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Diffstat (limited to 'source3/smbd/reply.c')
-rw-r--r--source3/smbd/reply.c33
1 files changed, 32 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/source3/smbd/reply.c b/source3/smbd/reply.c
index 63c0a7027e..7b8f4a502f 100644
--- a/source3/smbd/reply.c
+++ b/source3/smbd/reply.c
@@ -323,6 +323,7 @@ int reply_sesssetup_and_X(char *inbuf,char *outbuf,int length,int bufsize)
pstring user;
BOOL guest=False;
BOOL computer_id=False;
+ static BOOL done_sesssetup = False;
*smb_apasswd = 0;
@@ -489,7 +490,10 @@ int reply_sesssetup_and_X(char *inbuf,char *outbuf,int length,int bufsize)
to a uid can get through without a password, on the same VC */
register_uid(SVAL(inbuf,smb_uid),gid,user,guest);
- maxxmit = MIN(maxxmit,smb_bufsize);
+ if (!done_sesssetup)
+ maxxmit = MIN(maxxmit,smb_bufsize);
+
+ done_sesssetup = True;
return chain_reply(inbuf,outbuf,length,bufsize);
}
@@ -983,6 +987,10 @@ int reply_open(char *inbuf,char *outbuf)
put_dos_date3(outbuf,smb_vwv2,mtime);
SIVAL(outbuf,smb_vwv4,size);
SSVAL(outbuf,smb_vwv6,rmode);
+
+ if (lp_fake_oplocks(SNUM(cnum))) {
+ CVAL(outbuf,smb_flg) |= (CVAL(inbuf,smb_flg) & (1<<5));
+ }
return(outsize);
}
@@ -999,6 +1007,7 @@ int reply_open_and_X(char *inbuf,char *outbuf,int length,int bufsize)
int openmode = 0;
int smb_mode = SVAL(inbuf,smb_vwv3);
int smb_attr = SVAL(inbuf,smb_vwv5);
+ BOOL oplock_request = BITSETW(inbuf+smb_vwv2,1);
#if 0
int open_flags = SVAL(inbuf,smb_vwv2);
int smb_sattr = SVAL(inbuf,smb_vwv4);
@@ -1053,6 +1062,10 @@ int reply_open_and_X(char *inbuf,char *outbuf,int length,int bufsize)
return(ERROR(ERRDOS,ERRnoaccess));
}
+ if (oplock_request && lp_fake_oplocks(SNUM(cnum))) {
+ smb_action |= (1<<15);
+ }
+
set_message(outbuf,15,0,True);
SSVAL(outbuf,smb_vwv2,fnum);
SSVAL(outbuf,smb_vwv3,fmode);
@@ -1076,6 +1089,16 @@ int reply_ulogoffX(char *inbuf,char *outbuf,int length,int bufsize)
invalidate_uid(uid);
+ /* in user level security we are supposed to close any files
+ open by this user */
+ if (lp_security() != SEC_SHARE) {
+ int i;
+ for (i=0;i<MAX_OPEN_FILES;i++)
+ if (Files[i].uid == uid && Files[i].open) {
+ close_file(i);
+ }
+ }
+
set_message(outbuf,2,0,True);
DEBUG(3,("%s ulogoffX uid=%d\n",timestring(),uid));
@@ -1127,6 +1150,10 @@ int reply_mknew(char *inbuf,char *outbuf)
outsize = set_message(outbuf,1,0,True);
SSVAL(outbuf,smb_vwv0,fnum);
+
+ if (lp_fake_oplocks(SNUM(cnum))) {
+ CVAL(outbuf,smb_flg) |= (CVAL(inbuf,smb_flg) & (1<<5));
+ }
DEBUG(2,("new file %s\n",fname));
DEBUG(3,("%s mknew %s fd=%d fnum=%d cnum=%d dmode=%d umode=%o\n",timestring(),fname,Files[fnum].fd,fnum,cnum,createmode,unixmode));
@@ -1173,6 +1200,10 @@ int reply_ctemp(char *inbuf,char *outbuf)
SSVAL(outbuf,smb_vwv0,fnum);
CVAL(smb_buf(outbuf),0) = 4;
strcpy(smb_buf(outbuf) + 1,fname2);
+
+ if (lp_fake_oplocks(SNUM(cnum))) {
+ CVAL(outbuf,smb_flg) |= (CVAL(inbuf,smb_flg) & (1<<5));
+ }
DEBUG(2,("created temp file %s\n",fname2));
DEBUG(3,("%s ctemp %s fd=%d fnum=%d cnum=%d dmode=%d umode=%o\n",timestring(),fname2,Files[fnum].fd,fnum,cnum,createmode,unixmode));