diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'source3/passdb/secrets.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | source3/passdb/secrets.c | 1366 |
1 files changed, 1366 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/source3/passdb/secrets.c b/source3/passdb/secrets.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4527ae7127 --- /dev/null +++ b/source3/passdb/secrets.c @@ -0,0 +1,1366 @@ +/* + Unix SMB/CIFS implementation. + Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 1992-2001 + Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett 2002 + Copyright (C) Rafal Szczesniak 2002 + Copyright (C) Tim Potter 2001 + + This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or + (at your option) any later version. + + This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + GNU General Public License for more details. + + You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. +*/ + +/* the Samba secrets database stores any generated, private information + such as the local SID and machine trust password */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#undef DBGC_CLASS +#define DBGC_CLASS DBGC_PASSDB + +static struct db_context *db_ctx; + +/* Urrrg. global.... */ +bool global_machine_password_needs_changing; + +/** + * Use a TDB to store an incrementing random seed. + * + * Initialised to the current pid, the very first time Samba starts, + * and incremented by one each time it is needed. + * + * @note Not called by systems with a working /dev/urandom. + */ +static void get_rand_seed(int *new_seed) +{ + *new_seed = sys_getpid(); + if (db_ctx) { + dbwrap_change_int32_atomic(db_ctx, "INFO/random_seed", + new_seed, 1); + } +} + +/* open up the secrets database */ +bool secrets_init(void) +{ + char *fname = NULL; + unsigned char dummy; + + if (db_ctx != NULL) + return True; + + fname = talloc_asprintf(talloc_tos(), "%s/secrets.tdb", + lp_private_dir()); + if (fname == NULL) { + return false; + } + + db_ctx = db_open(NULL, fname, 0, + TDB_DEFAULT, O_RDWR|O_CREAT, 0600); + + if (db_ctx == NULL) { + DEBUG(0,("Failed to open %s\n", fname)); + TALLOC_FREE(fname); + return False; + } + + TALLOC_FREE(fname); + + /** + * Set a reseed function for the crypto random generator + * + * This avoids a problem where systems without /dev/urandom + * could send the same challenge to multiple clients + */ + set_rand_reseed_callback(get_rand_seed); + + /* Ensure that the reseed is done now, while we are root, etc */ + generate_random_buffer(&dummy, sizeof(dummy)); + + return True; +} + +struct db_context *secrets_db_ctx(void) +{ + if (!secrets_init()) { + return NULL; + } + + return db_ctx; +} + +/* + * close secrets.tdb + */ +void secrets_shutdown(void) +{ + TALLOC_FREE(db_ctx); +} + +/* read a entry from the secrets database - the caller must free the result + if size is non-null then the size of the entry is put in there + */ +void *secrets_fetch(const char *key, size_t *size) +{ + TDB_DATA dbuf; + void *result; + + if (!secrets_init()) { + return NULL; + } + + if (db_ctx->fetch(db_ctx, talloc_tos(), string_tdb_data(key), + &dbuf) != 0) { + return NULL; + } + + result = memdup(dbuf.dptr, dbuf.dsize); + if (result == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + TALLOC_FREE(dbuf.dptr); + + if (size) { + *size = dbuf.dsize; + } + + return result; +} + +/* store a secrets entry + */ +bool secrets_store(const char *key, const void *data, size_t size) +{ + NTSTATUS status; + + if (!secrets_init()) { + return false; + } + + status = dbwrap_trans_store(db_ctx, string_tdb_data(key), + make_tdb_data((const uint8 *)data, size), + TDB_REPLACE); + return NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status); +} + + +/* delete a secets database entry + */ +bool secrets_delete(const char *key) +{ + NTSTATUS status; + if (!secrets_init()) { + return false; + } + + status = dbwrap_trans_delete(db_ctx, string_tdb_data(key)); + + return NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status); +} + +/** + * Form a key for fetching the domain sid + * + * @param domain domain name + * + * @return keystring + **/ +static const char *domain_sid_keystr(const char *domain) +{ + char *keystr; + + keystr = talloc_asprintf_strupper_m(talloc_tos(), "%s/%s", + SECRETS_DOMAIN_SID, domain); + SMB_ASSERT(keystr != NULL); + return keystr; +} + +bool secrets_store_domain_sid(const