diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'source3/passdb')
| -rw-r--r-- | source3/passdb/secrets.c | 144 |
1 files changed, 72 insertions, 72 deletions
diff --git a/source3/passdb/secrets.c b/source3/passdb/secrets.c index 2727867906..c5c1e29ecf 100644 --- a/source3/passdb/secrets.c +++ b/source3/passdb/secrets.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* +/* Unix SMB/CIFS implementation. Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 1992-2001 Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett 2002 @@ -9,12 +9,12 @@ it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. - + This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License for more details. - + You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. */ @@ -36,11 +36,11 @@ BOOL global_machine_password_needs_changing; * Use a TDB to store an incrementing random seed. * * Initialised to the current pid, the very first time Samba starts, - * and incremented by one each time it is needed. - * + * and incremented by one each time it is needed. + * * @note Not called by systems with a working /dev/urandom. */ -static void get_rand_seed(int *new_seed) +static void get_rand_seed(int *new_seed) { *new_seed = sys_getpid(); if (tdb) { @@ -68,8 +68,8 @@ BOOL secrets_init(void) } /** - * Set a reseed function for the crypto random generator - * + * Set a reseed function for the crypto random generator + * * This avoids a problem where systems without /dev/urandom * could send the same challenge to multiple clients */ @@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ void *secrets_fetch(const char *key, size_t *size) return dbuf.dptr; } -/* store a secrets entry +/* store a secrets entry */ BOOL secrets_store(const char *key, const void *data, size_t size) { @@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ BOOL secrets_fetch_domain_sid(const char *domain, DOM_SID *sid) if (dyn_sid == NULL) return False; - if (size != sizeof(DOM_SID)) { + if (size != sizeof(DOM_SID)) { SAFE_FREE(dyn_sid); return False; } @@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ BOOL secrets_fetch_domain_guid(const char *domain, struct GUID *guid) } } - if (size != sizeof(struct GUID)) { + if (size != sizeof(struct GUID)) { DEBUG(1,("UUID size %d is wrong!\n", (int)size)); SAFE_FREE(dyn_guid); return False; @@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ static const char *trust_keystr(const char *domain) { static fstring keystr; - slprintf(keystr,sizeof(keystr)-1,"%s/%s", + slprintf(keystr,sizeof(keystr)-1,"%s/%s", SECRETS_MACHINE_ACCT_PASS, domain); strupper_m(keystr); @@ -231,7 +231,7 @@ static char *trustdom_keystr(const char *domain) pstr_sprintf(keystr, "%s/%s", SECRETS_DOMTRUST_ACCT_PASS, domain); strupper_m(keystr); - + return keystr; } @@ -255,9 +255,9 @@ BOOL secrets_lock_trust_account_password(const char *domain, BOOL dolock) Routine to get the default secure channel type for trust accounts ************************************************************************/ -uint32 get_default_sec_channel(void) +uint32 get_default_sec_channel(void) { - if (lp_server_role() == ROLE_DOMAIN_BDC || + if (lp_server_role() == ROLE_DOMAIN_BDC || lp_server_role() == ROLE_DOMAIN_PDC) { return SEC_CHAN_BDC; } else { @@ -279,7 +279,7 @@ BOOL secrets_fetch_trust_account_password(const char *domain, uint8 ret_pwd[16], char *plaintext; size_t size = 0; - plaintext = secrets_fetch_machine_password(domain, pass_last_set_time, + plaintext = secrets_fetch_machine_password(domain, pass_last_set_time, channel); if (plaintext) { DEBUG(4,("Using cleartext machine password\n")); @@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ BOOL secrets_fetch_trust_account_password(const char *domain, uint8 ret_pwd[16], DEBUG(5, ("secrets_fetch failed!