diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'source3/lib')
| -rw-r--r-- | source3/lib/system.c | 65 |
1 files changed, 4 insertions, 61 deletions
diff --git a/source3/lib/system.c b/source3/lib/system.c index 58240a34a8..5aab4417a9 100644 --- a/source3/lib/system.c +++ b/source3/lib/system.c @@ -908,11 +908,6 @@ char *sys_getwd(char *s) #if defined(HAVE_POSIX_CAPABILITIES) -/* This define hasn't made it into the glibc capabilities header yet. */ -#ifndef SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP -#define SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP 2 -#endif - /************************************************************************** Try and abstract process capabilities (for systems that have them). ****************************************************************************/ @@ -943,32 +938,6 @@ static bool set_process_capability(enum smbd_capability capability, } #endif -#if defined(HAVE_PRCTL) && defined(PR_SET_SECUREBITS) && defined(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP) - /* New way of setting capabilities as "sticky". */ - - /* - * Use PR_SET_SECUREBITS to prevent setresuid() - * atomically dropping effective capabilities on - * uid change. Only available in Linux kernels - * 2.6.26 and above. - * - * See here: - * http://www.kernel.org/doc/man-pages/online/pages/man7/capabilities.7.html - * for details. - * - * Specifically the CAP_KILL capability we need - * to allow Linux threads under different euids - * to send signals to each other. - */ - - if (prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, 1 << SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) { - DEBUG(0,("set_process_capability: " - "prctl PR_SET_SECUREBITS failed with error %s\n", - strerror(errno) )); - return false; - } -#endif - cap = cap_get_proc(); if (cap == NULL) { DEBUG(0,("set_process_capability: cap_get_proc failed: %s\n", @@ -997,11 +966,6 @@ static bool set_process_capability(enum smbd_capability capability, cap_vals[num_cap_vals++] = CAP_LEASE; #endif break; - case KILL_CAPABILITY: -#ifdef CAP_KILL - cap_vals[num_cap_vals++] = CAP_KILL; -#endif - break; } SMB_ASSERT(num_cap_vals <= ARRAY_SIZE(cap_vals)); @@ -1011,37 +975,16 @@ static bool set_process_capability(enum smbd_capability capability, return True; } - /* - * Ensure the capability is effective. We assume that as a root - * process it's always permitted. - */ - - if (cap_set_flag(cap, CAP_EFFECTIVE, num_cap_vals, cap_vals, - enable ? CAP_SET : CAP_CLEAR) == -1) { - DEBUG(0, ("set_process_capability: cap_set_flag effective " - "failed (%d): %s\n", - (int)capability, - strerror(errno))); - cap_free(cap); - return false; - } + cap_set_flag(cap, CAP_EFFECTIVE, num_cap_vals, cap_vals, + enable ? CAP_SET : CAP_CLEAR); /* We never want to pass capabilities down to our children, so make * sure they are not inherited. */ - if (cap_set_flag(cap, CAP_INHERITABLE, num_cap_vals, - cap_vals, CAP_CLEAR) == -1) { - DEBUG(0, ("set_process_capability: cap_set_flag inheritable " - "failed (%d): %s\n", - (int)capability, - strerror(errno))); - cap_free(cap); - return false; - } + cap_set_flag(cap, CAP_INHERITABLE, num_cap_vals, cap_vals, CAP_CLEAR); if (cap_set_proc(cap) == -1) { - DEBUG(0, ("set_process_capability: cap_set_flag (%d) failed: %s\n", - (int)capability, + DEBUG(0, ("set_process_capability: cap_set_proc failed: %s\n", strerror(errno))); cap_free(cap); return False; |