char *domain, const DOM_SID *sid) +{ + bool ret; + + ret = secrets_store(domain_sid_keystr(domain), sid, sizeof(DOM_SID)); + + /* Force a re-query, in case we modified our domain */ + if (ret) + reset_global_sam_sid(); + return ret; +} + +bool secrets_fetch_domain_sid(const char *domain, DOM_SID *sid) +{ + DOM_SID *dyn_sid; + size_t size = 0; + + dyn_sid = (DOM_SID *)secrets_fetch(domain_sid_keystr(domain), &size); + + if (dyn_sid == NULL) + return False; + + if (size != sizeof(DOM_SID)) { + SAFE_FREE(dyn_sid); + return False; + } + + *sid = *dyn_sid; + SAFE_FREE(dyn_sid); + return True; +} + +bool secrets_store_domain_guid(const char *domain, struct GUID *guid) +{ + fstring key; + + slprintf(key, sizeof(key)-1, "%s/%s", SECRETS_DOMAIN_GUID, domain); + strupper_m(key); + return secrets_store(key, guid, sizeof(struct GUID)); +} + +bool secrets_fetch_domain_guid(const char *domain, struct GUID *guid) +{ + struct GUID *dyn_guid; + fstring key; + size_t size = 0; + struct GUID new_guid; + + slprintf(key, sizeof(key)-1, "%s/%s", SECRETS_DOMAIN_GUID, domain); + strupper_m(key); + dyn_guid = (struct GUID *)secrets_fetch(key, &size); + + if (!dyn_guid) { + if (lp_server_role() == ROLE_DOMAIN_PDC) { + smb_uuid_generate_random(&new_guid); + if (!secrets_store_domain_guid(domain, &new_guid)) + return False; + dyn_guid = (struct GUID *)secrets_fetch(key, &size); + } + if (dyn_guid == NULL) { + return False; + } + } + + if (size != sizeof(struct GUID)) { + DEBUG(1,("UUID size %d is wrong!\n", (int)size)); + SAFE_FREE(dyn_guid); + return False; + } + + *guid = *dyn_guid; + SAFE_FREE(dyn_guid); + return True; +} + +/** + * Form a key for fetching the machine trust account sec channel type + * + * @param domain domain name + * + * @return keystring + **/ +static const char *machine_sec_channel_type_keystr(const char *domain) +{ + char *keystr; + + keystr = talloc_asprintf_strupper_m(talloc_tos(), "%s/%s", + SECRETS_MACHINE_SEC_CHANNEL_TYPE, + domain); + SMB_ASSERT(keystr != NULL); + return keystr; +} + +/** + * Form a key for fetching the machine trust account last change time + * + * @param domain domain name + * + * @return keystring + **/ +static const char *machine_last_change_time_keystr(const char *domain) +{ + char *keystr; + + keystr = talloc_asprintf_strupper_m(talloc_tos(), "%s/%s", + SECRETS_MACHINE_LAST_CHANGE_TIME, + domain); + SMB_ASSERT(keystr != NULL); + return keystr; +} + + +/** + * Form a key for fetching the machine trust account password + * + * @param domain domain name + * + * @return keystring + **/ +static const char *machine_password_keystr(const char *domain) +{ + char *keystr; + + keystr = talloc_asprintf_strupper_m(talloc_tos(), "%s/%s", + SECRETS_MACHINE_PASSWORD, domain); + SMB_ASSERT(keystr != NULL); + return keystr; +} + +/** + * Form a key for fetching the machine trust account password + * + * @param domain domain name + * + * @return stored password's key + **/ +static const char *trust_keystr(const char *domain) +{ + char *keystr; + + keystr = talloc_asprintf_strupper_m(talloc_tos(), "%s/%s", + SECRETS_MACHINE_ACCT_PASS, domain); + SMB_ASSERT(keystr != NULL); + return keystr; +} + +/** + * Form a key for fetching a trusted domain password + * + * @param domain trusted domain name + * + * @return stored password's key + **/ +static char *trustdom_keystr(const char *domain) +{ + char *keystr; + + keystr = talloc_asprintf_strupper_m(talloc_tos(), "%s/%s", + SECRETS_DOMTRUST_ACCT_PASS, + domain); + SMB_ASSERT(keystr != NULL); + return keystr; +} + +/************************************************************************ + Lock the trust password entry. +************************************************************************/ + +void *secrets_get_trust_account_lock(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, const char *domain) +{ + if (!secrets_init()) { + return NULL; + } + + return db_ctx->fetch_locked( + db_ctx, mem_ctx, string_term_tdb_data(trust_keystr(domain))); +} + +/************************************************************************ + Routine to get the default secure channel type for trust accounts +************************************************************************/ + +uint32 get_default_sec_channel(void) +{ + if (lp_server_role() == ROLE_DOMAIN_BDC || + lp_server_role() == ROLE_DOMAIN_PDC) { + return SEC_CHAN_BDC; + } else { + return SEC_CHAN_WKSTA; + } +} + +/************************************************************************ + Routine to get the trust account password for a domain. + This only tries to get the legacy hashed version of the password. + The user of this function must have locked the trust password file using + the above secrets_lock_trust_account_password(). +************************************************************************/ + +bool secrets_fetch_trust_account_password_legacy(const char *domain, + uint8 ret_pwd[16], + time_t *pass_last_set_time, + uint32 *channel) +{ + struct machine_acct_pass *pass; + size_t size = 0; + + if (!