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-rw-r--r--source3/rpc_server/srv_samr_chgpasswd.c1123
-rw-r--r--source3/rpc_server/srv_samr_util.h14
2 files changed, 1137 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/srv_samr_chgpasswd.c b/source3/rpc_server/srv_samr_chgpasswd.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2e76e55dfa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/source3/rpc_server/srv_samr_chgpasswd.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1123 @@
+/*
+ Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
+ Samba utility functions
+ Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 1992-1998
+ Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett 2001-2004
+
+ This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+ (at your option) any later version.
+
+ This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+ You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+*/
+
+/* These comments regard the code to change the user's unix password: */
+
+/* fork a child process to exec passwd and write to its
+ * tty to change a users password. This is running as the
+ * user who is attempting to change the password.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * This code was copied/borrowed and stolen from various sources.
+ * The primary source was the poppasswd.c from the authors of POPMail. This software
+ * was included as a client to change passwords using the 'passwd' program
+ * on the remote machine.
+ *
+ * This code has been hacked by Bob Nance (nance@niehs.nih.gov) and Evan Patterson
+ * (patters2@niehs.nih.gov) at the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences
+ * and rights to modify, distribute or incorporate this change to the CAP suite or
+ * using it for any other reason are granted, so long as this disclaimer is left intact.
+ */
+
+/*
+ This code was hacked considerably for inclusion in Samba, primarily
+ by Andrew.Tridgell@anu.edu.au. The biggest change was the addition
+ of the "password chat" option, which allows the easy runtime
+ specification of the expected sequence of events to change a
+ password.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include "../libcli/auth/libcli_auth.h"
+#include "../lib/crypto/arcfour.h"
+#include "rpc_server/srv_samr_util.h"
+
+#if ALLOW_CHANGE_PASSWORD
+
+static int findpty(char **slave)
+{
+ int master = -1;
+ char *line = NULL;
+ SMB_STRUCT_DIR *dirp = NULL;
+ const char *dpname;
+
+ *slave = NULL;
+
+#if defined(HAVE_GRANTPT)
+ /* Try to open /dev/ptmx. If that fails, fall through to old method. */
+ if ((master = sys_open("/dev/ptmx", O_RDWR, 0)) >= 0) {
+ grantpt(master);
+ unlockpt(master);
+ line = (char *)ptsname(master);
+ if (line) {
+ *slave = SMB_STRDUP(line);
+ }
+
+ if (*slave == NULL) {
+ DEBUG(0,
+ ("findpty: Unable to create master/slave pty pair.\n"));
+ /* Stop fd leak on error. */
+ close(master);
+ return -1;
+ } else {
+ DEBUG(10,
+ ("findpty: Allocated slave pty %s\n", *slave));
+ return (master);
+ }
+ }
+#endif /* HAVE_GRANTPT */
+
+ line = SMB_STRDUP("/dev/ptyXX");
+ if (!line) {
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ dirp = sys_opendir("/dev");
+ if (!dirp) {
+ SAFE_FREE(line);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ while ((dpname = readdirname(dirp)) != NULL) {
+ if (strncmp(dpname, "pty", 3) == 0 && strlen(dpname) == 5) {
+ DEBUG(3,
+ ("pty: try to open %s, line was %s\n", dpname,
+ line));
+ line[8] = dpname[3];
+ line[9] = dpname[4];
+ if ((master = sys_open(line, O_RDWR, 0)) >= 0) {
+ DEBUG(3, ("pty: opened %s\n", line));
+ line[5] = 't';
+ *slave = line;
+ sys_closedir(dirp);
+ return (master);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ sys_closedir(dirp);
+ SAFE_FREE(line);
+ return (-1);
+}
+
+static int dochild(int master, const char *slavedev, const struct passwd *pass,
+ const char *passwordprogram, bool as_root)
+{
+ int slave;
+ struct termios stermios;
+ gid_t gid;
+ uid_t uid;
+ char * const eptrs[1] = { NULL };
+
+ if (pass == NULL)
+ {
+ DEBUG(0,
+ ("dochild: user doesn't exist in the UNIX password database.\n"));
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ gid = pass->pw_gid;
+ uid = pass->pw_uid;
+
+ gain_root_privilege();
+
+ /* Start new session - gets rid of controlling terminal. */
+ if (setsid() < 0)
+ {
+ DEBUG(3,
+ ("Weirdness, couldn't let go of controlling terminal\n"));
+ return (False);
+ }
+
+ /* Open slave pty and acquire as new controlling terminal. */
+ if ((slave = sys_open(slavedev, O_RDWR, 0)) < 0)
+ {
+ DEBUG(3, ("More weirdness, could not open %s\n", slavedev));
+ return (False);
+ }
+#if defined(TIOCSCTTY) && !defined(SUNOS5)
+ /*
+ * On patched Solaris 10 TIOCSCTTY is defined but seems not to work,
+ * see the discussion under
+ * https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=5366.
