summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/source3/lib/util_unixsd.c
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
Diffstat (limited to 'source3/lib/util_unixsd.c')
-rw-r--r--source3/lib/util_unixsd.c679
1 files changed, 679 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/source3/lib/util_unixsd.c b/source3/lib/util_unixsd.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1bfc56a2da
--- /dev/null
+++ b/source3/lib/util_unixsd.c
@@ -0,0 +1,679 @@
+/*
+ Unix SMB/Netbios implementation.
+ Version 1.9.
+ SMB NT Security Descriptor / Unix permission conversion.
+ Copyright (C) Jeremy Allison 1994-2000
+
+ This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ (at your option) any later version.
+
+ This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+ You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
+*/
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include "rpc_parse.h"
+#include "sids.h"
+
+#ifndef WITH_SURS
+extern DOM_SID global_sid_World;
+#define global_sid_everyone &global_sid_World
+#endif
+
+
+/****************************************************************************
+ Map unix perms to NT.
+****************************************************************************/
+
+static SEC_ACCESS map_unix_perms(int *pacl_type, mode_t perm, int r_mask,
+ int w_mask, int x_mask, BOOL is_directory)
+{
+ SEC_ACCESS sa;
+ uint32 nt_mask = 0;
+
+ *pacl_type = SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED;
+
+ if ((perm & (r_mask | w_mask | x_mask)) == (r_mask | w_mask | x_mask))
+ {
+ nt_mask = UNIX_ACCESS_RWX;
+ }
+ else if ((perm & (r_mask | w_mask | x_mask)) == 0)
+ {
+ nt_mask = UNIX_ACCESS_NONE;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ nt_mask |= (perm & r_mask) ? UNIX_ACCESS_R : 0;
+ if (is_directory)
+ nt_mask |= (perm & w_mask) ? UNIX_ACCESS_W : 0;
+ else
+ nt_mask |= (perm & w_mask) ? UNIX_ACCESS_W : 0;
+ nt_mask |= (perm & x_mask) ? UNIX_ACCESS_X : 0;
+ }
+ make_sec_access(&sa, nt_mask);
+ return sa;
+}
+
+/****************************************************************************
+ Function to create owner and group SIDs from a SMB_STRUCT_STAT.
+****************************************************************************/
+
+static BOOL create_file_sids(const SMB_STRUCT_STAT * psbuf,
+ DOM_SID *powner_sid, DOM_SID *pgroup_sid)
+{
+ extern DOM_SID global_sam_sid;
+
+ sid_copy(powner_sid, &global_sam_sid);
+ sid_copy(pgroup_sid, &global_sam_sid);
+ sid_append_rid(powner_sid, pdb_uid_to_user_rid(psbuf->st_uid));
+ sid_append_rid(pgroup_sid, pdb_gid_to_group_rid(psbuf->st_gid));
+ return True;
+}
+
+#ifdef WITH_SURS
+static BOOL create_file_sids(const SMB_STRUCT_STAT * psbuf,
+ DOM_SID *powner_sid, DOM_SID *pgroup_sid)
+{
+ SURS_POSIX_ID id;
+
+ ZERO_STRUCTP(powner_sid);
+ ZERO_STRUCTP(pgroup_sid);
+ DEBUG(0, ("TODO: create_file_sids: not ok "
+ "to assume gid is NT group\n"));
+
+ id.type = SURS_POSIX_UID;
+ id.id = (uint32)psbuf->st_uid;
+
+ if (!surs_unixid_to_sam_sid(&id, powner_sid, False))
+ {
+ DEBUG(3, ("create_file_sids: map uid %d failed\n",
+ (int)psbuf->st_uid));
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ id.type = SURS_POSIX_GID;
+ id.id = (uint32)psbuf->st_gid;
+
+ if (!surs_unixid_to_sam_sid(&id, pgroup_sid, False))
+ {
+ DEBUG(3, ("create_file_sids: map gid %d failed\n",
+ (int)psbuf->st_gid));
+ return False;
+ }
+ return True;
+}
+#endif
+
+/****************************************************************************
+ Reply to query a security descriptor from an fsp. If it succeeds it allocates
+ the space for the return elements and returns True.