(pass = (struct machine_acct_pass *)secrets_fetch( + trust_keystr(domain), &size))) { + DEBUG(5, ("secrets_fetch failed!\n")); + return False; + } + + if (size != sizeof(*pass)) { + DEBUG(0, ("secrets were of incorrect size!\n")); + SAFE_FREE(pass); + return False; + } + + if (pass_last_set_time) { + *pass_last_set_time = pass->mod_time; + } + memcpy(ret_pwd, pass->hash, 16); + + if (channel) { + *channel = get_default_sec_channel(); + } + + /* Test if machine password has expired and needs to be changed */ + if (lp_machine_password_timeout()) { + if (pass->mod_time > 0 && time(NULL) > (pass->mod_time + + (time_t)lp_machine_password_timeout())) { + global_machine_password_needs_changing = True; + } + } + + SAFE_FREE(pass); + return True; +} + +/************************************************************************ + Routine to get the trust account password for a domain. + The user of this function must have locked the trust password file using + the above secrets_lock_trust_account_password(). +************************************************************************/ + +bool secrets_fetch_trust_account_password(const char *domain, uint8 ret_pwd[16], + time_t *pass_last_set_time, + uint32 *channel) +{ + char *plaintext; + + plaintext = secrets_fetch_machine_password(domain, pass_last_set_time, + channel); + if (plaintext) { + DEBUG(4,("Using cleartext machine password\n")); + E_md4hash(plaintext, ret_pwd); + SAFE_FREE(plaintext); + return True; + } + + return secrets_fetch_trust_account_password_legacy(domain, ret_pwd, + pass_last_set_time, + channel); +} + +/** + * Pack SID passed by pointer + * + * @param pack_buf pointer to buffer which is to be filled with packed data + * @param bufsize size of packing buffer + * @param sid pointer to sid to be packed + * + * @return length of the packed representation of the whole structure + **/ +static size_t tdb_sid_pack(uint8 *pack_buf, int bufsize, DOM_SID* sid) +{ + int idx; + size_t len = 0; + uint8 *p = pack_buf; + int remaining_space = pack_buf ? bufsize : 0; + + if (!sid) { + return -1; + } + + len += tdb_pack(p, remaining_space, "bb", sid->sid_rev_num, + sid->num_auths); + if (pack_buf) { + p = pack_buf + len; + remaining_space = bufsize - len; + } + + for (idx = 0; idx < 6; idx++) { + len += tdb_pack(p, remaining_space, "b", + sid->id_auth[idx]); + if (pack_buf) { + p = pack_buf + len; + remaining_space = bufsize - len; + } + } + + for (idx = 0; idx < MAXSUBAUTHS; idx++) { + len += tdb_pack(p, remaining_space, "d", + sid->sub_auths[idx]); + if (pack_buf) { + p = pack_buf + len; + remaining_space = bufsize - len; + } + } + + return len; +} + +/** + * Unpack SID into a pointer + * + * @param pack_buf pointer to buffer with packed representation + * @param bufsize size of the buffer + * @param sid pointer to sid structure to be filled with unpacked data + * + * @return size of structure unpacked from buffer + **/ +static size_t tdb_sid_unpack(uint8 *pack_buf, int bufsize, DOM_SID* sid) +{ + int idx, len = 0; + + if (!sid || !pack_buf) return -1; + + len += tdb_unpack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, "bb", + &sid->sid_rev_num, &sid->num_auths); + + for (idx = 0; idx < 6; idx++) { + len += tdb_unpack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, "b", + &sid->id_auth[idx]); + } + + for (idx = 0; idx < MAXSUBAUTHS; idx++) { + len += tdb_unpack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, "d", + &sid->sub_auths[idx]); + } + + return len; +} + +/** + * Pack TRUSTED_DOM_PASS passed by pointer + * + * @param pack_buf pointer to buffer which is to be filled with packed data + * @param bufsize size of the buffer + * @param pass pointer to trusted domain password to be packed + * + * @return