diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c | 2419 |
1 files changed, 2419 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..be7d3db444 --- /dev/null +++ b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c @@ -0,0 +1,2419 @@ +/* + * Unix SMB/CIFS implementation. + * RPC Pipe client / server routines + * Almost completely rewritten by (C) Jeremy Allison 2005. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or + * (at your option) any later version. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. + */ + +/* this module apparently provides an implementation of DCE/RPC over a + * named pipe (IPC$ connection using SMBtrans). details of DCE/RPC + * documentation are available (in on-line form) from the X-Open group. + * + * this module should provide a level of abstraction between SMB + * and DCE/RPC, while minimising the amount of mallocs, unnecessary + * data copies, and network traffic. + * + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +extern struct current_user current_user; + +#undef DBGC_CLASS +#define DBGC_CLASS DBGC_RPC_SRV + +static void free_pipe_ntlmssp_auth_data(struct pipe_auth_data *auth) +{ + AUTH_NTLMSSP_STATE *a = auth->a_u.auth_ntlmssp_state; + + if (a) { + auth_ntlmssp_end(&a); + } + auth->a_u.auth_ntlmssp_state = NULL; +} + +static DATA_BLOB generic_session_key(void) +{ + return data_blob("SystemLibraryDTC", 16); +} + +/******************************************************************* + Generate the next PDU to be returned from the data in p->rdata. + Handle NTLMSSP. + ********************************************************************/ + +static bool create_next_pdu_ntlmssp(pipes_struct *p) +{ + RPC_HDR_RESP hdr_resp; + uint32 ss_padding_len = 0; + uint32 data_space_available; + uint32 data_len_left; + uint32 data_len; + prs_struct outgoing_pdu; + NTSTATUS status; + DATA_BLOB auth_blob; + RPC_HDR_AUTH auth_info; + uint8 auth_type, auth_level; + AUTH_NTLMSSP_STATE *a = p->auth.a_u.auth_ntlmssp_state; + + /* + * If we're in the fault state, keep returning fault PDU's until + * the pipe gets closed. JRA. + */ + + if(p->fault_state) { + setup_fault_pdu(p, NT_STATUS(DCERPC_FAULT_OP_RNG_ERROR)); + return True; + } + + memset((char *)&hdr_resp, '\0', sizeof(hdr_resp)); + + /* Change the incoming request header to a response. */ + p->hdr.pkt_type = RPC_RESPONSE; + + /* Set up rpc header flags. */ + if (p->out_data.data_sent_length == 0) { + p->hdr.flags = RPC_FLG_FIRST; + } else { + p->hdr.flags = 0; + } + + /* + * Work out how much we can fit in a single PDU. + */ + + data_len_left = prs_offset(&p->out_data.rdata) - p->out_data.data_sent_length; + + /* + * Ensure there really is data left to send. + */ + + if(!data_len_left) { + DEBUG(0,("create_next_pdu_ntlmssp: no data left to send !\n")); + return False; + } + + data_space_available = sizeof(p->out_data.current_pdu) - RPC_HEADER_LEN - RPC_HDR_RESP_LEN - + RPC_HDR_AUTH_LEN - NTLMSSP_SIG_SIZE; + + /* + * The amount we send is the minimum of the available + * space and the amount left to send. + */ + + data_len = MIN(data_len_left, data_space_available); + + /* + * Set up the alloc hint. This should be the data left to + * send. + */ + + hdr_resp.alloc_hint = data_len_left; + + /* + * Work out if this PDU will be the last. + */ + + if(p->out_data.data_sent_length + data_len >= prs_offset(&p->out_data.rdata)) { + p->hdr.flags |= RPC_FLG_LAST; + if (data_len_left % 8) { + ss_padding_len = 8 - (data_len_left % 8); + DEBUG(10,("create_next_pdu_ntlmssp: adding sign/seal padding of %u\n", + ss_padding_len )); + } + } + + /* + * Set up the header lengths. + */ + + p->hdr.frag_len = RPC_HEADER_LEN + RPC_HDR_RESP_LEN + + data_len + ss_padding_len + + RPC_HDR_AUTH_LEN + NTLMSSP_SIG_SIZE; + p->hdr.auth_len = NTLMSSP_SIG_SIZE; + + + /* + * Init the parse struct to point at the outgoing + * data. + */ + + prs_init_empty( &outgoing_pdu, p->mem_ctx, MARSHALL); + prs_give_memory( &outgoing_pdu, (char *)p->out_data.current_pdu, sizeof(p->out_data.current_pdu), False); + + /* Store the header in the data stream. */ + if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr("hdr", &p->hdr, &outgoing_pdu, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("create_next_pdu_ntlmssp: failed to marshall RPC_HDR.\n")); + prs_mem_free(&outgoing_pdu); + return False; + } + + if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr_resp("resp", &hdr_resp, &outgoing_pdu, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("create_next_pdu_ntlmssp: failed to marshall RPC_HDR_RESP.\n")); + prs_mem_free(&outgoing_pdu); + return False; + } + + /* Copy the data into the PDU. */ + + if(!prs_append_some_prs_data(&outgoing_pdu, &p->out_data.rdata, p->out_data.data_sent_length, data_len)) { + DEBUG(0,("create_next_pdu_ntlmssp: failed to copy %u bytes of data.\n", (unsigned int)data_len)); + prs_mem_free(&outgoing_pdu); + return False; + } + + /* Copy the sign/seal padding data. */ + if (ss_padding_len) { + char pad[8]; + + memset(pad, '\0', 8); + if (!prs_copy_data_in(&outgoing_pdu, pad, ss_padding_len)) { + DEBUG(0,("create_next_pdu_ntlmssp: failed to add %u bytes of pad data.\n", + (unsigned int)ss_padding_len)); + prs_mem_free(&outgoing_pdu); + return False; + } + } + + + /* Now write out the auth header and null blob. */ + if (p->auth.auth_type == PIPE_AUTH_TYPE_NTLMSSP) { + auth_type = RPC_NTLMSSP_AUTH_TYPE; + } else { + auth_type = RPC_SPNEGO_AUTH_TYPE; + } + if (p->auth.auth_level == PIPE_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY) { + auth_level = RPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY; + } else { + auth_level = RPC_AUTH_LEVEL_INTEGRITY; + } + + init_rpc_hdr_auth(&auth_info, auth_type, auth_level, ss_padding_len, 1 /* context id. */); + if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr_auth("hdr_auth", &auth_info, &outgoing_pdu, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("create_next_pdu_ntlmssp: failed to marshall RPC_HDR_AUTH.\n")); + prs_mem_free(&outgoing_pdu); + return False; + } + + /* Generate the sign blob. */ + + switch (p->auth.auth_level) { + case PIPE_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY: + /* Data portion is encrypted. */ + status = ntlmssp_seal_packet(a->ntlmssp_state, + (unsigned char *)prs_data_p(&outgoing_pdu) + RPC_HEADER_LEN + RPC_HDR_RESP_LEN, + data_len + ss_padding_len, + (unsigned char *)prs_data_p(&outgoing_pdu), + (size_t)prs_offset(&outgoing_pdu), + &auth_blob); + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { + data_blob_free(&auth_blob); + prs_mem_free(&outgoing_pdu); + return False; + } + break; + case PIPE_AUTH_LEVEL_INTEGRITY: + /* Data is signed. */ + status = ntlmssp_sign_packet(a->ntlmssp_state, + (unsigned char *)prs_data_p(&outgoing_pdu) + RPC_HEADER_LEN + RPC_HDR_RESP_LEN, + data_len + ss_padding_len, + (unsigned char *)prs_data_p(&outgoing_pdu), + (size_t)prs_offset(&outgoing_pdu), + &auth_blob); + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { + data_blob_free(&auth_blob); + prs_mem_free(&outgoing_pdu); + return False; + } + break; + default: + prs_mem_free(&outgoing_pdu); + return False; + } + + /* Append the auth blob. */ + if (!prs_copy_data_in(&outgoing_pdu, (char *)auth_blob.data, NTLMSSP_SIG_SIZE)) { + DEBUG(0,("create_next_pdu_ntlmssp: failed to add %u bytes auth blob.\n", + (unsigned int)NTLMSSP_SIG_SIZE)); + data_blob_free(&auth_blob); + prs_mem_free(&outgoing_pdu); + return False; + } + + data_blob_free(&auth_blob); + + /* + * Setup the counts for this PDU. + */ + + p->out_data.data_sent_length += data_len; + p->out_data.current_pdu_len = p->hdr.frag_len; + p->out_data.current_pdu_sent = 0; + + prs_mem_free(&outgoing_pdu); + return True; +} + +/******************************************************************* + Generate the next PDU to be returned from the data in p->rdata. + Return an schannel authenticated fragment. + ********************************************************************/ + +static bool create_next_pdu_schannel(pipes_struct *p) +{ + RPC_HDR_RESP hdr_resp; + uint32 ss_padding_len = 0; + uint32 data_len; + uint32 data_space_available; + uint32 data_len_left; + prs_struct outgoing_pdu; + uint32 data_pos; + + /* + * If we're in the fault state, keep returning fault PDU's until + * the pipe gets closed. JRA. + */ + + if(p->fault_state) { + setup_fault_pdu(p, NT_STATUS(DCERPC_FAULT_OP_RNG_ERROR)); + return True; + } + + memset((char *)&hdr_resp, '\0', sizeof(hdr_resp)); + + /* Change the incoming request header to a response. */ + p->hdr.pkt_type = RPC_RESPONSE; + + /* Set up rpc header flags. */ + if (p->out_data.data_sent_length == 0) { + p->hdr.flags = RPC_FLG_FIRST; + } else { + p->hdr.flags = 0; + } + + /* + * Work out how much we can fit in a single PDU. + */ + + data_len_left = prs_offset(&p->out_data.rdata) - p->out_data.data_sent_length; + + /* + * Ensure there really is data left to send. + */ + + if(!data_len_left) { + DEBUG(0,("create_next_pdu_schannel: no data left to send !