+ */
+ if (ioctl(slave, TIOCSCTTY, 0) < 0)
+ {
+ DEBUG(3, ("Error in ioctl call for slave pty\n"));
+ /* return(False); */
+ }
+#elif defined(I_PUSH) && defined(I_FIND)
+ if (ioctl(slave, I_FIND, "ptem") == 0) {
+ ioctl(slave, I_PUSH, "ptem");
+ }
+ if (ioctl(slave, I_FIND, "ldterm") == 0) {
+ ioctl(slave, I_PUSH, "ldterm");
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /* Close master. */
+ close(master);
+
+ /* Make slave stdin/out/err of child. */
+
+ if (dup2(slave, STDIN_FILENO) != STDIN_FILENO)
+ {
+ DEBUG(3, ("Could not re-direct stdin\n"));
+ return (False);
+ }
+ if (dup2(slave, STDOUT_FILENO) != STDOUT_FILENO)
+ {
+ DEBUG(3, ("Could not re-direct stdout\n"));
+ return (False);
+ }
+ if (dup2(slave, STDERR_FILENO) != STDERR_FILENO)
+ {
+ DEBUG(3, ("Could not re-direct stderr\n"));
+ return (False);
+ }
+ if (slave > 2)
+ close(slave);
+
+ /* Set proper terminal attributes - no echo, canonical input processing,
+ no map NL to CR/NL on output. */
+
+ if (tcgetattr(0, &stermios) < 0)
+ {
+ DEBUG(3,
+ ("could not read default terminal attributes on pty\n"));
+ return (False);
+ }
+ stermios.c_lflag &= ~(ECHO | ECHOE | ECHOK | ECHONL);
+ stermios.c_lflag |= ICANON;
+#ifdef ONLCR
+ stermios.c_oflag &= ~(ONLCR);
+#endif
+ if (tcsetattr(0, TCSANOW, &stermios) < 0)
+ {
+ DEBUG(3, ("could not set attributes of pty\n"));
+ return (False);
+ }
+
+ /* make us completely into the right uid */
+ if (!as_root)
+ {
+ become_user_permanently(uid, gid);
+ }
+
+ DEBUG(10,
+ ("Invoking '%s' as password change program.\n",
+ passwordprogram));
+
+ /* execl() password-change application */
+ if (execle("/bin/sh", "sh", "-c", passwordprogram, NULL, eptrs) < 0)
+ {
+ DEBUG(3, ("Bad status returned from %s\n", passwordprogram));
+ return (False);
+ }
+ return (True);
+}
+
+static int expect(int master, char *issue, char *expected)
+{
+ char buffer[1024];
+ int attempts, timeout, nread;
+ size_t len;
+ bool match = False;
+
+ for (attempts = 0; attempts < 2; attempts++) {
+ NTSTATUS status;
+ if (!strequal(issue, ".")) {
+ if (lp_passwd_chat_debug())
+ DEBUG(100, ("expect: sending [%s]\n", issue));
+
+ if ((len = sys_write(master, issue, strlen(issue))) != strlen(issue)) {
+ DEBUG(2,("expect: (short) write returned %d\n",
+ (int)len ));
+ return False;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (strequal(expected, "."))