length of the packed representation of the whole structure + **/ +static size_t tdb_trusted_dom_pass_pack(uint8 *pack_buf, int bufsize, + TRUSTED_DOM_PASS* pass) +{ + int idx, len = 0; + uint8 *p = pack_buf; + int remaining_space = pack_buf ? bufsize : 0; + + if (!pass) { + return -1; + } + + /* packing unicode domain name and password */ + len += tdb_pack(p, remaining_space, "d", + pass->uni_name_len); + if (pack_buf) { + p = pack_buf + len; + remaining_space = bufsize - len; + } + + for (idx = 0; idx < 32; idx++) { + len += tdb_pack(p, remaining_space, "w", + pass->uni_name[idx]); + if (pack_buf) { + p = pack_buf + len; + remaining_space = bufsize - len; + } + } + + len += tdb_pack(p, remaining_space, "dPd", pass->pass_len, + pass->pass, pass->mod_time); + if (pack_buf) { + p = pack_buf + len; + remaining_space = bufsize - len; + } + + /* packing SID structure */ + len += tdb_sid_pack(p, remaining_space, &pass->domain_sid); + if (pack_buf) { + p = pack_buf + len; + remaining_space = bufsize - len; + } + + return len; +} + + +/** + * Unpack TRUSTED_DOM_PASS passed by pointer + * + * @param pack_buf pointer to buffer with packed representation + * @param bufsize size of the buffer + * @param pass pointer to trusted domain password to be filled with unpacked data + * + * @return size of structure unpacked from buffer + **/ +static size_t tdb_trusted_dom_pass_unpack(uint8 *pack_buf, int bufsize, + TRUSTED_DOM_PASS* pass) +{ + int idx, len = 0; + char *passp = NULL; + + if (!pack_buf || !pass) return -1; + + /* unpack unicode domain name and plaintext password */ + len += tdb_unpack(pack_buf, bufsize - len, "d", &pass->uni_name_len); + + for (idx = 0; idx < 32; idx++) + len += tdb_unpack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, "w", + &pass->uni_name[idx]); + + len += tdb_unpack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, "dPd", + &pass->pass_len, &passp, &pass->mod_time); + if (passp) { + fstrcpy(pass->pass, passp); + } + SAFE_FREE(passp); + + /* unpack domain sid */ + len += tdb_sid_unpack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, + &pass->domain_sid); + + return len; +} + +/************************************************************************ + Routine to get account password to trusted domain +************************************************************************/ + +bool secrets_fetch_trusted_domain_password(const char *domain, char** pwd, + DOM_SID *sid, time_t *pass_last_set_time) +{ + struct trusted_dom_pass pass; + size_t size = 0; + + /* unpacking structures */ + uint8 *pass_buf; + int pass_len = 0; + + ZERO_STRUCT(pass); + + /* fetching trusted domain password structure */ + if (!(pass_buf = (uint8 *)secrets_fetch(trustdom_keystr(domain), + &size))) { + DEBUG(5, ("secrets_fetch failed!\n")); + return False; + } + + /* unpack trusted domain password */ + pass_len = tdb_trusted_dom_pass_unpack(pass_buf, size, &pass); + SAFE_FREE(pass_buf); + + if (pass_len != size) { + DEBUG(5, ("Invalid secrets size. Unpacked data doesn't match trusted_dom_pass structure.\n")); + return False; + } + + /* the trust's password */ + if (pwd) { + *pwd = SMB_STRDUP(pass.pass); + if (!*pwd) { + return False; + } + } + + /* last change time */ + if (pass_last_set_time) *pass_last_set_time = pass.mod_time; + + /* domain sid */ + if (sid != NULL) sid_copy(sid, &pass.domain_sid); + + return True; +} + +/** + * Routine to store the password for trusted domain + * + * @param domain remote domain name + * @param pwd plain text password of trust relationship + * @param sid remote domain sid + * + * @return true if succeeded + **/ + +bool secrets_store_trusted_domain_password(const char* domain, const char* pwd, + const DOM_SID *sid) +{ + smb_ucs2_t *uni_dom_name; + bool ret; + size_t converted_size; + + /* packing structures */ + uint8 *pass_buf = NULL; + int pass_len = 0; + + struct trusted_dom_pass pass; + ZERO_STRUCT(pass); + + if (!push_ucs2_allocate(&uni_dom_name, domain, &converted_size)) { + DEBUG(0, ("Could not convert domain name %s to unicode\n", + domain)); + return False; + } + + strncpy_w(pass.uni_name, uni_dom_name, sizeof(pass.uni_name) - 1); + pass.uni_name_len = strlen_w(uni_dom_name)+1; + SAFE_FREE(uni_dom_name); + + /* last change time */ + pass.mod_time = time(NULL); + + /* password of the trust */ + pass.pass_len = strlen(pwd); + fstrcpy(pass.pass, pwd); + + /* domain