));
+ return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
+}
+
+/****************************************************************************
+ Do a specific test for a SAM_ACCOUNT being vaild for this connection
+ (ie not disabled, expired and the like).
+****************************************************************************/
+static NTSTATUS sam_account_ok(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ SAM_ACCOUNT *sampass,
+ const auth_usersupplied_info *user_info)
+{
+ uint16 acct_ctrl = pdb_get_acct_ctrl(sampass);
+ char *workstation_list;
+ time_t kickoff_time;
+
+ DEBUG(4,("sam_account_ok: Checking SMB password for user %s\n",pdb_get_username(sampass)));
+
+ /* Quit if the account was disabled. */
+ if (acct_ctrl & ACB_DISABLED) {
+ DEBUG(1,("Account for user '%s' was disabled.\n", pdb_get_username(sampass)));
+ return NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_DISABLED;
+ }
+
+ /* Test account expire time */
+
+ kickoff_time = pdb_get_kickoff_time(sampass);
+ if (kickoff_time != 0 && time(NULL) > kickoff_time) {
+ DEBUG(1,("Account for user '%s' has expried.\n", pdb_get_username(sampass)));
+ DEBUG(3,("Account expired at '%ld' unix time.\n", (long)kickoff_time));
+ return NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_EXPIRED;
+ }
+
+ if (!(pdb_get_acct_ctrl(sampass) & ACB_PWNOEXP)) {
+ time_t must_change_time = pdb_get_pass_must_change_time(sampass);
+ time_t last_set_time = pdb_get_pass_last_set_time(sampass);
+
+ /* check for immediate expiry "must change at next logon" */
+ if (must_change_time == 0 && last_set_time != 0) {
+ DEBUG(1,("Account for user '%s' password must change!.\n", pdb_get_username(sampass)));
+ return NT_STATUS_PASSWORD_MUST_CHANGE;
+ }
+
+ /* check for expired password */
+ if (must_change_time < time(NULL) && must_change_time != 0) {
+ DEBUG(1,("Account for user '%s' password expired!.\n", pdb_get_username(sampass)));
+ DEBUG(1,("Password expired at '%s' (%ld) unix time.\n", http_timestring(must_change_time), (long)must_change_time));
+ return NT_STATUS_PASSWORD_EXPIRED;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Test workstation. Workstation list is comma separated. */
+
+ workstation_list = talloc_strdup(mem_ctx, pdb_get_workstations(sampass));
+
+ if (!workstation_list) return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+
+ if (*workstation_list) {
+ BOOL invalid_ws = True;
+ char *s = workstation_list;
+
+ fstring tok;
+
+ while (next_token(&s, tok, ",", sizeof(tok))) {
+ DEBUG(10,("checking for workstation match %s and %s (len=%d)\n",
+ tok, user_info->wksta_name.str, user_info->wksta_name.len));
+ if(strequal(tok, user_info->wksta_name.str)) {
+ invalid_ws = False;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (invalid_ws)
+ return NT_STATUS_INVALID_WORKSTATION;
+ }
+
+ if (acct_ctrl & ACB_DOMTRUST) {
+ DEBUG(2,("sam_account_ok: Domain trust account %s denied by server\n", pdb_get_username(sampass)));
+ return NT_STATUS_NOLOGON_INTERDOMAIN_TRUST_ACCOUNT;
+ }
+
+ if (acct_ctrl & ACB_SVRTRUST) {
+ DEBUG(2,("sam_account_ok: Server trust account %s denied by server\n", pdb_get_username(sampass)));
+ return NT_STATUS_NOLOGON_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT;
+ }
+
+ if (acct_ctrl & ACB_WSTRUST) {
+ DEBUG(4,("sam_account_ok: Wksta trust account %s denied by server\n", pdb_get_username(sampass)));
+ return NT_STATUS_NOLOGON_WORKSTATION_TRUST_ACCOUNT;
+ }
+
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+
+/****************************************************************************
+check if a username/password is OK assuming the password is a 24 byte
+SMB hash supplied in the user_info structure
+return an NT_STATUS constant.
+****************************************************************************/
+
+static NTSTATUS check_sam_security(const struct auth_context *auth_context,
+ void *my_private_data,
+ TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ const auth_usersupplied_info *user_info,
+ auth_serversupplied_info **server_info)
+{
+ SAM_ACCOUNT *sampass=NULL;
+ BOOL ret;
+ NTSTATUS nt_status;
+ uint8 user_sess_key[16];
+ const uint8* lm_hash;
+
+ if (!user_info || !auth_context) {
+ return NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
+ }
+
+ /* Can't use the talloc version here, becouse the returned struct gets
+ kept on the server_info */
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status = pdb_init_sam(&sampass))) {
+ return nt_status;
+ }
+
+ /* get the account information */
+
+ become_root();
+ ret = pdb_getsampwnam(sampass, user_info->internal_username.str);
+ unbecome_root();
+
+ if (ret == False)
+ {
+ DEBUG(3,("Couldn't find user '%s' in passdb file.\n", user_info->internal_username.str));
+ pdb_free_sam(&sampass);
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER;
+ }
+
+ nt_status = sam_password_ok(auth_context, mem_ctx, sampass, user_info, user_sess_key);
+
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+ pdb_free_sam(&sampass);
+ return nt_status;
+ }
+
+ nt_status = sam_account_ok(mem_ctx, sampass, user_info);
+
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+ pdb_free_sam(&sampass);
+ return nt_status;
+ }
+
+ if (!make_server_info_sam(server_info, sampass)) {
+ DEBUG(0,("failed to malloc memory for server_info\n"));
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+ lm_hash = pdb_get_lanman_passwd((*server_info)->sam_account);
+ if (lm_hash) {
+ memcpy((*server_info)->first_8_lm_hash, lm_hash, 8);
+ }
+
+ memcpy((*server_info)->session_key, user_sess_key, sizeof(user_sess_key));
+
+ return nt_status;
+}
+
+/* module initialisation */
+BOOL auth_init_sam(struct auth_context *auth_context, auth_methods **auth_method)
+{
+ if (!make_auth_methods(auth_context, auth_method)) {
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ (*auth_method)->auth = check_sam_security;
+ return True;
+}
+
+
+/****************************************************************************
+Check SAM security (above) but with a few extra checks.
+****************************************************************************/
+
+static NTSTATUS check_samstrict_security(const struct auth_context *auth_context,
+ void *my_private_data,
+ TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ const auth_usersupplied_info *user_info,
+ auth_serversupplied_info **server_info)
+{
+
+ if (!user_info || !auth_context) {
+ return NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
+ }
+
+ /* If we are a domain member, we must not
+ attempt to check the password locally,
+ unless it is one of our aliases. */
+
+ if (!is_netbios_alias_or_name(user_info->domain.str)) {
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER;
+ }
+
+ return check_sam_security(auth_context, my_private_data, mem_ctx, user_info, server_info);
+}
+
+/* module initialisation */
+BOOL auth_init_samstrict(struct auth_context *auth_context, auth_methods **auth_method)
+{
+ if (!make_auth_methods(auth_context, auth_method)) {
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ (*auth_method)->auth = check_samstrict_security;
+ return True;
+}
+
+