\n")); + return False; + } + + data_space_available = sizeof(p->out_data.current_pdu) - RPC_HEADER_LEN - RPC_HDR_RESP_LEN - + RPC_HDR_AUTH_LEN - RPC_AUTH_SCHANNEL_SIGN_OR_SEAL_CHK_LEN; + + /* + * The amount we send is the minimum of the available + * space and the amount left to send. + */ + + data_len = MIN(data_len_left, data_space_available); + + /* + * Set up the alloc hint. This should be the data left to + * send. + */ + + hdr_resp.alloc_hint = data_len_left; + + /* + * Work out if this PDU will be the last. + */ + + if(p->out_data.data_sent_length + data_len >= prs_offset(&p->out_data.rdata)) { + p->hdr.flags |= RPC_FLG_LAST; + if (data_len_left % 8) { + ss_padding_len = 8 - (data_len_left % 8); + DEBUG(10,("create_next_pdu_schannel: adding sign/seal padding of %u\n", + ss_padding_len )); + } + } + + p->hdr.frag_len = RPC_HEADER_LEN + RPC_HDR_RESP_LEN + data_len + ss_padding_len + + RPC_HDR_AUTH_LEN + RPC_AUTH_SCHANNEL_SIGN_OR_SEAL_CHK_LEN; + p->hdr.auth_len = RPC_AUTH_SCHANNEL_SIGN_OR_SEAL_CHK_LEN; + + /* + * Init the parse struct to point at the outgoing + * data. + */ + + prs_init_empty( &outgoing_pdu, p->mem_ctx, MARSHALL); + prs_give_memory( &outgoing_pdu, (char *)p->out_data.current_pdu, sizeof(p->out_data.current_pdu), False); + + /* Store the header in the data stream. */ + if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr("hdr", &p->hdr, &outgoing_pdu, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("create_next_pdu_schannel: failed to marshall RPC_HDR.\n")); + prs_mem_free(&outgoing_pdu); + return False; + } + + if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr_resp("resp", &hdr_resp, &outgoing_pdu, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("create_next_pdu_schannel: failed to marshall RPC_HDR_RESP.\n")); + prs_mem_free(&outgoing_pdu); + return False; + } + + /* Store the current offset. */ + data_pos = prs_offset(&outgoing_pdu); + + /* Copy the data into the PDU. */ + + if(!prs_append_some_prs_data(&outgoing_pdu, &p->out_data.rdata, p->out_data.data_sent_length, data_len)) { + DEBUG(0,("create_next_pdu_schannel: failed to copy %u bytes of data.\n", (unsigned int)data_len)); + prs_mem_free(&outgoing_pdu); + return False; + } + + /* Copy the sign/seal padding data. */ + if (ss_padding_len) { + char pad[8]; + memset(pad, '\0', 8); + if (!prs_copy_data_in(&outgoing_pdu, pad, ss_padding_len)) { + DEBUG(0,("create_next_pdu_schannel: failed to add %u bytes of pad data.\n", (unsigned int)ss_padding_len)); + prs_mem_free(&outgoing_pdu); + return False; + } + } + + { + /* + * Schannel processing. + */ + char *data; + RPC_HDR_AUTH auth_info; + RPC_AUTH_SCHANNEL_CHK verf; + + data = prs_data_p(&outgoing_pdu) + data_pos; + /* Check it's the type of reply we were expecting to decode */ + + init_rpc_hdr_auth(&auth_info, + RPC_SCHANNEL_AUTH_TYPE, + p->auth.auth_level == PIPE_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY ? + RPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY : RPC_AUTH_LEVEL_INTEGRITY, + ss_padding_len, 1); + + if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr_auth("hdr_auth", &auth_info, &outgoing_pdu, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("create_next_pdu_schannel: failed to marshall RPC_HDR_AUTH.\n")); + prs_mem_free(&outgoing_pdu); + return False; + } + + schannel_encode(p->auth.a_u.schannel_auth, + p->auth.auth_level, + SENDER_IS_ACCEPTOR, + &verf, data, data_len + ss_padding_len); + + if (!smb_io_rpc_auth_schannel_chk("", RPC_AUTH_SCHANNEL_SIGN_OR_SEAL_CHK_LEN, + &verf, &outgoing_pdu, 0)) { + prs_mem_free(&outgoing_pdu); + return False; + } + + p->auth.a_u.schannel_auth->seq_num++; + } + + /* + * Setup the counts for this PDU. + */ + + p->out_data.data_sent_length += data_len; + p->out_data.current_pdu_len = p->hdr.frag_len; + p->out_data.current_pdu_sent = 0; + + prs_mem_free(&outgoing_pdu); + return True; +} + +/******************************************************************* + Generate the next PDU to be returned from the data in p->rdata. + No authentication done. +********************************************************************/ + +static bool create_next_pdu_noauth(pipes_struct *p) +{ + RPC_HDR_RESP hdr_resp; + uint32 data_len; + uint32 data_space_available; + uint32 data_len_left; + prs_struct outgoing_pdu; + + /* + * If we're in the fault state, keep returning fault PDU's until + * the pipe gets closed. JRA. + */ + + if(p->fault_state) { + setup_fault_pdu(p, NT_STATUS(DCERPC_FAULT_OP_RNG_ERROR)); + return True; + } + + memset((char *)&hdr_resp, '\0', sizeof(hdr_resp)); + + /* Change the incoming request header to a response. */ + p->hdr.pkt_type = RPC_RESPONSE; + + /* Set up rpc header flags. */ + if (p->out_data.data_sent_length == 0) { + p->hdr.flags = RPC_FLG_FIRST; + } else { + p->hdr.flags = 0; + } + + /* + * Work out how much we can fit in a single PDU. + */ + + data_len_left = prs_offset(&p->out_data.rdata) - p->out_data.data_sent_length; + + /* + * Ensure there really is data left to send. + */ + + if(!data_len_left) { + DEBUG(0,("create_next_pdu_noath: no data left to send !\n")); + return False; + } + + data_space_available = sizeof(p->out_data.current_pdu) - RPC_HEADER_LEN - RPC_HDR_RESP_LEN; + + /* + * The amount we send is the minimum of the available + * space and the amount left to send. + */ + + data_len = MIN(data_len_left, data_space_available); + + /* + * Set up the alloc hint. This should be the data left to + * send. + */ + + hdr_resp.alloc_hint = data_len_left; + + /* + * Work out if this PDU will be the last. + */ + + if(p->out_data.data_sent_length + data_len >= prs_offset(&p->out_data.rdata)) { + p->hdr.flags |= RPC_FLG_LAST; + } + + /* + * Set up the header lengths. + */ + + p->hdr.frag_len = RPC_HEADER_LEN + RPC_HDR_RESP_LEN + data_len; + p->hdr.auth_len = 0; + + /* + * Init the parse struct to point at the outgoing + * data. + */ + + prs_init_empty( &outgoing_pdu, p->mem_ctx, MARSHALL); + prs_give_memory( &outgoing_pdu, (char *)p->out_data.current_pdu, sizeof(p->out_data.current_pdu), False); + + /* Store the header in the data stream. */ + if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr("hdr", &p->hdr, &outgoing_pdu, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("create_next_pdu_noath: failed to marshall RPC_HDR.\n")); + prs_mem_free(&outgoing_pdu); + return False; + } + + if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr_resp("resp", &hdr_resp, &outgoing_pdu, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("create_next_pdu_noath: failed to marshall RPC_HDR_RESP.\n")); + prs_mem_free(&outgoing_pdu); + return False; + } + + /* Copy the data into the PDU. */ + + if(!prs_append_some_prs_data(&outgoing_pdu, &p->out_data.rdata, p->out_data.data_sent_length, data_len)) { + DEBUG(0,("create_next_pdu_noauth: failed to copy %u bytes of data.\n", (unsigned int)data_len)); + prs_mem_free(&outgoing_pdu); + return False; + } + + /* + * Setup the counts for this PDU. + */ + + p->out_data.data_sent_length += data_len; + p->out_data.current_pdu_len = p->hdr.frag_len; + p->out_data.current_pdu_sent = 0; + + prs_mem_free(&outgoing_pdu); + return True; +} + +/******************************************************************* + Generate the next PDU to be returned from the data in p->rdata. +********************************************************************/ + +bool create_next_pdu(pipes_struct *p) +{ + switch(p->auth.auth_level) { + case PIPE_AUTH_LEVEL_NONE: + case PIPE_AUTH_LEVEL_CONNECT: + /* This is incorrect for auth level connect. Fixme. JRA */ + return create_next_pdu_noauth(p); + + default: + switch(p->auth.auth_type) { + case PIPE_AUTH_TYPE_NTLMSSP: + case PIPE_AUTH_TYPE_SPNEGO_NTLMSSP: + return create_next_pdu_ntlmssp(p); + case PIPE_AUTH_TYPE_SCHANNEL: + return create_next_pdu_schannel(p); + default: + break; + } + } + + DEBUG(0,("create_next_pdu: invalid internal auth level %u / type %u", + (unsigned int)p->auth.auth_level, + (unsigned int)p->auth.auth_type)); + return False; +} + +/******************************************************************* + Process an NTLMSSP authentication response. + If this function succeeds, the user has been authenticated + and their domain, name and calling workstation stored in + the pipe struct. +*******************************************************************/ + +static bool pipe_ntlmssp_verify_final(pipes_struct *p, DATA_BLOB *p_resp_blob) +{ + DATA_BLOB session_key, reply; + NTSTATUS status; + AUTH_NTLMSSP_STATE *a = p->auth.a_u.auth_ntlmssp_state; + bool ret; + + DEBUG(5,("pipe_ntlmssp_verify_final: pipe %s checking user details\n", p->name)); + + ZERO_STRUCT(reply); + + /* Set up for non-authenticated user. */ + TALLOC_FREE(p->pipe_user.nt_user_token); + p->pipe_user.ut.ngroups = 0; + SAFE_FREE( p->pipe_user.ut.groups); + + /* this has to be done as root in order to verify the password */ + become_root(); + status = auth_ntlmssp_update(a, *p_resp_blob, &reply); + unbecome_root(); + + /* Don't generate a reply. */ + data_blob_free(&reply); + + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { + return False; + } + + /* Finally - if the pipe negotiated integrity (sign) or privacy (seal) + ensure the underlying NTLMSSP flags are also set. If not we should + refuse the bind. */ + + if (p->auth.auth_level == PIPE_AUTH_LEVEL_INTEGRITY) { + if (!