+****************************************************************************/
+
+size_t convertperms_unix_to_sd(const SMB_STRUCT_STAT * sbuf,
+ BOOL is_directory, mode_t mode,
+ SEC_DESC ** ppdesc)
+{
+ SEC_ACE *ace_list = NULL;
+ DOM_SID owner_sid;
+ DOM_SID group_sid;
+ size_t sec_desc_size;
+ SEC_ACL *psa = NULL;
+ SEC_ACCESS owner_access;
+ int owner_acl_type;
+ SEC_ACCESS group_access;
+ int grp_acl_type;
+ SEC_ACCESS other_access;
+ int other_acl_type;
+ int num_acls = 0;
+
+ (*ppdesc) = NULL;
+
+ if (!lp_nt_acl_support())
+ {
+ sid_copy(&owner_sid, global_sid_everyone);
+ sid_copy(&group_sid, global_sid_everyone);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (!create_file_sids(sbuf, &owner_sid, &group_sid))
+ {
+ DEBUG(3, ("create_file_sids: uid or gid "
+ "not mapped to SIDS\n"));
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Create the generic 3 element UNIX acl.
+ */
+
+ owner_access = map_unix_perms(&owner_acl_type, sbuf->st_mode,
+ S_IRUSR, S_IWUSR, S_IXUSR,
+ is_directory);
+ group_access = map_unix_perms(&grp_acl_type, sbuf->st_mode,
+ S_IRGRP, S_IWGRP, S_IXGRP,
+ is_directory);
+ other_access = map_unix_perms(&other_acl_type, sbuf->st_mode,
+ S_IROTH, S_IWOTH, S_IXOTH,
+ is_directory);
+
+ if (owner_access.mask)
+ {
+ ace_list = g_renew(SEC_ACE, ace_list, num_acls + 1);
+ if (ace_list == NULL)
+ {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ make_sec_ace(&ace_list[num_acls++], &owner_sid,
+ owner_acl_type, owner_access, 0);
+ }
+
+ if (group_access.mask)
+ {
+ ace_list = g_renew(SEC_ACE, ace_list, num_acls + 1);
+ if (ace_list == NULL)
+ {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ make_sec_ace(&ace_list[num_acls++], &group_sid,
+ grp_acl_type, group_access, 0);
+ }
+
+ if (other_access.mask)
+ {
+ ace_list = g_renew(SEC_ACE, ace_list, num_acls + 1);
+ if (ace_list == NULL)
+ {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ make_sec_ace(&ace_list[num_acls++],
+ global_sid_everyone, other_acl_type,
+ other_access, 0);
+ }
+
+ if (is_directory)
+ {
+ /*
+ * For directory ACLs we also add in the
+ * inherited permissions ACE entries. These
+ * are the permissions a file would get when
+ * being created in the directory.
+ */
+
+ owner_access = map_unix_perms(&owner_acl_type, mode,
+ S_IRUSR, S_IWUSR,
+ S_IXUSR, is_directory);
+ group_access = map_unix_perms(&grp_acl_type,
+ mode, S_IRGRP,
+ S_IWGRP, S_IXGRP,
+ is_directory);
+ other_access = map_unix_perms(&other_acl_type,
+ mode, S_IROTH,
+ S_IWOTH, S_IXOTH,
+ is_directory);
+
+ if (owner_access.mask)
+ {
+ ace_list = g_renew(SEC_ACE, ace_list,
+ num_acls + 1);
+ if (ace_list == NULL)
+ {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ make_sec_ace(&ace_list[num_acls++],
+ &owner_sid, owner_acl_type,
+ owner_access,
+ SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT |
+ SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERIT_ONLY);
+ }
+
+ if (group_access.mask)
+ {
+ ace_list = g_renew(SEC_ACE, ace_list,
+ num_acls + 1);
+ if (ace_list == NULL)
+ {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ make_sec_ace(&ace_list[num_acls++],
+ &group_sid, grp_acl_type,
+ group_access,
+ SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT |
+ SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERIT_ONLY);
+ }
+
+ if (other_access.mask)
+ {
+ ace_list = g_renew(SEC_ACE, ace_list,
+ num_acls + 1);
+ if (ace_list == NULL)
+ {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ make_sec_ace(&ace_list[num_acls++],
+ global_sid_everyone,
+ other_acl_type, other_access,
+ SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT |
+ SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERIT_ONLY);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (num_acls)
+ {
+ psa = g_new(SEC_ACL, 1);
+ if (psa == NULL)
+ {
+ safe_free(ace_list);
+ }
+ if (!make_sec_acl(psa, 2, num_acls, ace_list))
+ {
+ DEBUG(0, ("get_nt_acl: Unable to malloc "
+ "space for acl.\n"));
+ safe_free(ace_list);
+ safe_free(psa);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ (*ppdesc) = g_new(SEC_DESC, 1);
+
+ if ((*ppdesc) == NULL)
+ {
+ DEBUG(0, ("get_nt_acl: Unable to malloc space "
+ "for security descriptor.\n"));
+ sec_desc_size = 0;
+ free_sec_acl(psa);
+ safe_free(psa);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ sec_desc_size = make_sec_desc((*ppdesc), 1,
+ SEC_DESC_SELF_RELATIVE |
+ SEC_DESC_DACL_PRESENT,
+ sid_dup(&owner_sid),
+ sid_dup(&group_sid), NULL, psa);
+
+ return sec_desc_size;
+}
+
+/****************************************************************************
+ Map NT perms to UNIX.
