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-rw-r--r--source3/passdb/secrets.c144
1 files changed, 72 insertions, 72 deletions
diff --git a/source3/passdb/secrets.c b/source3/passdb/secrets.c
index 2727867906..c5c1e29ecf 100644
--- a/source3/passdb/secrets.c
+++ b/source3/passdb/secrets.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*
+/*
Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 1992-2001
Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett 2002
@@ -9,12 +9,12 @@
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
(at your option) any later version.
-
+
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
GNU General Public License for more details.
-
+
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
@@ -36,11 +36,11 @@ BOOL global_machine_password_needs_changing;
* Use a TDB to store an incrementing random seed.
*
* Initialised to the current pid, the very first time Samba starts,
- * and incremented by one each time it is needed.
- *
+ * and incremented by one each time it is needed.
+ *
* @note Not called by systems with a working /dev/urandom.
*/
-static void get_rand_seed(int *new_seed)
+static void get_rand_seed(int *new_seed)
{
*new_seed = sys_getpid();
if (tdb) {
@@ -68,8 +68,8 @@ BOOL secrets_init(void)
}
/**
- * Set a reseed function for the crypto random generator
- *
+ * Set a reseed function for the crypto random generator
+ *
* This avoids a problem where systems without /dev/urandom
* could send the same challenge to multiple clients
*/
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ void *secrets_fetch(const char *key, size_t *size)
return dbuf.dptr;
}
-/* store a secrets entry
+/* store a secrets entry
*/
BOOL secrets_store(const char *key, const void *data, size_t size)
{
@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ BOOL secrets_fetch_domain_sid(const char *domain, DOM_SID *sid)
if (dyn_sid == NULL)
return False;
- if (size != sizeof(DOM_SID)) {
+ if (size != sizeof(DOM_SID)) {
SAFE_FREE(dyn_sid);
return False;
}
@@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ BOOL secrets_fetch_domain_guid(const char *domain, struct GUID *guid)
}
}
- if (size != sizeof(struct GUID)) {
+ if (size != sizeof(struct GUID)) {
DEBUG(1,("UUID size %d is wrong!\n", (int)size));
SAFE_FREE(dyn_guid);
return False;
@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ static const char *trust_keystr(const char *domain)
{
static fstring keystr;
- slprintf(keystr,sizeof(keystr)-1,"%s/%s",
+ slprintf(keystr,sizeof(keystr)-1,"%s/%s",
SECRETS_MACHINE_ACCT_PASS, domain);
strupper_m(keystr);
@@ -231,7 +231,7 @@ static char *trustdom_keystr(const char *domain)
pstr_sprintf(keystr, "%s/%s", SECRETS_DOMTRUST_ACCT_PASS, domain);
strupper_m(keystr);
-
+
return keystr;
}
@@ -255,9 +255,9 @@ BOOL secrets_lock_trust_account_password(const char *domain, BOOL dolock)
Routine to get the default secure channel type for trust accounts
************************************************************************/
-uint32 get_default_sec_channel(void)
+uint32 get_default_sec_channel(void)
{
- if (lp_server_role() == ROLE_DOMAIN_BDC ||
+ if (lp_server_role() == ROLE_DOMAIN_BDC ||
lp_server_role() == ROLE_DOMAIN_PDC) {
return SEC_CHAN_BDC;
} else {
@@ -279,7 +279,7 @@ BOOL secrets_fetch_trust_account_password(const char *domain, uint8 ret_pwd[16],
char *plaintext;
size_t size = 0;
- plaintext = secrets_fetch_machine_password(domain, pass_last_set_time,
+ plaintext = secrets_fetch_machine_password(domain, pass_last_set_time,
channel);
if (plaintext) {
DEBUG(4,("Using cleartext machine password\n"));
@@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ BOOL secrets_fetch_trust_account_password(const char *domain, uint8 ret_pwd[16],