(a->ntlmssp_state->neg_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN)) { + DEBUG(0,("pipe_ntlmssp_verify_final: pipe %s : packet integrity requested " + "but client declined signing.\n", + p->name )); + return False; + } + } + if (p->auth.auth_level == PIPE_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY) { + if (!(a->ntlmssp_state->neg_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL)) { + DEBUG(0,("pipe_ntlmssp_verify_final: pipe %s : packet privacy requested " + "but client declined sealing.\n", + p->name )); + return False; + } + } + + DEBUG(5, ("pipe_ntlmssp_verify_final: OK: user: %s domain: %s " + "workstation: %s\n", a->ntlmssp_state->user, + a->ntlmssp_state->domain, a->ntlmssp_state->workstation)); + + /* + * Store the UNIX credential data (uid/gid pair) in the pipe structure. + */ + + p->pipe_user.ut.uid = a->server_info->utok.uid; + p->pipe_user.ut.gid = a->server_info->utok.gid; + + p->pipe_user.ut.ngroups = a->server_info->utok.ngroups; + if (p->pipe_user.ut.ngroups) { + if (!(p->pipe_user.ut.groups = (gid_t *)memdup( + a->server_info->utok.groups, + sizeof(gid_t) * p->pipe_user.ut.ngroups))) { + DEBUG(0,("failed to memdup group list to p->pipe_user.groups\n")); + return False; + } + } + + if (a->server_info->ptok) { + p->pipe_user.nt_user_token = + dup_nt_token(NULL, a->server_info->ptok); + } else { + DEBUG(1,("Error: Authmodule failed to provide nt_user_token\n")); + p->pipe_user.nt_user_token = NULL; + return False; + } + + TALLOC_FREE(p->server_info); + + p->server_info = copy_serverinfo(p, a->server_info); + if (p->server_info == NULL) { + DEBUG(0, ("copy_serverinfo failed\n")); + return false; + } + + /* + * We're an authenticated bind over smb, so the session key needs to + * be set to "SystemLibraryDTC". Weird, but this is what Windows + * does. See the RPC-SAMBA3SESSIONKEY. + */ + + session_key = generic_session_key(); + if (session_key.data == NULL) { + return False; + } + + ret = server_info_set_session_key(p->server_info, session_key); + + data_blob_free(&session_key); + + return True; +} + +/******************************************************************* + The switch table for the pipe names and the functions to handle them. +*******************************************************************/ + +struct rpc_table { + struct { + const char *clnt; + const char *srv; + } pipe; + struct ndr_syntax_id rpc_interface; + const struct api_struct *cmds; + int n_cmds; +}; + +static struct rpc_table *rpc_lookup; +static int rpc_lookup_size; + +/******************************************************************* + This is the "stage3" NTLMSSP response after a bind request and reply. +*******************************************************************/ + +bool api_pipe_bind_auth3(pipes_struct *p, prs_struct *rpc_in_p) +{ + RPC_HDR_AUTH auth_info; + uint32 pad; + DATA_BLOB blob; + + ZERO_STRUCT(blob); + + DEBUG(5,("api_pipe_bind_auth3: decode request. %d\n", __LINE__)); + + if (p->hdr.auth_len == 0) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_auth3: No auth field sent !\n")); + goto err; + } + + /* 4 bytes padding. */ + if (!prs_uint32("pad", rpc_in_p, 0, &pad)) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_auth3: unmarshall of 4 byte pad failed.\n")); + goto err; + } + + /* + * Decode the authentication verifier response. + */ + + if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr_auth("", &auth_info, rpc_in_p, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_auth3: unmarshall of RPC_HDR_AUTH failed.\n")); + goto err; + } + + if (auth_info.auth_type != RPC_NTLMSSP_AUTH_TYPE) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_auth3: incorrect auth type (%u).\n", + (unsigned int)auth_info.auth_type )); + return False; + } + + blob = data_blob(NULL,p->hdr.auth_len); + + if (!prs_copy_data_out((char *)blob.data, rpc_in_p, p->hdr.auth_len)) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_auth3: Failed to pull %u bytes - the response blob.\n", + (unsigned int)p->hdr.auth_len )); + goto err; + } + + /* + * The following call actually checks the challenge/response data. + * for correctness against the given DOMAIN\user name. + */ + + if (!pipe_ntlmssp_verify_final(p, &blob)) { + goto err; + } + + data_blob_free(&blob); + + p->pipe_bound = True; + + return True; + + err: + + data_blob_free(&blob); + free_pipe_ntlmssp_auth_data(&p->auth); + p->auth.a_u.auth_ntlmssp_state = NULL; + + return False; +} + +/******************************************************************* + Marshall a bind_nak pdu. +*******************************************************************/ + +static bool setup_bind_nak(pipes_struct *p) +{ + prs_struct outgoing_rpc; + RPC_HDR nak_hdr; + uint16 zero = 0; + + /* Free any memory in the current return data buffer. */ + prs_mem_free(&p->out_data.rdata); + + /* + * Marshall directly into the outgoing PDU space. We + * must do this as we need to set to the bind response + * header and are never sending more than one PDU here. + */ + + prs_init_empty( &outgoing_rpc, p->mem_ctx, MARSHALL); + prs_give_memory( &outgoing_rpc, (char *)p->out_data.current_pdu, sizeof(p->out_data.current_pdu), False); + + /* + * Initialize a bind_nak header. + */ + + init_rpc_hdr(&nak_hdr, RPC_BINDNACK, RPC_FLG_FIRST | RPC_FLG_LAST, + p->hdr.call_id, RPC_HEADER_LEN + sizeof(uint16), 0); + + /* + * Marshall the header into the outgoing PDU. + */ + + if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr("", &nak_hdr, &outgoing_rpc, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("setup_bind_nak: marshalling of RPC_HDR failed.\n")); + prs_mem_free(&outgoing_rpc); + return False; + } + + /* + * Now add the reject reason. + */ + + if(!prs_uint16("reject code", &outgoing_rpc, 0, &zero)) { + prs_mem_free(&outgoing_rpc); + return False; + } + + p->out_data.data_sent_length = 0; + p->out_data.current_pdu_len = prs_offset(&outgoing_rpc); + p->out_data.current_pdu_sent = 0; + + if (p->auth.auth_data_free_func) { + (*p->auth.auth_data_free_func)(&p->auth); + } + p->auth.auth_level = PIPE_AUTH_LEVEL_NONE; + p->auth.auth_type = PIPE_AUTH_TYPE_NONE; + p->pipe_bound = False; + + return True; +} + +/******************************************************************* + Marshall a fault pdu. +*******************************************************************/ + +bool setup_fault_pdu(pipes_struct *p, NTSTATUS status) +{ + prs_struct outgoing_pdu; + RPC_HDR fault_hdr; + RPC_HDR_RESP hdr_resp; + RPC_HDR_FAULT fault_resp; + + /* Free any memory in the current return data buffer. */ + prs_mem_free(&p->out_data.rdata); + + /* + * Marshall directly into the outgoing PDU space. We + * must do this as we need to set to the bind response + * header and are never sending more than one PDU here. + */ + + prs_init_empty( &outgoing_pdu, p->mem_ctx, MARSHALL); + prs_give_memory( &outgoing_pdu, (char *)p->out_data.current_pdu, sizeof(p->out_data.current_pdu), False); + + /* + * Initialize a fault header. + */ + + init_rpc_hdr(&fault_hdr, RPC_FAULT, RPC_FLG_FIRST | RPC_FLG_LAST | RPC_FLG_NOCALL, + p->hdr.call_id, RPC_HEADER_LEN + RPC_HDR_RESP_LEN + RPC_HDR_FAULT_LEN, 0); + + /* + * Initialize the HDR_RESP and FAULT parts of the PDU. + */ + + memset((char *)&hdr_resp, '\0', sizeof(hdr_resp)); + + fault_resp.status = status; + fault_resp.reserved = 0; + + /* + * Marshall the header into the outgoing PDU. + */ + + if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr("", &fault_hdr, &outgoing_pdu, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("setup_fault_pdu: marshalling of RPC_HDR failed.\n")); + prs_mem_free(&outgoing_pdu); + return False; + } + + if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr_resp("resp", &hdr_resp, &outgoing_pdu, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("setup_fault_pdu: failed to marshall RPC_HDR_RESP.\n")); + prs_mem_free(&outgoing_pdu); + return False; + } + + if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr_fault("fault", &fault_resp, &outgoing_pdu, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("setup_fault_pdu: failed to marshall RPC_HDR_FAULT.