sid */ + sid_copy(&pass.domain_sid, sid); + + /* Calculate the length. */ + pass_len = tdb_trusted_dom_pass_pack(NULL, 0, &pass); + pass_buf = SMB_MALLOC_ARRAY(uint8, pass_len); + if (!pass_buf) { + return false; + } + pass_len = tdb_trusted_dom_pass_pack(pass_buf, pass_len, &pass); + ret = secrets_store(trustdom_keystr(domain), (void *)pass_buf, + pass_len); + SAFE_FREE(pass_buf); + return ret; +} + +/************************************************************************ + Routine to delete the plaintext machine account password +************************************************************************/ + +bool secrets_delete_machine_password(const char *domain) +{ + return secrets_delete(machine_password_keystr(domain)); +} + +/************************************************************************ + Routine to delete the plaintext machine account password, sec channel type and + last change time from secrets database +************************************************************************/ + +bool secrets_delete_machine_password_ex(const char *domain) +{ + if (!secrets_delete(machine_password_keystr(domain))) { + return false; + } + if (!secrets_delete(machine_sec_channel_type_keystr(domain))) { + return false; + } + return secrets_delete(machine_last_change_time_keystr(domain)); +} + +/************************************************************************ + Routine to delete the domain sid +************************************************************************/ + +bool secrets_delete_domain_sid(const char *domain) +{ + return secrets_delete(domain_sid_keystr(domain)); +} + +/************************************************************************ + Routine to set the plaintext machine account password for a realm +the password is assumed to be a null terminated ascii string +************************************************************************/ + +bool secrets_store_machine_password(const char *pass, const char *domain, uint32 sec_channel) +{ + bool ret; + uint32 last_change_time; + uint32 sec_channel_type; + + ret = secrets_store(machine_password_keystr(domain), pass, strlen(pass)+1); + if (!ret) + return ret; + + SIVAL(&last_change_time, 0, time(NULL)); + ret = secrets_store(machine_last_change_time_keystr(domain), &last_change_time, sizeof(last_change_time)); + + SIVAL(&sec_channel_type, 0, sec_channel); + ret = secrets_store(machine_sec_channel_type_keystr(domain), &sec_channel_type, sizeof(sec_channel_type)); + + return ret; +} + +/************************************************************************ + Routine to fetch the plaintext machine account password for a realm + the password is assumed to be a null terminated ascii string. +************************************************************************/ + +char *secrets_fetch_machine_password(const char *domain, + time_t *pass_last_set_time, + uint32 *channel) +{ + char *ret; + ret = (char *)secrets_fetch(machine_password_keystr(domain), NULL); + + if (pass_last_set_time) { + size_t size; + uint32 *last_set_time; + last_set_time = (unsigned int *)secrets_fetch(machine_last_change_time_keystr(domain), &size); + if (last_set_time) { + *pass_last_set_time = IVAL(last_set_time,0); + SAFE_FREE(last_set_time); + } else { + *pass_last_set_time = 0; + } + } + + if (channel) { + size_t size; + uint32 *channel_type; + channel_type = (unsigned int *)secrets_fetch(machine_sec_channel_type_keystr(domain), &size); + if (channel_type) { + *channel = IVAL(channel_type,0); + SAFE_FREE(channel_type); + } else { + *channel = get_default_sec_channel(); + } + } + + return ret; +} + +/************************************************************************ + Routine to delete the password for trusted domain +************************************************************************/ + +bool trusted_domain_password_delete(const char *domain) +{ + return secrets_delete(trustdom_keystr(domain)); +} + +bool secrets_store_ldap_pw(const char* dn, char* pw) +{ + char *key = NULL; + bool ret; + + if (asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_LDAP_BIND_PW, dn) < 0) { + DEBUG(0, ("secrets_store_ldap_pw: asprintf failed!