DEBUG(5, ("secrets_fetch failed!\n"));
return False;
}
-
+
if (size != sizeof(*pass)) {
DEBUG(0, ("secrets were of incorrect size!\n"));
return False;
@@ -333,22 +333,22 @@ static size_t tdb_sid_pack(uint8 *pack_buf, int bufsize, DOM_SID* sid)
{
int idx;
size_t len = 0;
-
+
if (!sid || !pack_buf) return -1;
-
+
len += tdb_pack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, "bb", sid->sid_rev_num,
sid->num_auths);
-
+
for (idx = 0; idx < 6; idx++) {
len += tdb_pack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, "b",
sid->id_auth[idx]);
}
-
+
for (idx = 0; idx < MAXSUBAUTHS; idx++) {
len += tdb_pack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, "d",
sid->sub_auths[idx]);
}
-
+
return len;
}
@@ -364,22 +364,22 @@ static size_t tdb_sid_pack(uint8 *pack_buf, int bufsize, DOM_SID* sid)
static size_t tdb_sid_unpack(uint8 *pack_buf, int bufsize, DOM_SID* sid)
{
int idx, len = 0;
-
+
if (!sid || !pack_buf) return -1;
len += tdb_unpack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, "bb",
&sid->sid_rev_num, &sid->num_auths);
-
+
for (idx = 0; idx < 6; idx++) {
len += tdb_unpack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, "b",
&sid->id_auth[idx]);
}
-
+
for (idx = 0; idx < MAXSUBAUTHS; idx++) {
len += tdb_unpack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, "d",
&sid->sub_auths[idx]);
}
-
+
return len;
}
@@ -396,17 +396,17 @@ static size_t tdb_trusted_dom_pass_pack(uint8 *pack_buf, int bufsize,
TRUSTED_DOM_PASS* pass)
{
int idx, len = 0;
-
+
if (!pack_buf || !pass) return -1;
-
+
/* packing unicode domain name and password */
len += tdb_pack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, "d",
pass->uni_name_len);
-
+
for (idx = 0; idx < 32; idx++)
len += tdb_pack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, "w",
pass->uni_name[idx]);
-
+
len += tdb_pack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, "dPd", pass->pass_len,
pass->pass, pass->mod_time);
@@ -430,24 +430,24 @@ static size_t tdb_trusted_dom_pass_unpack(uint8 *pack_buf, int bufsize,
TRUSTED_DOM_PASS* pass)
{
int idx, len = 0;
-
+
if (!pack_buf || !pass) return -1;
/* unpack unicode domain name and plaintext password */
len += tdb_unpack(pack_buf, bufsize - len, "d", &pass->uni_name_len);
-
+
for (idx = 0; idx < 32; idx++)
len += tdb_unpack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, "w",
&pass->uni_name[idx]);
len += tdb_unpack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, "dPd",
&pass->pass_len, &pass->pass, &pass->mod_time);
-
+
/* unpack domain sid */
len += tdb_sid_unpack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len,
&pass->domain_sid);
-
- return len;
+
+ return len;
}
/************************************************************************
@@ -459,7 +459,7 @@ BOOL secrets_fetch_trusted_domain_password(const char *domain, char** pwd,
{
struct trusted_dom_pass pass;
size_t size = 0;
-
+
/* unpacking structures */
uint8 *pass_buf;
int pass_len = 0;
@@ -481,8 +481,8 @@ BOOL secrets_fetch_trusted_domain_password(const char *domain, char** pwd,
DEBUG(5, ("Invalid secrets size. Unpacked data doesn't match trusted_dom_pass structure.\n"));
return False;
}
-
- /* the trust's password */
+
+ /* the trust's password */
if (pwd) {
*pwd = SMB_STRDUP(pass.pass);
if (!*pwd) {
@@ -495,7 +495,7 @@ BOOL secrets_fetch_trusted_domain_password(const char *domain, char** pwd,
/* domain sid */
if (sid != NULL) sid_copy(sid, &pass.domain_sid);
-
+
return True;
}
@@ -518,7 +518,7 @@ BOOL secrets_store_trusted_domain_password(const char* domain, const char* pwd,
pstring pass_buf;
int pass_len = 0;
int pass_buf_len = sizeof(pass_buf);
-
+
struct trusted_dom_pass pass;
ZERO_STRUCT(pass);