\n")); + prs_mem_free(&outgoing_pdu); + return False; + } + + p->out_data.data_sent_length = 0; + p->out_data.current_pdu_len = prs_offset(&outgoing_pdu); + p->out_data.current_pdu_sent = 0; + + prs_mem_free(&outgoing_pdu); + return True; +} + +#if 0 +/******************************************************************* + Marshall a cancel_ack pdu. + We should probably check the auth-verifier here. +*******************************************************************/ + +bool setup_cancel_ack_reply(pipes_struct *p, prs_struct *rpc_in_p) +{ + prs_struct outgoing_pdu; + RPC_HDR ack_reply_hdr; + + /* Free any memory in the current return data buffer. */ + prs_mem_free(&p->out_data.rdata); + + /* + * Marshall directly into the outgoing PDU space. We + * must do this as we need to set to the bind response + * header and are never sending more than one PDU here. + */ + + prs_init_empty( &outgoing_pdu, p->mem_ctx, MARSHALL); + prs_give_memory( &outgoing_pdu, (char *)p->out_data.current_pdu, sizeof(p->out_data.current_pdu), False); + + /* + * Initialize a cancel_ack header. + */ + + init_rpc_hdr(&ack_reply_hdr, RPC_CANCEL_ACK, RPC_FLG_FIRST | RPC_FLG_LAST, + p->hdr.call_id, RPC_HEADER_LEN, 0); + + /* + * Marshall the header into the outgoing PDU. + */ + + if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr("", &ack_reply_hdr, &outgoing_pdu, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("setup_cancel_ack_reply: marshalling of RPC_HDR failed.\n")); + prs_mem_free(&outgoing_pdu); + return False; + } + + p->out_data.data_sent_length = 0; + p->out_data.current_pdu_len = prs_offset(&outgoing_pdu); + p->out_data.current_pdu_sent = 0; + + prs_mem_free(&outgoing_pdu); + return True; +} +#endif + +/******************************************************************* + Ensure a bind request has the correct abstract & transfer interface. + Used to reject unknown binds from Win2k. +*******************************************************************/ + +bool check_bind_req(struct pipes_struct *p, RPC_IFACE* abstract, + RPC_IFACE* transfer, uint32 context_id) +{ + int i=0; + struct pipe_rpc_fns *context_fns; + + DEBUG(3,("check_bind_req for %s\n", p->name)); + + /* we have to check all now since win2k introduced a new UUID on the lsaprpc pipe */ + + for (i=0; i<rpc_lookup_size; i++) { + DEBUGADD(10, ("checking %s\n", rpc_lookup[i].pipe.clnt)); + if (strequal(rpc_lookup[i].pipe.clnt, p->name) + && ndr_syntax_id_equal( + abstract, &rpc_lookup[i].rpc_interface) + && ndr_syntax_id_equal( + transfer, &ndr_transfer_syntax)) { + break; + } + } + + if (i == rpc_lookup_size) { + return false; + } + + context_fns = SMB_MALLOC_P(struct pipe_rpc_fns); + if (context_fns == NULL) { + DEBUG(0,("check_bind_req: malloc() failed!\n")); + return False; + } + + context_fns->cmds = rpc_lookup[i].cmds; + context_fns->n_cmds = rpc_lookup[i].n_cmds; + context_fns->context_id = context_id; + + /* add to the list of open contexts */ + + DLIST_ADD( p->contexts, context_fns ); + + return True; +} + +/******************************************************************* + Register commands to an RPC pipe +*******************************************************************/ + +NTSTATUS rpc_pipe_register_commands(int version, const char *clnt, + const char *srv, + const struct ndr_syntax_id *interface, + const struct api_struct *cmds, int size) +{ + struct rpc_table *rpc_entry; + + if (!clnt || !srv || !cmds) { + return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + + if (version != SMB_RPC_INTERFACE_VERSION) { + DEBUG(0,("Can't register rpc commands!\n" + "You tried to register a rpc module with SMB_RPC_INTERFACE_VERSION %d" + ", while this version of samba uses version %d!\n", + version,SMB_RPC_INTERFACE_VERSION)); + return NT_STATUS_OBJECT_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + + /* TODO: + * + * we still need to make sure that don't register the same commands twice!!! + * + * --metze + */ + + /* We use a temporary variable because this call can fail and + rpc_lookup will still be valid afterwards. It could then succeed if + called again later */ + rpc_lookup_size++; + rpc_entry = SMB_REALLOC_ARRAY_KEEP_OLD_ON_ERROR(rpc_lookup, struct rpc_table, rpc_lookup_size); + if (NULL == rpc_entry) { + rpc_lookup_size--; + DEBUG(0, ("rpc_pipe_register_commands: memory allocation failed\n")); + return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; + } else { + rpc_lookup = rpc_entry; + } + + rpc_entry = rpc_lookup + (rpc_lookup_size - 1); + ZERO_STRUCTP(rpc_entry); + rpc_entry->pipe.clnt = SMB_STRDUP(clnt); + rpc_entry->pipe.srv = SMB_STRDUP(srv); + rpc_entry->rpc_interface = *interface; + rpc_entry->cmds = cmds; + rpc_entry->n_cmds = size; + + return NT_STATUS_OK; +} + +/** + * Is a named pipe known? + * @param[in] cli_filename The pipe name requested by the client + * @result Do we want to serve this? + */ +bool is_known_pipename(const char *cli_filename) +{ + const char *pipename = cli_filename; + int i; + + if (strnequal(pipename, "\\PIPE\\", 6)) { + pipename += 5; + } + + if (*pipename == '\\') { + pipename += 1; + } + + if (lp_disable_spoolss() && strequal(pipename, "spoolss")) { + DEBUG(10, ("refusing spoolss access\n")); + return false; + } + + for (i=0; i<rpc_lookup_size; i++) { + if (strequal(pipename, rpc_lookup[i].pipe.clnt)) { + return true; + } + } + + DEBUG(10, ("is_known_pipename: %s unknown\n", cli_filename)); + return false; +} + +/******************************************************************* + Handle a SPNEGO krb5 bind auth. +*******************************************************************/ + +static bool pipe_spnego_auth_bind_kerberos(pipes_struct *p, prs_struct *rpc_in_p, RPC_HDR_AUTH *pauth_info, + DATA_BLOB *psecblob, prs_struct *pout_auth) +{ + return False; +} + +/******************************************************************* + Handle the first part of a SPNEGO bind auth. +*******************************************************************/ + +static bool pipe_spnego_auth_bind_negotiate(pipes_struct *p, prs_struct *rpc_in_p, + RPC_HDR_AUTH *pauth_info, prs_struct *pout_auth) +{ + DATA_BLOB blob; + DATA_BLOB secblob; + DATA_BLOB response; + DATA_BLOB chal; + char *OIDs[ASN1_MAX_OIDS]; + int i; + NTSTATUS status; + bool got_kerberos_mechanism = false; + AUTH_NTLMSSP_STATE *a = NULL; + RPC_HDR_AUTH auth_info; + + ZERO_STRUCT(secblob); + ZERO_STRUCT(chal); + ZERO_STRUCT(response); + + /* Grab the SPNEGO blob. */ + blob = data_blob(NULL,p->hdr.auth_len); + + if (!prs_copy_data_out((char *)blob.data, rpc_in_p, p->hdr.auth_len)) { + DEBUG(0,("pipe_spnego_auth_bind_negotiate: Failed to pull %u bytes - the SPNEGO auth header.\n", + (unsigned int)p->hdr.auth_len )); + goto err; + } + + if (blob.data[0] != ASN1_APPLICATION(0)) { + goto err; + } + + /* parse out the OIDs and the first sec blob */ + if (!parse_negTokenTarg(blob, OIDs, &secblob)) { + DEBUG(0,("pipe_spnego_auth_bind_negotiate: Failed to parse the security blob.\n")); + goto err; + } + + if (strcmp(OID_KERBEROS5, OIDs[0]) == 0 || strcmp(OID_KERBEROS5_OLD, OIDs[0]) == 0) { + got_kerberos_mechanism = true; + } + + for (i=0;OIDs[i];i++) { + DEBUG(3,("pipe_spnego_auth_bind_negotiate: Got OID %s\n", OIDs[i])); + SAFE_FREE(OIDs[i]); + } + DEBUG(3,("pipe_spnego_auth_bind_negotiate: Got secblob of size %lu\n", (unsigned long)secblob.length)); + + if ( got_kerberos_mechanism && ((lp_security()==SEC_ADS) || lp_use_kerberos_keytab()) ) { + bool ret = pipe_spnego_auth_bind_kerberos(p, rpc_in_p, pauth_info, &secblob, pout_auth); + data_blob_free(&secblob); + data_blob_free(&blob); + return ret; + } + + if (p->auth.auth_type == PIPE_AUTH_TYPE_SPNEGO_NTLMSSP && p->auth.a_u.auth_ntlmssp_state) { + /* Free any previous auth type. */ + free_pipe_ntlmssp_auth_data(&p->auth); + } + + if (!got_kerberos_mechanism) { + /* Initialize the NTLM engine. */ + status = auth_ntlmssp_start(&a); + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { + goto err; + } + + /* + * Pass the first security blob of data to it. + * This can return an error or NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED + * which means we need another packet to complete the bind. + */ + + status = auth_ntlmssp_update(a, secblob, &chal); + + if (!NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED)) { + DEBUG(3,("pipe_spnego_auth_bind_negotiate: auth_ntlmssp_update failed.\n")); + goto err; + } + + /* Generate the response blob we need for step 2 of the bind. */ + response = spnego_gen_auth_response(&chal, status, OID_NTLMSSP); + } else { + /* + * SPNEGO negotiate down to NTLMSSP. The subsequent + * code to process follow-up packets is not complete + * yet. JRA. + */ + response = spnego_gen_auth_response(NULL, + NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED, + OID_NTLMSSP); + } + + /* Copy the blob into the pout_auth parse struct */ + init_rpc_hdr_auth(&auth_info, RPC_SPNEGO_AUTH_TYPE, pauth_info->auth_level, RPC_HDR_AUTH_LEN, 1); + if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr_auth("", &auth_info, pout_auth, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("pipe_spnego_auth_bind_negotiate: marshalling of RPC_HDR_AUTH failed.