\n")); return False; } - + if (size != sizeof(*pass)) { DEBUG(0, ("secrets were of incorrect size!\n")); return False; @@ -333,22 +333,22 @@ static size_t tdb_sid_pack(uint8 *pack_buf, int bufsize, DOM_SID* sid) { int idx; size_t len = 0; - + if (!sid || !pack_buf) return -1; - + len += tdb_pack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, "bb", sid->sid_rev_num, sid->num_auths); - + for (idx = 0; idx < 6; idx++) { len += tdb_pack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, "b", sid->id_auth[idx]); } - + for (idx = 0; idx < MAXSUBAUTHS; idx++) { len += tdb_pack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, "d", sid->sub_auths[idx]); } - + return len; } @@ -364,22 +364,22 @@ static size_t tdb_sid_pack(uint8 *pack_buf, int bufsize, DOM_SID* sid) static size_t tdb_sid_unpack(uint8 *pack_buf, int bufsize, DOM_SID* sid) { int idx, len = 0; - + if (!sid || !pack_buf) return -1; len += tdb_unpack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, "bb", &sid->sid_rev_num, &sid->num_auths); - + for (idx = 0; idx < 6; idx++) { len += tdb_unpack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, "b", &sid->id_auth[idx]); } - + for (idx = 0; idx < MAXSUBAUTHS; idx++) { len += tdb_unpack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, "d", &sid->sub_auths[idx]); } - + return len; } @@ -396,17 +396,17 @@ static size_t tdb_trusted_dom_pass_pack(uint8 *pack_buf, int bufsize, TRUSTED_DOM_PASS* pass) { int idx, len = 0; - + if (!pack_buf || !pass) return -1; - + /* packing unicode domain name and password */ len += tdb_pack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, "d", pass->uni_name_len); - + for (idx = 0; idx < 32; idx++) len += tdb_pack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, "w", pass->uni_name[idx]); - + len += tdb_pack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, "dPd", pass->pass_len, pass->pass, pass->mod_time); @@ -430,24 +430,24 @@ static size_t tdb_trusted_dom_pass_unpack(uint8 *pack_buf, int bufsize, TRUSTED_DOM_PASS* pass) { int idx, len = 0; - + if (!pack_buf || !pass) return -1; /* unpack unicode domain name and plaintext password */ len += tdb_unpack(pack_buf, bufsize - len, "d", &pass->uni_name_len); - + for (idx = 0; idx < 32; idx++) len += tdb_unpack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, "w", &pass->uni_name[idx]); len += tdb_unpack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, "dPd", &pass->pass_len, &pass->pass, &pass->mod_time); - + /* unpack domain sid */ len += tdb_sid_unpack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, &pass->domain_sid); - - return len; + + return len; } /************************************************************************ @@ -459,7 +459,7 @@ BOOL secrets_fetch_trusted_domain_password(const char *domain, char** pwd, { struct trusted_dom_pass pass; size_t size = 0; - + /* unpacking structures */ uint8 *pass_buf; int pass_len = 0; @@ -481,8 +481,8 @@ BOOL secrets_fetch_trusted_domain_password(const char *domain, char** pwd, DEBUG(5, ("Invalid secrets size. Unpacked data doesn't match trusted_dom_pass structure.\n")); return False; } - - /* the trust's password */ + + /* the trust's password */ if (pwd) { *pwd = SMB_STRDUP(pass.pass); if (!