+****************************************************************************/
+
+#define FILE_SPECIFIC_READ_BITS \
+ (FILE_READ_DATA|FILE_READ_EA|FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES)
+#define FILE_SPECIFIC_WRITE_BITS \
+ (FILE_WRITE_DATA|FILE_APPEND_DATA|FILE_WRITE_EA|FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES)
+#define FILE_SPECIFIC_EXECUTE_BITS (FILE_EXECUTE)
+
+#define PRINT_SPECIFIC_READ_BITS (PRINTER_READ)
+#define PRINT_SPECIFIC_WRITE_BITS (PRINTER_READ)
+#define PRINT_SPECIFIC_EXECUTE_BITS (PRINTER_ALL_ACCESS)
+
+static mode_t map_nt_perms(SEC_ACCESS sec_access, int type)
+{
+ uint32 write_bits;
+ uint32 read_bits;
+ uint32 execute_bits;
+ mode_t mode = 0;
+
+ write_bits = FILE_SPECIFIC_WRITE_BITS;
+ read_bits = FILE_SPECIFIC_READ_BITS;
+ execute_bits = FILE_SPECIFIC_EXECUTE_BITS;
+
+ switch (type)
+ {
+ case S_IRUSR:
+ if (sec_access.mask & GENERIC_ALL_ACCESS)
+ mode = S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR | S_IXUSR;
+ else
+ {
+ mode |=
+ (sec_access.mask &
+ (GENERIC_READ_ACCESS |
+ read_bits)) ? S_IRUSR : 0;
+ mode |=
+ (sec_access.mask &
+ (GENERIC_WRITE_ACCESS |
+ write_bits)) ? S_IWUSR : 0;
+ mode |=
+ (sec_access.mask &
+ (GENERIC_EXECUTE_ACCESS |
+ execute_bits)) ? S_IXUSR : 0;
+ }
+ break;
+ case S_IRGRP:
+ if (sec_access.mask & GENERIC_ALL_ACCESS)
+ mode = S_IRGRP | S_IWGRP | S_IXGRP;
+ else
+ {
+ mode |=
+ (sec_access.mask &
+ (GENERIC_READ_ACCESS |
+ read_bits)) ? S_IRGRP : 0;
+ mode |=
+ (sec_access.mask &
+ (GENERIC_WRITE_ACCESS |
+ write_bits)) ? S_IWGRP : 0;
+ mode |=
+ (sec_access.mask &
+ (GENERIC_EXECUTE_ACCESS |
+ execute_bits)) ? S_IXGRP : 0;
+ }
+ break;
+ case S_IROTH:
+ if (sec_access.mask & GENERIC_ALL_ACCESS)
+ mode = S_IROTH | S_IWOTH | S_IXOTH;
+ else
+ {
+ mode |=
+ (sec_access.mask &
+ (GENERIC_READ_ACCESS |
+ read_bits)) ? S_IROTH : 0;
+ mode |=
+ (sec_access.mask &
+ (GENERIC_WRITE_ACCESS |
+ write_bits)) ? S_IWOTH : 0;
+ mode |=
+ (sec_access.mask &
+ (GENERIC_EXECUTE_ACCESS |
+ execute_bits)) ? S_IXOTH : 0;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return mode;
+}
+
+#ifndef WITH_SURS
+/****************************************************************************
+ Validate a SID.