\n")); + goto err; + } + + if (!prs_copy_data_in(pout_auth, (char *)response.data, response.length)) { + DEBUG(0,("pipe_spnego_auth_bind_negotiate: marshalling of data blob failed.\n")); + goto err; + } + + p->auth.a_u.auth_ntlmssp_state = a; + p->auth.auth_data_free_func = &free_pipe_ntlmssp_auth_data; + p->auth.auth_type = PIPE_AUTH_TYPE_SPNEGO_NTLMSSP; + + data_blob_free(&blob); + data_blob_free(&secblob); + data_blob_free(&chal); + data_blob_free(&response); + + /* We can't set pipe_bound True yet - we need an RPC_ALTER_CONTEXT response packet... */ + return True; + + err: + + data_blob_free(&blob); + data_blob_free(&secblob); + data_blob_free(&chal); + data_blob_free(&response); + + p->auth.a_u.auth_ntlmssp_state = NULL; + + return False; +} + +/******************************************************************* + Handle the second part of a SPNEGO bind auth. +*******************************************************************/ + +static bool pipe_spnego_auth_bind_continue(pipes_struct *p, prs_struct *rpc_in_p, + RPC_HDR_AUTH *pauth_info, prs_struct *pout_auth) +{ + RPC_HDR_AUTH auth_info; + DATA_BLOB spnego_blob; + DATA_BLOB auth_blob; + DATA_BLOB auth_reply; + DATA_BLOB response; + AUTH_NTLMSSP_STATE *a = p->auth.a_u.auth_ntlmssp_state; + + ZERO_STRUCT(spnego_blob); + ZERO_STRUCT(auth_blob); + ZERO_STRUCT(auth_reply); + ZERO_STRUCT(response); + + /* + * NB. If we've negotiated down from krb5 to NTLMSSP we'll currently + * fail here as 'a' == NULL. + */ + if (p->auth.auth_type != PIPE_AUTH_TYPE_SPNEGO_NTLMSSP || !a) { + DEBUG(0,("pipe_spnego_auth_bind_continue: not in NTLMSSP auth state.\n")); + goto err; + } + + /* Grab the SPNEGO blob. */ + spnego_blob = data_blob(NULL,p->hdr.auth_len); + + if (!prs_copy_data_out((char *)spnego_blob.data, rpc_in_p, p->hdr.auth_len)) { + DEBUG(0,("pipe_spnego_auth_bind_continue: Failed to pull %u bytes - the SPNEGO auth header.\n", + (unsigned int)p->hdr.auth_len )); + goto err; + } + + if (spnego_blob.data[0] != ASN1_CONTEXT(1)) { + DEBUG(0,("pipe_spnego_auth_bind_continue: invalid SPNEGO blob type.\n")); + goto err; + } + + if (!spnego_parse_auth(spnego_blob, &auth_blob)) { + DEBUG(0,("pipe_spnego_auth_bind_continue: invalid SPNEGO blob.\n")); + goto err; + } + + /* + * The following call actually checks the challenge/response data. + * for correctness against the given DOMAIN\user name. + */ + + if (!pipe_ntlmssp_verify_final(p, &auth_blob)) { + goto err; + } + + data_blob_free(&spnego_blob); + data_blob_free(&auth_blob); + + /* Generate the spnego "accept completed" blob - no incoming data. */ + response = spnego_gen_auth_response(&auth_reply, NT_STATUS_OK, OID_NTLMSSP); + + /* Copy the blob into the pout_auth parse struct */ + init_rpc_hdr_auth(&auth_info, RPC_SPNEGO_AUTH_TYPE, pauth_info->auth_level, RPC_HDR_AUTH_LEN, 1); + if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr_auth("", &auth_info, pout_auth, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("pipe_spnego_auth_bind_continue: marshalling of RPC_HDR_AUTH failed.\n")); + goto err; + } + + if (!prs_copy_data_in(pout_auth, (char *)response.data, response.length)) { + DEBUG(0,("pipe_spnego_auth_bind_continue: marshalling of data blob failed.\n")); + goto err; + } + + data_blob_free(&auth_reply); + data_blob_free(&response); + + p->pipe_bound = True; + + return True; + + err: + + data_blob_free(&spnego_blob); + data_blob_free(&auth_blob); + data_blob_free(&auth_reply); + data_blob_free(&response); + + free_pipe_ntlmssp_auth_data(&p->auth); + p->auth.a_u.auth_ntlmssp_state = NULL; + + return False; +} + +/******************************************************************* + Handle an schannel bind auth. +*******************************************************************/ + +static bool pipe_schannel_auth_bind(pipes_struct *p, prs_struct *rpc_in_p, + RPC_HDR_AUTH *pauth_info, prs_struct *pout_auth) +{ + RPC_HDR_AUTH auth_info; + RPC_AUTH_SCHANNEL_NEG neg; + RPC_AUTH_VERIFIER auth_verifier; + bool ret; + struct dcinfo *pdcinfo; + uint32 flags; + DATA_BLOB session_key; + + if (!smb_io_rpc_auth_schannel_neg("", &neg, rpc_in_p, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("pipe_schannel_auth_bind: Could not unmarshal SCHANNEL auth neg\n")); + return False; + } + + /* + * The neg.myname key here must match the remote computer name + * given in the DOM_CLNT_SRV.uni_comp_name used on all netlogon pipe + * operations that use credentials. + */ + + become_root(); + ret = secrets_restore_schannel_session_info(p->mem_ctx, neg.myname, &pdcinfo); + unbecome_root(); + + if (!ret) { + DEBUG(0, ("pipe_schannel_auth_bind: Attempt to bind using schannel without successful serverauth2\n")); + return False; + } + + p->auth.a_u.schannel_auth = talloc(p, struct schannel_auth_struct); + if (!p->auth.a_u.schannel_auth) { + TALLOC_FREE(pdcinfo); + return False; + } + + memset(p->auth.a_u.schannel_auth->sess_key, 0, sizeof(p->auth.a_u.schannel_auth->sess_key)); + memcpy(p->auth.a_u.schannel_auth->sess_key, pdcinfo->sess_key, + sizeof(pdcinfo->sess_key)); + + TALLOC_FREE(pdcinfo); + + p->auth.a_u.schannel_auth->seq_num = 0; + + /* + * JRA. Should we also copy the schannel session key into the pipe session key p->session_key + * here ? We do that for NTLMSSP, but the session key is already set up from the vuser + * struct of the person who opened the pipe. I need to test this further. JRA. + * + * VL. As we are mapping this to guest set the generic key + * "SystemLibraryDTC" key here. It's a bit difficult to test against + * W2k3, as it does not allow schannel binds against SAMR and LSA + * anymore. + */ + + session_key = generic_session_key(); + if (session_key.data == NULL) { + DEBUG(0, ("pipe_schannel_auth_bind: Could not alloc session" + " key\n")); + return false; + } + + ret = server_info_set_session_key(p->server_info, session_key); + + data_blob_free(&session_key); + + if (!ret) { + DEBUG(0, ("server_info_set_session_key failed\n")); + return false; + } + + init_rpc_hdr_auth(&auth_info, RPC_SCHANNEL_AUTH_TYPE, pauth_info->auth_level, RPC_HDR_AUTH_LEN, 1); + if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr_auth("", &auth_info, pout_auth, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("pipe_schannel_auth_bind: marshalling of RPC_HDR_AUTH failed.\n")); + return False; + } + + /*** SCHANNEL verifier ***/ + + init_rpc_auth_verifier(&auth_verifier, "\001", 0x0); + if(!smb_io_rpc_schannel_verifier("", &auth_verifier, pout_auth, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("pipe_schannel_auth_bind: marshalling of RPC_AUTH_VERIFIER failed.\n")); + return False; + } + + prs_align(pout_auth); + + flags = 5; + if(!prs_uint32("flags ", pout_auth, 0, &flags)) { + return False; + } + + DEBUG(10,("pipe_schannel_auth_bind: schannel auth: domain [%s] myname [%s]\n", + neg.domain, neg.myname)); + + /* We're finished with this bind - no more packets. */ + p->auth.auth_data_free_func = NULL; + p->auth.auth_type = PIPE_AUTH_TYPE_SCHANNEL; + + p->pipe_bound = True; + + return True; +} + +/******************************************************************* + Handle an NTLMSSP bind auth. +*******************************************************************/ + +static bool pipe_ntlmssp_auth_bind(pipes_struct *p, prs_struct *rpc_in_p, + RPC_HDR_AUTH *pauth_info, prs_struct *pout_auth) +{ + RPC_HDR_AUTH auth_info; + DATA_BLOB blob; + DATA_BLOB response; + NTSTATUS status; + AUTH_NTLMSSP_STATE *a = NULL; + + ZERO_STRUCT(blob); + ZERO_STRUCT(response); + + /* Grab the NTLMSSP blob. */ + blob = data_blob(NULL,p->hdr.auth_len); + + if (!prs_copy_data_out((char *)blob.data, rpc_in_p, p->hdr.auth_len)) { + DEBUG(0,("pipe_ntlmssp_auth_bind: Failed to pull %u bytes - the NTLM auth header.\n", + (unsigned int)p->hdr.auth_len )); + goto err; + } + + if (strncmp((char *)blob.data, "NTLMSSP", 7) != 0) { + DEBUG(0,("pipe_ntlmssp_auth_bind: Failed to read NTLMSSP in blob\n")); + goto err; + } + + /* We have an NTLMSSP blob. */ + status = auth_ntlmssp_start(&a); + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { + DEBUG(0,("pipe_ntlmssp_auth_bind: auth_ntlmssp_start failed: %s\n", + nt_errstr(status) )); + goto err; + } + + status = auth_ntlmssp_update(a, blob, &response); + if (!NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED)) { + DEBUG(0,("pipe_ntlmssp_auth_bind: auth_ntlmssp_update failed: %s\n", + nt_errstr(status) )); + goto err; + } + + data_blob_free(&blob); + + /* Copy the blob into the pout_auth parse struct */ + init_rpc_hdr_auth(&auth_info, RPC_NTLMSSP_AUTH_TYPE, pauth_info->auth_level, RPC_HDR_AUTH_LEN, 1); + if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr_auth("", &auth_info, pout_auth, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("pipe_ntlmssp_auth_bind: marshalling of RPC_HDR_AUTH failed.