diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'source3')
| -rw-r--r-- | source3/libads/sasl.c | 310 |
1 files changed, 309 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/source3/libads/sasl.c b/source3/libads/sasl.c index d1cd9f4f0b..6c5a518e6a 100644 --- a/source3/libads/sasl.c +++ b/source3/libads/sasl.c @@ -356,19 +356,307 @@ static const struct ads_saslwrap_ops ads_sasl_gssapi_ops = { .unwrap = ads_sasl_gssapi_unwrap, .disconnect = ads_sasl_gssapi_disconnect }; + +/* + perform a LDAP/SASL/SPNEGO/GSSKRB5 bind +*/ +static ADS_STATUS ads_sasl_spnego_gsskrb5_bind(ADS_STRUCT *ads, const char *sname) +{ + ADS_STATUS status; + BOOL ok; + uint32 minor_status; + int gss_rc, rc; + gss_OID_desc krb5_mech_type = + {9, CONST_DISCARD(char *, "\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x12\x01\x02\x02") }; + gss_OID mech_type = &krb5_mech_type; + gss_OID actual_mech_type = GSS_C_NULL_OID; + const char *spnego_mechs[] = {OID_KERBEROS5_OLD, OID_KERBEROS5, OID_NTLMSSP, NULL}; + gss_name_t serv_name; + gss_ctx_id_t context_handle = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT; + gss_buffer_desc input_token, output_token; + uint32 req_flags, ret_flags; + uint32 req_tmp, ret_tmp; + DATA_BLOB unwrapped; + DATA_BLOB wrapped; + struct berval cred, *scred = NULL; + krb5_principal principal = NULL; + gss_buffer_desc input_name; + krb5_context ctx = NULL; + krb5_enctype enc_types[] = { +#ifdef ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC + ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC, +#endif + ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD5, + ENCTYPE_NULL}; + gss_OID_desc nt_principal = + {10, CONST_DISCARD(char *, "\052\206\110\206\367\022\001\002\002\002")}; + + initialize_krb5_error_table(); + status = ADS_ERROR_KRB5(krb5_init_context(&ctx)); + if (!ADS_ERR_OK(status)) { + return status; + } + status = ADS_ERROR_KRB5(krb5_set_default_tgs_ktypes(ctx, enc_types)); + if (!ADS_ERR_OK(status)) { + krb5_free_context(ctx); + return status; + } + status = ADS_ERROR_KRB5(smb_krb5_parse_name(ctx, sname, &principal)); + if (!ADS_ERR_OK(status)) { + krb5_free_context(ctx); + return status; + } + + /* + * The MIT libraries have a *HORRIBLE* bug - input_value.value needs + * to point to the *address* of the krb5_principal, and the gss libraries + * to a shallow copy of the krb5_principal pointer - so we need to keep + * the krb5_principal around until we do the gss_release_name. MIT *SUCKS* ! + * Just one more way in which MIT engineers screwed me over.... JRA. + */ + input_name.value = &principal; + input_name.length = sizeof(principal); + + gss_rc = gss_import_name(&minor_status, &input_name, &nt_principal, &serv_name); + if (gss_rc) { + krb5_free_principal(ctx, principal); + krb5_free_context(ctx); + return ADS_ERROR_GSS(gss_rc, minor_status); + } + + input_token.value = NULL; + input_token.length = 0; + + req_flags = GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG; + switch (ads->ldap.wrap_type) { + case ADS_SASLWRAP_TYPE_SEAL: + req_flags |= GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | GSS_C_CONF_FLAG; + break; + case ADS_SASLWRAP_TYPE_SIGN: + req_flags |= GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG; + break; + case ADS_SASLWRAP_TYPE_PLAIN: + break; + } + + /* Note: here we explicit ask for the krb5 mech_type */ + gss_rc = gss_init_sec_context(&minor_status, + GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, + &context_handle, + serv_name, + mech_type, + req_flags, + 0, + NULL, + &input_token, + &actual_mech_type, + &output_token, + &ret_flags, + NULL); + if (gss_rc && gss_rc != GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) { + status = ADS_ERROR_GSS(gss_rc, minor_status); + goto failed; + } + + /* + * As some gssapi krb5 mech implementations + * automaticly add GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG and GSS_C_CONF_FLAG + * to req_flags internaly, it's not possible to + * use plain or signing only connection via + * the gssapi interface. + * + * Because of this we need to check it the ret_flags + * has more flags as req_flags and correct the value + * of ads->ldap.wrap_type. + * + * I ads->auth.flags has ADS_AUTH_SASL_FORCE + * we need to give an error. + */ + req_tmp = req_flags & (GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | GSS_C_CONF_FLAG); + ret_tmp = ret_flags & (GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | GSS_C_CONF_FLAG); + + if (req_tmp == ret_tmp) { + /* everythings fine... */ + + } else if (req_flags & GSS_C_CONF_FLAG) { + /* + * here we wanted sealing but didn't got it + * from the gssapi library + */ + status = ADS_ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED); + goto failed; + + } else if (req_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG) { + /* + * here we wanted siging but didn't got it + * from the gssapi library + */ + status = ADS_ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED); + goto failed; + + } else if (ret_flags & GSS_C_CONF_FLAG) { + /* + * here we didn't want sealing + * but the gssapi library forces it + * so correct the needed wrap_type if + * the caller didn't forced siging only + */ + if (ads->auth.flags & ADS_AUTH_SASL_FORCE) { + status = ADS_ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED); + goto