*pwd) { @@ -495,7 +495,7 @@ BOOL secrets_fetch_trusted_domain_password(const char *domain, char** pwd, /* domain sid */ if (sid != NULL) sid_copy(sid, &pass.domain_sid); - + return True; } @@ -518,7 +518,7 @@ BOOL secrets_store_trusted_domain_password(const char* domain, const char* pwd, pstring pass_buf; int pass_len = 0; int pass_buf_len = sizeof(pass_buf); - + struct trusted_dom_pass pass; ZERO_STRUCT(pass); @@ -527,7 +527,7 @@ BOOL secrets_store_trusted_domain_password(const char* domain, const char* pwd, domain)); return False; } - + strncpy_w(pass.uni_name, uni_dom_name, sizeof(pass.uni_name) - 1); pass.uni_name_len = strlen_w(uni_dom_name)+1; SAFE_FREE(uni_dom_name); @@ -541,7 +541,7 @@ BOOL secrets_store_trusted_domain_password(const char* domain, const char* pwd, /* domain sid */ sid_copy(&pass.domain_sid, sid); - + pass_len = tdb_trusted_dom_pass_pack((uint8 *)pass_buf, pass_buf_len, &pass); return secrets_store(trustdom_keystr(domain), (void *)&pass_buf, pass_len); @@ -579,7 +579,7 @@ BOOL secrets_store_machine_password(const char *pass, const char *domain, uint32 tdb_errorstr(tdb))); goto fail; } - + if (asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_MACHINE_LAST_CHANGE_TIME, domain) == -1) { DEBUG(5, ("asprintf failed\n")); @@ -596,7 +596,7 @@ BOOL secrets_store_machine_password(const char *pass, const char *domain, uint32 tdb_errorstr(tdb))); goto fail; } - + if (asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_MACHINE_SEC_CHANNEL_TYPE, domain) == -1) { DEBUG(5, ("asprintf failed\n")); @@ -634,7 +634,7 @@ BOOL secrets_store_machine_password(const char *pass, const char *domain, uint32 the password is assumed to be a null terminated ascii string. ************************************************************************/ -char *secrets_fetch_machine_password(const char *domain, +char *secrets_fetch_machine_password(const char *domain, time_t *pass_last_set_time, uint32 *channel) { @@ -644,7 +644,7 @@ char *secrets_fetch_machine_password(const char *domain, strupper_m(key); ret = (char *)secrets_fetch(key, NULL); SAFE_FREE(key); - + if (pass_last_set_time) { size_t size; uint32 *last_set_time; @@ -659,7 +659,7 @@ char *secrets_fetch_machine_password(const char *domain, } SAFE_FREE(key); } - + if (channel) { size_t size; uint32 *channel_type; @@ -674,7 +674,7 @@ char *secrets_fetch_machine_password(const char *domain, } SAFE_FREE(key); } - + return ret; } @@ -691,14 +691,14 @@ BOOL secrets_store_ldap_pw(const char* dn, char* pw) { char *key = NULL; BOOL ret; - + if (asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_LDAP_BIND_PW, dn) < 0) { DEBUG(0, ("secrets_store_ldap_pw: asprintf failed!\n")); return False; } - + ret = secrets_store(key, pw, strlen(pw)+1); - + SAFE_FREE(key); return ret; } @@ -711,14 +711,14 @@ BOOL fetch_ldap_pw(char **dn, char** pw) { char *key = NULL; size_t size = 0; - + *dn = smb_xstrdup(lp_ldap_admin_dn()); - + if (asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_LDAP_BIND_PW, *dn) < 0) { SAFE_FREE(*dn); DEBUG(0, ("fetch_ldap_pw: asprintf failed!\n")); } - + *pw=(char *)secrets_fetch(key, &size); SAFE_FREE(key); @@ -728,7 +728,7 @@ BOOL fetch_ldap_pw(char **dn, char** pw) char* old_style_key = SMB_STRDUP(*dn); char *data; fstring old_style_pw; - + if (!old_style_key) { DEBUG(0, ("fetch_ldap_pw: strdup failed!\n")); return False; @@ -736,7 +736,7 @@ BOOL fetch_ldap_pw(char **dn, char** pw) for (p=old_style_key; *p; p++) if (*p == ',') *p = '/'; - + data=(char *)secrets_fetch(old_style_key, &size); if (!size && size < sizeof(old_style_pw)) { DEBUG(0,("fetch_ldap_pw: neither ldap secret retrieved!