@@ -527,7 +527,7 @@ BOOL secrets_store_trusted_domain_password(const char* domain, const char* pwd,
domain));
return False;
}
-
+
strncpy_w(pass.uni_name, uni_dom_name, sizeof(pass.uni_name) - 1);
pass.uni_name_len = strlen_w(uni_dom_name)+1;
SAFE_FREE(uni_dom_name);
@@ -541,7 +541,7 @@ BOOL secrets_store_trusted_domain_password(const char* domain, const char* pwd,
/* domain sid */
sid_copy(&pass.domain_sid, sid);
-
+
pass_len = tdb_trusted_dom_pass_pack((uint8 *)pass_buf, pass_buf_len, &pass);
return secrets_store(trustdom_keystr(domain), (void *)&pass_buf, pass_len);
@@ -579,7 +579,7 @@ BOOL secrets_store_machine_password(const char *pass, const char *domain, uint32
tdb_errorstr(tdb)));
goto fail;
}
-
+
if (asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_MACHINE_LAST_CHANGE_TIME,
domain) == -1) {
DEBUG(5, ("asprintf failed\n"));
@@ -596,7 +596,7 @@ BOOL secrets_store_machine_password(const char *pass, const char *domain, uint32
tdb_errorstr(tdb)));
goto fail;
}
-
+
if (asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_MACHINE_SEC_CHANNEL_TYPE,
domain) == -1) {
DEBUG(5, ("asprintf failed\n"));
@@ -634,7 +634,7 @@ BOOL secrets_store_machine_password(const char *pass, const char *domain, uint32
the password is assumed to be a null terminated ascii string.
************************************************************************/
-char *secrets_fetch_machine_password(const char *domain,
+char *secrets_fetch_machine_password(const char *domain,
time_t *pass_last_set_time,
uint32 *channel)
{
@@ -644,7 +644,7 @@ char *secrets_fetch_machine_password(const char *domain,
strupper_m(key);
ret = (char *)secrets_fetch(key, NULL);
SAFE_FREE(key);
-
+
if (pass_last_set_time) {
size_t size;
uint32 *last_set_time;
@@ -659,7 +659,7 @@ char *secrets_fetch_machine_password(const char *domain,
}
SAFE_FREE(key);
}
-
+
if (channel) {
size_t size;
uint32 *channel_type;
@@ -674,7 +674,7 @@ char *secrets_fetch_machine_password(const char *domain,
}
SAFE_FREE(key);
}
-
+
return ret;
}
@@ -691,14 +691,14 @@ BOOL secrets_store_ldap_pw(const char* dn, char* pw)
{
char *key = NULL;
BOOL ret;
-
+
if (asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_LDAP_BIND_PW, dn) < 0) {
DEBUG(0, ("secrets_store_ldap_pw: asprintf failed!\n"));
return False;
}
-
+
ret = secrets_store(key, pw, strlen(pw)+1);
-
+
SAFE_FREE(key);
return ret;
}
@@ -711,14 +711,14 @@ BOOL fetch_ldap_pw(char **dn, char** pw)
{
char *key = NULL;
size_t size = 0;
-
+
*dn = smb_xstrdup(lp_ldap_admin_dn());
-
+
if (asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_LDAP_BIND_PW, *dn) < 0) {
SAFE_FREE(*dn);
DEBUG(0, ("fetch_ldap_pw: asprintf failed!\n"));
}
-
+
*pw=(char *)secrets_fetch(key, &size);
SAFE_FREE(key);
@@ -728,7 +728,7 @@ BOOL fetch_ldap_pw(char **dn, char** pw)
char* old_style_key = SMB_STRDUP(*dn);
char *data;
fstring old_style_pw;
-
+
if (!old_style_key) {
DEBUG(0, ("fetch_ldap_pw: strdup failed!\n"));
return False;
@@ -736,7 +736,7 @@ BOOL fetch_ldap_pw(char **dn, char** pw)
for (p=old_style_key; *p; p++)
if (*p == ',') *p = '/';
-
+
data=(char *)secrets_fetch(old_style_key, &size);
if (!size && size < sizeof(old_style_pw)) {
DEBUG(0,("fetch_ldap_pw: neither ldap secret retrieved!\n"));
@@ -755,7 +755,7 @@ BOOL fetch_ldap_pw(char **dn, char** pw)
DEBUG(0,("fetch_ldap_pw: ldap secret could not be upgraded!\n"));
SAFE_FREE(old_style_key);
SAFE_FREE(*dn);
- return False;
+ return False;
}
if (!secrets_delete(old_style_key)) {
DEBUG(0,("fetch_ldap_pw: old ldap secret could not be deleted!\n"));
@@ -763,15 +763,15 @@ BOOL fetch_ldap_pw(char **dn, char** pw)
SAFE_FREE(old_style_key);
- *pw = smb_xstrdup(old_style_pw);
+ *pw = smb_xstrdup(old_style_pw);
}
-
+
return True;
}
/**
* Get trusted domains info from secrets.tdb.