\n")); + return False; + } + + ret = secrets_store(key, pw, strlen(pw)+1); + + SAFE_FREE(key); + return ret; +} + +/******************************************************************* + Find the ldap password. +******************************************************************/ + +bool fetch_ldap_pw(char **dn, char** pw) +{ + char *key = NULL; + size_t size = 0; + + *dn = smb_xstrdup(lp_ldap_admin_dn()); + + if (asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_LDAP_BIND_PW, *dn) < 0) { + SAFE_FREE(*dn); + DEBUG(0, ("fetch_ldap_pw: asprintf failed!\n")); + } + + *pw=(char *)secrets_fetch(key, &size); + SAFE_FREE(key); + + if (!size) { + /* Upgrade 2.2 style entry */ + char *p; + char* old_style_key = SMB_STRDUP(*dn); + char *data; + fstring old_style_pw; + + if (!old_style_key) { + DEBUG(0, ("fetch_ldap_pw: strdup failed!\n")); + return False; + } + + for (p=old_style_key; *p; p++) + if (*p == ',') *p = '/'; + + data=(char *)secrets_fetch(old_style_key, &size); + if ((data == NULL) || (size < sizeof(old_style_pw))) { + DEBUG(0,("fetch_ldap_pw: neither ldap secret retrieved!\n")); + SAFE_FREE(old_style_key); + SAFE_FREE(*dn); + SAFE_FREE(data); + return False; + } + + size = MIN(size, sizeof(fstring)-1); + strncpy(old_style_pw, data, size); + old_style_pw[size] = 0; + + SAFE_FREE(data); + + if (!secrets_store_ldap_pw(*dn, old_style_pw)) { + DEBUG(0,("fetch_ldap_pw: ldap secret could not be upgraded!\n")); + SAFE_FREE(old_style_key); + SAFE_FREE(*dn); + return False; + } + if (!secrets_delete(old_style_key)) { + DEBUG(0,("fetch_ldap_pw: old ldap secret could not be deleted!\n")); + } + + SAFE_FREE(old_style_key); + + *pw = smb_xstrdup(old_style_pw); + } + + return True; +} + +/** + * Get trusted domains info from secrets.tdb. + **/ + +struct list_trusted_domains_state { + uint32 num_domains; + struct trustdom_info **domains; +}; + +static int list_trusted_domain(struct db_record *rec, void *private_data) +{ + const size_t prefix_len = strlen(SECRETS_DOMTRUST_ACCT_PASS); + size_t converted_size, packed_size = 0; + struct trusted_dom_pass pass; + struct trustdom_info *dom_info; + + struct list_trusted_domains_state *state = + (struct list_trusted_domains_state *)private_data; + + if ((rec->key.dsize < prefix_len) + || (strncmp((char *)rec->key.dptr, SECRETS_DOMTRUST_ACCT_PASS, + prefix_len) != 0)) { + return 0; + } + + packed_size = tdb_trusted_dom_pass_unpack( + rec->value.dptr, rec->value.dsize, &pass); + + if (rec->value.dsize != packed_size) { + DEBUG(2, ("Secrets record is invalid!\n")); + return 0; + } + + if (pass.domain_sid.num_auths != 4) { + DEBUG(0, ("SID %s is not a domain sid, has %d " + "auths instead of 4\n", + sid_string_dbg(&pass.domain_sid), + pass.domain_sid.num_auths)); + return 0; + } + + if (!(dom_info = TALLOC_P(state->domains, struct trustdom_info))) { + DEBUG(0, ("talloc failed\n")); + return 0; + } + + if (!pull_ucs2_talloc(dom_info, &dom_info->name, pass.uni_name, + &converted_size)) { + DEBUG(2, ("pull_ucs2_talloc failed\n")); + TALLOC_FREE(dom_info); + return 0; + } + + sid_copy(&dom_info->sid, &pass.domain_sid); + + ADD_TO_ARRAY(state->domains, struct trustdom_info *, dom_info, + &state->domains, &state->num_domains); + + if (state->domains == NULL) { + state->num_domains = 0; + return -1; + } + return 0; +} + +NTSTATUS secrets_trusted_domains(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, uint32 *num_domains, + struct trustdom_info ***domains) +{ + struct list_trusted_domains_state state; + + secrets_init(); + + if (db_ctx == NULL) { + return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; + } + + state.num_domains = 0; + + /* + * Make sure that a talloc context for the trustdom_info structs + * exists + */ + + if (!(state.domains = TALLOC_ARRAY( + mem_ctx, struct trustdom_info *, 1))) { + return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; + } + + db_ctx->traverse_read(db_ctx, list_trusted_domain, (void *)&state); + + *num_domains = state.num_domains; + *domains = state.domains; + return NT_STATUS_OK; +} + +/******************************************************************************* + Store a complete AFS keyfile into secrets.tdb. +*******************************************************************************/ + +bool secrets_store_afs_keyfile(const char *cell, const struct afs_keyfile *keyfile) +{ + fstring key; + + if ((cell == NULL) || (keyfile == NULL)) + return False; + + if (ntohl(keyfile->nkeys) > SECRETS_AFS_MAXKEYS) + return False; + + slprintf(key, sizeof(key)-1, "%s/%s", SECRETS_AFS_KEYFILE, cell); + return