\n")); + goto err; + } + + if (!prs_copy_data_in(pout_auth, (char *)response.data, response.length)) { + DEBUG(0,("pipe_ntlmssp_auth_bind: marshalling of data blob failed.\n")); + goto err; + } + + p->auth.a_u.auth_ntlmssp_state = a; + p->auth.auth_data_free_func = &free_pipe_ntlmssp_auth_data; + p->auth.auth_type = PIPE_AUTH_TYPE_NTLMSSP; + + data_blob_free(&blob); + data_blob_free(&response); + + DEBUG(10,("pipe_ntlmssp_auth_bind: NTLMSSP auth started\n")); + + /* We can't set pipe_bound True yet - we need an RPC_AUTH3 response packet... */ + return True; + + err: + + data_blob_free(&blob); + data_blob_free(&response); + + free_pipe_ntlmssp_auth_data(&p->auth); + p->auth.a_u.auth_ntlmssp_state = NULL; + return False; +} + +/******************************************************************* + Respond to a pipe bind request. +*******************************************************************/ + +bool api_pipe_bind_req(pipes_struct *p, prs_struct *rpc_in_p) +{ + RPC_HDR_BA hdr_ba; + RPC_HDR_RB hdr_rb; + RPC_HDR_AUTH auth_info; + uint16 assoc_gid; + fstring ack_pipe_name; + prs_struct out_hdr_ba; + prs_struct out_auth; + prs_struct outgoing_rpc; + int i = 0; + int auth_len = 0; + unsigned int auth_type = RPC_ANONYMOUS_AUTH_TYPE; + + /* No rebinds on a bound pipe - use alter context. */ + if (p->pipe_bound) { + DEBUG(2,("api_pipe_bind_req: rejecting bind request on bound pipe %s.\n", p->pipe_srv_name)); + return setup_bind_nak(p); + } + + prs_init_empty( &outgoing_rpc, p->mem_ctx, MARSHALL); + + /* + * Marshall directly into the outgoing PDU space. We + * must do this as we need to set to the bind response + * header and are never sending more than one PDU here. + */ + + prs_give_memory( &outgoing_rpc, (char *)p->out_data.current_pdu, sizeof(p->out_data.current_pdu), False); + + /* + * Setup the memory to marshall the ba header, and the + * auth footers. + */ + + if(!prs_init(&out_hdr_ba, 1024, p->mem_ctx, MARSHALL)) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_req: malloc out_hdr_ba failed.\n")); + prs_mem_free(&outgoing_rpc); + return False; + } + + if(!prs_init(&out_auth, 1024, p->mem_ctx, MARSHALL)) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_req: malloc out_auth failed.\n")); + prs_mem_free(&outgoing_rpc); + prs_mem_free(&out_hdr_ba); + return False; + } + + DEBUG(5,("api_pipe_bind_req: decode request. %d\n", __LINE__)); + + ZERO_STRUCT(hdr_rb); + + /* decode the bind request */ + + if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr_rb("", &hdr_rb, rpc_in_p, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_req: unable to unmarshall RPC_HDR_RB " + "struct.\n")); + goto err_exit; + } + + if (hdr_rb.num_contexts == 0) { + DEBUG(0, ("api_pipe_bind_req: no rpc contexts around\n")); + goto err_exit; + } + + /* + * Try and find the correct pipe name to ensure + * that this is a pipe name we support. + */ + + for (i = 0; i < rpc_lookup_size; i++) { + if (ndr_syntax_id_equal(&rpc_lookup[i].rpc_interface, + &hdr_rb.rpc_context[0].abstract)) { + DEBUG(3, ("api_pipe_bind_req: \\PIPE\\%s -> \\PIPE\\%s\n", + rpc_lookup[i].pipe.clnt, rpc_lookup[i].pipe.srv)); + fstrcpy(p->name, rpc_lookup[i].pipe.clnt); + fstrcpy(p->pipe_srv_name, rpc_lookup[i].pipe.srv); + break; + } + } + + if (i == rpc_lookup_size) { + if (NT_STATUS_IS_ERR(smb_probe_module("rpc", p->name))) { + DEBUG(3,("api_pipe_bind_req: Unknown pipe name %s in bind request.\n", + p->name )); + prs_mem_free(&outgoing_rpc); + prs_mem_free(&out_hdr_ba); + prs_mem_free(&out_auth); + + return setup_bind_nak(p); + } + + for (i = 0; i < rpc_lookup_size; i++) { + if (strequal(rpc_lookup[i].pipe.clnt, p->name)) { + DEBUG(3, ("api_pipe_bind_req: \\PIPE\\%s -> \\PIPE\\%s\n", + rpc_lookup[i].pipe.clnt, rpc_lookup[i].pipe.srv)); + fstrcpy(p->pipe_srv_name, rpc_lookup[i].pipe.srv); + break; + } + } + + if (i == rpc_lookup_size) { + DEBUG(0, ("module %s doesn't provide functions for pipe %s!\n", p->name, p->name)); + goto err_exit; + } + } + + /* name has to be \PIPE\xxxxx */ + fstrcpy(ack_pipe_name, "\\PIPE\\"); + fstrcat(ack_pipe_name, p->pipe_srv_name); + + DEBUG(5,("api_pipe_bind_req: make response. %d\n", __LINE__)); + + /* + * Check if this is an authenticated bind request. + */ + + if (p->hdr.auth_len) { + /* + * Decode the authentication verifier. + */ + + if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr_auth("", &auth_info, rpc_in_p, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_req: unable to unmarshall RPC_HDR_AUTH struct.\n")); + goto err_exit; + } + + auth_type = auth_info.auth_type; + + /* Work out if we have to sign or seal etc. */ + switch (auth_info.auth_level) { + case RPC_AUTH_LEVEL_INTEGRITY: + p->auth.auth_level = PIPE_AUTH_LEVEL_INTEGRITY; + break; + case RPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY: + p->auth.auth_level = PIPE_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY; + break; + default: + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_req: unexpected auth level (%u).\n", + (unsigned int)auth_info.auth_level )); + goto err_exit; + } + } else { + ZERO_STRUCT(auth_info); + } + + assoc_gid = hdr_rb.bba.assoc_gid ? hdr_rb.bba.assoc_gid : 0x53f0; + + switch(auth_type) { + case RPC_NTLMSSP_AUTH_TYPE: + if (!pipe_ntlmssp_auth_bind(p, rpc_in_p, &auth_info, &out_auth)) { + goto err_exit; + } + assoc_gid = 0x7a77; + break; + + case RPC_SCHANNEL_AUTH_TYPE: + if (!pipe_schannel_auth_bind(p, rpc_in_p, &auth_info, &out_auth)) { + goto err_exit; + } + break; + + case RPC_SPNEGO_AUTH_TYPE: + if (!pipe_spnego_auth_bind_negotiate(p, rpc_in_p, &auth_info, &out_auth)) { + goto err_exit; + } + break; + + case RPC_ANONYMOUS_AUTH_TYPE: + /* Unauthenticated bind request. */ + /* Get the authenticated pipe user from current_user */ + if (!copy_current_user(&p->pipe_user, ¤t_user)) { + DEBUG(10, ("Could not copy current user\n")); + goto err_exit; + } + /* We're finished - no more packets. */ + p->auth.auth_type = PIPE_AUTH_TYPE_NONE; + /* We must set the pipe auth_level here also. */ + p->auth.auth_level = PIPE_AUTH_LEVEL_NONE; + p->pipe_bound = True; + /* The session key was initialized from the SMB + * session in make_internal_rpc_pipe_p */ + break; + + default: + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_req: unknown auth type %x requested.\n", auth_type )); + goto err_exit; + } + + /* + * Create the bind response struct. + */ + + /* If the requested abstract synt uuid doesn't match our client pipe, + reject the bind_ack & set the transfer interface synt to all 0's, + ver 0 (observed when NT5 attempts to bind to abstract interfaces + unknown to NT4) + Needed when adding entries to a DACL from NT5 - SK */ + + if(check_bind_req(p, &hdr_rb.rpc_context[0].abstract, &hdr_rb.rpc_context[0].transfer[0], + hdr_rb.rpc_context[0].context_id )) { + init_rpc_hdr_ba(&hdr_ba, + RPC_MAX_PDU_FRAG_LEN, + RPC_MAX_PDU_FRAG_LEN, + assoc_gid, + ack_pipe_name, + 0x1, 0x0, 0x0, + &hdr_rb.rpc_context[0].transfer[0]); + } else { + RPC_IFACE null_interface; + ZERO_STRUCT(null_interface); + /* Rejection reason: abstract syntax not supported */ + init_rpc_hdr_ba(&hdr_ba, RPC_MAX_PDU_FRAG_LEN, + RPC_MAX_PDU_FRAG_LEN, assoc_gid, + ack_pipe_name, 0x1, 0x2, 0x1, + &null_interface); + p->pipe_bound = False; + } + + /* + * and marshall it. + */ + + if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr_ba("", &hdr_ba, &out_hdr_ba, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_req: marshalling of RPC_HDR_BA failed.\n")); + goto err_exit; + } + + /* + * Create the header, now we know the length. + */ + + if (prs_offset(&out_auth)) { + auth_len = prs_offset(&out_auth) - RPC_HDR_AUTH_LEN; + } + + init_rpc_hdr(&p->hdr, RPC_BINDACK, RPC_FLG_FIRST | RPC_FLG_LAST, + p->hdr.call_id, + RPC_HEADER_LEN + prs_offset(&out_hdr_ba) + prs_offset(&out_auth), + auth_len); + + /* + * Marshall the header into the outgoing PDU. + */ + + if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr("", &p->hdr, &outgoing_rpc, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_req: marshalling of RPC_HDR failed.\n")); + goto err_exit; + } + + /* + * Now add the RPC_HDR_BA and any auth needed. + */ + + if(!prs_append_prs_data( &outgoing_rpc, &out_hdr_ba)) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_req: append of RPC_HDR_BA failed.\n")); + goto err_exit; + } + + if (auth_len && !prs_append_prs_data( &outgoing_rpc, &out_auth)) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_req: append of auth info failed.