+ return True;
+
+ /* Initial timeout. */
+ timeout = lp_passwd_chat_timeout() * 1000;
+ nread = 0;
+ buffer[nread] = 0;
+
+ while (True) {
+ status = read_fd_with_timeout(
+ master, buffer + nread, 1,
+ sizeof(buffer) - nread - 1,
+ timeout, &len);
+
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ break;
+ }
+ nread += len;
+ buffer[nread] = 0;
+
+ {
+ /* Eat leading/trailing whitespace before match. */
+ char *str = SMB_STRDUP(buffer);
+ if (!str) {
+ DEBUG(2,("expect: ENOMEM\n"));
+ return False;
+ }
+ trim_char(str, ' ', ' ');
+
+ if ((match = unix_wild_match(expected, str)) == True) {
+ /* Now data has started to return, lower timeout. */
+ timeout = lp_passwd_chat_timeout() * 100;
+ }
+ SAFE_FREE(str);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (lp_passwd_chat_debug())
+ DEBUG(100, ("expect: expected [%s] received [%s] match %s\n",
+ expected, buffer, match ? "yes" : "no" ));
+
+ if (match)
+ break;
+
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ DEBUG(2, ("expect: %s\n", nt_errstr(status)));
+ return False;
+ }
+ }
+
+ DEBUG(10,("expect: returning %s\n", match ? "True" : "False" ));
+ return match;
+}
+
+static void pwd_sub(char *buf)
+{
+ all_string_sub(buf, "\\n", "\n", 0);
+ all_string_sub(buf, "\\r", "\r", 0);
+ all_string_sub(buf, "\\s", " ", 0);
+ all_string_sub(buf, "\\t", "\t", 0);
+}
+
+static int talktochild(int master, const char *seq)
+{
+ TALLOC_CTX *frame = talloc_stackframe();
+ int count = 0;
+ char *issue;
+ char *expected;
+
+ issue = talloc_strdup(frame, ".");
+ if (!issue) {
+ TALLOC_FREE(frame);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ while (next_token_talloc(frame, &seq, &expected, NULL)) {
+ pwd_sub(expected);
+ count++;
+
+ if (!expect(master, issue, expected)) {
+ DEBUG(3, ("Response %d incorrect\n", count));
+ TALLOC_FREE(frame);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (!next_token_talloc(frame, &seq, &issue, NULL)) {
+ issue = talloc_strdup(frame, ".");
+ if (!issue) {
+ TALLOC_FREE(frame);
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
+ pwd_sub(issue);
+ }
+
+ if (!strequal(issue, ".")) {
+ /* we have one final issue to send */
+ expected = talloc_strdup(frame, ".");
+ if (!expected) {
+ TALLOC_FREE(frame);
+ return false;
+ }
+ if (!expect(master, issue, expected)) {
+ TALLOC_FREE(frame);
+ return False;
+ }
+ }
+ TALLOC_FREE(frame);
+ return (count > 0);
+}
+
+static bool chat_with_program(char *passwordprogram, const struct passwd *pass,
+ char *chatsequence, bool as_root)
+{
+ char *slavedev = NULL;
+ int master;
+ pid_t pid, wpid;
+ int wstat;
+ bool chstat = False;
+
+ if (pass == NULL) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("chat_with_program: user doesn't exist in the UNIX password database.\n"));
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ /* allocate a pseudo-terminal device */
+ if ((master = findpty(&slavedev)) < 0) {
+ DEBUG(3, ("chat_with_program: Cannot Allocate pty for password change: %s\n", pass->pw_name));
+ return (False);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We need to temporarily stop CatchChild from eating
+ * SIGCLD signals as it also eats the exit status code. JRA.
+ */
+
+ CatchChildLeaveStatus();
+
+ if ((pid = sys_fork()) < 0) {
+ DEBUG(3, ("chat_with_program: Cannot fork() child for password change: %s\n", pass->pw_name));
+ SAFE_FREE(slavedev);
+ close(master);
+ CatchChild();
+ return (False);
+ }
+
+ /* we now have a pty */
+ if (pid > 0) { /* This is the parent process */
+ /* Don't need this anymore in parent. */
+ SAFE_FREE(slavedev);
+
+ if ((chstat = talktochild(master, chatsequence)) == False) {
+ DEBUG(3, ("chat_with_program: Child failed to change password: %s\n", pass->pw_name));
+ kill(pid, SIGKILL); /* be sure to end this process */
+ }
+
+ while ((wpid = sys_waitpid(pid, &wstat, 0)) < 0) {
+ if (errno == EINTR) {
+ errno = 0;
+ continue;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (wpid < 0) {
+ DEBUG(3, ("chat_with_program: The process is no longer waiting!\n\n"));
+ close(master);
+ CatchChild();
+ return (False);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Go back to ignoring children.
+ */
+ CatchChild();
+
+ close(master);
+
+ if (pid != wpid) {
+ DEBUG(3, ("chat_with_program: We were waiting for the wrong process ID\n"));
+ return (False);
+ }
+ if (WIFEXITED(wstat) && (WEXITSTATUS(wstat) != 0)) {
+ DEBUG(3, ("chat_with_program: The process exited with status %d \
+while we were waiting\n", WEXITSTATUS(wstat)));
+ return (False);
+ }
+#if defined(WIFSIGNALLED) && defined(WTERMSIG)
+ else if (WIFSIGNALLED(wstat)) {
+ DEBUG(3, ("chat_with_program: The process was killed by signal %d \
+while we were waiting\n", WTERMSIG(wstat)));
+ return (False);
+ }
+#endif
+ } else {
+ /* CHILD */
+
+ /*
+ * Lose any elevated privileges.