failed; + } + + ads->ldap.wrap_type = ADS_SASLWRAP_TYPE_SEAL; + req_flags = ret_flags; + + } else if (ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG) { + /* + * here we didn't want signing + * but the gssapi library forces it + * so correct the needed wrap_type if + * the caller didn't forced plain + */ + if (ads->auth.flags & ADS_AUTH_SASL_FORCE) { + status = ADS_ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED); + goto failed; + } + + ads->ldap.wrap_type = ADS_SASLWRAP_TYPE_SIGN; + req_flags = ret_flags; + } else { + /* + * This could (should?) not happen + */ + status = ADS_ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto failed; + + } + + /* and wrap that in a shiny SPNEGO wrapper */ + unwrapped = data_blob_const(output_token.value, output_token.length); + wrapped = gen_negTokenTarg(spnego_mechs, unwrapped); + gss_release_buffer(&minor_status, &output_token); + if (unwrapped.length > wrapped.length) { + status = ADS_ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY); + goto failed; + } + + cred.bv_val = (char *)wrapped.data; + cred.bv_len = wrapped.length; + + rc = ldap_sasl_bind_s(ads->ldap.ld, NULL, "GSS-SPNEGO", &cred, NULL, NULL, + &scred); + data_blob_free(&wrapped); + if (rc != LDAP_SUCCESS) { + status = ADS_ERROR(rc); + goto failed; + } + + if (scred) { + wrapped = data_blob_const(scred->bv_val, scred->bv_len); + } else { + wrapped = data_blob_null; + } + + ok = spnego_parse_auth_response(wrapped, NT_STATUS_OK, + OID_KERBEROS5_OLD, + &unwrapped); + if (scred) ber_bvfree(scred); + if (!ok) { + status = ADS_ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_INVALID_NETWORK_RESPONSE); + goto failed; + } + + input_token.value = unwrapped.data; + input_token.length = unwrapped.length; + + /* + * As we asked for mutal authentication + * we need to pass the servers response + * to gssapi + */ + gss_rc = gss_init_sec_context(&minor_status, + GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, + &context_handle, + serv_name, + mech_type, + req_flags, + 0, + NULL, + &input_token, + &actual_mech_type, + &output_token, + &ret_flags, + NULL); + data_blob_free(&unwrapped); + if (gss_rc) { + status = ADS_ERROR_GSS(gss_rc, minor_status); + goto failed; + } + + gss_release_buffer(&minor_status, &output_token); + + /* + * If we the sign and seal options + * doesn't match after getting the response + * from the server, we don't want to use the connection + */ + req_tmp = req_flags & (GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | GSS_C_CONF_FLAG); + ret_tmp = ret_flags & (GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | GSS_C_CONF_FLAG); + + if (req_tmp != ret_tmp) { + /* everythings fine... */ + status = ADS_ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_INVALID_NETWORK_RESPONSE); + goto failed; + } + + if (ads->ldap.wrap_type > ADS_SASLWRAP_TYPE_PLAIN) { + uint32 max_msg_size = 0x0A000000; + + gss_rc = gss_wrap_size_limit(&minor_status, context_handle, + (ads->ldap.wrap_type == ADS_SASLWRAP_TYPE_SEAL), + GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, + max_msg_size, &ads->ldap.out.max); + if (gss_rc) { + status = ADS_ERROR_GSS(gss_rc, minor_status); + goto failed; + } + + ads->ldap.out.min = 4; + ads->ldap.out.sig_size = max_msg_size - ads->ldap.out.max; + ads->ldap.in.min = 4; + ads->ldap.in.max = max_msg_size; + ads_setup_sasl_wrapping(ads, &ads_sasl_gssapi_ops, context_handle); + /* make sure we don't free context_handle */ + context_handle = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT; + } + +failed: + gss_release_name(&minor_status, &serv_name); + if (context_handle != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) + gss_delete_sec_context(&minor_status, &context_handle, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER); + krb5_free_principal(ctx, principal); + krb5_free_context(ctx); + return status; +} + #endif #ifdef HAVE_KRB5 /* perform a LDAP/SASL/SPNEGO/KRB5 bind */ -static ADS_STATUS ads_sasl_spnego_krb5_bind(ADS_STRUCT *ads, const char *principal) +static ADS_STATUS ads_sasl_spnego_rawkrb5_bind(ADS_STRUCT *ads, const char *principal) { DATA_BLOB blob = data_blob_null; struct berval cred, *scred = NULL; DATA_BLOB session_key = data_blob_null; int rc; + if (ads->ldap.wrap_type > ADS_SASLWRAP_TYPE_PLAIN) { + return ADS_ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED); + } + rc = spnego_gen_negTokenTarg(principal, ads->auth.time_offset, &blob, &session_key, 0, &ads->auth.tgs_expire); @@ -389,6 +677,26 @@ static ADS_STATUS ads_sasl_spnego_krb5_bind(ADS_STRUCT *ads, const char *princip return ADS_ERROR(rc); } + +static ADS_STATUS ads_sasl_spnego_krb5_bind(ADS_STRUCT *ads, const char *principal) +{ +#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI + /* + * we only use the gsskrb5 based implementation + * when sasl sign or seal is requested. + * + * This has the following reasons: + * - it's likely that the gssapi krb5 mech implementation + * doesn't support to negotiate plain connections + * - the ads_sasl_spnego_rawkrb5_bind is more robust + * against clock skew errors + */ + if (ads->ldap.wrap_type > ADS_SASLWRAP_TYPE_PLAIN) { + return ads_sasl_spnego_gsskrb5_bind(ads, principal); + } +#endif + return ads_sasl_spnego_rawkrb5_bind(ads, principal); +} #endif /* |