\n")); + goto err_exit; + } + + /* + * Setup the lengths for the initial reply. + */ + + p->out_data.data_sent_length = 0; + p->out_data.current_pdu_len = prs_offset(&outgoing_rpc); + p->out_data.current_pdu_sent = 0; + + prs_mem_free(&out_hdr_ba); + prs_mem_free(&out_auth); + + return True; + + err_exit: + + prs_mem_free(&outgoing_rpc); + prs_mem_free(&out_hdr_ba); + prs_mem_free(&out_auth); + return setup_bind_nak(p); +} + +/**************************************************************************** + Deal with an alter context call. Can be third part of 3 leg auth request for + SPNEGO calls. +****************************************************************************/ + +bool api_pipe_alter_context(pipes_struct *p, prs_struct *rpc_in_p) +{ + RPC_HDR_BA hdr_ba; + RPC_HDR_RB hdr_rb; + RPC_HDR_AUTH auth_info; + uint16 assoc_gid; + fstring ack_pipe_name; + prs_struct out_hdr_ba; + prs_struct out_auth; + prs_struct outgoing_rpc; + int auth_len = 0; + + prs_init_empty( &outgoing_rpc, p->mem_ctx, MARSHALL); + + /* + * Marshall directly into the outgoing PDU space. We + * must do this as we need to set to the bind response + * header and are never sending more than one PDU here. + */ + + prs_give_memory( &outgoing_rpc, (char *)p->out_data.current_pdu, sizeof(p->out_data.current_pdu), False); + + /* + * Setup the memory to marshall the ba header, and the + * auth footers. + */ + + if(!prs_init(&out_hdr_ba, 1024, p->mem_ctx, MARSHALL)) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_alter_context: malloc out_hdr_ba failed.\n")); + prs_mem_free(&outgoing_rpc); + return False; + } + + if(!prs_init(&out_auth, 1024, p->mem_ctx, MARSHALL)) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_alter_context: malloc out_auth failed.\n")); + prs_mem_free(&outgoing_rpc); + prs_mem_free(&out_hdr_ba); + return False; + } + + DEBUG(5,("api_pipe_alter_context: decode request. %d\n", __LINE__)); + + /* decode the alter context request */ + if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr_rb("", &hdr_rb, rpc_in_p, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_alter_context: unable to unmarshall RPC_HDR_RB struct.\n")); + goto err_exit; + } + + /* secondary address CAN be NULL + * as the specs say it's ignored. + * It MUST be NULL to have the spoolss working. + */ + fstrcpy(ack_pipe_name,""); + + DEBUG(5,("api_pipe_alter_context: make response. %d\n", __LINE__)); + + /* + * Check if this is an authenticated alter context request. + */ + + if (p->hdr.auth_len != 0) { + /* + * Decode the authentication verifier. + */ + + if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr_auth("", &auth_info, rpc_in_p, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_alter_context: unable to unmarshall RPC_HDR_AUTH struct.\n")); + goto err_exit; + } + + /* + * Currently only the SPNEGO auth type uses the alter ctx + * response in place of the NTLMSSP auth3 type. + */ + + if (auth_info.auth_type == RPC_SPNEGO_AUTH_TYPE) { + /* We can only finish if the pipe is unbound. */ + if (!p->pipe_bound) { + if (!pipe_spnego_auth_bind_continue(p, rpc_in_p, &auth_info, &out_auth)) { + goto err_exit; + } + } else { + goto err_exit; + } + } + } else { + ZERO_STRUCT(auth_info); + } + + assoc_gid = hdr_rb.bba.assoc_gid ? hdr_rb.bba.assoc_gid : 0x53f0; + + /* + * Create the bind response struct. + */ + + /* If the requested abstract synt uuid doesn't match our client pipe, + reject the bind_ack & set the transfer interface synt to all 0's, + ver 0 (observed when NT5 attempts to bind to abstract interfaces + unknown to NT4) + Needed when adding entries to a DACL from NT5 - SK */ + + if(check_bind_req(p, &hdr_rb.rpc_context[0].abstract, &hdr_rb.rpc_context[0].transfer[0], + hdr_rb.rpc_context[0].context_id )) { + init_rpc_hdr_ba(&hdr_ba, + RPC_MAX_PDU_FRAG_LEN, + RPC_MAX_PDU_FRAG_LEN, + assoc_gid, + ack_pipe_name, + 0x1, 0x0, 0x0, + &hdr_rb.rpc_context[0].transfer[0]); + } else { + RPC_IFACE null_interface; + ZERO_STRUCT(null_interface); + /* Rejection reason: abstract syntax not supported */ + init_rpc_hdr_ba(&hdr_ba, RPC_MAX_PDU_FRAG_LEN, + RPC_MAX_PDU_FRAG_LEN, assoc_gid, + ack_pipe_name, 0x1, 0x2, 0x1, + &null_interface); + p->pipe_bound = False; + } + + /* + * and marshall it. + */ + + if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr_ba("", &hdr_ba, &out_hdr_ba, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_alter_context: marshalling of RPC_HDR_BA failed.\n")); + goto err_exit; + } + + /* + * Create the header, now we know the length. + */ + + if (prs_offset(&out_auth)) { + auth_len = prs_offset(&out_auth) - RPC_HDR_AUTH_LEN; + } + + init_rpc_hdr(&p->hdr, RPC_ALTCONTRESP, RPC_FLG_FIRST | RPC_FLG_LAST, + p->hdr.call_id, + RPC_HEADER_LEN + prs_offset(&out_hdr_ba) + prs_offset(&out_auth), + auth_len); + + /* + * Marshall the header into the outgoing PDU. + */ + + if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr("", &p->hdr, &outgoing_rpc, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_alter_context: marshalling of RPC_HDR failed.\n")); + goto err_exit; + } + + /* + * Now add the RPC_HDR_BA and any auth needed. + */ + + if(!prs_append_prs_data( &outgoing_rpc, &out_hdr_ba)) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_alter_context: append of RPC_HDR_BA failed.\n")); + goto err_exit; + } + + if (auth_len && !prs_append_prs_data( &outgoing_rpc, &out_auth)) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_alter_context: append of auth info failed.\n")); + goto err_exit; + } + + /* + * Setup the lengths for the initial reply. + */ + + p->out_data.data_sent_length = 0; + p->out_data.current_pdu_len = prs_offset(&outgoing_rpc); + p->out_data.current_pdu_sent = 0; + + prs_mem_free(&out_hdr_ba); + prs_mem_free(&out_auth); + + return True; + + err_exit: + + prs_mem_free(&outgoing_rpc); + prs_mem_free(&out_hdr_ba); + prs_mem_free(&out_auth); + return setup_bind_nak(p); +} + +/**************************************************************************** + Deal with NTLMSSP sign & seal processing on an RPC request. +****************************************************************************/ + +bool api_pipe_ntlmssp_auth_process(pipes_struct *p, prs_struct *rpc_in, + uint32 *p_ss_padding_len, NTSTATUS *pstatus) +{ + RPC_HDR_AUTH auth_info; + uint32 auth_len = p->hdr.auth_len; + uint32 save_offset = prs_offset(rpc_in); + AUTH_NTLMSSP_STATE *a = p->auth.a_u.auth_ntlmssp_state; + unsigned char *data = NULL; + size_t data_len; + unsigned char *full_packet_data = NULL; + size_t full_packet_data_len; + DATA_BLOB auth_blob; + + *pstatus = NT_STATUS_OK; + + if (p->auth.auth_level == PIPE_AUTH_LEVEL_NONE || p->auth.auth_level == PIPE_AUTH_LEVEL_CONNECT) { + return True; + } + + if (!a) { + *pstatus = NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER; + return False; + } + + /* Ensure there's enough data for an authenticated request. */ + if ((auth_len > RPC_MAX_SIGN_SIZE) || + (RPC_HEADER_LEN + RPC_HDR_REQ_LEN + RPC_HDR_AUTH_LEN + auth_len > p->hdr.frag_len)) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_ntlmssp_auth_process: auth_len %u is too large.\n", + (unsigned int)auth_len )); + *pstatus = NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER; + return False; + } + + /* + * We need the full packet data + length (minus auth stuff) as well as the packet data + length + * after the RPC header. + * We need to pass in the full packet (minus auth len) to the NTLMSSP sign and check seal + * functions as NTLMv2 checks the rpc headers also. + */ + + data = (unsigned char *)(prs_data_p(rpc_in) + RPC_HDR_REQ_LEN); + data_len = (size_t)(p->hdr.frag_len - RPC_HEADER_LEN - RPC_HDR_REQ_LEN - RPC_HDR_AUTH_LEN - auth_len); + + full_packet_data = p->in_data.current_in_pdu; + full_packet_data_len = p->hdr.frag_len - auth_len; + + /* Pull the auth header and the following data into a blob. */ + if(!prs_set_offset(rpc_in, RPC_HDR_REQ_LEN + data_len)) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_ntlmssp_auth_process: cannot move offset to %u.\n", + (unsigned int)RPC_HDR_REQ_LEN + (unsigned int)data_len )); + *pstatus = NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER; + return False; + } + + if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr_auth("hdr_auth", &auth_info, rpc_in, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_ntlmssp_auth_process: failed to unmarshall RPC_HDR_AUTH.