secrets_store(key, keyfile, sizeof(struct afs_keyfile)); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + Fetch the current (highest) AFS key from secrets.tdb +*******************************************************************************/ +bool secrets_fetch_afs_key(const char *cell, struct afs_key *result) +{ + fstring key; + struct afs_keyfile *keyfile; + size_t size = 0; + uint32 i; + + slprintf(key, sizeof(key)-1, "%s/%s", SECRETS_AFS_KEYFILE, cell); + + keyfile = (struct afs_keyfile *)secrets_fetch(key, &size); + + if (keyfile == NULL) + return False; + + if (size != sizeof(struct afs_keyfile)) { + SAFE_FREE(keyfile); + return False; + } + + i = ntohl(keyfile->nkeys); + + if (i > SECRETS_AFS_MAXKEYS) { + SAFE_FREE(keyfile); + return False; + } + + *result = keyfile->entry[i-1]; + + result->kvno = ntohl(result->kvno); + + SAFE_FREE(keyfile); + + return True; +} + +/****************************************************************************** + When kerberos is not available, choose between anonymous or + authenticated connections. + + We need to use an authenticated connection if DCs have the + RestrictAnonymous registry entry set > 0, or the "Additional + restrictions for anonymous connections" set in the win2k Local + Security Policy. + + Caller to free() result in domain, username, password +*******************************************************************************/ +void secrets_fetch_ipc_userpass(char **username, char **domain, char **password) +{ + *username = (char *)secrets_fetch(SECRETS_AUTH_USER, NULL); + *domain = (char *)secrets_fetch(SECRETS_AUTH_DOMAIN, NULL); + *password = (char *)secrets_fetch(SECRETS_AUTH_PASSWORD, NULL); + + if (*username && **username) { + + if (!*domain || !**domain) + *domain = smb_xstrdup(lp_workgroup()); + + if (!*password || !**password) + *password = smb_xstrdup(""); + + DEBUG(3, ("IPC$ connections done by user %s\\%s\n", + *domain, *username)); + + } else { + DEBUG(3, ("IPC$ connections done anonymously\n")); + *username = smb_xstrdup(""); + *domain = smb_xstrdup(""); + *password = smb_xstrdup(""); + } +} + +/****************************************************************************** + Open or create the schannel session store tdb. +*******************************************************************************/ + +static TDB_CONTEXT *open_schannel_session_store(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx) +{ + TDB_DATA vers; + uint32 ver; + TDB_CONTEXT *tdb_sc = NULL; + char *fname = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "%s/schannel_store.tdb", lp_private_dir()); + + if (!fname) { + return NULL; + } + + tdb_sc = tdb_open_log(fname, 0, TDB_DEFAULT, O_RDWR|O_CREAT, 0600); + + if (!tdb_sc) { + DEBUG(0,("open_schannel_session_store: Failed to open %s\n", fname)); + TALLOC_FREE(fname); + return NULL; + } + + vers = tdb_fetch_bystring(tdb_sc, "SCHANNEL_STORE_VERSION"); + if (vers.dptr == NULL) { + /* First opener, no version. */ + SIVAL(&ver,0,1); + vers.dptr = (uint8 *)&ver; + vers.dsize = 4; + tdb_store_bystring(tdb_sc, "SCHANNEL_STORE_VERSION", vers, TDB_REPLACE); + vers.dptr = NULL; + } else if (vers.dsize == 4) { + ver = IVAL(vers.dptr,0); + if (ver != 1) { + tdb_close(tdb_sc); + tdb_sc = NULL; + DEBUG(0,("open_schannel_session_store: wrong version number %d in %s\n", + (int)ver, fname )); + } + } else { + tdb_close(tdb_sc); + tdb_sc = NULL; + DEBUG(0,("open_schannel_session_store: wrong version number size %d in %s\n", + (int)vers.dsize, fname )); + } + + SAFE_FREE(vers.dptr); + TALLOC_FREE(fname); + + return tdb_sc; +} + +/****************************************************************************** + Store the schannel state after an AUTH2 call. + Note we must be root here. +*******************************************************************************/ + +bool secrets_store_schannel_session_info(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + const char *remote_machine, + const struct dcinfo *pdc) +{ + TDB_CONTEXT *tdb_sc = NULL; + TDB_DATA value; + bool ret; + char *keystr = talloc_asprintf_strupper_m(mem_ctx, "%s/%s", + SECRETS_SCHANNEL_STATE, + remote_machine); + if (!keystr) { + return False; + } + + /* Work out how large the record is. */ + value.dsize = tdb_pack(NULL, 0, "dBBBBBfff", + pdc->sequence, + 8, pdc->seed_chal.data, + 8, pdc->clnt_chal.data, + 8, pdc->srv_chal.data, + 