+ */
+ drop_effective_capability(KERNEL_OPLOCK_CAPABILITY);
+ drop_effective_capability(DMAPI_ACCESS_CAPABILITY);
+
+ /* make sure it doesn't freeze */
+ alarm(20);
+
+ if (as_root)
+ become_root();
+
+ DEBUG(3, ("chat_with_program: Dochild for user %s (uid=%d,gid=%d) (as_root = %s)\n", pass->pw_name,
+ (int)getuid(), (int)getgid(), BOOLSTR(as_root) ));
+ chstat = dochild(master, slavedev, pass, passwordprogram, as_root);
+
+ if (as_root)
+ unbecome_root();
+
+ /*
+ * The child should never return from dochild() ....
+ */
+
+ DEBUG(0, ("chat_with_program: Error: dochild() returned %d\n", chstat));
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ if (chstat)
+ DEBUG(3, ("chat_with_program: Password change %ssuccessful for user %s\n",
+ (chstat ? "" : "un"), pass->pw_name));
+ return (chstat);
+}
+
+bool chgpasswd(const char *name, const struct passwd *pass,
+ const char *oldpass, const char *newpass, bool as_root)
+{
+ char *passwordprogram = NULL;
+ char *chatsequence = NULL;
+ size_t i;
+ size_t len;
+ TALLOC_CTX *ctx = talloc_tos();
+
+ if (!oldpass) {
+ oldpass = "";
+ }
+
+ DEBUG(3, ("chgpasswd: Password change (as_root=%s) for user: %s\n", BOOLSTR(as_root), name));
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
+ DEBUG(100, ("chgpasswd: Passwords: old=%s new=%s\n", oldpass, newpass));
+#endif
+
+ /* Take the passed information and test it for minimum criteria */
+
+ /* Password is same as old password */
+ if (strcmp(oldpass, newpass) == 0) {
+ /* don't allow same password */
+ DEBUG(2, ("chgpasswd: Password Change: %s, New password is same as old\n", name)); /* log the attempt */
+ return (False); /* inform the user */
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Check the old and new passwords don't contain any control
+ * characters.
+ */
+
+ len = strlen(oldpass);
+ for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+ if (iscntrl((int)oldpass[i])) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("chgpasswd: oldpass contains control characters (disallowed).\n"));
+ return False;
+ }
+ }
+
+ len = strlen(newpass);
+ for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+ if (iscntrl((int)newpass[i])) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("chgpasswd: newpass contains control characters (disallowed).\n"));
+ return False;
+ }
+ }
+
+#ifdef WITH_PAM
+ if (lp_pam_password_change()) {
+ bool ret;
+#ifdef HAVE_SETLOCALE
+ const char *prevlocale = setlocale(LC_ALL, "C");
+#endif
+
+ if (as_root)
+ become_root();
+
+ if (pass) {
+ ret = smb_pam_passchange(pass->pw_name, oldpass, newpass);
+ } else {
+ ret = smb_pam_passchange(name, oldpass, newpass);
+ }
+
+ if (as_root)
+ unbecome_root();
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SETLOCALE
+ setlocale(LC_ALL, prevlocale);
+#endif
+
+ return ret;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /* A non-PAM password change just doen't make sense without a valid local user */
+
+ if (pass == NULL) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("chgpasswd: user %s doesn't exist in the UNIX password database.\n", name));
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ passwordprogram = talloc_strdup(ctx, lp_passwd_program());
+ if (!passwordprogram || !*passwordprogram) {
+ DEBUG(2, ("chgpasswd: Null password program - no password changing\n"));
+ return false;
+ }
+ chatsequence = talloc_strdup(ctx, lp_passwd_chat());
+ if (!chatsequence || !*chatsequence) {
+ DEBUG(2, ("chgpasswd: Null chat sequence - no password changing\n"));
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (as_root) {
+ /* The password program *must* contain the user name to work. Fail if not. */
+ if (strstr_m(passwordprogram, "%u") == NULL) {
+ DEBUG(0,("chgpasswd: Running as root the 'passwd program' parameter *MUST* contain \
+the string %%u, and the given string %s does not.\n", passwordprogram ));
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
+
+ passwordprogram = talloc_string_sub(ctx, passwordprogram, "%u", name);
+ if (!passwordprogram) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ /* note that we do NOT substitute the %o and %n in the password program
+ as this would open up a security hole where the user could use
+ a new password containing shell escape characters */
+
+ chatsequence = talloc_string_sub(ctx, chatsequence, "%u", name);
+ if (!chatsequence) {
+ return false;
+ }
+ chatsequence = talloc_all_string_sub(ctx,
+ chatsequence,
+ "%o",
+ oldpass);
+ if (!chatsequence) {
+ return false;
+ }
+ chatsequence = talloc_all_string_sub(ctx,
+ chatsequence,
+ "%n",
+ newpass);
+ return chat_with_program(passwordprogram,
+ pass,
+ chatsequence,
+ as_root);
+}
+
+#else /* ALLOW_CHANGE_PASSWORD */
+
+bool chgpasswd(const char *name, const struct passwd *pass,
+ const char *oldpass, const char *newpass, bool as_root)
+{
+ DEBUG(0, ("chgpasswd: Unix Password changing not compiled in (user=%s)\n", name));
+ return (False);
+}
+#endif /* ALLOW_CHANGE_PASSWORD */
+
+/***********************************************************
+ Decrypt and verify a user password change.