\n")); @@ -755,7 +755,7 @@ BOOL fetch_ldap_pw(char **dn, char** pw) DEBUG(0,("fetch_ldap_pw: ldap secret could not be upgraded!\n")); SAFE_FREE(old_style_key); SAFE_FREE(*dn); - return False; + return False; } if (!secrets_delete(old_style_key)) { DEBUG(0,("fetch_ldap_pw: old ldap secret could not be deleted!\n")); @@ -763,15 +763,15 @@ BOOL fetch_ldap_pw(char **dn, char** pw) SAFE_FREE(old_style_key); - *pw = smb_xstrdup(old_style_pw); + *pw = smb_xstrdup(old_style_pw); } - + return True; } /** * Get trusted domains info from secrets.tdb. - **/ + **/ NTSTATUS secrets_trusted_domains(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, uint32 *num_domains, struct trustdom_info ***domains) @@ -785,7 +785,7 @@ NTSTATUS secrets_trusted_domains(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, uint32 *num_domains, } if (!secrets_init()) return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; - + /* generate searching pattern */ pattern = talloc_asprintf(tmp_ctx, "%s/*", SECRETS_DOMTRUST_ACCT_PASS); if (pattern == NULL) { @@ -817,7 +817,7 @@ NTSTATUS secrets_trusted_domains(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, uint32 *num_domains, struct trusted_dom_pass pass; char *secrets_key; struct trustdom_info *dom_info; - + /* important: ensure null-termination of the key string */ secrets_key = talloc_strndup(tmp_ctx, (const char *)k->node_key.dptr, @@ -834,7 +834,7 @@ NTSTATUS secrets_trusted_domains(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, uint32 *num_domains, &pass); /* packed representation isn't needed anymore */ SAFE_FREE(packed_pass); - + if (size != packed_size) { DEBUG(2, ("Secrets record %s is invalid!\n", secrets_key)); @@ -875,7 +875,7 @@ NTSTATUS secrets_trusted_domains(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, uint32 *num_domains, return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; } } - + DEBUG(5, ("secrets_get_trusted_domains: got %d domains\n", *num_domains)); @@ -971,7 +971,7 @@ BOOL secrets_fetch_afs_key(const char *cell, struct afs_key *result) /****************************************************************************** When kerberos is not available, choose between anonymous or - authenticated connections. + authenticated connections. We need to use an authenticated connection if DCs have the RestrictAnonymous registry entry set > 0, or the "Additional @@ -985,16 +985,16 @@ void secrets_fetch_ipc_userpass(char **username, char **domain, char **password) *username = (char *)secrets_fetch(SECRETS_AUTH_USER, NULL); *domain = (char *)secrets_fetch(SECRETS_AUTH_DOMAIN, NULL); *password = (char *)secrets_fetch(SECRETS_AUTH_PASSWORD, NULL); - + if (*username && **username) { if (!*domain || !**domain) *domain = smb_xstrdup(lp_workgroup()); - + if (!*password || !**password) *password = smb_xstrdup(""); - DEBUG(3, ("IPC$ connections done by user %s\\%s\n", + DEBUG(3, ("IPC$ connections done by user %s\\%s\n", *domain, *username)); } else { @@ -1230,14 +1230,14 @@ BOOL secrets_store_generic(const char *owner, const char *key, const char *secre { char *tdbkey = NULL; BOOL ret; - + if (asprintf(&tdbkey, "SECRETS/GENERIC/%s/%s", owner, key) < 0) { DEBUG(0, ("asprintf failed!\n")); return False; } - + ret = secrets_store(tdbkey, secret, strlen(secret)+1); - + SAFE_FREE(tdbkey); return ret; } @@ -1260,7 +1260,7 @@ char *secrets_fetch_generic(const char *owner, const char *key) DEBUG(0, ("Out of memory!\n")); return NULL; } - + secret = (char *)secrets_fetch(tdbkey, NULL); SAFE_FREE(tdbkey); |