16, pdc->sess_key, + 16, pdc->mach_pw, + pdc->mach_acct, + pdc->remote_machine, + pdc->domain); + + value.dptr = TALLOC_ARRAY(mem_ctx, uint8, value.dsize); + if (!value.dptr) { + TALLOC_FREE(keystr); + return False; + } + + value.dsize = tdb_pack(value.dptr, value.dsize, "dBBBBBfff", + pdc->sequence, + 8, pdc->seed_chal.data, + 8, pdc->clnt_chal.data, + 8, pdc->srv_chal.data, + 16, pdc->sess_key, + 16, pdc->mach_pw, + pdc->mach_acct, + pdc->remote_machine, + pdc->domain); + + tdb_sc = open_schannel_session_store(mem_ctx); + if (!tdb_sc) { + TALLOC_FREE(keystr); + TALLOC_FREE(value.dptr); + return False; + } + + ret = (tdb_store_bystring(tdb_sc, keystr, value, TDB_REPLACE) == 0 ? True : False); + + DEBUG(3,("secrets_store_schannel_session_info: stored schannel info with key %s\n", + keystr )); + + tdb_close(tdb_sc); + TALLOC_FREE(keystr); + TALLOC_FREE(value.dptr); + return ret; +} + +/****************************************************************************** + Restore the schannel state on a client reconnect. + Note we must be root here. +*******************************************************************************/ + +bool secrets_restore_schannel_session_info(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + const char *remote_machine, + struct dcinfo **ppdc) +{ + TDB_CONTEXT *tdb_sc = NULL; + TDB_DATA value; + unsigned char *pseed_chal = NULL; + unsigned char *pclnt_chal = NULL; + unsigned char *psrv_chal = NULL; + unsigned char *psess_key = NULL; + unsigned char *pmach_pw = NULL; + uint32 l1, l2, l3, l4, l5; + int ret; + struct dcinfo *pdc = NULL; + char *keystr = talloc_asprintf_strupper_m(mem_ctx, "%s/%s", + SECRETS_SCHANNEL_STATE, + remote_machine); + + *ppdc = NULL; + + if (!keystr) { + return False; + } + + tdb_sc = open_schannel_session_store(mem_ctx); + if (!tdb_sc) { + TALLOC_FREE(keystr); + return False; + } + + value = tdb_fetch_bystring(tdb_sc, keystr); + if (!value.dptr) { + DEBUG(0,("secrets_restore_schannel_session_info: Failed to find entry with key %s\n", + keystr )); + tdb_close(tdb_sc); + return False; + } + + pdc = TALLOC_ZERO_P(mem_ctx, struct dcinfo); + + /* Retrieve the record. */ + ret = tdb_unpack(value.dptr, value.dsize, "dBBBBBfff", + &pdc->sequence, + &l1, &pseed_chal, + &l2, &pclnt_chal, + &l3, &psrv_chal, + &l4, &psess_key, + &l5, &pmach_pw, + &pdc->mach_acct, + &pdc->remote_machine, + &pdc->domain); + + if (ret == -1 || l1 != 8 || l2 != 8 || l3 != 8 || l4 != 16 || l5 != 16) { + /* Bad record - delete it. */ + tdb_delete_bystring(tdb_sc, keystr); + tdb_close(tdb_sc); + TALLOC_FREE(keystr); + TALLOC_FREE(pdc); + SAFE_FREE(pseed_chal); + SAFE_FREE(pclnt_chal); + SAFE_FREE(psrv_chal); + SAFE_FREE(psess_key); + SAFE_FREE(pmach_pw); + SAFE_FREE(value.dptr); + return False; + } + + tdb_close(tdb_sc); + + memcpy(pdc->seed_chal.data, pseed_chal, 8); + memcpy(pdc->clnt_chal.data, pclnt_chal, 8); + memcpy(pdc->srv_chal.data, psrv_chal, 8); + memcpy(pdc->sess_key, psess_key, 16); + memcpy(pdc->mach_pw, pmach_pw, 16); + + /* We know these are true so didn't bother to store them. */ + pdc->challenge_sent = True; + pdc->authenticated = True; + + DEBUG(3,("secrets_restore_schannel_session_info: restored schannel info key %s\n", + keystr )); + + SAFE_FREE(pseed_chal); + SAFE_FREE(pclnt_chal); + SAFE_FREE(psrv_chal); + SAFE_FREE(psess_key); + SAFE_FREE(pmach_pw); + + TALLOC_FREE(keystr); + SAFE_FREE(value.dptr); + + *ppdc = pdc; + + return True; +} + +bool secrets_store_generic(const char *owner, const char *key, const char *secret) +{ + char *tdbkey = NULL; + bool ret; + + if (asprintf(&tdbkey, "SECRETS/GENERIC/%s/%s", owner, key) < 0) { + DEBUG(0, ("asprintf failed!\n")); + return False; + } + + ret = secrets_store(tdbkey, secret, strlen(secret)+1); + + SAFE_FREE(tdbkey); + return ret; +} + +/******************************************************************* + Find the ldap password. +******************************************************************/ + +char *secrets_fetch_generic(const char *owner, const char *key) +{ + char *secret = NULL; + char *tdbkey = NULL; + + if (( ! owner) || ( ! key)) { + DEBUG(1, ("Invalid Paramters")); + return NULL; + } + + if (asprintf(&tdbkey, "SECRETS/GENERIC/%s/%s", owner, key) < 0) { + DEBUG(0, ("Out of memory!\n")); + return NULL; + } + + secret = (char *)secrets_fetch(tdbkey, NULL); + SAFE_FREE(tdbkey); + + return secret; +} + |