diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'source3/smbd')
| -rw-r--r-- | source3/smbd/open.c | 413 |
1 files changed, 242 insertions, 171 deletions
diff --git a/source3/smbd/open.c b/source3/smbd/open.c index 007b64abf2..b83d6844d6 100644 --- a/source3/smbd/open.c +++ b/source3/smbd/open.c @@ -2444,6 +2444,243 @@ static struct case_semantics_state *set_posix_case_semantics(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx * Wrapper around open_file_ntcreate and open_directory */ +NTSTATUS create_file_unixpath(connection_struct *conn, + struct smb_request *req, + const char *fname, + uint32_t access_mask, + uint32_t share_access, + uint32_t create_disposition, + uint32_t create_options, + uint32_t file_attributes, + uint32_t oplock_request, + SMB_BIG_UINT allocation_size, + struct security_descriptor *sd, + struct ea_list *ea_list, + + files_struct **result, + int *pinfo, + SMB_STRUCT_STAT *psbuf) +{ + SMB_STRUCT_STAT sbuf; + int info = FILE_WAS_OPENED; + files_struct *fsp = NULL; + NTSTATUS status; + + DEBUG(10,("create_file_unixpath: access_mask = 0x%x " + "file_attributes = 0x%x, share_access = 0x%x, " + "create_disposition = 0x%x create_options = 0x%x " + "oplock_request = 0x%x ea_list = 0x%p, sd = 0x%p, " + "fname = %s\n", + (unsigned int)access_mask, + (unsigned int)file_attributes, + (unsigned int)share_access, + (unsigned int)create_disposition, + (unsigned int)create_options, + (unsigned int)oplock_request, + ea_list, sd, fname)); + + if (create_options & FILE_OPEN_BY_FILE_ID) { + status = NT_STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED; + goto fail; + } + + if (req == NULL) { + oplock_request |= INTERNAL_OPEN_ONLY; + } + + if (psbuf != NULL) { + sbuf = *psbuf; + } + else { + SET_STAT_INVALID(sbuf); + } + + /* This is the correct thing to do (check every time) but can_delete + * is expensive (it may have to read the parent directory + * permissions). So for now we're not doing it unless we have a strong + * hint the client is really going to delete this file. If the client + * is forcing FILE_CREATE let the filesystem take care of the + * permissions. */ + + /* Setting FILE_SHARE_DELETE is the hint. */ + + if (lp_acl_check_permissions(SNUM(conn)) + && (create_disposition != FILE_CREATE) + && (share_access & FILE_SHARE_DELETE) + && (access_mask & DELETE_ACCESS) + && (((dos_mode(conn, fname, &sbuf) & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_READONLY) + && !lp_delete_readonly(SNUM(conn))) + || !can_delete_file_in_directory(conn, fname))) { + status = NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; + goto fail; + } + +#if 0 + /* We need to support SeSecurityPrivilege for this. */ + if ((access_mask & SEC_RIGHT_SYSTEM_SECURITY) && + !user_has_privileges(current_user.nt_user_token, + &se_security)) { + status = NT_STATUS_PRIVILEGE_NOT_HELD; + goto fail; + } +#endif + + /* + * If it's a request for a directory open, deal with it separately. + */ + + if (create_options & FILE_DIRECTORY_FILE) { + + /* Can't open a temp directory. IFS kit test. */ + if (file_attributes & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_TEMPORARY) { + status = NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER; + goto fail; + } + + /* + * We will get a create directory here if the Win32 + * app specified a security descriptor in the + * CreateDirectory() call. + */ + + oplock_request = 0; + status = open_directory( + conn, req, fname, &sbuf, access_mask, share_access, + create_disposition, create_options, file_attributes, + &info, &fsp); + } else { + + /* + * Ordinary file case. + */ + + status = open_file_ntcreate( + conn, req, fname, &sbuf, access_mask, share_access, + create_disposition, create_options, file_attributes, + oplock_request, &info, &fsp); + + if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_FILE_IS_A_DIRECTORY)) { + + /* + * Fail the open if it was explicitly a non-directory + * file. + */ + + if (create_options & FILE_NON_DIRECTORY_FILE) { + status = NT_STATUS_FILE_IS_A_DIRECTORY; + goto fail; + } + + oplock_request = 0; + status = open_directory( + conn, req, fname, &sbuf, access_mask, + share_access, create_disposition, + create_options, file_attributes, + &info, &fsp); + } + } + + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { + goto fail; + } + + /* + * According to the MS documentation, the only time the security + * descriptor is applied to the opened file is iff we *created* the + * file; an existing file stays the same. + * + * Also, it seems (from observation) that you can open the file with + * any access mask but you can still write the sd. We need to override + * the granted access before we call set_sd + * Patch for bug #2242 from Tom Lackemann <cessnatomny@yahoo.com>. + */ + + if ((sd != NULL) && (info == FILE_WAS_CREATED) + && lp_nt_acl_support(SNUM(conn))) { + + uint32_t sec_info_sent = ALL_SECURITY_INFORMATION; + uint32_t saved_access_mask = fsp->access_mask; + + if (sd->owner_sid==0) { + sec_info_sent &= ~OWNER_SECURITY_INFORMATION; + } + if (sd->group_sid==0) { + sec_info_sent &= ~GROUP_SECURITY_INFORMATION; + } + if (sd->sacl==0) { + sec_info_sent &= ~SACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION; + } + if (sd->dacl==0) { + sec_info_sent &= ~DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION; + } + + fsp->access_mask = FILE_GENERIC_ALL; + + status = SMB_VFS_FSET_NT_ACL( + fsp, fsp->fh->fd, sec_info_sent, sd); + + fsp->access_mask = saved_access_mask; + + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { + goto fail; + } + } + + if ((ea_list != NULL) && (info == FILE_WAS_CREATED)) { + status = set_ea(conn, fsp, fname, ea_list); + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { + goto fail; + } + } + + if (!fsp->is_directory && S_ISDIR(sbuf.st_mode)) { + status = NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; + goto fail; + } + + /* Save the requested allocation size. */ + if ((info == FILE_WAS_CREATED) || (info == FILE_WAS_OVERWRITTEN)) { + if (allocation_size + && (allocation_size > sbuf.st_size)) { + fsp->initial_allocation_size = smb_roundup( + fsp->conn, allocation_size); + if (fsp->is_directory) { + /* Can't set allocation size on a directory. */ + status = NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; + goto fail; + } + if (vfs_allocate_file_space( + fsp, fsp->initial_allocation_size) == -1) { + status = NT_STATUS_DISK_FULL; + goto fail; + } + } else { + fsp->initial_allocation_size = smb_roundup( + fsp->conn, (SMB_BIG_UINT)sbuf.st_size); + } + } + + DEBUG(10, ("create_file: info=%d\n", info)); + + *result = fsp; + if (pinfo != NULL) { + *pinfo = info; + } + if (psbuf != NULL) { + *psbuf = sbuf; + } + return NT_STATUS_OK; + + fail: + DEBUG(10, ("create_file: %s\n", nt_errstr(status))); + + if (fsp != NULL) { + close_file(fsp, ERROR_CLOSE); + fsp = NULL; + } + return status; +} + NTSTATUS create_file(connection_struct *conn, struct smb_request *req, uint16_t root_dir_fid, @@ -2651,182 +2888,16 @@ NTSTATUS create_file(connection_struct *conn, goto fail; } - if (create_options & FILE_OPEN_BY_FILE_ID) { - status = NT_STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED; - goto fail; - } - - if (req == NULL) { - oplock_request |= INTERNAL_OPEN_ONLY; - } - - /* This is the correct thing to do (check every time) but can_delete - * is expensive (it may have to read the parent directory - * permissions). So for now we're not doing it unless we have a strong - * hint the client is really going to delete this file. If the client - * is forcing FILE_CREATE let the filesystem take care of the - * permissions. */ - - /* Setting FILE_SHARE_DELETE is the hint. */ - - if (lp_acl_check_permissions(SNUM(conn)) - && (create_disposition != FILE_CREATE) - && (share_access & FILE_SHARE_DELETE) - && (access_mask & DELETE_ACCESS) - && (((dos_mode(conn, fname, &sbuf) & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_READONLY) - && !lp_delete_readonly(SNUM(conn))) - || !can_delete_file_in_directory(conn, fname))) { - status = NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; - goto fail; - } - -#if 0 - /* We need to support SeSecurityPrivilege for this. */ - if ((access_mask & SEC_RIGHT_SYSTEM_SECURITY) && - !user_has_privileges(current_user.nt_user_token, - &se_security)) { - status = NT_STATUS_PRIVILEGE_NOT_HELD; - goto fail; - } -#endif - - /* - * If it's a request for a directory open, deal with it separately. - */ - - if (create_options & FILE_DIRECTORY_FILE) { - - /* Can't open a temp directory. IFS kit test. */ - if (file_attributes & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_TEMPORARY) { - status = NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER; - goto fail; - } - - /* - * We will get a create directory here if the Win32 - * app specified a security descriptor in the - * CreateDirectory() call. - */ - - oplock_request = 0; - status = open_directory( - conn, req, fname, &sbuf, access_mask, share_access, - create_disposition, create_options, file_attributes, - &info, &fsp); - } else { - - /* - * Ordinary file case. - */ - - status = open_file_ntcreate( - conn, req, fname, &sbuf, access_mask, share_access, - create_disposition, create_options, file_attributes, - oplock_request, &info, &fsp); - - if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_FILE_IS_A_DIRECTORY)) { - - /* - * Fail the open if it was explicitly a non-directory - * file. - */ - - if (create_options & FILE_NON_DIRECTORY_FILE) { - status = NT_STATUS_FILE_IS_A_DIRECTORY; - goto fail; - } - - oplock_request = 0; - status = open_directory( - conn, req, fname, &sbuf, access_mask, - share_access, create_disposition, - create_options, file_attributes, - &info, &fsp); - } - } - - TALLOC_FREE(case_state); + status = create_file_unixpath( + conn, req, fname, access_mask, share_access, + create_disposition, create_options, file_attributes, + oplock_request, allocation_size, sd, ea_list, + &fsp, &info, &sbuf); if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { goto fail; } - /* - * According to the MS documentation, the only time the security - * descriptor is applied to the opened file is iff we *created* the - * file; an existing file stays the same. - * - * Also, it seems (from observation) that you can open the file with - * any access mask but you can still write the sd. We need to override - * the granted access before we call set_sd - * Patch for bug #2242 from Tom Lackemann <cessnatomny@yahoo.com>. - */ - - if ((sd != NULL) && (info == FILE_WAS_CREATED) - && lp_nt_acl_support(SNUM(conn))) { - - uint32_t sec_info_sent = ALL_SECURITY_INFORMATION; - uint32_t saved_access_mask = fsp->access_mask; - - if (sd->owner_sid==0) { - sec_info_sent &= ~OWNER_SECURITY_INFORMATION; - } - if (sd->group_sid==0) { - sec_info_sent &= ~GROUP_SECURITY_INFORMATION; - } - if (sd->sacl==0) { - sec_info_sent &= ~SACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION; - } - if (sd->dacl==0) { - sec_info_sent &= ~DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION; - } - - fsp->access_mask = FILE_GENERIC_ALL; - - status = SMB_VFS_FSET_NT_ACL( - fsp, fsp->fh->fd, sec_info_sent, sd); - - fsp->access_mask = saved_access_mask; - - if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { - goto fail; - } - } - - if ((ea_list != NULL) && (info == FILE_WAS_CREATED)) { - status = set_ea(conn, fsp, fname, ea_list); - if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { - goto fail; - } - } - - if (!fsp->is_directory && S_ISDIR(sbuf.st_mode)) { - status = NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; - goto fail; - } - - /* Save the requested allocation size. */ - if ((info == FILE_WAS_CREATED) || (info == FILE_WAS_OVERWRITTEN)) { - if (allocation_size - && (allocation_size > sbuf.st_size)) { - fsp->initial_allocation_size = smb_roundup( - fsp->conn, allocation_size); - if (fsp->is_directory) { - /* Can't set allocation size on a directory. */ - status = NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; - goto fail; - } - if (vfs_allocate_file_space( - fsp, fsp->initial_allocation_size) == -1) { - status = NT_STATUS_DISK_FULL; - goto fail; - } - } else { - fsp->initial_allocation_size = smb_roundup( - fsp->conn, (SMB_BIG_UINT)sbuf.st_size); - } - } - done: DEBUG(10, ("create_file: info=%d\n", info)); |