\n")); + *pstatus = NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER; + return False; + } + + auth_blob.data = (unsigned char *)prs_data_p(rpc_in) + prs_offset(rpc_in); + auth_blob.length = auth_len; + + switch (p->auth.auth_level) { + case PIPE_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY: + /* Data is encrypted. */ + *pstatus = ntlmssp_unseal_packet(a->ntlmssp_state, + data, data_len, + full_packet_data, + full_packet_data_len, + &auth_blob); + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(*pstatus)) { + return False; + } + break; + case PIPE_AUTH_LEVEL_INTEGRITY: + /* Data is signed. */ + *pstatus = ntlmssp_check_packet(a->ntlmssp_state, + data, data_len, + full_packet_data, + full_packet_data_len, + &auth_blob); + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(*pstatus)) { + return False; + } + break; + default: + *pstatus = NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER; + return False; + } + + /* + * Return the current pointer to the data offset. + */ + + if(!prs_set_offset(rpc_in, save_offset)) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_auth_process: failed to set offset back to %u\n", + (unsigned int)save_offset )); + *pstatus = NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER; + return False; + } + + /* + * Remember the padding length. We must remove it from the real data + * stream once the sign/seal is done. + */ + + *p_ss_padding_len = auth_info.auth_pad_len; + + return True; +} + +/**************************************************************************** + Deal with schannel processing on an RPC request. +****************************************************************************/ + +bool api_pipe_schannel_process(pipes_struct *p, prs_struct *rpc_in, uint32 *p_ss_padding_len) +{ + uint32 data_len; + uint32 auth_len; + uint32 save_offset = prs_offset(rpc_in); + RPC_HDR_AUTH auth_info; + RPC_AUTH_SCHANNEL_CHK schannel_chk; + + auth_len = p->hdr.auth_len; + + if (auth_len != RPC_AUTH_SCHANNEL_SIGN_OR_SEAL_CHK_LEN) { + DEBUG(0,("Incorrect auth_len %u.\n", (unsigned int)auth_len )); + return False; + } + + /* + * The following is that length of the data we must verify or unseal. + * This doesn't include the RPC headers or the auth_len or the RPC_HDR_AUTH_LEN + * preceeding the auth_data. + */ + + if (p->hdr.frag_len < RPC_HEADER_LEN + RPC_HDR_REQ_LEN + RPC_HDR_AUTH_LEN + auth_len) { + DEBUG(0,("Incorrect frag %u, auth %u.\n", + (unsigned int)p->hdr.frag_len, + (unsigned int)auth_len )); + return False; + } + + data_len = p->hdr.frag_len - RPC_HEADER_LEN - RPC_HDR_REQ_LEN - + RPC_HDR_AUTH_LEN - auth_len; + + DEBUG(5,("data %d auth %d\n", data_len, auth_len)); + + if(!prs_set_offset(rpc_in, RPC_HDR_REQ_LEN + data_len)) { + DEBUG(0,("cannot move offset to %u.\n", + (unsigned int)RPC_HDR_REQ_LEN + data_len )); + return False; + } + + if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr_auth("hdr_auth", &auth_info, rpc_in, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("failed to unmarshall RPC_HDR_AUTH.\n")); + return False; + } + + if (auth_info.auth_type != RPC_SCHANNEL_AUTH_TYPE) { + DEBUG(0,("Invalid auth info %d on schannel\n", + auth_info.auth_type)); + return False; + } + + if(!smb_io_rpc_auth_schannel_chk("", RPC_AUTH_SCHANNEL_SIGN_OR_SEAL_CHK_LEN, &schannel_chk, rpc_in, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("failed to unmarshal RPC_AUTH_SCHANNEL_CHK.\n")); + return False; + } + + if (!schannel_decode(p->auth.a_u.schannel_auth, + p->auth.auth_level, + SENDER_IS_INITIATOR, + &schannel_chk, + prs_data_p(rpc_in)+RPC_HDR_REQ_LEN, data_len)) { + DEBUG(3,("failed to decode PDU\n")); + return False; + } + + /* + * Return the current pointer to the data offset. + */ + + if(!prs_set_offset(rpc_in, save_offset)) { + DEBUG(0,("failed to set offset back to %u\n", + (unsigned int)save_offset )); + return False; + } + + /* The sequence number gets incremented on both send and receive. */ + p->auth.a_u.schannel_auth->seq_num++; + + /* + * Remember the padding length. We must remove it from the real data + * stream once the sign/seal is done. + */ + + *p_ss_padding_len = auth_info.auth_pad_len; + + return True; +} + +/**************************************************************************** + Return a user struct for a pipe user. +****************************************************************************/ + +struct current_user *get_current_user(struct current_user *user, pipes_struct *p) +{ + if (p->pipe_bound && + (p->auth.auth_type == PIPE_AUTH_TYPE_NTLMSSP || + (p->auth.auth_type == PIPE_AUTH_TYPE_SPNEGO_NTLMSSP))) { + memcpy(user, &p->pipe_user, sizeof(struct current_user)); + } else { + memcpy(user, ¤t_user, sizeof(struct current_user)); + } + + return user; +} + +/**************************************************************************** + Find the set of RPC functions associated with this context_id +****************************************************************************/ + +static PIPE_RPC_FNS* find_pipe_fns_by_context( PIPE_RPC_FNS *list, uint32 context_id ) +{ + PIPE_RPC_FNS *fns = NULL; + PIPE_RPC_FNS *tmp = NULL; + + if ( !list ) { + DEBUG(0,("find_pipe_fns_by_context: ERROR! No context list for pipe!\n")); + return NULL; + } + + for (tmp=list; tmp; tmp=tmp->next ) { + if ( tmp->context_id == context_id ) + break; + } + + fns = tmp; + + return fns; +} + +/**************************************************************************** + Memory cleanup. +****************************************************************************/ + +void free_pipe_rpc_context( PIPE_RPC_FNS *list ) +{ + PIPE_RPC_FNS *tmp = list; + PIPE_RPC_FNS *tmp2; + + while (tmp) { + tmp2 = tmp->next; + SAFE_FREE(tmp); + tmp = tmp2; + } + + return; +} + +static bool api_rpcTNP(pipes_struct *p, const char *rpc_name, + const struct api_struct *api_rpc_cmds, int n_cmds); + +/**************************************************************************** + Find the correct RPC function to call for this request. + If the pipe is authenticated then become the correct UNIX user + before doing the call. +****************************************************************************/ + +bool api_pipe_request(pipes_struct *p) +{ + bool ret = False; + bool changed_user = False; + PIPE_RPC_FNS *pipe_fns; + + if (p->pipe_bound && + ((p->auth.auth_type == PIPE_AUTH_TYPE_NTLMSSP) || + (p->auth.auth_type == PIPE_AUTH_TYPE_SPNEGO_NTLMSSP))) { + if(!become_authenticated_pipe_user(p)) { + prs_mem_free(&p->out_data.rdata); + return False; + } + changed_user = True; + } + + DEBUG(5, ("Requested \\PIPE\\%s\n", p->name)); + + /* get the set of RPC functions for this context */ + + pipe_fns = find_pipe_fns_by_context(p->contexts, p->hdr_req.context_id); + + if ( pipe_fns ) { + TALLOC_CTX *frame = talloc_stackframe(); + ret = api_rpcTNP(p, p->name, pipe_fns->cmds, pipe_fns->n_cmds); + TALLOC_FREE(frame); + } + else { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_request: No rpc function table associated with context [%d] on pipe [%s]\n", + p->hdr_req.context_id, p->name)); + } + + if (changed_user) { + unbecome_authenticated_pipe_user(); + } + + return ret; +} + +/******************************************************************* + Calls the underlying RPC function for a named pipe. + ********************************************************************/ + +static bool api_rpcTNP(pipes_struct *p, const char *rpc_name, + const struct api_struct *api_rpc_cmds, int n_cmds) +{ + int fn_num; + fstring name; + uint32 offset1, offset2; + + /* interpret the command */ + DEBUG(4,("api_rpcTNP: %s op 0x%x - ", rpc_name, p->hdr_req.opnum)); + + slprintf(name, sizeof(name)-1, "in_%s", rpc_name); + prs_dump(name, p->hdr_req.opnum, &p->in_data.data); + + for (fn_num = 0; fn_num < n_cmds; fn_num++) { + if (api_rpc_cmds[fn_num].opnum == p->hdr_req.opnum && api_rpc_cmds[fn_num].fn != NULL) { + DEBUG(3,("api_rpcTNP: rpc command: %s\n", api_rpc_cmds[fn_num].name)); + break; + } + } + + if (fn_num == n_cmds) { + /* + * For an unknown RPC just return a fault PDU but + * return True to allow RPC's on the pipe to continue + * and not put the pipe into fault state. JRA. + */ + DEBUG(4, ("unknown\n")); + setup_fault_pdu(p, NT_STATUS(DCERPC_FAULT_OP_RNG_ERROR)); + return True; + } + + offset1 = prs_offset(&p->out_data.rdata); + + DEBUG(6, ("api_rpc_cmds[%d].fn == %p\n", + fn_num, api_rpc_cmds[fn_num].fn)); + /* do the actual command */ + if(!api_rpc_cmds[fn_num].fn(p)) { + DEBUG(0,("api_rpcTNP: %s: %s failed.\n", rpc_name, api_rpc_cmds[fn_num].name)); + prs_mem_free(&p->out_data.rdata); + return False; + } + + if (p->bad_handle_fault_state) { + DEBUG(4,("api_rpcTNP: bad handle fault return.\n")); + p->bad_handle_fault_state = False; + setup_fault_pdu(p, NT_STATUS(DCERPC_FAULT_CONTEXT_MISMATCH)); + return True; + } + + if (p->rng_fault_state) { + DEBUG(4, ("api_rpcTNP: rng fault return\n")); + p->rng_fault_state = False; + setup_fault_pdu(p, NT_STATUS(DCERPC_FAULT_OP_RNG_ERROR)); + return True; + } + + slprintf(name, sizeof(name)-1, "out_%s", rpc_name); + offset2 = prs_offset(&p->out_data.rdata); + prs_set_offset(&p->out_data.rdata, offset1); + prs_dump(name, p->hdr_req.opnum, &p->out_data.rdata); + prs_set_offset(&p->out_data.rdata, offset2); + + DEBUG(5,("api_rpcTNP: called %s successfully\n", rpc_name)); + + /* Check for buffer underflow in rpc parsing */ + + if ((DEBUGLEVEL >= 10) && + (prs_offset(&p->in_data.data) != prs_data_size(&p->in_data.data))) { + size_t data_len = prs_data_size(&p->in_data.data) - prs_offset(&p->in_data.data); + char *data = (char *)SMB_MALLOC(data_len); + + DEBUG(10, ("api_rpcTNP: rpc input buffer underflow (parse error?)\n")); + if (data) { + prs_uint8s(False, "", &p->in_data.data, 0, (unsigned char *)data, (uint32)data_len); + SAFE_FREE(data); + } + + } + + return True; +} |