+
+ The 516 byte long buffers are encrypted with the old NT and
+ old LM passwords, and if the NT passwords are present, both
+ buffers contain a unicode string.
+
+ After decrypting the buffers, check the password is correct by
+ matching the old hashed passwords with the passwords in the passdb.
+
+************************************************************/
+
+static NTSTATUS check_oem_password(const char *user,
+ uchar password_encrypted_with_lm_hash[516],
+ const uchar old_lm_hash_encrypted[16],
+ uchar password_encrypted_with_nt_hash[516],
+ const uchar old_nt_hash_encrypted[16],
+ struct samu *sampass,
+ char **pp_new_passwd)
+{
+ uchar null_pw[16];
+ uchar null_ntpw[16];
+ uint8 *password_encrypted;
+ const uint8 *encryption_key;
+ const uint8 *lanman_pw, *nt_pw;
+ uint32 acct_ctrl;
+ size_t new_pw_len;
+ uchar new_nt_hash[16];
+ uchar new_lm_hash[16];
+ uchar verifier[16];
+ char no_pw[2];
+
+ bool nt_pass_set = (password_encrypted_with_nt_hash && old_nt_hash_encrypted);
+ bool lm_pass_set = (password_encrypted_with_lm_hash && old_lm_hash_encrypted);
+
+ acct_ctrl = pdb_get_acct_ctrl(sampass);
+#if 0
+ /* I am convinced this check here is wrong, it is valid to
+ * change a password of a user that has a disabled account - gd */
+
+ if (acct_ctrl & ACB_DISABLED) {
+ DEBUG(2,("check_lanman_password: account %s disabled.\n", user));
+ return NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_DISABLED;
+ }
+#endif
+ if ((acct_ctrl & ACB_PWNOTREQ) && lp_null_passwords()) {
+ /* construct a null password (in case one is needed */
+ no_pw[0] = 0;
+ no_pw[1] = 0;
+ nt_lm_owf_gen(no_pw, null_ntpw, null_pw);
+ lanman_pw = null_pw;
+ nt_pw = null_pw;
+
+ } else {
+ /* save pointers to passwords so we don't have to keep looking them up */
+ if (lp_lanman_auth()) {
+ lanman_pw = pdb_get_lanman_passwd(sampass);
+ } else {
+ lanman_pw = NULL;
+ }
+ nt_pw = pdb_get_nt_passwd(sampass);
+ }
+
+ if (nt_pw && nt_pass_set) {
+ /* IDEAL Case: passwords are in unicode, and we can
+ * read use the password encrypted with the NT hash
+ */
+ password_encrypted = password_encrypted_with_nt_hash;
+ encryption_key = nt_pw;
+ } else if (lanman_pw && lm_pass_set) {
+ /* password may still be in unicode, but use LM hash version */
+ password_encrypted = password_encrypted_with_lm_hash;
+ encryption_key = lanman_pw;
+ } else if (nt_pass_set) {
+ DEBUG(1, ("NT password change supplied for user %s, but we have no NT password to check it with\n",
+ user));
+ return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
+ } else if (lm_pass_set) {
+ if (lp_lanman_auth()) {
+ DEBUG(1, ("LM password change supplied for user %s, but we have no LanMan password to check it with\n",
+ user));
+ } else {
+ DEBUG(1, ("LM password change supplied for user %s, but we have disabled LanMan authentication\n",
+ user));
+ }
+ return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
+ } else {
+ DEBUG(1, ("password change requested for user %s, but no password supplied!\n",
+ user));
+ return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Decrypt the password with the key
+ */
+ arcfour_crypt( password_encrypted, encryption_key, 516);
+
+ if (!decode_pw_buffer(talloc_tos(),
+ password_encrypted,
+ pp_new_passwd,
+ &new_pw_len,
+ nt_pass_set ? CH_UTF16 : CH_DOS)) {
+ return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * To ensure we got the correct new password, hash it and
+ * use it as a key to test the passed old password.