- **/
+ **/
NTSTATUS secrets_trusted_domains(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, uint32 *num_domains,
struct trustdom_info ***domains)
@@ -785,7 +785,7 @@ NTSTATUS secrets_trusted_domains(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, uint32 *num_domains,
}
if (!secrets_init()) return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
-
+
/* generate searching pattern */
pattern = talloc_asprintf(tmp_ctx, "%s/*", SECRETS_DOMTRUST_ACCT_PASS);
if (pattern == NULL) {
@@ -817,7 +817,7 @@ NTSTATUS secrets_trusted_domains(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, uint32 *num_domains,
struct trusted_dom_pass pass;
char *secrets_key;
struct trustdom_info *dom_info;
-
+
/* important: ensure null-termination of the key string */
secrets_key = talloc_strndup(tmp_ctx,
(const char *)k->node_key.dptr,
@@ -834,7 +834,7 @@ NTSTATUS secrets_trusted_domains(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, uint32 *num_domains,
&pass);
/* packed representation isn't needed anymore */
SAFE_FREE(packed_pass);
-
+
if (size != packed_size) {
DEBUG(2, ("Secrets record %s is invalid!\n",
secrets_key));
@@ -875,7 +875,7 @@ NTSTATUS secrets_trusted_domains(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, uint32 *num_domains,
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
}
-
+
DEBUG(5, ("secrets_get_trusted_domains: got %d domains\n",
*num_domains));
@@ -971,7 +971,7 @@ BOOL secrets_fetch_afs_key(const char *cell, struct afs_key *result)
/******************************************************************************
When kerberos is not available, choose between anonymous or
- authenticated connections.
+ authenticated connections.
We need to use an authenticated connection if DCs have the
RestrictAnonymous registry entry set > 0, or the "Additional
@@ -985,16 +985,16 @@ void secrets_fetch_ipc_userpass(char **username, char **domain, char **password)
*username = (char *)secrets_fetch(SECRETS_AUTH_USER, NULL);
*domain = (char *)secrets_fetch(SECRETS_AUTH_DOMAIN, NULL);
*password = (char *)secrets_fetch(SECRETS_AUTH_PASSWORD, NULL);
-
+
if (*username && **username) {
if (!*domain || !**domain)
*domain = smb_xstrdup(lp_workgroup());
-
+
if (!*password || !**password)
*password = smb_xstrdup("");
- DEBUG(3, ("IPC$ connections done by user %s\\%s\n",
+ DEBUG(3, ("IPC$ connections done by user %s\\%s\n",
*domain, *username));
} else {
@@ -1230,14 +1230,14 @@ BOOL secrets_store_generic(const char *owner, const char *key, const char *secre
{
char *tdbkey = NULL;
BOOL ret;
-
+
if (asprintf(&tdbkey, "SECRETS/GENERIC/%s/%s", owner, key) < 0) {
DEBUG(0, ("asprintf failed!\n"));
return False;
}
-
+
ret = secrets_store(tdbkey, secret, strlen(secret)+1);
-
+
SAFE_FREE(tdbkey);
return ret;
}
@@ -1260,7 +1260,7 @@ char *secrets_fetch_generic(const char *owner, const char *key)
DEBUG(0, ("Out of memory!\n"));
return NULL;
}
-
+
secret = (char *)secrets_fetch(tdbkey, NULL);
SAFE_FREE(tdbkey);