+****************************************************************************/
+static BOOL validate_unix_sid(DOM_SID *psid, uint32 *prid, DOM_SID *sd_sid)
+{
+ extern DOM_SID global_sam_sid;
+ DOM_SID sid;
+
+ if (!sd_sid)
+ {
+ DEBUG(5, ("validate_unix_sid: sid missing.\n"));
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ sid_copy(psid, sd_sid);
+ sid_copy(&sid, sd_sid);
+
+ if (!sid_split_rid(&sid, prid))
+ {
+ DEBUG(5, ("validate_unix_sid: cannot get RID from sid.\n"));
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ if (!sid_equal(&sid, &global_sam_sid))
+ {
+ DEBUG(5, ("validate_unix_sid: sid is not ours.\n"));
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ return True;
+}
+#endif
+
+/****************************************************************************
+ Unpack a SEC_DESC into a owner, group and set of UNIX permissions.
+****************************************************************************/
+
+BOOL convertperms_sd_to_unix(SMB_STRUCT_STAT * psbuf, uid_t * puser,
+ gid_t * pgrp, mode_t * pmode,
+ uint32 security_info_sent, SEC_DESC * psd,
+ BOOL is_directory)
+{
+ DOM_SID file_owner_sid;
+ DOM_SID file_grp_sid;
+ SEC_ACL *dacl = psd->dacl;
+ BOOL all_aces_are_inherit_only = (is_directory ? True : False);
+ int i;
+#ifdef WITH_SURS
+ SURS_POSIX_ID id;
+#else
+ DOM_SID owner_sid;
+ DOM_SID grp_sid;
+ uint32 owner_rid;
+ uint32 grp_rid;
+#endif
+
+ *pmode = 0;
+ *puser = (uid_t) - 1;
+ *pgrp = (gid_t) - 1;
+
+ if (security_info_sent == 0)
+ {
+ DEBUG(0, ("unpack_nt_permissions: "
+ "no security info sent !\n"));
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Windows 2000 sends the owner and group SIDs as the logged in
+ * user, not the connected user. But it still sends the file
+ * owner SIDs on an ACL set. So we need to check for the file
+ * owner and group SIDs as well as the owner SIDs. JRA.
+ */
+
+ if (!create_file_sids(psbuf, &file_owner_sid, &file_grp_sid))
+ {
+ DEBUG(3, ("create_file_sids: uid or gid "
+ "not mapped to SIDS\n"));
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Don't immediately fail if the owner sid cannot be validated.
+ * This may be a group chown only set.
+ */
+
+ DEBUG(0, ("TODO: LsaLookupSids to find type of owner_sid\n"));
+
+#ifdef WITH_SURS
+ if (security_info_sent & OWNER_SECURITY_INFORMATION &&
+ surs_sam_sid_to_unixid(psd->owner_sid, &id, False) &&
+ id.type == SURS_POSIX_UID)
+ {
+ *puser = (uid_t) id.id;
+ }
+
+#else
+ if (!validate_unix_sid(&owner_sid, &owner_rid, psd->owner_sid))
+ DEBUG(3,
+ ("unpack_nt_permissions: unable to validate owner sid.\n"));
+ else if (security_info_sent & OWNER_SECURITY_INFORMATION)
+ *puser = pdb_user_rid_to_uid(owner_rid);
+
+ if (security_info_sent & OWNER_SECURITY_INFORMATION)
+ {
+ *puser = pdb_user_rid_to_uid(owner_rid);
+ }
+
+#endif
+ /*
+ * Don't immediately fail if the group sid cannot be validated.
+ * This may be an owner chown only set.
+ */
+
+#ifdef WITH_SURS
+ if (security_info_sent & GROUP_SECURITY_INFORMATION &&
+ surs_sam_sid_to_unixid(psd->grp_sid, &id, False) &&
+ (id.type == SURS_POSIX_GID))
+ {
+ *pgrp = (gid_t) id.id;
+ }
+#else
+ if (!validate_unix_sid(&grp_sid, &grp_rid, psd->grp_sid))
+ DEBUG(3,
+ ("unpack_nt_permissions: unable to validate group sid.\n"));
+ else if (security_info_sent & GROUP_SECURITY_INFORMATION)
+ *pgrp = pdb_user_rid_to_gid(grp_rid);
+
+#endif
+ /*
+ * If no DACL then this is a chown only security descriptor.