+ */
+
+ if (nt_pass_set) {
+ /* NT passwords, verify the NT hash. */
+
+ /* Calculate the MD4 hash (NT compatible) of the password */
+ memset(new_nt_hash, '\0', 16);
+ E_md4hash(*pp_new_passwd, new_nt_hash);
+
+ if (nt_pw) {
+ /*
+ * check the NT verifier
+ */
+ E_old_pw_hash(new_nt_hash, nt_pw, verifier);
+ if (memcmp(verifier, old_nt_hash_encrypted, 16)) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("check_oem_password: old nt "
+ "password doesn't match.\n"));
+ return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
+ }
+
+ /* We could check the LM password here, but there is
+ * little point, we already know the password is
+ * correct, and the LM password might not even be
+ * present. */
+
+ /* Further, LM hash generation algorithms
+ * differ with charset, so we could
+ * incorrectly fail a perfectly valid password
+ * change */
+#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
+ DEBUG(100,
+ ("check_oem_password: password %s ok\n", *pp_new_passwd));
+#endif
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+ }
+
+ if (lanman_pw) {
+ /*
+ * check the lm verifier
+ */
+ E_old_pw_hash(new_nt_hash, lanman_pw, verifier);
+ if (memcmp(verifier, old_lm_hash_encrypted, 16)) {
+ DEBUG(0,("check_oem_password: old lm password doesn't match.\n"));
+ return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
+ }
+#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
+ DEBUG(100,
+ ("check_oem_password: password %s ok\n", *pp_new_passwd));
+#endif
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (lanman_pw && lm_pass_set) {
+
+ E_deshash(*pp_new_passwd, new_lm_hash);
+
+ /*
+ * check the lm verifier
+ */
+ E_old_pw_hash(new_lm_hash, lanman_pw, verifier);
+ if (memcmp(verifier, old_lm_hash_encrypted, 16)) {
+ DEBUG(0,("check_oem_password: old lm password doesn't match.\n"));
+ return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
+ }
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
+ DEBUG(100,
+ ("check_oem_password: password %s ok\n", *pp_new_passwd));
+#endif
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+ }
+
+ /* should not be reached */
+ return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
+}
+
+static bool password_in_history(uint8_t nt_pw[NT_HASH_LEN],
+ uint32_t pw_history_len,
+ const uint8_t *pw_history)
+{
+ static const uint8_t zero_md5_nt_pw[SALTED_MD5_HASH_LEN] = { 0, };
+ int i;
+
+ dump_data(100, nt_pw, NT_HASH_LEN);
+ dump_data(100, pw_history, PW_HISTORY_ENTRY_LEN * pw_history_len);
+
+ for (i=0; i<pw_history_len; i++) {
+ uint8_t new_nt_pw_salted_md5_hash[SALTED_MD5_HASH_LEN];
+ const uint8_t *current_salt;
+ const uint8_t *old_nt_pw_salted_md5_hash;
+
+ current_salt = &pw_history[i*PW_HISTORY_ENTRY_LEN];
+ old_nt_pw_salted_md5_hash = current_salt + PW_HISTORY_SALT_LEN;
+
+ if (memcmp(zero_md5_nt_pw, old_nt_pw_salted_md5_hash,
+ SALTED_MD5_HASH_LEN) == 0) {
+ /* Ignore zero valued entries. */
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (memcmp(zero_md5_nt_pw, current_salt,
+ PW_HISTORY_SALT_LEN) == 0)
+ {
+ /*
+ * New format: zero salt and then plain nt hash.
+ * Directly compare the hashes.
+ */
+ if (memcmp(nt_pw, old_nt_pw_salted_md5_hash,
+ SALTED_MD5_HASH_LEN) == 0)
+ {
+ return true;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Old format: md5sum of salted nt hash.
+ * Create salted version of new pw to compare.
+ */
+ E_md5hash(current_salt, nt_pw, new_nt_pw_salted_md5_hash);
+
+ if (memcmp(new_nt_pw_salted_md5_hash,
+ old_nt_pw_salted_md5_hash,
+ SALTED_MD5_HASH_LEN) == 0) {
+ return true;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ return false;
+}
+
+/***********************************************************
+ This routine takes the given password and checks it against
+ the password history. Returns True if this password has been
+ found in the history list.
+************************************************************/
+
+static bool check_passwd_history(struct samu *sampass, const char *plaintext)
+{
+ uchar new_nt_p16[NT_HASH_LEN];
+ const uint8 *nt_pw;
+ const uint8 *pwhistory;
+ uint32 pwHisLen, curr_pwHisLen;
+
+ pdb_get_account_policy(PDB_POLICY_PASSWORD_HISTORY, &pwHisLen);
+ if (pwHisLen == 0) {
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ pwhistory = pdb_get_pw_history(sampass, &curr_pwHisLen);
+ if (!pwhistory || curr_pwHisLen == 0) {
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ /* Only examine the minimum of the current history len and
+ the stored history len. Avoids race conditions. */
+ pwHisLen = MIN(pwHisLen,curr_pwHisLen);
+
+ nt_pw = pdb_get_nt_passwd(sampass);
+
+ E_md4hash(plaintext, new_nt_p16);
+
+ if (!memcmp(nt_pw, new_nt_p16, NT_HASH_LEN)) {
+ DEBUG(10,("check_passwd_history: proposed new password for user %s is the same as the current password !\n",
+ pdb_get_username(sampass) ));
+ return True;
+ }
+
+ if (password_in_history(new_nt_p16, pwHisLen, pwhistory)) {
+ DEBUG(1,("check_passwd_history: proposed new password for "
+ "user %s found in history list !\n",
+ pdb_get_username(sampass) ));
+ return true;
+ }
+ return false;
+}
+
+/***********************************************************
+************************************************************/
+
+NTSTATUS check_password_complexity(const char *username,
+ const char *password,
+ enum samPwdChangeReason *samr_reject_reason)
+{
+ TALLOC_CTX *tosctx = talloc_tos();
+ int check_ret;
+ char *cmd;
+
+ /* Use external script to check password complexity */
+ if ((lp_check_password_script() == NULL)
+ || (*(lp_check_password_script()) == '\0')) {
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+ }
+
+ cmd = talloc_string_sub(tosctx, lp_check_password_script(), "%u",
+ username);
+ if (!cmd) {
+ return NT_STATUS_PASSWORD_RESTRICTION;
+ }
+
+ check_ret = smbrunsecret(cmd, password);
+ DEBUG(5,("check_password_complexity: check password script (%s) "
+ "returned [%d]\n", cmd, check_ret));
+ TALLOC_FREE(cmd);
+
+ if (check_ret != 0) {
+ DEBUG(1,("check_password_complexity: "
+ "check password script said new password is not good "
+ "enough!\n"));
+ if (samr_reject_reason) {
+ *samr_reject_reason = SAM_PWD_CHANGE_NOT_COMPLEX;
+ }
+ return NT_STATUS_PASSWORD_RESTRICTION;
+ }
+
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+/***********************************************************
+ Code to change the oem password. Changes both the lanman
+ and NT hashes. Old_passwd is almost always NULL.
+ NOTE this function is designed to be called as root. Check the old password
+ is correct before calling. JRA.
+************************************************************/
+
+static NTSTATUS change_oem_password(struct samu *hnd, char *old_passwd, char *new_passwd, bool as_root, enum samPwdChangeReason *samr_reject_reason)
+{
+ uint32 min_len;
+ uint32 refuse;
+ TALLOC_CTX *tosctx = talloc_tos();
+ struct passwd *pass = NULL;
+ const char *username = pdb_get_username(hnd);
+ time_t can_change_time = pdb_get_pass_can_change_time(hnd);
+ NTSTATUS status;
+
+ if (samr_reject_reason) {
+ *samr_reject_reason = SAM_PWD_CHANGE_NO_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ /* check to see if the secdesc has previously been set to disallow */
+ if (!pdb_get_pass_can_change(hnd)) {
+ DEBUG(1, ("user %s does not have permissions to change password\n", username));
+ if (samr_reject_reason) {
+ *samr_reject_reason = SAM_PWD_CHANGE_NO_ERROR;
+ }
+ return NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_RESTRICTION;
+ }
+
+ /* check to see if it is a Machine account and if the policy
+ * denies machines to change the password. *
+ * Should we deny also SRVTRUST and/or DOMSTRUST ? .SSS. */
+ if (pdb_get_acct_ctrl(hnd) & ACB_WSTRUST) {
+ if (pdb_get_account_policy(PDB_POLICY_REFUSE_MACHINE_PW_CHANGE, &refuse) && refuse) {
+ DEBUG(1, ("Machine %s cannot change password now, "
+ "denied by Refuse Machine Password Change policy\n",
+ username));
+ if (samr_reject_reason) {
+ *samr_reject_reason = SAM_PWD_CHANGE_NO_ERROR;
+ }
+ return NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_RESTRICTION;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* removed calculation here, because passdb now calculates
+ based on policy. jmcd */
+ if ((can_change_time != 0) && (time(NULL) < can_change_time)) {
+ DEBUG(1, ("user %s cannot change password now, must "
+ "wait until %s\n", username,
+ http_timestring(tosctx, can_change_time)));
+ if (samr_reject_reason) {
+ *samr_reject_reason = SAM_PWD_CHANGE_NO_ERROR;
+ }
+ return NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_RESTRICTION;
+ }
+
+ if (pdb_get_account_policy(PDB_POLICY_MIN_PASSWORD_LEN, &min_len) && (str_charnum(new_passwd) < min_len)) {
+ DEBUG(1, ("user %s cannot change password - password too short\n",
+ username));
+ DEBUGADD(1, (" account policy min password len = %d\n", min_len));
+ if (samr_reject_reason) {
+ *samr_reject_reason = SAM_PWD_CHANGE_PASSWORD_TOO_SHORT;
+ }
+ return NT_STATUS_PASSWORD_RESTRICTION;
+/* return NT_STATUS_PWD_TOO_SHORT; */
+ }
+
+ if (check_passwd_history(hnd,new_passwd)) {
+ if (samr_reject_reason) {
+ *samr_reject_reason = SAM_PWD_CHANGE_PWD_IN_HISTORY;
+ }
+ return NT_STATUS_PASSWORD_RESTRICTION;
+ }
+
+ pass = Get_Pwnam_alloc(tosctx, username);
+ if (!pass) {
+ DEBUG(1, ("change_oem_password: Username %s does not exist in system !?!\n", username));
+ return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
+ }
+
+ status = check_password_complexity(username, new_passwd, samr_reject_reason);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ TALLOC_FREE(pass);
+ return status;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If unix password sync was requested, attempt to change
+ * the /etc/passwd database first. Return failure if this cannot
+ * be done.