+ */
+
+ if (!(security_info_sent & DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION) || !dacl)
+ {
+ *pmode = 0;
+ return True;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Now go through the DACL and ensure that
+ * any owner/group sids match.
+ */
+
+ for (i = 0; i < dacl->num_aces; i++)
+ {
+ DOM_SID ace_sid;
+ SEC_ACE *psa = &dacl->ace[i];
+
+ if ((psa->type != SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED) &&
+ (psa->type != SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_DENIED))
+ {
+ DEBUG(3, ("unpack_nt_permissions: "
+ "unable to set anything but an "
+ "ALLOW or DENY ACE.\n"));
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Ignore or remove bits we don't care about on a directory ACE.
+ */
+
+ if (is_directory)
+ {
+ if (psa->flags & SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERIT_ONLY)
+ {
+ DEBUG(3, ("unpack_nt_permissions: "
+ "ignoring inherit only ACE.\n"));
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * At least one of the ACE entries wasn't inherit only.
+ * Flag this so we know the returned mode is valid.
+ */
+
+ all_aces_are_inherit_only = False;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Windows 2000 sets these flags even on *file* ACE's.
+ * This is wrong but we can ignore them for now.
+ * Revisit this when we go to POSIX ACLs on directories.
+ */
+
+ psa->flags &=
+ ~(SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT |
+ SEC_ACE_FLAG_CONTAINER_INHERIT);
+
+ if (psa->flags != 0)
+ {
+ DEBUG(1,
+ ("unpack_nt_permissions: unable to set ACE flags (%x).\n",
+ (unsigned int)psa->flags));
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The security mask may be UNIX_ACCESS_NONE which
+ * should map into no permissions (we overload the
+ * WRITE_OWNER bit for this) or it should be one of
+ * the ALL/EXECUTE/READ/WRITE bits. Arrange for this
+ * to be so. Any other bits override the
+ * UNIX_ACCESS_NONE bit.
+ */
+
+ psa->info.mask &=
+ (GENERIC_ALL_ACCESS | GENERIC_EXECUTE_ACCESS |
+ GENERIC_WRITE_ACCESS | GENERIC_READ_ACCESS |
+ UNIX_ACCESS_NONE | FILE_ALL_ATTRIBUTES);
+
+ if (psa->info.mask != UNIX_ACCESS_NONE)
+ psa->info.mask &= ~UNIX_ACCESS_NONE;
+
+ sid_copy(&ace_sid, &psa->sid);
+
+ if (sid_equal(&ace_sid, &file_owner_sid))
+ {
+ /*
+ * Map the desired permissions into owner perms.
+ */
+
+ if (psa->type == SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED)
+ *pmode |= map_nt_perms(psa->info, S_IRUSR);
+ else
+ *pmode &= ~(map_nt_perms(psa->info, S_IRUSR));
+
+ }
+ else if (sid_equal(&ace_sid, &file_grp_sid))
+ {
+ /*
+ * Map the desired permissions into group perms.
+ */
+
+ if (psa->type == SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED)
+ *pmode |= map_nt_perms(psa->info, S_IRGRP);
+ else
+ *pmode &= ~(map_nt_perms(psa->info, S_IRGRP));
+
+ }
+ else if (sid_equal(&ace_sid, global_sid_everyone))
+ {
+ /*
+ * Map the desired permissions into other perms.
+ */
+
+ if (psa->type == SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED)
+ *pmode |= map_nt_perms(psa->info, S_IROTH);
+ else
+ *pmode &= ~(map_nt_perms(psa->info, S_IROTH));
+
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ DEBUG(0, ("unpack_nt_permissions: "
+ "unknown SID used in ACL.\n"));
+ return False;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (is_directory && all_aces_are_inherit_only)
+ {
+ /*
+ * Windows 2000 is doing one of these weird 'inherit acl'
+ * traverses to conserve NTFS ACL resources. Just pretend
+ * there was no DACL sent. JRA.
+ */
+
+ DEBUG(10, ("unpack_nt_permissions: "
+ "Win2k inherit acl traverse. "
+ "Ignoring DACL.\n"));
+ free_sec_acl(psd->dacl);
+ safe_free(psd->dacl);
+ psd->dacl = NULL;
+ }
+
+ return True;
+}