+ *
+ * This occurs before the oem change, because we don't want to
+ * update it if chgpasswd failed.
+ *
+ * Conditional on lp_unix_password_sync() because we don't want
+ * to touch the unix db unless we have admin permission.
+ */
+
+ if(lp_unix_password_sync() &&
+ !chgpasswd(username, pass, old_passwd, new_passwd, as_root)) {
+ TALLOC_FREE(pass);
+ return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
+ }
+
+ TALLOC_FREE(pass);
+
+ if (!pdb_set_plaintext_passwd (hnd, new_passwd)) {
+ return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
+ }
+
+ /* Now write it into the file. */
+ return pdb_update_sam_account (hnd);
+}
+
+/***********************************************************
+ Code to check and change the OEM hashed password.
+************************************************************/
+
+NTSTATUS pass_oem_change(char *user,
+ uchar password_encrypted_with_lm_hash[516],
+ const uchar old_lm_hash_encrypted[16],
+ uchar password_encrypted_with_nt_hash[516],
+ const uchar old_nt_hash_encrypted[16],
+ enum samPwdChangeReason *reject_reason)
+{
+ char *new_passwd = NULL;
+ struct samu *sampass = NULL;
+ NTSTATUS nt_status;
+ bool ret = false;
+
+ if (!(sampass = samu_new(NULL))) {
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+ become_root();
+ ret = pdb_getsampwnam(sampass, user);
+ unbecome_root();
+
+ if (ret == false) {
+ DEBUG(0,("pass_oem_change: getsmbpwnam returned NULL\n"));
+ TALLOC_FREE(sampass);
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER;
+ }
+
+ nt_status = check_oem_password(user,
+ password_encrypted_with_lm_hash,
+ old_lm_hash_encrypted,
+ password_encrypted_with_nt_hash,
+ old_nt_hash_encrypted,
+ sampass,
+ &new_passwd);
+
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+ TALLOC_FREE(sampass);
+ return nt_status;
+ }
+
+ /* We've already checked the old password here.... */
+ become_root();
+ nt_status = change_oem_password(sampass, NULL, new_passwd, True, reject_reason);
+ unbecome_root();
+
+ memset(new_passwd, 0, strlen(new_passwd));
+
+ TALLOC_FREE(sampass);
+
+ return nt_status;
+}
diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/srv_samr_util.h b/source3/rpc_server/srv_samr_util.h
index 9dbc8b5ad6..fb6d02620d 100644
--- a/source3/rpc_server/srv_samr_util.h
+++ b/source3/rpc_server/srv_samr_util.h
@@ -61,3 +61,17 @@ void copy_id25_to_sam_passwd(struct samu *to,
struct samr_UserInfo25 *from);
void copy_id26_to_sam_passwd(struct samu *to,
struct samr_UserInfo26 *from);
+
+/* The following definitions come from rpc_server/srv_samr_chgpasswd.c */
+
+bool chgpasswd(const char *name, const struct passwd *pass,
+ const char *oldpass, const char *newpass, bool as_root);
+NTSTATUS pass_oem_change(char *user,
+ uchar password_encrypted_with_lm_hash[516],
+ const uchar old_lm_hash_encrypted[16],
+ uchar password_encrypted_with_nt_hash[516],
+ const uchar old_nt_hash_encrypted[16],
+ enum samPwdChangeReason *reject_reason);
+NTSTATUS check_password_complexity(const char *username,
+ const char *password,
+ enum samPwdChangeReason *samr_reject_reason);